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Glossary and Abbreviations 
 
Baperki (Badan Permusjawaratan  Chinese Indonesian political organization,  
Kewarganegaraan Indonesia)  founded in 1954 
 
Cantonese    South Chinese dialect (Guangdong Province) 
 
CHH (Chung Hwa Hui)  Chinese Association, founded in 1928 
 
Cina Official term for ethnic Chinese and China during the 
Soeharto-regime; considered to be insulting by many 
ethnic Chinese 
 
Cukong Chinese businessman who entertains close ties to a 
member of the Indonesian power elite – mainly from the 
military 
 
EU     European Union 
 
GANDI (Gerakan Perjuangan  Indonesia Anti-Discrimination Movement 
Anti-discriminasi Indonesia)  founded in 1998 
 
Hainanese    South Chinese dialect (Hainan Island) 
 
Hakka Minority group in China and their dialect (South China, 
mainly Guangdong and Guangxi Province) 
 
Hokkien    South Chinese dialect (Fujian Province) 
 
Imlek Hokkien term for Chinese New Year; also used officially 
in Indonesia 
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INTI (Perhimpunan Indonesia  Chinese Indonesian Association, founded in  
Tionghua)     1998  
 
KCJ (kartu cacah jiwa)   Indonesian census registration card 
 
Komnas HAM (Komisi nasional  National Human Rights Commission 
untuk Hak Asasi Manusia)   
 
KTP (karta tanda penduduk)  Indonesian identity card 
 
LPKB (Lembaga  Institution for Promotion of National Unity, 
Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa) founded in 1963 
 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 
Pao An Tui An armed self-defence organisation formed during the 
Indonesian revolution to protect ethnic Chinese lives and 
property  
 
Pancasila Indonesian State Philosophy / Ideology, introduced by 
Soekarno 
 
PBI (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal  Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party, ethnic  
Ika Indonesia)  Chinese Party, founded in 1998 
 
PIR (Partai Indonesia Raja) The People’s Party of Indonesia, founded in 1929 
 
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) Indonesian Communist Party, founded in 1920 
 
PNI (Partai National Indonesia) National Party Indonesia, founded in 1927 (Soekarno’s 
party) 
 
Pribumi    Indigenous Indonesian 
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PRTI (Partai Reformasi Tionghoa)  Chinese Indonesian Reform Party, founded in 1999 
 
PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia) Socialist Party of Indonesia, founded in 1948 
 
PSMTI (Paguyuban Sosial Marga Indonesian Chinese Social Association, founded  
Tionghoa Indonesia)   in 1998 
 
PTI (Partai Tionghoa Indonesia) Chinese Party of Indonesia, founded in 1932 
 
Reformasi [Literally: reforms] Name given to Post-Soeharto period 
(since 1998 – today)    
 
Siang Hwee Chinese Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, founded in 
1907/08 
 
SBKRI (Surat Bukti    Indonesian Citizenship Certificate  
Kewarganegaraan Republik  
Indonesia) 
 
Sinergy Chinese Indonesian Magazine, published in Indonesian 
language 
 
Sin Po Chinese Indonesian Newspaper, published in Chinese-
Malay language 
 
Suku     Term for ethnic group in Indonesia 
 
Teochiu    South Chinese dialect 
 
THHK (Tiong Hwa Hwe Kuan)  Chinese organisation, founded in 1900 
 
Tionghoa Official term for Chinese Indonesian (Chinese in Hokkien 
dialect) 
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TRuK (Tim Relawan untuk   Volunteer Group of Humanity 
Kemanusiaan)  
 
UN     United Nations 
 
Volksraad Advisory council in Indonesia, established by the Dutch 
in 1917  
 
WNA (Warga Negara Asing)  Foreign citizen 
 
WNI (Warga Negara Indonesia)  Indonesian citizen, but commonly used to refer to the 
ethnic Chinese minority only 
 
Yayasan Nabil Foundation for Nation-building projects in Indonesia, 
founded in 2007 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Conflict Case Study 
The fall the Indonesian President Soeharto which marked the end of his long reign (1966 – 
1998)1, the so-called „New Order‟ era was marked by severe riots against the country‟s ethnic 
Chinese minority. These violent acts were not the first of their kind, but rather followed a 
pattern of conflict between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese that can be traced back 
to colonial times. Historically in times of economic, political or social instability, ethnic Chinese 
have repeatedly become scapegoats for indigenous Indonesians.2 In between these bouts of large-
scale violent acts ethnic Chinese often assumed that the overall conflict between them and the 
indigenous Indonesians was resolved, and lived in hope that there would be no further violent 
acts. This included Heryanto (Australian National University), a renowned expert of the Chinese 
Indonesians, who claimed in a study published early in 1998 that anti-Chinese sentiments had 
declined if not entirely vanished. He based his statement on the fact that a number of incidents, 
like the mass-rally in Medan, and riots in Jakarta in the early 1990s, had not triggered anti-
Chinese riots. “Up to the 1980s it would have been difficult to imagine that street violence on 
such a scale could have taken place in the capital city without singling out the Chinese 
community as primary targets.”3 Shortly afterwards, the May Riots proved him and those who 
had come to the same conclusion wrong.  
Due to the long history of conflict between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, this 
development was not entirely surprising. This conflict is unlikely to be resolved by itself and the 
absence of open violence – even for years – does not necessarily mean that it would not turn 
violent again in the future. This study is founded on the assumption that the conflict has not been 
resolved; the absence of violent acts only implies that for the time being the conflict is currently 
not in a violent phase. There are indications that sentiments about and prejudices against ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia have changed little since the 1998 May Riots. As long as the root causes 
of the conflict have not changed, it has to be assumed that violent acts could re-occur if no 
measures of conflict prevention are undertaken. Developing a culture of conflict prevention or 
                                                   
1 In 1997 the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia causing mass unemployment as well as increases in food 
prices due to the devaluation of the Indonesian currency. The crisis revealed that President Soeharto‟s 
authoritarian government was not able to deal with the economic problems which the country was facing. 
The Indonesian people‟s faith in their political leaders vanished and the difficult economic situation 
triggered a political crisis. Demonstrations initiated by students throughout the country escalated to mass 
riots which eventually culminated in the May Riots in 1998. Purdey, 2006, pp. 77ff.  
2 Purdey, 2006, pp. 7-24.  
3 Heryanto, 1998b, p. 96.  
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how to deal in conflicts in general is important for Indonesia as it also witnesses other minority 
conflicts. 
  
What are the root causes of this conflict? Since the ethnic Chinese have been singled out in 
times of crises, regardless of their social status, place of residency or religion, it can be assumed 
that the root causes of this conflict are related to their status as an ethnic minority with a foreign 
background. Cultural differences resulting in incompatibilities of perceived values between 
ethnic groups are often mentioned as reasons for conflicts by actors themselves.4 However, 
Indonesia is a multi-ethnic country, hosting more than 1,000 ethnic groups and sub-ethnic 
groups.5 Multi-ethnicity and diversity as such are considered positive characteristics of the 
Indonesian nation ever since the country‟s first President Soekarno (1945 – 1965) declared its 
independence in 1945. Therefore, the position of the ethnic Chinese within Indonesian society 
perhaps does not stem from their supposed cultural incompatibility with other indigenous 
Indonesian ethnic groups. In fact, this would not only be an oversimplification of the complex 
relations between the various conflict actors but also ignore the fact that the concept of 
ethnicity often only forms the subtext in a broader conflict contexts evolving from interest 
struggles. Ethnicity may serve as socio-political strategy in a processes of polarization, i.e. the 
sharpening of distinctions between groups which lead to segregation and tensions. Social 
structures that have evolved over time are in part responsible for aggravating frictions between 
the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians which manifested in a violent conflict.  
 
The research questions of this thesis therefore are:    
1) what is the conflict between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians about,  
2) what are the underlying structures causing frictions between the two groups which initiate 
violent conflict, and 
3) How can this conflict be transformed into the direction of sustainable peace acceptable to all 
parties involved? 
 
1.2 Subjects and Focus  
Analysing the conflict between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians requires a study of 
the two opposing conflict parties. Although for the purposes of the conflict analysis I will by 
                                                   
4 Interview with Conda G. (11.04.2010).  
5 According to the official national census held in 2000, 1,072 ethnic and sub-ethnic groups were identified. 
Suryadinata, 2003, p. 22. 
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necessity refer on occasion to „the ethnic Chinese‟ and „the indigenous Indonesians‟, neither 
group is homogenous. In order to do justice to this heterogeneousness of the two, each group 
shall be analyzed taking into account different categories.  
 
Social groups can be categorised in numerous ways. These include using demographic 
categories, such as age, sex, geographical location, ethnicity and religion, or, taking a vertical 
social perspective; people can be categorized based on social classes. Another category that has 
been frequently utilised in conflict studies is identity. During the field research, it became clear 
how the perception of the respondent‟s own identity not only shaped their respective perception 
of the other party in the conflict but also their own position within the conflict, as well as 
interests and aims.6  
In examining subgroups amongst the indigenous and Chinese Indonesians, the following 
categories were taken into consideration: 
1. Ethnicity 
2. Geographical place of residency 
3. Identity 
4. Religion 
5. Social class 
                                                   
6 The concept of identity, in particular collective identity has been vastly debated in academic literature.  In 
contrast to an essentialist understanding of identity, identity in this study is understood as constructed and 
this construction is influenced by historical developments (Hall, 1996, pp. 3ff). Indonesian identity was 
constructed during the fight for independence from the Dutch. Especially postmodern academics, 
however, reject the concept of collective identity entirely. As identity is constructed and characteristics are 
attributed to it, these academics argue that individuals may be homogenized into one group, possibly 
against their will. Collective identities are therefore considered to be fictions which have mystifying 
effects and as such may act as carriers of ideologies (Moya, 2000, pp. 4 -6 and Niethammer, 2000, cited in 
Straub 1998, pp. 98ff.). To escape the problem of an assigned collective identity, definitions which include 
the criterion of self-identification of the members of a collective identity have been developed (e.g. 
Assmann, 1992, p. 132.). With regard to conflicts between groups of asymmetric power relations, self-
identification by free choice seems to be illusionary as their group membership is already determined by 
outside factors as well as the perspective of members of the opposing conflict group (Winkelmann, 2008, 
p. 19). Indonesians with Chinese ancestry who do not want to be identified as ethnic Chinese but still are 
labeled thus by indigenous Indonesians do not seem to have a „choice‟ in this matter. Therefore, the 
perception of „others‟ shall be included in the understanding of identity for this study. Even if the 
perspective from the in-group may differ from that of the out-group, for example, there are ethnic Chinese 
who are not considered to be „Chinese‟ by other ethnic Chinese as they do not speak Chinese and are not 
Chinese cultured, but who are considered to be „Chinese‟ by indigenous Indonesians or other less 
„Chinese‟ cultured ethnic Chinese (Hoon, 2008, p. 31). In the framework of this study, identity shall be 
understood as a collective cultural identity. The underlying understanding of culture derives from cultural 
studies and constitutes “culture in its sense of art, literature, film, practices of representation of all kinds, 
both draw from and participate in the construction of culture as a way of life, as a system of values and 
beliefs which, in turn, affects culture as a creative, representational practice.” (King, 1991, p. 2). As “most 
work in cultural studies is concerned with investigating and challenging the construction of subaltern, 
marginalized or dominated identities (…)” (Jenks, 1993, p. 155), this definition of culture is suitable for 
the framework of this study.   
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The categories of age and sex have been omitted here, as in literature and interviews they 
played a minor role and there was no discernible pattern to show if they influenced attitudes 
and behaviour.   
 
The case study represents an asymmetric ethnic conflict in which the minority group can further 
be classified as middlemen minority who occupy a marginalized position in Indonesian society. 
I will next present the study subjects and define key concepts such as middlemen minority and 
marginalization. I shall then compare this study with previous approaches to the case of 
Indonesia‟s ethnic Chinese, explain the study‟s focus as well as outline its scientific 
contribution.   
 
Subjects 
Ethnic Chinese / Chinese Indonesian minority 
According to the „Minority Rights Group‟ a minority is defined as “A group numerically 
inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members – 
being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from 
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.”7 According to this definition, 
Chinese Indonesians8 qualify for the status of a minority group, although, it is difficult to 
determine how many Chinese reside in Indonesia. In Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and 
Religion in a Changing Political Landscape, Suryadinata, Nurvidya Arifin, and Ananta note 
that the definition of „ethnic Chinese‟ is in itself problematic. During the first census that 
included ethnic background in 2000, self-identification was used by all ethnic groups in 
Indonesia. According to this census, 2.92 million Chinese lived in Indonesia, 1.06 million of 
whom were born after 1966 (those aged 0 to 34). However, Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta 
cautioned that the figures may not be accurate because some Chinese might not have identified 
themselves as „ethnic Chinese‟ anymore, as they have assumed the identity of other Indonesian 
ethnic groups. In other words, if a Chinese refused to identify him/herself as Chinese, the 
person was recorded as non-Chinese. The authors observed that the long process of 
acculturation and the change of identity of some „ethnic Chinese‟ who have assumed the 
identity of other ethnic Indonesian groups have contributed to the impossibility in estimating 
                                                   
7 Minority Rights Group, 1990, p. xiv. For further definitions, see Deschenes, 1985. 
8 In this research I use the terms „ethnic Chinese‟ and „Chinese Indonesians‟ interchangeably. 
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the exact number and percentage of the ethnic Chinese. Regardless of the exact numbers, ethnic 
Chinese clearly are a numerically inferior group in Indonesia. As discussed below, they possess 
ethnic characteristics, and some of them also religious and linguistic characteristics which 
distinguish them from the indigenous majority population. 
 
Ethnicity is the main characteristic that distinguishes this minority group from the indigenous 
Indonesian majority population. When referring to either ethnic Chinese or Chinese Indonesians 
in this work, I am referring to Indonesians of Chinese descent, not „overseas Chinese‟ who are 
Chinese citizens living in Southeast Asia and therefore sojourners rather than settlers.9 The terms 
are thus used here for people of a group with cultural elements attributable to or recognizable as 
being part of Chinese culture, who claim to have Chinese ancestry or are considered to be 
Chinese by non-Chinese members of the local population. While the ethnic Chinese might all be 
classified as being „Chinese‟, there are ethnic differences among them due to their different 
provinces of origin. The majority of them are Han-Chinese, but there are also Chinese whose 
ancestors belong to one of the many Chinese minorities, such as the Hakka. Therefore, they 
also do not have one common language. The main Chinese dialects spoken in Indonesia are 
Hokkien, Teochiu, Cantonese, Hakka, and Hainanese.10 
 
Ethnic Chinese often identify themselves within different cultural indigenous backgrounds 
depending on their place of residence in Indonesia in addition to their Chinese identity.11 While 
the ethnic Chinese in Jakarta would distinguish themselves from the ethnic Chinese in 
Pontianak, for example based on their different accents when speaking Indonesian or Chinese, 
they would turn to their common background (we, Chinese) when it comes to referring to 
indigenous Indonesians (they, Indonesians).12  
Another aspect of place of residency which proved to be a characteristic for differentiating 
ethnic Chinese is whether they lived in urban or rural areas. Due to historical developments and 
restrictions on employment, ethnic Chinese tend to be more concentrated in cities than in the 
countryside. The largest ethnic Chinese population is in Jakarta, Java. Other cities that have a 
high proportion of ethnic Chinese are Tangerang, Solo, Surabaya on Java, Pontianak and 
Singkawang in West Kalimantan, as well as Riau and Medan on Sumatra. Interviews with 
indigenous Indonesians showed that Chinese Indonesians living in cities where they form larger 
                                                   
9 Suryadinata, 2001, p. 55. For more on the differing meanings and connotations of the terms used for ethnic 
Chinese in Southeast Asia, s. Suryadinata, 1997, p. 2ff. 
10 Chua-Franz, 2002, p. 23-4.  
11 Hoon, 2008, p. 48.  
12 Hoon, 2002, p. 133.  
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groups are more likely perceived as exclusive, homogenous middle- and upper-class 
communities which are mainly engaged in business.13 
With regard to the ethnic Chinese, the subject of identity plays an important role for many 
Chinese Indonesians in their daily life.14 Especially literature on the ethnic Chinese community 
published prior to the year 2000 differentiates between Totok and Peranakan.15 Totok were 
considered to be more „Chinese‟, as they still spoke either Mandarin or another Chinese dialect 
and more knowledgeable with regard to Chinese culture than Peranakan. Peranakan developed 
a culture of their own, blending Chinese and Indonesian elements. One of the results is the 
Chinese-Malay language, a mixture of Malay, the Chinese dialect Hokkien and borrowings 
from Dutch and other Western languages. 16  However, today, only a few older generation 
Chinese Indonesians still identify themselves as Totok or Peranakan and the importance of this 
distinction is diminishing.17 Most Totok were „Indonesianized‟ during the implementation of 
the assimilation policies during the Soeharto-regime. The original distinction became blurred 
and it does not fit the rather complex and heterogeneous identities of today‟s Chinese 
Indonesians anymore. Tjhin even argues that the distinction is confusing, superficial and 
misleading.18 
In Identities in Flux: Young Chinese in Jakarta Thung distinguished her respondents by 
applying the following categories: 
1. Those who believe they are Chinese and will always be Chinese 
2. Those who think that they have assimilated successfully into Indonesian society 
3. Those who feel they have transcended ethnic and national boundaries and become 
globalists or internationalists  
4. Those who like to think that their lives are dictated by work and thus prefer to refrain 
from offering an opinion on who they are culturally or politically 
Thung herself stressed that her sample was not representative.19 However, these categories 
proved useful with regard to the conflict since they include the person‟s perception of their own 
identity in the context of belonging to a minority group. 
  
                                                   
13 Hoon, 208, p. 257. Hoon conducted interviews with 16 indigenous Indonesians mainly in Jakarta, but also 
included 4 respondents from Medan and Solo who confirmed the impression of ethnic Chinese as a 
homogenous group of „economic animals‟. Ibid.  
14 E.g. interview with Fajar P., 09.09.2008. A few ethnic Chinese scholars even made this subject the topic of 
their Master or PhD thesis (Tjhin, 2002, Dawis, 2009; Thung, 1998 and Setijadi, still in progress). 
15 E.g. Williams, 1960 and Somers-Heidhues, 1964.  
16 Hoon, 2008, p. 6.  
17 Interview with Tan Swie Liong and B. Teng (10.09.2008). 
18 Tjhin, 2002, p. 8. 
19 Thung, 1998, pp. 18-19.  
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With regard to religion, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia can be categorized into two general 
categories: Non-Muslims (Christians20, Budhists, Confucianists or Atheists) and Muslims. For 
the conflict, it is especially the first (and larger) group which plays a significant role because 
members of this group are not only ethnically a minority, but also in religious terms, as the 
overwhelming majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim.  
 
Social stratification also plays a key role, since the different classes (upper-, middle- and lower) 
have different interests and aims in this conflict. As during colonial times, Indonesian social 
structure still resembles a pyramid: the lower class makes up the majority of the population 
while the elite consists of a relatively small group of people. Politicians and the industrialists 
are at the top, holding a large percentage of the wealth of the country to the detriment of the 
majority of the citizens.21  
In this case study, special attention has been paid to the rising middle-class. In 2006, there were 
6.6 million households with an annual disposable income of over US$10,000 (in constant 
terms), but by 2011 this number had risen to 13.7 million households.22  Traditionally, ethnic 
Chinese have formed a considerable part of the middle-class and continue to do so.23 In the new 
status symbols of the emerging middle-class, such as luxurious shopping malls that have been 
built in the capital and other Indonesian cities, a dominance of consumers from ethnic 
minorities, like Chinese, Indian or Arab Indonesians could be observed.24 This middle-class has 
often been the most affected by the conflict. Whenever ethnic Chinese became targets of 
concerted violent attacks, members of the middle class were the most numerous among the 
victims. In contrast, upper-class Chinese Indonesians had the financial and personal resources 
to protect themselves during the riots in 1998 or the possibility to leave the country. Even 
though lower-class Chinese Indonesians were also attacked during the riots, the main targets 
were districts where middle-class Chinese Indonesians resided. The personal experience of 
violence has, in part and for some, been incorporated in their self-understanding. Thung states 
that “it seems unlikely for middle-class Chinese to act as agents of change and / or to become 
                                                   
20 The Christians are further divided into and classified as Catholics and various Protestant groups.  
21 The combined wealth of Indonesia‟s 40 richest people is equivalent to that of about 60 million of its poorest 
citizens, or more than 10 percent of its GDP (di Stefani Pironti, 2012).  
22 Euromonitor International, 2012.  
23 Cohen, 2011 and interview with William Kwan (15.04.2010).  
24 Observation made during field trips in 2008 and 2010 when visiting shopping malls in Jakarta: Grand 
Indonesia, Plaza Indonesia, Senayan and Taman Anggrek. This observation has been confirmed by 
respondents, for example Patricia S. (Interview 02.09.2008).  
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the motor of the Indonesian nation-building process; as might have been the case if ethnicity 
were not in conflict with nationality.”25  
Nevertheless, with regard to the conflict, most of the respondents from this social group 
interviewed for this study acknowledged that if someone was going to change something about 
their situation, it would have to be them – the middle-class Chinese Indonesians. 
 
Indigenous Indonesian majority population 
Only a very limited insight into this group will be provided here as Indonesia is the fourth 
largest nation in the world with a population of more than 240 million people26 of which the 
ethnic Chinese only constitute about 2-3% leaving almost 235 million people in this 
heterogeneous group. A detailed study of this group would therefore be beyond the framework 
of this thesis. The term „indigenous Indonesians‟ in this study refers to the people living within 
the borders of the Indonesian nation-state, holding Indonesian citizenship, and who consider 
themselves or are considered by others as belonging to one of the ethnic groups which have been 
classified as native Indonesian or pribumi (meaning „sons of the soil‟) by the Dutch colonial 
administration. This classification did not change after Indonesia‟s independence and expresses a 
dichotomy between ethnic Chinese27 as non-indigenous, and the other ethnic groups residing on 
the archipelago. The largest ethnic group of indigenous Indonesians are the Javanese who make 
up approximately 41% of the total population of the archipelago. 
They mainly live on the island of Java, although they have also migrated to other Indonesian 
islands.28 The next largest groups are the Sundanese, Malay and Madurese. There are also small 
ethnic groups who only have hundreds of members, for example some indigenous tribes in 
Kalimantan and Papua.29 The many Indonesian local ethnic identities have been strengthened 
especially after 2001 in the course of the decentralization policies.30 Therefore, local identities 
play an important part with regard to the understanding of identity among indigenous 
Indonesians.  
 
Religion often plays a crucial role in ethnic conflicts in Indonesia. The Indonesian Constitution 
guarantees religious freedom to all Indonesians. The first of the five principles of the state 
                                                   
25 Thung, 1998, p. 219.  
26 Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung, 2012 (www.weltbevoelkerung.de, 14.09.2012). 
27 It also involves other non-indigenous groups, like the Arabs or the Sikhs, but the dichotomy has mainly 
been between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians. 
28 The other main islands are Kalimantan (the Indonesian part of Borneo), Sumatra, Sulawesi and Madura. 
29 For a more detailed composition of the Indonesian population according to the 2009 census, s. Suryadinata 
et al., 2003.  
30 Diprose & Ukiwo, 2008, p. 9.  
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ideology Pancasila is: “The belief in one God”. Indonesian citizens are required to register as 
belonging to one of the following main religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, 
Buddhism or Confucianism – even if Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism are not 
monotheistic religions. The majority of Indonesians are Muslims (88%). 31  Only 10% are 
Christians, 1.7% are Hindus and less than 1% are Buddhists. The Hindus are mainly residents 
of Bali and Lombok.32 
The conflict discussed here is also related to the conflict between Christians and Muslims in 
Indonesia, since many ethnic Chinese are Christians while the majority population is Muslim. 
In “Mehrheit mit Minderwertigkeitskomplex? Der Islam in Indonesien”33, Schreiner points out 
two basic strands of Indonesian Islam: modernism and traditionalism. Traditional Indonesian 
Islam is characterized by a greater flexibility and accommodation of Javanese traditions and 
can be found mainly in the rural areas of Central and East Java as well as Madura and South 
Kalimantan. The religious leaders are called kiyai are highly respected in the community 
because of their religious education. The second strand, the modernists, have been influenced 
by an Islamic reformation movement in the 19th century led by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-
1897) , Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) whose main aim was 
strengthening the role of classical Islam in daily life. Adherents of this group can be mainly 
found in the coastal parts of West Sumatra, West Java and South Sulawesi. It was introduced by 
the urban middle-class of these areas which is stronger connected with the Islamic world 
outside Indonesia and adopted the ideas of the reformation movement. The modernists try to 
translate old Islamic values and principles into modern language or to integrate modern theories 
into Islamic tradition.34 This group is trying to extend the influence of Islam in the public realm, 
especially in the field of jurisdiction. In 1989 the competence of Islamic courts was extended to 
divorce, heritage and marriage.35  It is very difficult to make general statements about the 
positions of the two strands with regard to the conflict here for these two strands are only a very 
broad classification. In addition to these two major strands there are also adherents of other 
forms of Islam in Indonesia, including Ahmadis and Shiites.  
 
The definition and function of social classes in Indonesia is a matter of considerable 
controversy. Although few would dispute that Indonesia is a highly stratified society, it is 
                                                   
31 For the different strands of Islam in Indonesia see Schreiner 2001, pp. 159ff and Geske, 2002, pp. 45ff.  
32 According to the 2010 census conducted by the Indonesian Central Statistics Agency for statistics in May 
2010.  
33 The following paragraph is based on Schreiner, 2001, pp. 159-161.  
34 Schreiner, 2001, pp. 160ff.  
35 Geske, 2002, p. 45.  
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nonetheless difficult to identify the constituents of the different classes.36 The 1970s witnessed 
a shift among the indigenous upper class. While the indigenous elite was mainly active in the 
politico-bureaucratic realm before, it began extending its activities into the commercial sector. 
Sato lists three policies of the Soeharto government that encouraged this shift: giving priority 
(1) to national capital instead of foreign capital, (2) to state capital instead of private capital, 
and (3) to indigenous capital instead of Chinese capital.37 These protectionist policies were 
designed to favor the indigenous in order to bring about a more equal distribution of wealth in 
society. However, in the end these policies became a mere “legitimacy device for the predatory 
self-enrichment” of the ruling class. 38  The collusion between capital and the state, the 
politicians and high bureaucrats, was intensified and this transformation of parts of the political 
elite into indigenous capitalists marks a significant change. From this time onwards (1980s), 
indigenous capitalists began to flourish.39 
Due the economic development of the country – especially the cities, a diverse urban middle-
class continues to grow. Similar to the rise of indigenous capitalists, the 1980s marked the 
emergence of the Indonesian middle-class.40 Even though non-indigenous play a major role in 
the make-up of Indonesia‟s middle-class, more and more indigenous Indonesians are entering 
this group and thereby adding to its growth.41   
Lower class citizens make up the majority of the Indonesian population. According to the 
Indonesian Central Statistics Agency, 30.02 million people in Indonesia are classified as being 
poor.42 The definition for „poor‟ is based on an income of less than 1.25 USD per day.43 In 2011 
the number of poor people has constantly declined from 13.33 percent (which translates into 
31.02 million people) of the population in March 2010 to 12.5 percent in 2011. Rural areas 
accounted for 950,000 of those who rose from poverty, while only 50,000 came from urban 
areas.44 While the reduction in poverty figures is positive, the definition of poverty which they 
                                                   
36 Nyman, 2007, p. 94.  
37 Sato, 1994, p. 136.  
38 Robinson & Hadiz, 1993, p. 26. 
39 Chua, 2008, p. 86. 
40 Ansori, 2009, p. 90.  
41 Hervandi, 2011 and Euromonitor International, 2012.  
42 Jakarta Globe, July 4, 2011. 
43 The figures of the people living in poverty vary between sources depending on the parameters the different 
researchers apply. In addition, poverty is a very fluid dimension. Household surveys which were 
conducted over years in South India or China showed that over time many households frequently move in 
and out of poverty. While less than 20 percent of the households have always been poor in South Indian 
villages and 12 percent were never poor, the vast majority constantly moved in and out of poverty, Gaiha 
and Deolalikar, 1993, pp. 409-421. Another study by Jalan and Ravallion using six year panel data of 
households in rural China found that only 6.2 percent of households remained poor. In fact, less than 20 
percent were found to be poor in any given year and 54 percent had experienced at least one episode of 
poverty, Jalan and Ravallion, 2000, pp. 82-99. 
44 Jakarta Globe, July 4, 2011.  
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are based upon has been critiqued.45 Bambang Shergi Laksmono, University of Indonesia‟s 
Social and Political Science Faculty, stated that “We can't be happy with the percentage, 
because it only reflects absolute poverty. We need to analyze the relative poverty, the gap 
between the rich people and the poor people that is getting wider and wider.”46    
When the financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, the poverty rate increased and about 16 percent 
of the rural households moved from non-poor to poor.47 Headcount poverty rate in Indonesia 
increased from 15.6 percent in 1996 to 27.4 percent in 1999, which is an increase of 11.8 
percentage points or 76 percent from the pre-crisis level.48  As Indonesia is dependent on 
imports for basic commodities such as rice, sugar, soybean, maize, wheat and cassava, 
increases in international food prices 2007-2008 directly affected the Indonesian markets.49 
Even if the government is resolute on reducing poverty, Indonesia still has not fully recovered 
from these set-backs and more than 30 million people are living below or slightly above the 
poverty line.  
 
Middlemen minority 
Blalock, a US-American sociologist, was one of the first to coin the term „middlemen 
minority‟,50  even though the concept itself was not new at the time. The phenomenon of 
middlemen minorities or pariah minorities (as these minorities are also referred) had already 
been noted by academics in the 19th century, such as Weber and Sombart. Although the Jewish 
minorities of various European countries served as initial examples for such a group, however, 
Roscher already drew a comparison to the Chinese of Southeast Asia as early as 1875.51 In 
several writings Vajiravudh, King of Thailand (Rama VI), castigated Chinese as „Jews of the 
Orient‟ (1914) and associated the supposed negative characteristics of European Jews with 
Chinese in Southeast Asia.52   
 
                                                   
45 Sri Palupi, director of the Institute for Ecosoc Rights, doubted the value of the figures, questioning if it 
would really be possible to live on less than 1.25 USD per day. He also considers the reduction in poverty 
as being rather small in the light of the government's large poverty reduction efforts, which include nine 
years of free basic education, health insurance schemes, cash handout programs and microcredit schemes, 
ibid.   
46 Ibid. According to Euromonitor, between 2006 and 2011, Indonesia's Gini coefficient rose from 33.0 to 
37.7, reflecting greater income inequality. A zero Gini coefficient represents perfect income equality and a 
score of 100 indicates absolute income inequality. Euromonitor International, 2012.  
47 Skoufias et. al., 2000, pp. 97-114.  
48 Suryahadi and Sumato, 2001, p.10.  
49 Warr and Yusuf, 2010, p. 20.  
50 Blalock, 1967, pp. 79ff.  
51 Reid, 1997, pp. 34ff.  
52 Callahan, 2003, p. 495.  
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Many minorities are low-status groups, but there are some who occupy intermediate positions 
due to benefits offered to them or thanks to high adaptive capacity. Blalock notes that “such 
minorities are often associated with special occupational niches by virtue of a combination of 
circumstances, plus a cultural heritage that has been used as an adaptive remains structurally 
the same, these groups often become „perpetual‟ minorities, whereas minorities that are initially 
less fortunate may eventually become completely absorbed into the dominant group.”53 He 
explicitly mentions the Chinese in Southeast Asia as an example of these groups.54 Further, he 
points out that the power of the middlemen minority “is largely dependent on the goodwill or 
tolerance of the power elite. As long as it is fulfilling its role successfully, but not too 
successfully, it will be protected by the elite. But although its power is weak, its general status 
and income are highly relative to that of the subordinate masses. The middlemen minority is 
thus in a vulnerable position.”55 
The middlemen minority serves as a buffer between two other groups – usually the elite and the 
masses. Their function as a buffer precludes them from being absorbed into either the elite or 
the masses.56 Since this group is needed as buffer by the elite, the elite has no interest in 
absorbing its members.57 The middlemen minority does not have a natural interest in being 
absorbed in the masses for it would have to sacrifice its competitive advantage – nevertheless, 
even if members of the group wished to be absorbed, the indigenous would be reluctant to 
accept them as they are only perceived as the helpers of the elite. 58 
There are a number of typical professions performed by this middlemen group such as e.g. 
merchants, overseers, tax collectors or money-lenders. These professions cannot be occupied by 
the elite, but they are required for the smooth functioning of social, economic and political 
processes.59 In the case of the Dutch East Indies and later Indonesia, the ethnic Chinese filled 
these roles.   
It proved to be more than convenient for the colonial and later political Indonesian elite to 
benefit from their skills on the one hand and to use them as an intermediate towards the masses 
on the other. During colonial times, unpopular professions such as overseer or tax-collector 
were later also delegated to the Chinese by the Dutch colonial administration. It was therefore 
the ethnic Chinese who were blamed for the consequences of colonisation for they were the 
                                                   
53 Blalock, 1967, pp. 79-80. 
54 Other examples he mentions are the East Indians in Burma and South Africa. 
55Blalock, 1967, p. 80.  
56 According to Blalock, people are interested in a social upward movement, i.e. they rather strive to become 
members of the elite than the masses. Blalock, 1967, pp. 80ff.  
57 Blalock, 1967, p. 83.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Blalock, 1967, p. 81.  
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„face‟ of colonialism to the indigenous population rather than the colonial masters themselves. 
This impression may have been encouraged due to the fact that the middleman minority was an 
ethnically distinct group.  
Consequently, in times of peace, the middlemen minority can live in agreeable circumstances, 
however, during crises, its members can become scapegoats. Social psychological theories of 
scapegoating predict that in case the source of frustration is either unknown or too powerful, a 
substitute target is searched for.60 In the case of the Dutch East Indies and Indonesia until 1998, 
the privileged were not only powerful, but were also difficult to reach since they comprised 
only a relatively small group. It was therefore convenient for the population to direct their 
aggression towards a group of people which has a more obvious presence, but is still closely 
associated with the elite.  
 
Marginalisation 
Marginalization is defined here as the restriction of physical or social mobility for members of 
a specific social group. With regard to physical mobility, this means that the members of a 
group are denied their right to settle where they please, but instead are forced to live in certain 
areas (e.g. ghettos). In extreme cases, the group is not allowed to leave designated areas without 
permission. Social mobility is limited when a group is trapped by the social structure of a 
society and where its members are prevented from changing their social status due to state 
regulations or social / religious customs that restrict their access for example to education or to 
professions that would otherwise allow for social development.61 Members of a marginalized 
group often serve as social outsiders (out-group or underdogs) whose existence is essential to 
satisfy another group‟s need for superiority – the in-group (or topdogs). 
 
Focus 
An abundance of literature provides conflict analyses of minority conflicts in general and 
conflicts in Indonesia in particular. In the field of political science, many of these conflicts have 
been approached in research following democratic theory, security / comprehensive or good 
governance approach. All of these approaches can be classified as top-down approaches which 
rely on governments and their institutions as agents for change in conflict situations.  
 
Democratic theory approach: 
                                                   
60 Blalock, 1967, p. 82. 
61 This definition is similar to Rotter, 1954 and Degner, Meiser, Rothermund, 2009.  
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Democratic theories revolve around the concept of rule by majority vote. Dahl identified three 
characteristic of democracies: 62 
- Popular sovereignty, 
- Political equality, and 
- Majority rule.  
Due to the focus the majority, representatives of democratic theories struggle to incorporate 
minority participation or minority rights without endangering the overall concept of majority 
rule. On this basis, minority conflicts are not in the focus of democratic theories. Further, it has 
to be debated whether or not the concept of democracy is applicable to each and every conflict 
environment and if so which type of democracy would be best suited for the needs of the 
people depending on their cultural background and historical development. As this thesis does 
not aim at providing suggestions with regard to reforming the political system of Indonesia, but 
instead focuses on a minority conflict, the democratic approach which does not focus on 
minority conflicts has not therefore been further considered when choosing the theoretical 
approach for this thesis.  
 
Security or comprehensive approach 
After the Cold War, the world view which focused on potential invasions as the existential 
threats which required solely military instruments as response shifted towards a more holistic 
view of crisis situations in conflicts.63 In 2006 the United Nation‟s Security Council adopted 
resolution 1674 in which the Security Council “[e]mphasises the importance of preventing 
armed conflict and its recurrence, and stresses in this context the need for a comprehensive 
approach through promoting economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, 
national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for, and 
protection of, human rights, and in this regard, urges the cooperation of Member States and 
underlines the importance of a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated approach by the 
principal organs of the United Nations, cooperating with one another and within their respective 
mandates” 64  The Security Council thus recommended conflict prevention strategies which 
include not only military, but also civilian instruments to develop a multi-faceted approach to 
address the different aspects and dimensions of a conflict situation in a coherent manner. Such 
an approach requires rapid response capabilities as well as complementary long-term 
                                                   
62 Krouse, 1982, p. 442.  
63 Barry, 2012, p. 1. 
64 UN Security Council, SC 8710, 2006, 10.04.2013.  
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strategies.65 Despite the inclusion of civilian approaches, this approach relies on governments 
of the states and their actions with regard to their national security and defence policies. 
Organizations such as the EU and NATO in their function as “global security actor”66  or 
national states have difficulties including non-government organizations in their strategies even 
though they play an important role in many conflict environments.67  
This approach attempts to include civilian and military approaches. It perceives working on 
conflicts or preventing conflicts as crisis management and not as a strategy towards peace as 
aimed at in this thesis. Further, the focus on governments renders this approach less promising 
for the specific case study of this thesis. The conflict between the ethnic Chinese and 
indigenous Indonesians is not a so-called “hot conflict” at the moment and the government 
(along the lines of its security policy) is concentrating on other conflicts instead which are 
characterized by a higher level of physical violence. Developing approaches along the lines of 
the comprehensive approach therefore do not appear to be reasonable in this case.  
 
Good governance approach 
This approach also focuses on governments and their institutions as major drivers in handling 
conflicts as it centers around their responsibility as governments and their associated bodies to 
meet the needs of their citizens. A conflict analysis according to the good governance approach 
could include an analysis of the relationships between the government and its national or local 
institutions and the citizens.  
The analysis of these relationships may uncover deficits that in order to achieve good 
governance would have to be compensated through reforms of human development and 
political institutions. According to the UN, good governance has to comprise eight 
characteristics:68  
- consensus oriented  
- participatory  
- following the Rule of Law  
- effective and efficient  
- accountable  
- transparent  
                                                   
65 Barry, 2012, p. 2.  
66 Barry, 2012, p. 1.  
67 Ministry of Defence Finland, 2008, p. 19. 
68 UNESCAP, 2009, 15.04.2013.  
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- responsive  
- equitable and inclusive  
These characteristics reveal that this approach is closely aligned with the concept of democratic 
governance and as such oriented towards the Western concept of democracy which cannot be 
applied to all cultural environments. Similar to the democratic theory approach focuses on the 
needs of the majority of a country‟s population and minority conflicts and their rights are a side 
topic. As the comprehensive approach was not considered to be promising for this case study, 
this approach‟s strong focus on the government and its institutions. 
 
The conflict between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians particular has principally been 
studied by researchers who have focused only on one of the conflict parties: the ethnic Chinese. 
The topic of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia in general has gained importance for historians, 
social scientists, economists and other scholars worldwide since the 1960s.69 Abundant literature 
focusing on the cultural perspective of the topic, such as analyses of their socio-cultural 
background, are available, ranging from a broad comparative perspective including other 
Southeast Asian Chinese communities to more specific research focusing on, among other 
things, on their culture and (the construction of) identity. A significantly smaller body of 
literature examines ethnic Chinese and their relationship to indigenous Indonesians from a 
political perspective (e.g. participation in the political system). The relevant studies and 
literature from which this works draws upon have been grouped as follows. 
 
Historical perspective  
The available literature sources on Chinese settlers before the colonization of the islands which 
today belong to the Indonesian archipelago are especially rare making it difficult to form a 
nuanced or reliable picture of this time period. However, academics such as Liem, Somers-
Heidhues, Reid and Taylor have compiled and published multiple data on ethnic Chinese 
during this period. Liem‟s book Überseechinesen – eine Minderheit: zur Erforschung 
interethnischer Vorurteile in Indonesien (1986) as well as Somers-Heidhues‟ Southeast Asia’s 
Chinese Minorities (1974) provide detailed information about this early period and remain 
valuable sources even until today (end of research 2012). Reid has published a number of 
studies about ethnic Chinese as entrepreneurial minorities in Southeast Asia and thereby 
                                                   
69 Documents about ethnic Chinese were lost over the years or have been neglect in the archives in many of the 
Southeast Asian countries. Documentation and research centres have only been established in the 1990s to 
rescue the remaining documents and collate a systematic collection of current and retrospective material (e.g. 
the Shao Overseas Chinese Documentation and Research Center at the Ohio University, USA and the 
Chinese Heritage Center in Singapore).  
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actively shaped the academic debate on this subject. His work Southeast Asia in the age of 
commerce, 1450-1680. I: The lands below the winds (1988) which analyzes economic and 
social change in pre-colonial times as well as the emergence of entrepreneurial minorities in 
Southeast Asia is one of the few sources available analyzing the distinct development of a 
Chinese merchant class in Indonesia. Taylor‟s “The Chinese and the Early Centuries of 
Conversion to Islam in Indonesia” (2005) provides an interesting and rather new insight into the 
involvement of Chinese in the introduction of Islam and the subsequent social consequences for 
the Chinese. These sources proved themselves to be valuable when working on the 
development of the conflict and its setting.  
 
Cultural perspective  
Many of the academics, who work on the subject of Chinese Indonesians, focus on issues of 
culture and identity. One of the first comprehensive monographs on this topic was published by 
Purcell (1951) which laid the groundwork for successive scholars, among others Tan (1987 and 
2004), Wang (1981 and 2004), and Dawis (2009). They offer valuable insights about the 
development of a distinct Chinese Indonesian culture which consists of a mixture of Chinese 
and Indonesian elements. Somers-Heidhues‟ (2003) study on ethnic Chinese on the „outer 
islands‟ shows how Chinese Indonesian culture has been influenced by the surrounding local 
cultures. A major focus is on identity and how it adapted to the changing social circumstances 
which the ethnic Chinese faced. Two book-length sources are worth of particularly mention are 
Identities in Flux. Young Chinese in Jakarta by Thung (1998) and Reconceptionalising Ethnic 
Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia by Hoon (2008). They provide empirical research 
on how ethnic Chinese perceive their identity and implicitly the conflict. These results were 
taken into consideration when discussing attitudes and behaviour of the conflict actors in this 
study. 
These publications consider the ethnicity of the Chinese Indonesians at least indirectly as a 
natural boundary marker which explains the behaviour of the ethnic Chinese as well as their 
treatment by indigenous Indonesians. Up till now only a few studies deviate from this 
prevailing paradigm, among them Heryanto (1998) and Chua (2008) who convincingly argue 
that the ethnicity of the Chinese Indonesians has repeatedly been constructed by the political 
elites (colonial as well as indigenous) to maintain the social status quo. This more critical 
perspective on ethnicity has been taken up in this study in particular when discussing different 
dimensions of violence in the conflict.  
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Social / Political Perspective 
Further literature which formed the groundwork for analyzing the conflict along the lines of 
empirical peace and conflict research included studies by Mackie, Suryadinata, Reid, Heryanto, 
Purdey and Coppel.  
 
Mackie approaches the ethnic Chinese by concentrating on their business elite. He relates the 
difficult social position of the ethnic Chinese as a group to the economic success of this 
business elite.70 The topics of the political thought and the political participation of ethnic 
Chinese, their role within the nation-building process, their relation to the indigenous 
Indonesians as well as to China and how these are affected by the economic rise of the latter, 
have been studied by Suryadinata, a renowned analyst who approaches this minority from the 
perspective of social and political studies.71 By comparing the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia 
to the Jews in Europe, Reid discloses analogies that explain the treatment of the ethnic Chinese 
based on their status as middlemen minorities. 72  Heryanto published insightful articles 
regarding the issue of discrimination against ethnic Chinese and rape as a new type of violence 
which first occurred during the May riots 1998.73 The most comprehensive study analyzing 
violent acts prior to and after the May riots is Jemma Purdey‟s Anti-Chinese Violence in 
Indonesia, 1996 – 1999.74 The main incidents are closely analyzed and placed in the broader 
context of anti-Chinese sentiments and violence. She convincingly argues that the riots were 
organized by members of the military and were initiated by the political elite. Coppel75 is 
among the few scholars who explicitly deals with the case of the ethnic Chinese as a conflict. 
Even though he focuses entirely on one of the conflict parties, he places this conflict in the 
broader context of Indonesian ethnic conflicts in general. The studies above provide insightful 
analyzes of the causes and impacts of the conflict on the ethnic Chinese which help to 
understand the contemporary setting of the conflict.  
 
Although the existing studies include valuable perspectives and insights into the case of the 
ethnic Chinese, research gaps requiring closure remain. The research does not cover analyses of 
the conflict or its violence in the time period after the May Riots 1998 and its direct aftermath, 
thereby leaving a historical gap of more than a decade. Even if no large-scale violence has 
                                                   
70 Mackie, 1988.  
71 Suryadinata, 1978; Suryadinata, 1988; Suryadinata, 1997; Suryadinata, 1999; Suryadinata, 2001; 
Suryadinata, 2002; Suryadinata, 2003; Suryadinata, 2004; Suryadinata, 2006; Surydinata, 2008.  
72 Reid, 1997. 
73 Heryanto, 1998a); Heryanto 1999; Heryanto, 2008.  
74 Purdey, 2006.  
75 Coppel, 1983; Coppel, 2001; Coppel, 2006.  
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occurred since then, this does not mean that the conflict is resolved. The topic is therefore still 
of relevance and further research up-dating the current status is required.    
  
Approach to the Conflict in this Thesis 
Although previous studies acknowledge that ethnic Chinese are in conflict with indigenous 
Indonesians, these studies did not examine both conflict parties but rather remained only 
focused on ethnic Chinese. Therefore, while ethnic Chinese play a major part in this work as 
well, the focus is set on the whole of the conflict formation, thereby including the indigenous 
majority population as well. This focus requires a different perspective than those already 
classified previously for approaching the case of the ethnic Chinese. I have chosen to tackle the 
research questions with the Transcend method developed by Johan Galtung which derives from 
the field of peace and conflict research.76 This approach has been developed for practitioners 
engaging in conflict transformation work in the field and consists of a theoretical, academic 
part which includes methods for conflict analysis and a practical part which provides concrete 
guidance for field work, especially mediation. Due to this background, it differs from purely 
academic approaches which do not aim at preparing the grounds for practical conflict 
transformation work. It includes for example the search for potential stake-holders beyond the 
primary conflict parties who could be mobilized in the course of a conflict transformation 
process. As I am not engaging in practical conflict transformation, I will only apply the 
theoretical, academic part of the Transcend method in this analysis.  
Other academic conflict analyses evaluate different concepts, approaches or mechanisms by 
testing their applicability with respect to specific conflict case studies.77 In this study, measures 
and approaches which may serve as guidance to political institutions or non-governmental 
organizations or even individuals (in case they attempt practical conflict transformation) are 
developed. These recommendations are based on the results of an extensive context-sensitive 
conflict analysis. Apart from academic research, a number of organizations or institutions also 
deal with conflict analyses and issue recommendations for dealing with conflicts or conflict 
                                                   
76 Due to the fact that the theoretical approach to the present conflict has been developed by Galtung his 
publications form the main body of research literature for the theoretical background of this thesis. In 
addition, studies by other researchers, such as Lederach, Francis, and Ropers, which offer approaches to 
conflict analysis and transformation, are also considered. The interest in conflict and conflict 
transformation as an academic topic blossomed throughout the 1990s, as did the literature on the subject. 
The theoretical approaches used in the thesis were chosen based on their relevance to and applicability to 
answer the research questions of the case study. For the purpose of this thesis, a sample of theoretical 
approaches that appeared to be most relevant for answering the research questions regarding the present 
case study has been chosen.  
77 For example, in my own master thesis, I applied the concept of autonomy to the minority conflict of the 
Uyghurs with the government of the People‟s Republic of China in order to investigate and prove that an 
extended autonomy concept which provides more self-governance could produce peace enhancing effects. 
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actors, such as for example the International Crisis Group. The recommendations, however, 
usually follow a similar pattern regardless of the diverse and individual background of conflicts 
as they are not based on results of preceding conflict analyses.78  
Using the Transcend approach for the case study of ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, 
this study contributes a new perspective to the conflict and helps close the research gap for the 
period 1998 – 2012. It further provides impulses for concrete conflict transformation efforts 
into practice. Also, the study tests the applicability of the analytical part of the Transcend 
method in the context of academic conflict analysis, thereby contributing more generally to the 
field of peace and conflict research.79 
 
1.3 Theoretical Background of the Research  
As the Transcend method has been chosen as the theoretical basis for approaching the conflict 
case study, the theoretical background of this study draws extensively on the ideas of peace and 
conflict research as developed by Johan Galtung. With regard to the selection of literature by 
Galtung, I focused on articles and books relevant for the development of his peace and conflict 
theories. Based on his works, three stages within this development can be identified: 1969 
Galtung introduced his extended definition of violence in his article “Violence, Peace and 
Peace Research” which he further developed in the 1970s. In the 1990s constructive conflict 
transformation and minority conflicts played a major role in peace and conflict research. 1996 
Galtung published “Peace by Peaceful means”. This book contains further basics of this conflict 
and peace theories as well as instruments for conflict analysis which I have applied in this 
thesis. The latest re-conceptionalization which comprises systematic steps for conflict 
transformation and links theory with practical work is revealed in his book “A theory of 
conflict” published 2010. A further book “A theory of Peace” is announced but has not been 
published at the time of writing and could therefore not be included here.  
Within peace and conflict research there are numerous methods and approaches on how to deal 
with conflicts, such as conflict settling, conflict management; conflict resolution and conflict 
                                                   
78 Recommendations of the International Crisis Group aim at conflict management and therefore mainly 
address top-level actors as entry-points: national or international institutions (national governments, 
military and police, the United Nations or other nation states). The recommendations therefore often aim 
at issuing or implementing new laws and regulations, restoring the rule of law and implementing political 
mechanism and programs, however, not transforming the conflict itself.  
79 Galtung, 2007b, p. 145-146. 
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transformation.80  The Transcend method belongs to the family of „conflict transformation‟ 
approaches.81 Even though it is applied by practitioners in the field, among academics the 
approach is often viewed skeptically and rarely used for academic conflict analyses. In 
particular, the broad definition of violence and peace which constitute an important pillar of 
Galtung‟s approach represents a major point of criticism as discussed in more detail in chapter 3.  
 
Peace and Conflict Research According to Johan Galtung 
Peace and conflict research is multidisciplinary and encompasses, but is not limited to, 
academic disciplines such as political science, sociology, anthropology, cultural science, 
psychology, and economics. Like interdisciplinary studies in general, peace and conflict 
research has been criticized for blurring distinctions and for being unscientific as well as 
conceptually banal doubting their academic status.82 However, building upon the methods and 
theories of different fields of study ensures that peace and conflict research is subject to 
academic rigor. The premises, such as data and theories, as well as deductions and their 
coherence have to be analytical and withstand close scrutiny, including public verification. The 
subjects „peace‟ and „conflict‟ themselves cannot clearly be attributed to only one academic 
field, but touch upon different academic disciplines. Therefore, analyses are conducted from 
different angles. According to Galtung and other founders of peace and conflict studies, this 
discipline is a normative one. As a normative discipline, peace and conflict research aims at 
connecting theoretical research with values and involves judgements. Critics – disregarding or 
even objecting the explicit claim of peace and conflict research to be normative – point out that 
research, programs and publications of peace and conflict studies merely reflect the ideologies 
of its researchers and can therefore not be considered science as the dominance of ideological 
positions goes “far beyond the boundaries of careful and value-free discourse”.83 Peace and 
conflict researchers reply to this and acknowledge that they are influenced by normative moral 
concepts and have different perceptions of „good‟ and „bad‟ – instead of ignoring this and 
pretending that research can be conducted purely objective, neutral and value-free. As an 
academic discipline it is theoretical; due to its subject (peace and conflict) though, it is also an 
                                                   
80 Definitions and distinctions between these methods and terms have been dealt with in articles by Reimann 
(2004) and Miall (2004) in the Berghof Handbook of Conflict Transformation. http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/all (20.07.2011). 
81 According to Miall and Reimann, but also to Galtung himself.  
82  Rodgers et al., 2003. 
83 Steinberg, 2007, p. 788. Steinberg further claims that peace and conflict studies are influenced by subjective 
political positions and in particular by postcolonial ideology, ibid. 
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applied discipline. Peace and conflict research thus aims at advising and suggesting how to deal 
with conflicts peacefully and how to initiate the relevant changes from violence to peace. 84    
 
There are different strands in peace and conflict research. Following the classification as 
suggested by Galtung, these are:85 
1. Empirical peace and conflict research 
2. Critical peace and conflict research 
3. Constructive peace and conflict research 
 
The first strand of peace and conflict research is characterized by the empirical analysis of past 
peace or conflict, and theories are formulated both inductively and deductively based on 
carefully collected and analyzed data.86  Using these methods, not only can the development of 
a conflict‟s past be reconstructed, but also root causes which may still be relevant for a 
conflict‟s present can be analysed. Even though lessons learned from the past cannot 
necessarily be applied in the present or in the future, they can help in gaining a better 
understanding of a particular conflict, sensitivities, causes, and the impact they have generated. 
Therefore, the case study of the ethnic Chinese will be first introduced by following this strand 
with an analysis of the conflict‟s past, i.e. its historical development in general as well as the 
development of the violence in particular (chapters 2 and 3).  
The second strand of peace and conflict research deals with the present. Data and information 
are evaluated in the light of values. Values are analyzed by depicting value statements as 
dichotomous: desired or rejected. Peace e.g. is considered to be a desired value. If the „present 
reality‟ does not correspond with the values, the „present reality‟ has to be changed accordingly. 
This would infer that values therefore, overrule reality.87 This approach will be applied in this 
work in evaluating conflict formation with respect to developments that have taken place since 
the last violent riots of the conflict in 1998 (chapters 3, 4 and 5). The actors and their respective 
aims will be analyzed using the tool box developed by Galtung. The conflict will thus be 
depicted with as many of its facets as possible – as far as they can be handled – in order to 
prepare the ground for a vision of positive conflict transformation. In assessing the actors with 
respect to their potential and willingness to engage in a conflict transformation process, patterns 
for their respective motivations and latitudes to act will be taken into account.88  
                                                   
84 Galtung, 2007b, p. 31. 
85 Galtung, 2007a, p. 32.  
86 Galtung, 2007b, pp. 32-33.  
87 Galtung, 2007b, p. 32-33.  
88 Cf. Pattern of „Handlungserklärung“: Reckwitz, 2000, p. 91ff.  
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The third strand of peace and conflict research focuses on the future and tries to combine 
theories about possible ways of transforming conflicts, effective peace-building, and peace-
making measure with values.89 This constructive, future-oriented strand forms the basis for the 
attempt in this work to formulate analysis-based recommendations for conflict transformation 
in practice (chapter 6). Measures and approaches drawn from the Transcend method will be 
evaluated with regard to their applicability to the case study. Since these measures and 
approaches aim at constructing a new conflict reality, this falls within the constructive third 
strand.  
 
As this study follows the Transcend method, it incorporates all three strands of conflict and 
peace research as stipulated by Galtung. The critical analyses of the conflict‟s past and present 
as well as the evaluation of new empirical data form the basis for formulating constructive 
suggestions for a possible conflict transformation in the future.  
 
Conflict Transformation  
In order to establish a reference framework for „conflict transformation‟ and consequently the 
Transcend method, I shall next focus on the questions: What is „conflict transformation‟ and 
how is it different from other concepts or generic approaches dealing with conflicts? The basis 
for the definition of the approach relative to and as distinct from other approaches relies on the 
Berghof Handbooks on conflict transformation Vol. I and II.90  In these two volumes authors 
access state-of-the-art knowledge on conflict transformation from a theoretical as well as a 
practitioner perspective.  
 
According to Reimann and Miall,91 conflict transformation refers to peace-building strategies 
which aim at overcoming all forms of violence regardless. Violence does not only refer to 
physical violent acts here, but also covers violent structures. 
In contrast, concepts like conflict settlement and conflict management aim at ending direct 
violence by negotiating win-win solutions. Limited resources or a lack of political will often 
only allow for these types of approaches in practice; however, contemporary, complex conflicts 
require more profound changes in society than merely the reframing of positions and the 
identification of possible win-win outcomes. Without working to the core of a conflict, 
                                                   
89 Galtung, 2007b, p. 32-34. 
90 Austin et al, 2004 and Austin et al, 2011.  
91 Reimann, 2004 and Miall, 2004. 
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violence-prevention will be unlikely and the approaches of conflict settlement and conflict 
management are consequently insufficient.  
The strategies of conflict transformation can be characterized as long-term, outcome-, process- 
and structure-oriented. They consist of processes of engaging with and transforming the 
relationships, interests, and discourses of conflict parties. These processes may go as far as 
changing the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of a violent conflict. 
Conflict settlement and management, meanwhile, concentrate on making conflicts 
controllable, i.e. reaching political agreements without necessarily addressing the underlying 
conflict causes and initiating far-reaching social change. The propensity for violent acts of 
aggression arises from existing institutions and historical relationships, as well as from the 
established distribution of power. Since these are deep-seated in society, these approaches 
generally perceive resolving conflicts as being unrealistic; the best that can be done is to 
manage and contain them. According to these approaches, a historic compromise can 
occasionally be reached through which violence may be suspended.92 Conflict transformation 
aims at engaging all actors, including intervening actors, and mobilizing their „peace 
resources‟,  as all actors are expected to be able to contribute to the conflict transformation 
process in various forms based on their personal strengths and capacities. The involved parties 
as well as outsiders have to be made aware of their contradicting aims and have to be willing to 
change their attitudes and behavior. This comprehensive and wide-ranging approach 
emphasizes support for groups in conflict within the society rather than for mediation by 
outsiders. It also recognizes that conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller 
or larger changes, in which a variety of actors may play important roles. 93  Conflict 
transformation is therefore an open-ended, long-term, multi-track and dynamic process, which 
significantly widens the scope of the actors involved. Unlike conflict settlement and conflict 
management which do not consider any long-term efforts and deal only with violent outbursts, 
conflict transformation aims at effectively combining track I, II and III activities along the 
continuum of short-, middle-, and long-term involvement. It is thus likely to engage a wide 
variety of actors, including: official, military and political leaders (track I); informal conflict 
transformation experts, international NGOs working in conflict transformation (track II); 
grassroots, local NGOs providing development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (track 
III). In conflict transformation, conflicts are not per se perceived as bad; on the contrary, 
constructive, non-violent conflict is seen as a vital agent or catalyst for change.94  
                                                   
92 Miall, 2004, p. 8ff; Reimann, 2004, pp. 8ff.  
93 Miall, 2004, p. 4.  
94 Reimann, 2004, pp. 10–13 and Miall, 2004, p. 4.  
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At first glance, conflict transformation does not seem to differ significantly from conflict 
resolution. Conflict resolution also includes all process-oriented activities (short-, middle-, and 
long-term engagements on all three tracks) whose aim is re-defining the conflict as a collective 
new problem. The conflict has to be analyzed with regard to its root causes and creative 
solutions can be found with the help of skilled third parties that are acceptable to all parties 
involved.95 Strategies also include in-depth conflict analysis, process-oriented and relationship-
oriented strategies that comprise non-coercive actions and track II negotiations. Examples range 
from facilitation or consultation in the form of controlled, direct communication, to problem-
solving workshops and organized round-tables.96  
Consequently, researchers such as Mitchell question whether or not the term conflict 
transformation  actually adds anything new to the academic debate: “As I have argued 
elsewhere (Mitchell 2002), the original interpretation of the term „conflict resolution‟ certainly 
involved a process that recognized the possible need for far-reaching structural changes and 
changes in relationships as part of any durable solution, so I prefer to retain this term rather 
than the currently fashionable one of „conflict transformation‟.”97  
Lederach on the other hand sees the concept of conflict transformation as being more holistic 
and comprehensive than the concept of conflict resolution as the former points to the inherent 
dialectical process, the ability to transform the dynamics of the conflict and the relationships 
between the parties, in other words to transform the very creators of the conflict.98 Galtung also 
rejects the term conflict resolution as he claims that underlying the conflict resolution 
perspective is the assumption that every conflict has a finite life and a clear end and can, 
therefore, either be solved or declared intractable.99  
 
When comparing conflict transformation with conflict resolution, the main difference between 
the two concepts which thus becomes visible is the understanding of the life cycles of conflicts. 
Consequently, the goals of those working on conflicts utilizing the two different approaches 
will not be the same. In conflict resolution, the aim is to reach a stage in which the conflict is 
solved and thereby vanishes. For conflict transformation, the accepted premise is that the 
conflict does not vanish but rather takes on new forms. If working on the conflict is successful, 
the new forms will be less, or without violence. Therefore, there is not one final change that is 
                                                   
95 Reimann, 2004, p. 9; Miall, 2004, p. 3. 
96 Reimann, 2004, p. 10.  
97 Mitchell, 2011, footnote 3, p. 77.  
98 Lederach, 1995b, pp. 201ff.  
99 Galtung, 1995a, p. 51.  
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aimed for but rather changes are pursued one step at the time. Along the way, the understanding 
and competences of how to deal with conflicts non-violently are developed among the conflict 
parties and in the context of their societies. This understanding and associated skills should then 
help the conflict parties and broader society in dealing with new, future aspects of the conflict 
or future conflicts. Even if some of the measures or tools such as round-tables or workshops are 
applied by both concepts, their overall understanding of conflict and their goals are not the 
same. It is this understanding of complex conflicts as on-going social phenomena that explains 
their longevity. Since the measures and tools suggested by methods affiliated with the conflict 
transformation approach, e.g. the Transcend method, are based on this understanding, they are 
considered to be most suitable for protracted conflicts, such as the case study presented here.   
 
1.4 Research Method  
As relatively little academic material has been published about the case study conflict, mainly 
Indonesian media outlets in the English, Chinese and Indonesian language, such as newspapers 
and magazines, were also examined. Chinese-language newspapers and magazines have been 
re-admitted in Indonesia after the end of the Soeharto-regime. An examination of the main 
Chinese-language press revealed that they mainly deal with cultural and economic topics. 
Publications in Indonesian (bahasa Indonesia) were only briefly examined, as apart from two 
magazines, articles regarding the discourse about ethnic Chinese or the conflict in particular 
were mainly published in the local English language media (e.g. The Jakarta Post). These is not 
surprising considering that many ethnic Chinese have been and still are educated abroad or in 
schools and universities where the first language is English. This language therefore seems to 
be their first choice when it comes to publications.100 These publications were contrasted and 
compared with direct observation as well as that of others (scholars, experts, activists etc.). The 
texts were analyzed qualitatively rather than quantitatively as it was not the aim of the study to 
detect quantitative coherences or interrelations between the sources. The texts were interpreted 
following the style of the „qualitative content analysis‟ (qualitative Inhaltsanalyse) 101 
developed by Philipp Mayring, though in contrast to Mayring who advocates a classification of 
the material without advance considerations (criteria, clusters etc.), the material gathered was 
pre-screened and classified according to its relevance with regard to the focus of this study.  
 
                                                   
100 For example, Thung, 1998 or Dawis, 2009. 
101 Mayring, 2007, pp. 42ff. 
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In order to be able to further understand the current needs and interests of the involved parties, 
interviews with leading groups and organizations, scholars as well as activists who are working 
on the issue were conducted. These expert interviews were mainly conducted in Jakarta (Java), 
which is not only the capital of Indonesia and thus the centre of political activities, but also 
attracts many Indonesians from different regions of the country allowing for a more diverse 
sample of ethnic Chinese as well as indigenous Indonesians. 47 interviews were one-on-one 
interviews and two were group interviews. The one-on-one interviews proved to be more efficient 
for this research even though they were more time-consuming. The respondents tended to reveal 
more information when they were interviewed on their own. When conducting the two group 
interviews, one participant – the oldest member of the group – would mostly take the lead while 
the others would merely confirm his or her statements.  
The interviews provided further insight into the different subgroups that exist and their 
interests. This informed my analysis of what measures and ways to support conflict 
transformation would be acceptable. Similar to the text analysis, a qualitative approach was 
chosen for the interviews. Qualitative inquiries examine “the constitution of meaning in 
everyday social phenomena” and also focus on how meanings are produced102. According to 
Erlandson103, qualitative research methods such as interviewing using open-ended questions 
and relatively unstructured observations can be preferable to quantitative ones. This is because 
quantitative measures mainly seek to reduce data to numbers that represent a single criterion.  
By so doing, they remove that data from the rich detail that distinguishes it from other similar 
data and from the contexts and alternative constructions that give the data meaning. Therefore, 
a qualitative approach was the most suitable for assessing the respondents‟ perception of the 
conflict, their needs and interests as well as their thoughts about transforming the conflict.   
 
The field research period was centred around the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 
2009 were chosen as an event of potential political change; the situation prior to and after the 
elections was also assessed. Over the course of two field visits in 2008 and 2010, the year 
before and the year after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was re-elected, I interviewed a 
total of 51 persons in semi-structured face-to-face interviews. Afterwards, the data deriving 
from the interviews was clustered according to the categories reflecting my theoretical 
framework. The interviews were structured by identifying themes that were mentioned 
frequently. These included evaluating the current situation of the conflict, identifying actors, 
the actors‟ attitudes, problems or fears, personal aims, suggestions with regard to improvement, 
                                                   
102 Lindlof, 1991, p. 24. 
103 Erlandson et al., 1993.  
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their own contributions and behaviour, experiences with other people's behaviour in the conflict 
and the respondents‟ perception of fragmentation of the conflict parties. Having identified the 
themes, it was necessary to further re-categorize them based on the Transcend method 
according to the conflict actors‟ attitudes, behaviour, and aims. This categorization enabled an 
interpretation and analysis of the data with direct reference to my theoretical framework and 
formed the basis for the analysis of the conflict‟s present state.  
  
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Having introduced the research topic and purpose of the study as well as the theoretical 
approach, research method and sources in the first chapter, the following chapters will deal with 
the case study.  
Chapter 2 provides an insight into the development of the conflict‟s social and historical 
setting. Root causes and the development of conflict structures that are still valid today are 
analyzed from the initial settling of Chinese in the archipelago throughout the colonial era and 
the declaration of the Indonesian nation-state (1945) until the Soeharto era.   
Chapter 3 analyzes violence during Soeharto‟s New Order regime (1965 – 1998) as well as the 
post-Soeharto era (1998 – 2012) according to the analytical tool of the violence triangle. By 
comparing the results of the analyses of the two time periods, both the existence of different 
types of violence and their development will be assessed.   
Chapter 4 examines the conflict formation by analyzing the conflict actors‟ behaviour and 
attitudes as well as their contradicting aims. Since the conflict parties are not homogenous, 
subgroups will first be formed.  
Chapter 5 reveals underlying dimensions of the conflict formation which are unconscious to the 
actors, but influence their attitudes and behaviour towards the members of the other conflict 
party as well as their general position within the conflict formation. Since they are deeply 
rooted inside the actors, these dimensions can only be uncovered by an outsider to the conflict.  
Chapter 6 discusses attempts for a possible transformation of this conflict based on the results 
of the preceding conflict analysis. According to the conflict cycle, this conflict is in the „After 
(direct) violence‟- stage and different measures can therefore be applied for its transformation. 
Suggestions will include how the conflict formation as analyzed in chapter 4 can be 
transcended and how the violence of the conflict as assessed in chapter 3 can be reduced.  
Chapter 7 examines experiences made by approaching the present case study with the 
Transcend method. It further offers elements from other conflict transformation approaches that 
can complement the Transcend approach.  
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Chapter 8 reviews the findings of the case study by revisiting the research questions on the one 
hand and the Transcend method as a possible approach for academic conflict analysis on the 
other. 
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2. Analysis of the Socio-historical Development of the Conflict‟s 
Setting 
 
Indonesia is characterized by diversity: Across its approximate 6,000 inhabited islands, the 
archipelago consists of more than 1,000 ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious groups.104 To 
understand the conflict between the ethnic Chinese and other (indigenous) ethnic groups, it is 
necessary to return in history to how its setting evolved, i.e. the „making of‟ of Indonesia, as it 
were until 1965. The current conflict configuration cannot be attributed to single incidents, it is 
embedded within the structure of Indonesian society. It is thus essential to analyze the 
particular social and political tendencies and patterns in Indonesian history that are relevant to 
current issues and problems. I shall begin with the early history of the archipelago, followed by 
the arrival of the first Chinese settlers, the introduction of Islam (today‟s most prominent 
religion), and finally the colonial period primarily under the Dutch until the founding of the 
Indonesian national state and the first Presidential era under Soekarno.founding of the 
Indonesian nation state and the first Presidential era under Soekarno.    
 
2.1 Pre-colonial Times: Early Societies and the Arrival of Chinese Settlers 
The Population of the Archipelago 
In order to understand today‟s constellation of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Indonesian 
society, it is beneficial to return to the period when the archipelago was settled. The 
Austronesian population, who form the majority of the modern Indonesian population, migrated 
to South East Asia from Taiwan in 2000 BC. They spread throughout the archipelago and 
comprise the indigenous population. Due to archipelago‟s good agricultural conditions, 
villages, small towns and eventually kingdoms developed until the 1st century AD. Indonesia‟s 
strategic maritime position fostered inter-island and regional trade which also opened Indonesia 
to foreign influence at an early stage of its development. Trade relations with Indian kingdoms 
and China brought with it Hinduism and Buddhism to the archipelago.105  
From the 7th century AD onwards, the sea-faring Buddhist kingdom of Srivijava based in 
Sumatra flourished.106 Between the 8th and 10th century AD, the agricultural Buddhist Sailendra 
                                                   
104Indonesian embassy in Germany. http://www.botschaft-indonesien.de/de/indonesien/indonesien_index.htm. 
105 Taylor, 2004, pp. 5ff.  
106 Taylor, 2004, pp. 20ff.  
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and Hindu Matarum dynasties initially thrived, but later contracted in inland Java. The last 
influential Hindu kingdom, the Majapahit kingdom, was founded in eastern Java in the late 13th 
century. It was also in the 13th century that Islam entered the archipelago and like Buddhism 
and Hinduism it was introduced by foreign traders or explorers from Islamic kingdoms. 
Subsequently, it spread throughout the archipelago and became the dominant religion by the 
16th century. Elements of the already existent cultures and religious rituals have been semi 
incorporated, shaping the traditional form of Islam still widely practiced today in Indonesia.107  
In the 16th century, European traders also were also drawn to the archipelago. The main 
commodities of interest were nutmeg, cloves, and pepper. At first, Portuguese traders tried to 
establish trade monopolies in Maluku; followed later by British and Dutch traders but 
eventually it was the Dutch who established themselves as the colonial power on Java. 
Subsequently they extended their power to the outer islands including the entire territory of 
what is known as Indonesia today (s. figure 1).108  
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Indonesia.  
 
The trade and the geographical position of Indonesia have without doubt influenced its 
population and the development of its societies. Due to the fact that Indonesia consists of 
                                                   
107 Ricklefs, 1993, pp. 3-14.  
108 Ricklefs, 1993, pp. 22-24.  
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numerous islands populated in surges over the centuries, it has never been a closed society – on 
the contrary, the islands have been heavily influenced by foreign cultures, albeit to different 
extents. The first trade contacts involving Indian kingdoms, China as well as Arab countries 
already introduced foreigners to the archipelago during the initial stage of the development of 
its societies. Multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism have thus played an important role 
throughout its history. Due to its maritime location, the archipelago became an attractive 
destination for traders from different origins, including Chinese merchants some of whom 
settled permanently. 
It is important to note that none of the ancient kingdoms entirely covered the current territory of 
Indonesia. Even the Dutch could only extend their power to the country‟s current boundaries by 
the early 20th century. Therefore, although strong regional identities developed over centuries a 
sense of a national identity encompassing all islands of today‟s Indonesia only emerged and 
developed during the fight for independence from the Dutch during the 20th century.  
  
Chinese Settlers and Their Role in Local Societies 
Trade brought the first Chinese settlers to the archipelago and established nearly 1000 years of 
trade relationship, as well as cultural exchange, between China and what is today Indonesia 
(mainly Java). Liem states that Chinese traders made their way to Java as early as the Tang-
Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) and started establishing trading routes.109 The first comprehensive 
descriptions of Chinese settlements and trading centers on Java can be found in Admiral Zheng 
He‟s travel reports of his journeys during the Ming-Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.) under the 
Yongle Emperor (1403-1425 A.D.). These trips intensified trade relations and led to the first 
migration wave and the founding of more settlements on Java by Chinese merchants.110  
Anthony Reid has termed the pre-colonial era the age of commerce.111 Commerce or trade was 
the main reason for Chinese merchants to migrate and to either commute between Java and 
China or to move entirely to Java. The majority of these merchants who immigrated to 
Indonesia mainly came from the southern provinces of China – namely Fujian and Guangdong 
(s. figure 2).  
                                                   
109 Liem, 1986, p. 94.  
110 Somers-Heidhues, 1974, p. 6; Liem, 1986, p. 85ff. 
111 Reid, 1988, title.  
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Figure 2: Map of the People‟s Republic of China. Fujian and Guangdong (marked in red and 
blue)112 
 
Building on the knowledge obtained by Admiral Zheng He, Chinese sailors established trade 
routes with the coastal regions of Java despite imperial edicts aimed at restraining overseas 
trade. Commercial cities with an increasing Chinese population developed first to facilitate off-
shore production associated with Chinese industries during the period of market development in 
Southeast Asia. The Chinese grew sugar in West Java, peppers in Riau and Ha Tinh in modern-
day Vietnam, and traded specialty foods used for medicines and Chinese feasts and exported 
them to Southern China. Furthermore, Chinese mined gold in West Kalimantan. 113   The 
Chinese market was the primary market for Southeast Asian goods at that time.114 Chinese 
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merchants had the means and necessary connections for trade with China and thus acted as 
agents, an occupational niche which could not have been filled by the indigenous population.  
Chua states that the reason why trade had not been monopolized by locals was because the 
profession of a merchant was either not known or not respectable in the traditional Hindu-
Javanese society, leaving the Chinese a vacant position to fill within these communities.115 
Unfortunately, no further evidence to support this hypothesis could be found. However, at least 
for overseas trade it could be argued that since the local population had not been involved in 
overseas trade before the arrival of foreign traders like the Chinese or the Arabs, they were 
lacking the required experience in sailing as well as in trading with foreign countries. Due to 
their advantageous experience, it was a logical step for local rulers to appoint Chinese as 
intermediaries between them and the Chinese market. As such, the ethnic Chinese started to fill 
an occupational niche in local society and emerged as a new social class whose members would 
often work directly for or with local rulers. A Chinese merchant class that interacted closely 
with the local rulers or elite constitutes a pattern that has prevailed throughout Indonesian 
history. The existence of a Chinese merchant class certainly hindered the emerging of a 
local/indigenous merchant class especially with regard to overseas-trade, even if it did not 
prevent it entirely. Having a class of their own may have also hindered something else: the full 
social integration116 or absorption of Chinese into indigenous society.    
 
Were the Chinese from the outset an exclusive ethnic group at the margins of society? Whether 
or not the Chinese merchant settlers were integrated in full or whether they were just tolerated 
as sojourners in pre-colonial times is indeed difficult to assess due to the limited historical 
material available. However, apart from their occupational niche, there is another indicator of 
social integration that can be assessed to some extent: intermarriage (exogamy). Since the 
influxes of Chinese consisted mainly of men coming to the Indonesian archipelago to work, 
those who decided to settle permanently married local women. The offspring of these marriages 
were later named Peranakan – meaning „children of the country‟ or „descendants‟ (indicating a 
                                                   
115 Chua-Franz, 2002, p.63. 
116Integration is a widely discussed term in social science. Representatives of systems theory (Luhmann 
(1985) and Nassehi (1999) e.g.) even argue that the term itself should be replaced by the term “inclusion” 
into partial systems (of society). There are different concepts about integration ranging from next-to-
assimilation to multiculturalism and hybridism. In this context, being integrated means to be fully accepted 
as part of the local society. To be able to actually measure the degree of integration of the ethnic Chinese, 
it would be necessary to develop indicators for data collection for this case based on a multidimensional 
approach covering economic, social and political measures, Cf.Coucil of Europe, 1995, p. 175. Data 
would have to be collected consistently over a sufficient length of time. Further, one has to evaluate in fact 
two social processes (two points of view): the minority as well as the host society has to be taken into 
account. 
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person of mixed ancestry, where one ancestor was indigenous to the archipelago). Historical 
accounts recount biographies of Chinese migrants who achieved higher social or political 
positions due to intermarriage with women from respectable indigenous families.117 
However, since none of the sources provide the numbers of intermarriages, it is impossible to 
generally conclude that intermarriages were common, and thus underlining a high degree of 
integration of the Chinese into Indonesian society in pre-colonial times. It is also possible that 
the Chinese had serious problems being accepted by the local population and that the available 
accounts dealt with exceptional cases. Nevertheless, they show that intermarriages – even on 
higher social levels – were generally possible at the time. Chinese were therefore not excluded 
per se from broader society and marrying a Chinese was not necessarily considered a social 
descent for locals. If there was a degree of social exclusion or segregation, it was a permeable 
barrier and allowed for social mobility.  
 
Arrival of Islam  
From the 16th century onwards, Islam spread in Indonesia, not only bringing with it a change in 
religion but also social change. Although Admiral Zheng He and his crew were Muslims and 
were among the early Muslims who spread Islam in its initial stage,118 the majority of ethnic 
Chinese who arrived due to the intensification of trade relations were not. The more local 
society turned to Islam, the more difficult it became for non-Muslim Chinese migrants to marry 
into society. Once a family had converted to Islam, the daughters of that family were forbidden 
to marry a non-Muslim since the religion of the offspring is determined by the father‟s religion 
in Islamic tradition. Therefore, male Muslims would have been allowed to marry non-Islamic 
women, but not the other way round. As a consequence, social mobility for Chinese men 
became restricted: Chinese men could no longer gain access to higher levels of society – let 
alone the ruling class – by marriage. Only girls of Chinese ancestry could marry into Muslim 
families, but they were often left with the status of second-wives or concubines with little 
chance of improving their own blood families‟ social status.119   
To overcome these social limitations set by religion, those Chinese who intended to stay and to 
integrate into society would be required to follow the trend and convert to Islam. No historical 
                                                   
117 Liem, 1986, p. 110-111; Taylor, 2005, p.150. 
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providing trading infrastructure and attracting Islamic traders. Taylor, 2005, pp. 152ff. 
119 Taylor, 2005, p.158. 
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sources on Chinese converting to Islam could be found. Thus, adopting a „new‟ religion 
together with the locals would have been another useful strategy and indicator towards the 
integration of the Chinese. The fact that the Dutch encountered a socially distinct group of 
ethnic Chinese when they arrived at the archipelago, however, suggests that the ethnic Chinese 
did not, for the most part, convert to Islam. One can concluded that the introduction and spread 
of Islam in Indonesia and its establishment throughout the country enhanced the 
marginalization of the Chinese. Islam as a dominant religion is still important today as supra-
regional element to the archipelago. Even though the practices of Islam differ between regions, 
it has a major influence on the social setting in today‟s Indonesia as well as on the conflict 
formation between ethnic Chinese and parts of the indigenous population. 
 
Thus, while a few prominent Muslim Chinese (e.g. Admiral Zheng He) engaged in shaping the 
Muslim society of today‟s Indonesia by either directly introducing or helping to spread Islam, 
this did not improve the social integration of the ethnic group as a whole. On the contrary, due 
to the fact that most Chinese immigrants who came to the islands were not Muslims, Islam as 
the new dominant religion proved to have a negative effect on the overall integration process. 
Together with their specialized occupation as merchants, the foundation for an exclusive and 
marginalized position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society was already laid in this early 
period of their history.  
 
2.2 Colonial Times: Ethnic Chinese as Middlemen Minority under 
Colonial Powers 
Towards the end of the 16th century (1595/6) a Dutch expedition under van Houtman arrived in 
Indonesia and in 1602 the East Indian Company – later United East Indian Company 
(Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie - VOC) – was established to handle trade in the name of 
the Dutch government.120 The VOC was more than merely a trading company – it was granted a 
monopoly to carry out colonial activities by the Dutch government and was thereby provided 
with quasi-governmental powers, including the ability to wage war, imprison and execute 
convicts, negotiate treaties, coin money, and establish colonies.121 Jacatra – later Batavia and 
today‟s Jakarta – became the main trading centre of the Dutch.  
In 1800, the company went bankrupt and was formally dissolved. Its possessions and debts 
were taken over by the government of the Dutch Batavian Republic and the territories became 
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the Dutch East Indies. Over the course of the 19th century, further territories were conquered 
and by the beginning of the 20th century, the Dutch East Indies included almost the whole of the 
archipelago. Apart from the Dutch, the Portuguese, the British and the Japanese also had set 
foot on the archipelago as colonial powers but only for short periods of time. In 1945, the 
nation-state of Indonesia was declared by its first President Soekarno. The period from 1602 – 
1945 therefore constitutes Indonesia‟s colonial period.  
 
Instrumentalization of Ethnic Chinese for a ‘Divide-et-Impera’ Approach  
Since the VOC needed infrastructure for successful trading, they required middlemen to expand 
their influence into the inner regions of Java. Forming a close relationship with the ethnic 
Chinese proved to be the easiest and quickest way for the Dutch to gain access to an already 
existing trade infrastructure. The ethnic Chinese were known as both diligent traders and 
workers, and at that time more than 2000 were living in Banten, an economic centre for pepper 
trade on the Northwest coast of Java, where they had already established themselves as 
successful distributors (middlemen) and formed the local merchant class.  
The Dutch therefore aimed at attracting these ethnic Chinese into their operational centre, 
Batavia. However, peaceful attempts to lure them to Batavia failed. The Sultan of Banten who 
had come to value the ethnic Chinese merchants had offered attractive economic prospects to 
persuade them to stay. It was only after the Dutch imposed a total blockade leading to the crash 
of the economy in Banten that ethnic Chinese merchants were forced to move to Batavia to 
further pursue trading activities.122 However, the ethnic Chinese from Banten were too few to 
fulfil the needs of the Dutch. To increase the number of Chinese in Java, more Chinese from 
the Chinese mainland were introduced (lured and/or kidnapped) to Batavia to populate the 
city.123 Eventually, the Dutch successfully established Batavia as the economic centre of Java 
and solidified their position as an economical power in the archipelago.  
In addition to their experience and established trading networks, employing ethnic Chinese was 
beneficial to the Dutch for another reason. As the Dutch presence was very limited in numbers, 
they required middlemen to not only act as agents but also to take over bureaucratic tasks. A 
minority group that took over brokering roles was perceived to be less threatening to the 
colonialists than to empower the local indigenous elite – as long as the middlemen minority 
could be separated as a distinct group and restricted to their (economical) area of influence. As 
ethnic outsiders with a specialized occupation who did not even share the religious belief of the 
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majority population the distinctiveness of the ethnic Chinese was easy to cultivate and 
maintain, making them suitable middlemen. The Dutch were thus able to instrumentalize the 
distinctiveness of the ethnic Chinese and the resulting special and exclusive position within the 
existing political and economical structures for their colonial ‘divide-et-impera’ approach to 
gain and later keep control over the archipelago. Keeping the ethnic Chinese separated from 
other groups proved to be essential for the success of this approach and resulted in a social 
pyramid with the Dutch on top, the ethnic Chinese in the middle, and the indigenous population 
on the bottom.  
  
Figure 3: The Social Pyramid (Indonesia, during colonial times)124   
 
As overseas trade began to flourish at the beginning of the 18th century, it became increasingly 
attractive for the Chinese – in particular from the Southern provinces of China – to migrate to 
Java. Push-factors such as famines, floods, overpopulation, and civil wars in China and pull-
factors such as established trade connections to the region along with working opportunities in 
industries producing for the Chinese market led to an increase in the Chinese population, 
reaching approximately 80,000 people in the 1730s.125 Although the increase in Chinese settlers 
was at first welcomed by the Dutch colonists, the situation changed markedly when the growth 
of the Chinese population became unmanageable for the Dutch as the Chinese started to spread 
over the islands to pursue their own economic interests. 
The Dutch took steps to regain control by introducing administrative measures such as a poll tax, 
along with restrictions on the right to settle, a ban on owning agricultural land, deportation, and 
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the discharge of Chinese workers. The Dutch – as a small group of people – wanted Batavia to 
remain the sole economic centre of the region as they did not have the resource ability to control 
more than one economic centre. Had the Chinese mingled with other local groups in the inner 
country and established other economic centres, the Dutch would not only have lost their services 
as a separate and distinct merchant middlemen class, but also lost control over the country‟s 
economy. Therefore, the Dutch needed to prevent them from migrating to other islands and from 
integrating into local societies to maintain control, in a classic „divide-et-impera‟ fashion.    
 
Despite the regulatory measures introduced by the Dutch, many Chinese continued to settle in the 
inner regions of Java and even took part in local rebellions against the Dutch.126 The ethnic 
Chinese could no longer be regarded as reliable „economic helpers‟ but as competitors. In order to 
deal with illegal immigrants from China so-called „permissiebriefjes‟ (residence permits) were 
imposed in 1738. Whoever was caught without a residence permit was to be arrested and 
deported to Ceylon as a slave.127  The growing dissatisfaction of the Chinese towards these 
measures was known by the Dutch VOC administration. Warnings of a possible Chinese 
rebellion as well as the general economic advances made by the Chinese led to the massacre of 
Batavia in 1740. On October 7, hundreds of Chinese (most of them were mill-workers) killed 50 
Dutch soldiers. As a consequence, the Dutch dispatched troops as they expected a Chinese revolt, 
imposed a curfew and cancelled plans for a Chinese festival. Dutch troops searched Chinese 
houses in Batavia and confiscated any weapons. Two days later, rumours about possible attacks 
by Chinese led to pre-emptive burning of Chinese houses and killing of the Chinese by Dutch 
troops and bolstered other ethnic groups living in Batavia who acted on rumours that the Chinese 
were plotting on killing and enslaving them. Almost the entire Chinese population of Batavia, 
comprising around 10,000, were killed during the violence inside the city which lasted until 
October 22, 1740.128  In the long history of physical violent acts against the Chinese in the 
archipelago, this was the first documented large-scale incident.    
 
However, the Dutch were very aware of the fact that they were depended on such middlemen for 
their economic activities. They recruited (new) Chinese again for Batavia while at the same time 
they further constrained the economic power of the Chinese by acts of repression. To improve the 
control over the Chinese from the outset, Chinese ghettos were built.129 Due to the establishment 
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of these Chinese ghettos (Chinatowns), ethnic Chinese who were already in various stages of 
integration were subsequently brought together reversing the successful integration of at least a 
section of the community. It further prevented ethnic Chinese from gaining roots in Indonesian 
society and instead enhanced their position as a distinct and separate group. This aided the 
development of the unique status of the ethnic Chinese, not only economically, but also socially 
and culturally. As a consequence, the Chinese minority‟s cohesion grew and any differentiating 
factors, such as Chinese religions, language and traditions were further cultivated – a 
development typical for suppressed middlemen minorities. Middlemen are therefore more likely 
than low-status minorities to remain perpetual minorities. 130   Preserving a distinct cultural 
heritage helps to maintain the competitive resource from one generation to the next. 
Paradoxically, this thinking which reflects an individual's interest in giving a competitive 
advantage to his or her own children can result in long-term disadvantages for the minority group 
as a whole.131 Therefore, the establishment of Chinatowns during the colonial era became part of 
the cause for later integration problems which the ethnic Chinese have encountered since.  
 
After the VOC was officially dissolved in 1800, ethnic Chinese managed to replace the VOC in 
parts of the economic sphere of influence and began dominating the markets on Java.132 For the 
Dutch, the objectives of colonialism shifted from trade to the exploitation of raw materials. This 
change required a more effective administrative framework and economic infrastructure. Again, 
the small number of Dutch was not able to handle the new tasks on their own. The Dutch 
decided to sell local administrative rights (e.g. taxation) in order to subsidise their own 
administration costs. These rights were sold to members of a group that had already performed 
bureaucratic tasks for them and that they had already successfully separated from the majority 
of society: the ethnic Chinese. The only other group capable of buying these rights and working 
as administrators for the Dutch would have been the Javanese aristocrats. However, the risk that 
the aristocrats could have turned against the colonial masters with the support of the local 
people posed a considerable threat to the rule of the Dutch.133  
 
The sovereign right of tax collection and revenue farming were thus sub-contracted to already 
wealthy and well-connected Chinese businessmen. By doing this, the Dutch did not have to 
invest their own capital, nor bankroll an existing bureaucracy, and moreover, they did not have 
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to conduct these rather „unpopular‟ tasks themselves. Again, even though for the individual and 
the direct family, working as administrator for the Dutch had considerable economic 
advantages, it had negative consequences for the ethnic group as a whole. Ethnic Chinese were 
thus not only considered to be different and foreign, but also associated with the „dirty work‟ 
they conducted on behalf of the Dutch. This expanded the social gap between the indigenous 
communities and the ethnic Chinese – creating and establishing negative stereotypes134  of 
Chinese in general which have prevailed until today.  
 
When referring to ethnic Chinese merchants, it is important to distinguish between petty traders 
and businessmen. Only the elite of the ethnic Chinese business community was able to play a 
role in the colonial system. 135  Wealth and political connections were the basis for an 
appointment as a revenue farmer or tax collector. In turn, such positions intensified the 
concentration of economic and political power held by a few ethnic Chinese and were beyond 
the reach of most members of the community. 136  Those ethnic Chinese who gained such 
positions were able to accumulate wealth through different channels: as tax collectors, through 
opium farming, gambling dens, pawnshops, or as financiers and bankers of the rural population. 
Due to this combination of economic and bureaucratic power, these ethnic Chinese managed to 
control the entire internal rice market and general trade, eliminating many of the indigenous 
trading communities by the end of the 18th century.137  
 
According to Ramanthan, some of these rich and powerful ethnic Chinese abused their 
positions of responsibility and exploited indigenous Indonesians. Although this was only true 
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for a small group of ethnic Chinese, negative stereotypes of the greedy, ruthless money lenders 
and helpers of the colonial masters developed and were soon regarded as being valid for all 
Chinese. In contrast to pre-colonial times, the degree of integration at this time can be expected 
to have been considerably lower, not only because of the evolving negative image of the ethnic 
Chinese. As the new situation improved the economic prospects for the ethnic Chinese, 
especially for those who had arrived during colonial times, they did not orientate themselves 
towards the poorer local population as assimilation with the indigenous population at this point 
in time would instead have meant a decline in their social status.138  
 
In 1811, the Netherlands were conquered by France; the British took their chances and landed 
on Java under Sir Stamford Raffles who became the new governor of Java until  the Dutch 
returned in 1816. The British enforced a number of reforms curbing the privileges of the ethnic 
Chinese such as abolishing their monopoly rights, leading to a more direct rule by the colonial 
masters. Although those measures were not fully implemented during the short period of British 
reign, a number of Chinese landowners were dispossessed.139  
After the Dutch regained power, they adopted some of the reforms the British had enforced and 
added further reforms themselves under the so-called „ethical policy‟. This policy was officially 
aimed at improving the living conditions of the indigenous people, but at the same time directed 
against the increasing commercial influence of the ethnic Chinese which was perceived as a 
major threat for the Dutch authorities by that time. The Chinese were no longer perceived as 
allies by the Dutch but rather as serious competitors, even as „the foremost enemies‟ of the 
state.140 As a consequence, the rights and privileges of the ethnic Chinese were restricted and 
regulated, including the rights to settle, to travel, and to work. The opium farming system was 
replaced by a government monopoly.141 
In order to reduce their dependence on only the ethnic Chinese, the Dutch also turned to the 
local aristocracy to recruit administrators. Some of the privileges and tasks previously given to 
the ethnic Chinese were then transferred on to the local aristocracy. To strengthen the power of 
the aristocrats, territories formerly annexed by the Dutch were returned. 142  However, the 
administrative and economic system still depended on the Chinese, their investments, taxes, 
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revenue collections, and trade activities. They had become indispensable for running the 
country‟s economy and administration. The strengthening of the local aristocracy in the course 
of the „ethical policy‟ was not aimed at fully replacing the ethnic Chinese in the system but 
rather aimed at reducing their power and influence without empowering the local aristocracy to 
a degree where they could pose a threat to Dutch rule.   
 
Over the course of the colonial period, the ethnic Chinese were established as marginalized 
middlemen – not only economically, but also socially. The colonial rule of the Dutch imposed a 
social structure on the archipelago that has in part prevailed until today. As a middlemen 
minority, ethnic Chinese were prevented from moving socially upwards or downwards by 
economical incentives as well as punishments (raids, discriminatory laws and the forcing into 
ghettos) and kept in a marginalized position in society. This position was ambivalent: on the 
one hand, the ethnic Chinese were dependent upon the Dutch for their positions and titles which 
had not been earned but rather been bestowed upon them. In saying that, the Dutch also needed 
them as merchants and administrators. In their functions for the Dutch, the ethnic Chinese 
nurtured a colonial power that, in the end, found it expedient to place restraints on their 
economic role. Even though both parties were dependent upon each other, it was the Dutch who 
proved to be the more powerful partner in this symbiosis since they could regulate the social 
and economical influence of the ethnic Chinese.  
On the other hand, the integration process of the ethnic Chinese into the indigenous population 
was hindered. To ensure this, it was important for the Dutch elite to stress the distinctiveness of 
the ethnic Chinese to the local population as well as to the ethnic Chinese themselves. 
Stereotypes stemming from negative examples of the ethnic Chinese community, their image as 
collaborators and the fact that contact between locals and ethnic Chinese was reduced due to 
the ghetto system resulted in anti-Chinese sentiment among the indigenous population. Being 
aware of their „otherness‟, the special privileges granted by the elite, and the reluctance of the 
local population to regard them as an integral part of East Indies society, made a Chinese 
identity the only one they were allowed and willing to accept. Marginalisation was thus 
cemented and ethnic Chinese successfully prevented from either moving towards the top or 
towards the bottom of the social pyramid – both economically as well as socially. In 
conclusion, ethnic segregation („divide et impera‟) as intended by the Dutch was successfully 
established at this point, enabling the colonials to remain the dominant group despite of their 
small numbers.  
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Ethnic Chinese: Not Only Helpers of Colonial Masters 
The image of the ethnic Chinese as collaborators of the Dutch is a dominant one. However, not 
all of them were working for the Dutch nor did all of them support or benefit from colonial 
rule. Those who suffered under the Dutch rule probably suffered more than the indigenous 
population due to the additional restrictions and suppressive measures specifically directed 
against the ethnic Chinese. Anti-Dutch resistance by the Chinese minority took on various 
forms, including violent physical uprisings as well as the founding of nationalist organisations, 
a nationalist press, and Chinese political parties. The latter actions being inspired by the rise of 
nationalism in China and even though these were mainly initiated to help the situation of the 
ethnic Chinese, they also indirectly influenced the indigenous population in their struggle for 
independence.  
 
The participation of ethnic Chinese in anti-colonial uprisings as well as their suffering under 
colonial rule are a neglected chapter in Indonesian history. Nevertheless, a few records exist 
that deal with revolts initiated by the Chinese due to the restrictions against them during the 
implementation of the „ethical policy‟ between 1825 and 1851. 143  However, the imposed 
restrictions, such as the forcing of ethnic Chinese to live in ghettos, the suppressive regulations 
on occupation, free movement, the break-up of Chinese organizations which constituted their 
social and economic structures, the agricultural law of 1870 which prohibited the transfer of 
land from „natives‟ to Europeans or other „foreigners‟ (like the Chinese or Arabs),144 as well as 
direct violent acts against the Chinese minority are rarely mentioned in Indonesian history 
writings. This might be due to the persistent image of ethnic Chinese as collaborators of the 
Dutch and the fact that they were classified as foreigners (foreign Orientals) by the Dutch in 
contrast to indigenous Indonesians. Thus, it is not entirely surprising that Chinese conflicts with 
the Dutch were not considered noteworthy by indigenous historians and only incidents directed 
against the indigenous population and their sufferings under colonial rule are part of the regular 
school curricula in Indonesia today.145  
Apart from direct revolts against the colonial rule, ethnic Chinese inspired by mainland Chinese 
nationalism started setting up the Tiong Hwa Hwe Kuan (THHK – Chinese organisation), the 
Siang Hwee (the Chinese Chamber of Commerce), the Chinese newspaper Sin Po, and Chinese 
political parties. The THHK opened Chinese schools promoting Chinese values of Confucianism 
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which proved to be a very effective in maintaining a sense for Chinese heritage.146 The pride in 
being Chinese was awakened and many re-sinicized 147  ethnic Chinese started to orientate 
themselves politically towards China.  
In the 1920s ethnic Chinese nationalist organizations co-operated with Indonesian nationalist 
organizations under the banner of Pan-Asianism to free Indonesia from colonialism. When 
ethnic Chinese organisations promoting nationalist thoughts started influencing other 
indigenous Indonesian groups 148 , the Dutch started lifting restrictions against the ethnic 
Chinese. The limitations on the right of movement were abolished and civil rights were granted 
after 1911. Instead of scapegoating the ethnic Chinese for the misery of the indigenous 
population and cutting back the influence of the Chinese merchants, the Dutch sought to win 
them over as allies again. These measures were clearly designed to appease the ethnic Chinese, 
to reduce the influence of Chinese nationalism, and to turn them into loyal Dutch subjects. 
Chinese were even given seats in the Volksraad, a mainly consultative organ established in 
1918.149 
 
The ethnic Chinese organizations and parties shared a common (positive) view of Chinese 
culture and a Chinese heritage, however, it is important to note that they did not all share the 
same vision and approaches to improve the situation of the ethnic Chinese in the Dutch-Indies. 
Three concepts can be distinguished: the colonial, the kinship and the independent concept: 
 The colonial concept was orientated towards the Dutch and its followers tried to play a 
more active role in the political system of the colony (in the Volksraad, e.g.). 
Supporters of this concept were mainly Dutch-educated peranakan professionals and 
businessman. They established the Chung Hwa Hui which advocated the acceptance of 
Dutch Nationality and active participation in the colonial administration.150 This group 
consisted of ethnic Chinese who already worked for the Dutch administration and who 
then established associations such as the Chung Hwa Hui (Chinese Association) 
(established in 1928). This organization promoted a purely cultural relationship with 
China and loyalty towards the Dutch. It aimed at achieving equal legal status with the 
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Dutch for ethnic Chinese and strongly encouraged its members to work for the 
prosperity of the archipelago under Dutch rule.151  
 The kinship concept was orientated towards China politically, counting on the 
„motherland‟ for protection. This was supported by a group of ethnic Chinese who had 
incorporated the anti-colonial resentments strongly enough to openly oppose the 
Dutch152. The Sin Po newspaper (mentioned above)153 in which anti-Dutch feelings 
were openly expressed belonged to this strand. Its members wanted to maintain ties to 
China as the „motherland‟, cherish Chinese Nationalism, but also support Indonesian 
nationalism.154  
 The independent concept supported the nascent Indonesian independence movement 
and hoped for an equal status among the other Indonesian indigenous people. Later, 
supporters of this concept founded a political party called Chinese Indonesian Party 
(PTI, Partai Tionghoa Indonesia) in 1932. In contrast to the Sin Po group, the PTI 
strongly supported Indonesia‟s independence and a common citizenship for all ethnic 
groups – urging the ethnic Chinese to leave behind Chinese Nationalism, however, 
without abandoning their Chinese culture heritage.155  
 
The first two strands did not help to improve the image of the ethnic Chinese among the local 
population and the local political parties due to their orientation towards either the Dutch 
colonists or the Chinese motherland. The third strand – even though supporting Indonesian 
independence and trying to blend into the national picture of a new Indonesia – failed due to the 
already long-established segregation between ethnic Chinese and indigenous people. It should 
also be kept in mind that there were also Chinese who did not belong to any of these categories, 
who were apolitical or subscribed themselves to other political movements, e.g. the communist 
movement that did not focus on nationalism. 
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There were also individual ethnic Chinese who sought to contribute to the independence 
movement but who were excluded from participating in the significant political parties. Early in 
his political career, the later president Soekarno had refused to admit ethnic Chinese (even 
Peranakan Chinese) to his National Party of Indonesia (PNI, Partai National Indonesia, 
founded in 1927). He did not consider them to be a part of the Indonesian nation-to-be. Other 
parties such as the Socialist Party of Indonesia (PSI, Partai Sosialis Indonesia) and the People‟s 
Party of Indonesia (PIR, Partai Indonesia Raja) also stated that its members should be 
indigenous as distinct from non-indigenous groups. Indigenous groups should explicitly be 
favoured, and given special privileged treatment to protect them from alien economic 
exploitation.156 This clearly excluded ethnic Chinese from participating in the most influential 
political parties. The under-representation of ethnic Chinese in these parties further fostered the 
alienation of ethnic Chinese.  
 
Birth of the Indonesian Nation-State: Without Ethnic Chinese 
During World War II Imperial Japan occupied the Dutch East Indies from March 1942 until the 
end of World War II in 1945. Being themselves under German occupation, the Dutch had little 
ability to defend the colony against the Japanese Imperial Forces. Within only two months, the 
Japanese navy and army overran the Dutch armed forces, ending 300 years of Dutch colonial 
presence. In 1944–45, Allied troops largely by-passed the archipelago and did not fight their 
way into the islands – not even populous islands like Java or Sumatra. As such, most of the 
islands were still under Japanese occupation when Japan surrendered in August 1945. 
 
Initially the Japanese were welcomed by the Indonesians as liberators. However, later tens of 
thousands of Indonesians were to die of starvation and forced to work as slave laborers away 
from their homes serving Japanese war needs. The Japanese encouraged local nationalist 
movements across Southeast Asia and the Indonesian independence movement increased in 
popularity during this time – especially on Java. The Japanese created new Indonesian 
institutions and promoted nationalist leaders like Soekarno. In July 1942, Soekarno accepted 
Japan's offer to rally the public in support of the Japanese war effort. As a reward both 
Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, the later vice-president, were decorated by the Emperor of 
Japan in 1943. The Japanese regime perceived Java as being the most politically sophisticated 
but as the least important area economically; its people were Japan‟s main resource. The outer 
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islands, which were administered by the Imperial Navy, on the other hand were regarded as 
politically backward but economically vital for the Japanese war effort.  
 
The Japanese occupation had several affects on the ethnic Chinese. The closing of Dutch 
schools forced many ethnic Chinese to send their children to Chinese schools – initiating 
harmonisation between the less acculturated Totoks and the more acculturated Peranakans.157 
Chinese nationalism had influenced the ethnic Chinese organizations strongly enough to openly 
support the mainland Chinese war against the Japanese. For this reason, most of those who 
were leading Chinese organisations were imprisoned or had to go into hiding158 and the Chinese 
organisations were shut down.159  Especially in the beginning of the occupation, ethnic Chinese 
were targeted by Japanese and – with their encouragement – by the indigenous population as 
well. The so-called „Pontiniak-Affair‟ in October 1943 resulted in large-scale arrests and 
executions of „prominent persons‟ to suppress a suspected rebellion. Among the 1,500 people 
who were killed, 854 were Chinese.160 The Chinese press was silenced.161  
The members of the ethnic Chinese organisations were left without their leaders. As a result the 
ethnic Chinese on the whole remained rather passive during the important phase of the 
Independence Movement and many were even surprised by Soekarno‟s announcement of 
Indonesia‟s independence in 1945.162 Since the ethnic Chinese „missed‟ this crucial moment of 
the birth of Independent Indonesia, the stereotype of their questionable loyalty was enforced 
and they were perceived by the local population as generally not being interested in the nation-
state of Indonesia. Furthermore, the perceived unity of the ethnic Chinese against the Japanese 
deepened the impression of them as a homogenous and oppositional group of „Others‟.   
 
Some of the ethnic Chinese abused the prevailing chaos by indulging in black-marketing, 
smuggling, and other illegal activities which harmed the local population, leading to attacks 
against the Chinese communities regardless their involvement. In 1946 an anti-Chinese incident 
took place in Tangerang which resulted in the killing of more than six hundred Chinese163 and 
an exodus of Chinese from rural areas to the more secure urban areas. In order to protect 
themselves, the ethnic Chinese established a self-protection force called Pao An Tui. Since this 
body was armed by the Dutch, it appeared to the indigenous to be pro-Dutch and anti-
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revolution, thus leading many indigenous to further resent the ethnic Chinese. 164  In areas 
already occupied by nationalists, repressive measures and special taxes were enforced to 
control the ethnic Chinese.165  
 
The fact that the Chinese had „missed the birth of the nation‟ and the fact that Mainland China 
had four years later turned communist made their loyalty more dubious since the nationalist 
leaders followed bourgeois, nationalist rhetoric.166 As the ethnic Chinese were the victims of 
numerous attacks both during and shortly after the Japanese occupation, a reluctance to engage 
in political activities remained after the Japanese left. This attitude widened the gap between 
the indigenous population and the ethnic Chinese. Although some of the independence leaders 
were sympathetic towards the ethnic Chinese, violence directed against them could not be 
prevented, leading to more hesitation among the ethnic Chinese to actively support the 
independence movement. Instead, they further retreated to their ethnic community at the margin 
of society. The independence movement would have been a chance for the ethnic Chinese to 
leave their marginalized middlemen position and to overcome negative stereotypes and their 
image of being the foreign „others‟. Instead, their lack of engagement fuelled an image of them 
as „others‟ and they were not regarded as full members of Indonesian society.  
 
2.3 Soekarno‟s „Old Order‟: Ethnic Chinese in the Dawn of the 
Indonesian Nation-State 
The birth of the Indonesian nation-state marked the end of the colonial rule and profoundly 
changed the lives of the people of the archipelago. However, for the ethnic Chinese, their 
difficult position at the margin of society did not change for better, but was instead further 
cemented. At the top of the pyramid, the Dutch were replaced by a group of indigenous 
Indonesians. Since the young government was lacking economic aptitude, they decided to 
maintain the social and economical structures of the old regime, leaving the ethnic Chinese 
capitalists in their position and thus incorporating an essential element of the colonial system 
(the class structure) into the nascent nation-state. In this social contract based on business 
cooperation, political protection was given in return for economic cooperation. This 
information settlement was not a fusion of economic and political power, but a shaky solution 
for both groups to ensure their survival. 167  However, if it was a decision arising out of 
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convenience that left the ethnic Chinese with economic power at the very beginning of the 
newly founded state. Having them continue to occupy this position was clearly a political 
decision.  
To give in to the demands of the indigenous population, the government established programs 
to counter the still existing Dutch and Chinese economic dominance with the intention to alter 
the economy towards a more self-sufficient industrial economy based on indigenous capital. 
Programs such as the benteng (fortress) program were established in 1950, through which 
import licenses and credits were only to be given to indigenous importers.168 It was not only the 
aim of the program to reduce Dutch and Chinese economic dominance but also to build up an 
indigenous business class.169 In 1959, Presidential Regulation No. 10 ruled that alien Chinese 
were not allowed to conduct retail business outside of urban areas. Even if the ban was not 
directed at ethnic Chinese who had Indonesian citizenship it also affected them in many cases, 
since bureaucrats required sufficient proof of citizenship which the ethnic Chinese often could 
not provide.170 The efforts to encourage more indigenous to engage in business by restraining 
the ethnic Chinese only showed moderate success. The benteng program could be bypassed by 
using indigenous license holders as substitutes and Presidential Regulation No. 10 mainly 
affected small Chinese businesses rather than the well-established Chinese businessmen. The 
government focused on the lower levels of economy, such as the transfer of ownership of small 
shops. One of the reasons for this might have been that for small businesses neither required 
much capital or expertise, thus providing a good starting point for building up an indigenous 
merchant class. 
 
Another motivating factor was that it was not in the political interest of the new government to 
build up a powerful indigenous capitalist class. Even though Soekarno wanted to keep his 
promises of economic nationalism made during the struggle for independence, he did not want 
to fully eliminate the ethnic Chinese merchant class. Instead of merely concentrating on the 
lower levels of economy, the government could have transferred Dutch and Chinese businesses 
to indigenous merchants. However, the government chose to seize them and hand them over to 
the military to manage. Another indicator is that no significant state credits were given 
indigenous businessmen who might have helped to build up an indigenous capitalist class. 
Like the Dutch before them, the indigenous power-holders obviously did not want a strong 
indigenous bourgeoisie wielding economic power because they could pose a potential threat to 
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their political power: “The particular importance of indigenous businessmen as opposed to 
Chinese is essentially political. Whereas a dominant Chinese capitalist class may impose the 
general interests of capital upon the state, an indigenous capitalist class possesses the potential 
for direct and public political action. Chinese capital may impose constraints and imperatives 
upon the policies of the state, but a powerful indigenous capitalist class has the potential to 
transform the very structure of power.” 171 
 
It was thus safer for the power-holders to keep the ethnic Chinese as an economic bourgeoisie 
since these did not have access (or very limited access) to the state apparatus. Furthermore, 
getting rid of the ethnic Chinese during the rather chaotic time immediately after the founding 
of the nation would have caused enormous damage to the Indonesian economy as well as to 
individual alliances between power-holders and ethnic Chinese businessmen.172 It was therefore 
only the former Dutch businesses which were for the most part nationalized and handed over to 
the military. This, among other factors, helped the military to grow into the most important 
politico-bureaucratic force in the state. Alliances between generals and ethnic Chinese 
entrepreneurs were formed; one of the most prominent for the next decades being that of 
General Soeharto and the ethnic Chinese businessman Liem Soe Liang.  
 
Political Awakening of Ethnic Chinese 
In spite of the continuation of the difficult middlemen status and the on-going „othering‟ during 
the so-called parliamentary democracy period (1949-58), President Soekarno‟s pluralistic 
approach to nation-building allowed ethnic Chinese to form their own organizations and to 
become more politically active than during colonial times. The most prominent organization 
was the Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki, the Indonesian 
citizenship consultative body). The founding of this organization is linked to the issue of 
citizenship of the ethnic Chinese which had been under debate already towards the end of 
colonial times. The Citizenship Act of 1946 and the Round Table Agreement 1949 both were 
promulgated based on the jus soli principle and the „passive system‟ which automatically 
assigned Indonesian citizenship to those who were born on Indonesian territory and had lived 
there for a minimum of five years. This resulted in dual citizenship for many ethnic Chinese as 
according to mainland Chinese law („jus sanguinis‟) all ethnic Chinese were regarded mainland 
Chinese citizens. Those who did not want to be Indonesian citizens had to officially reject their 
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Indonesian citizenship. Thus, instead of simplifying the situation, this led to a complication of 
the issue which the government tried to solve. 173  In 1954 a draft law was introduced in 
parliament which aimed at changing the system from a „passive‟ to an „active‟ one. According 
to the draft law, ethnic Chinese had to officially reject their Chinese citizenship in order to 
become Indonesian citizens  
The citizenship issue in general was more of interest to the government than to the members of 
the ethnic Chinese or indigenous communities. After the new citizenship act in 1958, the ethnic 
Chinese had to officially declare that they rejected their Chinese citizenship in order not to lose 
their Indonesian citizenship within a limited period of time. In a situation of political instability 
and limited infrastructure this „active system‟ which aimed at solving the problem of dual 
citizenship, however, limited the number of ethnic Chinese who become Indonesian citizens.174 
When the act was fully implemented in 1960, there were two categories of ethnic Chinese: the 
Warga Negara Indonesia (Indonesian citizen, WNI, mainly peranakans) and the Warga 
Negara Asing (Foreign citizens, WNA, mainly totoks). Nevertheless, it was possible for 
members of one ethnic Chinese family to have different citizenships.175 Regardless of their 
official citizenship status, both WNI as well as WNA of Chinese descent were continuously 
discriminated against as „unwanted aliens‟.176 It was the social distinction between indigenous 
(pribumi) and non-indigenous (non-pribumi) in society that was important in daily life rather 
than the legal distinction between citizens and non-citizens.  
 
Ethnic Chinese opposing this draft law founded the Baperki organization to demonstrate that 
they were indeed interested in their future in Indonesia and were politically conscious.177 Even 
if Baperki was founded because of the draft citizenship law, the organization did not focus on 
this issue alone. The organization was dominated by peranakans and promoted political 
equality in general among all Indonesians regardless of their origin and cultural rights for their 
ethnic group in particular.178 They wanted the ethnic Chinese to be treated as another ethnic 
group (suku) in a multi-ethnic Indonesia.179 Those who did not agree with the orientation of 
Baperki joined the „assimilationist‟ group LPKB (Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa, 
Institution for Promotion of National Unity) who favored the complete assimilation of the 
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ethnic Chinese into Indonesian society. They considered „Chineseness‟ as the reason for and 
source of discrimination against ethnic Chinese.180 
 
Soekarno’s Political Shift and Its Consequences 
In the course of the 1950s, the influence of the communist party increased in Indonesia. The 
PKI won 16.4% of the votes in the elections 1955. President Soekarno shifted politically from 
bourgeois but anti-colonialist and nationalist ideas to socialism and the influence of the PKI 
within the governmental administration increased. Baperki followed this leftward shift and 
formed an alliance with Soekarno and the PKI which increased the organization‟s political 
influence significantly.181 Under Siauw Giok Tjhan, Baperki promoted socialism and the idea 
that with a socialist society ethnicity would not be regarded as important anymore.182  
The government itself showed a considerably open political attitude towards the ethnic Chinese 
which might be attributable to the active involvement of the Baperki. However, there were also 
groups who openly expressed anti-Chinese sentiments. For example, in 1956, Assaat, a 
businessman and former Minister of the Interior (1950 – 1951) openly demanded 
discrimination against ethnic Chinese in economic affairs in favor of indigenous Indonesians. 
He blamed ethnic Chinese for the problems which the Indonesian economy was facing and 
further called them opportunists beholden to Dutch and mainland Chinese interests. The 
directness of anti-Chinese sentiments expressed by Assaat, a man of economic and (once) 
political importance, triggered the establishing of many committees consisting mainly of 
businessmen throughout the country in support of his ideas. 183  Even though the so-called 
Assaat-movement did not achieve its objectives with regard to official economic discrimination 
against the ethnic Chinese,184 it verifies that explicitly anit-Chinese organizations were at work. 
Apart from business associations, the military, whose position in the government had been 
weakened due to the political rise of the PKI and the Baperki, also took a strong anti-Chinese 
stance. The Central Army Head Quarters issued a decree in 1959 authorizing regional military 
commanders to remove aliens from their places of residence for security reasons.185 Due to the 
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uncertainties related to their citizenship status, this decree could and was used to remove ethnic 
Chinese from their homes.  
 
Even though the ethnic Chinese were present in the political sphere, they did not manage to 
have their ethnic group included as one of the many Indonesian peoples (suku) into the 
imaginary Indonesian national identity. In the course of the construction of a national identity 
that had to encompass the numerous different ethnic groups of the archipelago, there would 
have been a chance for the ethnic Chinese to overcome their status as „foreigners‟ and to be 
become officially recognized as local Indonesians. Instead, they served as non-indigenous (non-
pribumi) counterpart to the rest of Indonesia's ethnic groups who could then become joined 
under the umbrella of all being indigenous (pribumi) to the archipelago regardless of their 
different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds.186 The ethnic Chinese were thus the only 
group left outside of the newly created common Indonesian identity, reinforcing their 
problematic as well as vulnerable position in society once again.187  
 
Soekarno‟s orientation towards the political left proved to be disturbing not only to the military 
whose influence was reduced as a consequence, but also for another nation-state: the United 
States of America. Since the struggle for independence, Indonesia had been entertaining good 
relations to the government of the United States of America. For the USA a good relationship 
with Indonesia was economically important due to the intense trade relationship with Indonesia: 
from 1945 onwards, US imports from Indonesia grew steadily and by 1947, the US was in the 
third largest importer of Indonesian goods. Conversely, Indonesia was also reliant upon imports 
from the US.  The USA were also politically interested in Indonesia as an ally against the 
Soviet Union. In the 1950s, the United States exerted their influence by providing economic aid 
to Indonesia. The ideology of anti-communism was smoothly conveyed. The objectives of the 
United States were:  
“To prevent Indonesia from passing into the Communist orbit; to persuade Indonesia 
that its best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of 
the free world; and to assist Indonesia to develop toward a stable, free, government with 
the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without and to contribute to 
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the strengthening of the free world.”188  
Simultaneously however, Soekarno also entered into relations with the Soviet Union, which 
also offered economic aid. In 1956 Soekarno even claimed that Western concepts, such as 
democracy, would not work in Indonesia.189 The United States had to fear that Indonesia would 
lean towards communism and thus fall into the „enemy camp‟. The US government therefore 
provided assistance in the form of training as well as funds to groups who were anti-communist 
and supported their cause. Among these were General Soeharto and his troops.190 Soekarno‟s 
orientation towards the political left therefore indirectly helped the rise of his competitor. The 
support of the US government might serve as an explanation why Soeharto allied himself very 
closely to the US after he came to power. He adopted part of the Western ideology from the US 
with a focus on nationalism and anti-communism. This ideology formed the basis for 
legitimizing violent acts against communists as such and as a consequence also against Chinese 
Indonesians.  
 
By the end of the 1950s when the nationalist faction within the military was gaining influence, 
anti-communist and anti-Chinese riots were initiated by these troops - mainly starting in the 
rural areas of Java and Bali and later spreading throughout Indonesia. The masses were easily 
triggered by the military thanks to the consequences of the unsuccessful economic policies of 
the Soekarno government, which led to price inflation and wide-spread poverty. 191  Some 
articles claim that hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese were among the victims of these 
riots.192 However, this high number of ethnic Chinese victims seems to be unlikely. The killings 
mainly took place in rural areas where ethnic Chinese were underrepresented as the majority of 
ethnic Chinese were living in urban areas after the passing of Presidential Regulation No. 10. 
As a consequence of the riots, about 130,000 ethnic Chinese in 1959 – 1960 not only left the 
countryside, but the country as whole seeking a new life in Mainland China. In 1960, the PR 
Chinese government sought to stem this influx and urged the ethnic Chinese to stay in 
Indonesia.193  
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In 1965/66 Soeharto took over power by means of a coup-d'état. He justified the need for taking 
over the government as a counter-reaction to an attempted coup-d‟état by the PKI. The 
communist party was accused of having formed ties with military leaders and planned to take 
over the government. The government‟s official version of the events of October 1, 1965 state 
that six generals were killed in the attempted coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung. After that 
Untung‟s forces occupied the national telecommunication centre and the president‟s palace. 
General Soeharto then opposed Untung with the country‟s strategic reserve, seized control of 
Jakarta and gradually had executive powers transferred to himself from Soekarno. He wanted to 
ensure that communism would no longer be a threat to the state and that Communists and their 
presumed sympathizers within the military would be punished.194  
 
This official version of the events has been questioned by several academics. They assume that 
there had not been an attempted coup d‟état by communist forces, but that Soeharto had 
orchestrated an attempted coup to justify his actions.195 Since the main enemy of the military 
before the coup had been the PKI, the newly formed government therefore initiated anti-
communist measures which included wide-spread massacres. It is difficult to assess the number 
of victims who have died in these massacres, but it is commonly assumed that around 500,000 
people were killed. There are no reliable figures on how many ethnic Chinese were killed. It 
can however be assumed that their percentage was higher than their percentage of the 
Indonesian population (2-3 percent).196 During the riots, the ethnic Chinese proved to be an 
easy target for the military as they were easily recognizable due to their distinct physical 
appearance. Therefore, even though the aim was to persecute Communists, it was often ethnic 
Chinese who were attacked. This further fostered anti-Chinese sentiments in general and 
thereby the singling out and marginalization of ethnic Chinese as a group. 
 
On the surface, this period of time seems to be characterized by a considerable amount of 
freedom for and political openness towards the ethnic Chinese. The ethnic Chinese did not only 
return to political engagement - they even actively interacted with the government through an 
ethnic Chinese organization. However, their overall social and economic position in this new 
nation-state was not fundamentally different from their position under colonial rule. They were 
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still the middlemen minority and the negative stereotypes which had developed during colonial 
times still prevailed among the indigenous people.  
Furthermore, their national loyalty was often put in question and instead of becoming part of 
the new Indonesian national identity, they constituted an alien „other‟ which allowed the other 
ethnic groups to feel as „one‟ people. Their vulnerability was manifested in physical violent 
acts against them towards the end of the Soekarno administration. They were dependent upon 
the government to protect them, but since its position was steadily weakened by the military, it 
could not act upon it.   
 
2.4 Conclusions  
In order to understand the conflict, it is important to note that the basis for a marginalized 
position in society for the ethnic Chinese had already been laid in pre-colonial times. They were 
of foreign origin, specialized occupationally, and (mostly) non-Muslims. During colonial times, 
their distinctiveness was further fostered, instrumentalized but also repressed by the Dutch 
colonial masters. Thus they became a constant element in Indonesian society, occupying a 
position in which they largely remain in until today - a predominantly ethnic Chinese merchant 
class characterized by economic strength and political weakness. Even if the ethnic Chinese 
were more involved and considerably active in politics under Soekarno, their position as 
„others‟ in the middle of the social pyramid did not change.  
When assessing the historical development of their social position as a middlemen minority 
within Indonesian society and in particular their relationship with the ruling elite, it becomes 
clear that their economic success as well as their political weakness is grounded in the 
construction and instrumentalization of their ethnicity by the ruling elite. The ruling elite 
entered a symbiosis with ethnic Chinese merchants, from which both the ethnic Chinese elite as 
well as the power-holders drew a mutual benefit from.  
However, historical developments show that the economically strong minority played the 
weaker part of this alliance and was thus, highly depending on the ruling elite. In times of crises 
all members of this marginalized minority, even those who were not aligned with the elite, 
could easily be played as scapegoats by the ruling elite in times of economic and political 
crises. As such, they became victims of physical violent acts against themselves and their 
property in the course of riots. However, not only during crises and resulting riots were the 
ethnic Chinese exposed to violence: To keep the status quo and thus this minority in their 
vulnerable and dependent middlemen position also other forms of violence were exerted.  
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Their vulnerable position has been well established over centuries and forms an integral part of 
the make-up of Indonesian society. As a consequence, it will be very difficult to change. Any 
transformation of their position will have to be addressed carefully as they would have a 
significant impact on Indonesia‟s overall social structure.  
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3. Analysis of Conflict Violence 
 
In colloquial language, statements like “If ever there was a true opposite of Peace, conflict 
would appear the natural culprit”197 suggest that conflict is the opposite of peace. According to 
Galtung, however, it is not conflict itself which hinders peace, but rather the violent and 
destructive ways of dealing with it. The basis for peace is therefore not the absence of conflict 
but the absence o f violence.198 Enabling a move towards peace means reducing violence; and 
as a first step, the violence in this conflict has to be assessed. The previous chapter focused on 
the conflict setting as well as on how the conflict came about and developed over the last 700 
years. The following chapter concentrates on comparing the violence in the conflict during the 
„New Order‟ regime under President Soeharto (1968 – 1998), linking the conflict‟s past with its 
present state (1998 – 2010). These periods are analyzed using the „triangle of violence‟ 
developed by Galtung. Results of the violence analysis of the past and the present will be 
compared using three dimensions: direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. 
This comparison forms the basis of an analysis of the development of violence over this period 
until the present day.  
The analysis in this chapter aims not only at specifying dimensions of violence that some 
conflict actors exerted and others endured. It also seeks to assess the need for conflict 
transformation to reduce violence in the future. In the following sub-chapters, the use of the 
triangle of violence as a tool will at first be presented and discussed. The method is then applied 
to the conflict's most recent past – the New Order regime and the riots in the 1990s which 
constitute a peak in the history of violence against ethnic Chinese. An analysis of today‟s 
violence follows afterwards. By comparing the results of the assessment of past and present 
violence, the development of the violence over time will be assessed in order to determine 
whether or not the violence could be reduced and if there are issues which still would need to 
be addressed.  
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3.1 The Concept “Triangle of Violence”  
Different Dimensions of Violence: Direct, Structural and Cultural 
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as “the intentional use of physical 
force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or 
community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.”The unambiguous definition by WHO 
defines violence as purely an act of direct (personal) violence. The focus on direct (personal) 
violence was prevalent when peace research emerged in the 1950s within the university scene. 
In the 1960s Galtung, however, introduced an extended concept of violence to the theme of 
peace research as he believed that along with the absence of direct (personal) violence, which 
he refers to as „negative peace‟, then „positive peace‟ which “is the integration of human 
society”199 was also required. The reason for the extended concept was Galtung distrusted that 
measures and strategies aimed at „negative peace‟ (e.g. general and complete disarmament 
through multilateralism or regulation of means of violence by international conventions which 
are mainly top-down approaches on the national and international level) would be sufficient in 
themselves to achieve negative peace.200 Therefore strategies to achieve „positive peace‟ were 
considered to be required to work towards peace including items such as efforts to improve 
human relationships through dialogue, peace education, political, economical and cultural 
exchange and cooperation not only within nation states but also across the national borders.201 
Inspired by the principles of health science where a healthy body is perceived not only as a 
body that is not affected by a disease, but also as a body capable of resisting diseases, Galtung 
formed an analogy to peace. Strategies to counter „negative peace‟ were considered to be like 
curative measures for diseases while strategies aiming at „positive peace‟ were considered to be 
preventive measures to avoid diseases in the future.202 Based on this understanding of peace in 
a negative and positive manner, he extended the concept to violence. If the opposite to 
„negative peace‟ is defined as the direct and visible act of physical/psychological violence, i.e. 
the intentional incapacitation and / or deprivation of health of a human being by an identifiable 
actor, then the opposite to „positive peace‟ had to be characterised as well.203 In his article 
“Violence, Peace and Peace Research”204, Galtung distinguished between manifest personal 
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violence (also referred to as direct violence) and latent structural violence (also referred to as 
indirect violence).205   The idea of structural violence was inspired by Ghandi who did not 
approach the perpetrators of violence, but instead the structure of violence in his fight for 
peace.206 By adapting this idea, Galtung extended the actor-oriented explanation of violence to 
a structure-oriented one in which structural violence must be overcome to achieve „positive 
peace‟. Using this as a basis, Galtung employed a set of two distinct parameters to investigate 
and categorize different dimensions of violence and their intermittent interaction. Direct 
violence means restricting the basic human needs of others (by killing, maiming etc.), while 
structural violence is embedded in social structures that leads to among others exploitation 
and/or repression. In addition structural violence can trigger direct violence and vice versa. In 
1990, Galtung identified a third form: cultural violence 207  and thereby completed what is 
known as the “triangle of violence” (s. figure 4). Cultural violence is harder to grasp 
conceptually and it is more difficult to detect in practice than the other two forms. Cultural 
violence serves to legitimize any form of violence or provides a cultural background which 
justifies it for the perpetrators, thus forming the basis for the acceptance of other forms of 
violence – direct and structural violence.208 It is important to keep in mind that all of these 
forms of violence constitute violence in themselves.  
He extended the definition of violence to encompass “avoidable insults to basic human needs, 
and more generally to life”.209 Basic human needs have been categorized by Galtung based on 
interviews conducted in different parts of the world and are catalogued into the following types 
of needs: survival, well-being, identity / meaning, and freedom needs. An attempt was thus 
made to define human needs that generally apply to all people regardless their ethnic, cultural, 
local or individual background based on empirical data. Galtung collected the data during his 
research for the „World Indicator Program‟ at the University of Oslo.210 By having identified 
the basic human needs, he attempted to measure whether or not these needs were affected by 
violence. If people‟s basic human needs are not fulfilled, according to Galtung, they are 
considered victims of violence as violence has been defined by him as “the cause of the 
difference between the potential and the actual [fulfillment of their needs]”.211. According to 
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him, basic human needs are not debatable; they cannot be compromised and there is no ranking 
among them, i.e. they are to be treated equally.212   
 
 
Figure 4: The Triangle of Violence (based on Galtung 2007a, p. 348) 
 
In contrast to indirect violence, direct violence is generally easy to recognize: it is manifested in 
physical or psychological violence, performed by human beings directed against other human 
beings or their property. The perpetrators are identifiable and it is thus actor-generated.213 
Structural violence is structure-generated; it occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by 
political, legal, economic or social traditions. The violence caused does not have to be intended, 
i.e. a victim may suffer from violence even if a perpetrator did not intend to harm someone.  
The concept of violence (and, implicitly, guilt) is therefore not linked to the intention of 
harming. 214  In the definition as presented here, the concept of violence focuses on the 
consequences and hence the victims instead of the perpetrator. Even the victims of structural 
violence themselves are often not aware of the systematic ways in which their plight is 
determined by an unequal distribution of society's resources.215 
In most cases, indirect violence is rendered invisible and generally accepted as „ordinary” by 
victims and perpetrators as it is embedded in ubiquitous social structures, normalized by stable 
institutions and regular experience („the way things are and always have been”). Why people 
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who are suffering from indirect violence tolerate the status quo may be explained by referring 
to the concept of „symbolic violence‟ developed by Bourdieu 216  in which he refers to a 
mechanism whereby the socially dominated blame themselves for their domination. According 
to Bourdieu, those who are dominated misrecognize their own position and consider their (low) 
social status as accurate and deserved. 217  Unequal access to resources, political power, 
education, health care, or legal standing constitutes violent social structures. Since even those 
who are victims of structural violence are often not aware of it, it can be difficult to determine 
the entire extent of unequal distribution of society's resources. Nevertheless, despite its 
invisibility, structural violence is shaped by identifiable institutions, relationships, force-fields 
or ideologies, such as institutionalized inequalities between ethnic or social groups or racism 
which may be manifested in e.g. health disparities.218 Galtung assigned direct and structural 
violence to the four basic human needs and added examples for a better understanding (table 
1).219 
 
  Violence 
(D/S)     
Survival 
needs (SN) 
Well-being needs 
(WN) 
Identity needs 
(IN) 
Freedom needs (FN) 
Direct 
Violence 
Killing 
(DSN) 
Maiming, Siege, 
Sanctions, Misery 
(DWN) 
Desocialization 
Resocialization, 
Second class 
citizen (DIN) 
Repression, 
Detention, 
Expulsion (DFN) 
Structural 
Violence 
Exploitation 
A (SSN) 
Exploitation B 
(SWN) 
Penetration, 
Segmentation 
(SIN) 
Marginalisation, 
Fragmentation 
(SFN) 
Table 1: Violence and their Effects on Basic Human Needs 
 
While the examples for infliction of direct violence with respect to the four basic human needs 
are quite clear, the inflictions by structural violence may require further introduction. 
1. Survival needs  
Exploitation A: the underdog (as Galtung refers to the victims) may actually die – e.g. 
starve or die of curable diseases – because of the disadvantages exposed to by the 
topdog (as Galtung refers to the perpetrators).  
                                                   
216 Galtung explicitely deals with Bourdieu‟s research and his finding on conflict in comparison to his own, 
Galtung, 2010.  
217 Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 170ff.  
218 Bourgois, 2004, p. 19. 
219 Galtung, 1990, pp. 292ff.  
70 
 
 
2. Well-being needs 
Exploitation B: the underdog may be left in a permanent, unwanted stage of misery, 
suffering which may include malnutrition, curable diseases, limited access to water or 
housing. In contrast to Exploitation A, the underdog does not die. 
3. Identity needs:  
Penetration: implanting the view of the topdog in the underdog‟s mind and 
Segmentation:  assigning only a social segment to the underdog, limiting his view as 
well as forced assimilation 
4. Freedom needs:  
Marginalization: keeping the underdog on the outside and  
Fragmentation: keeping the underdogs away from each other and prevent them from 
organizing themselves 
 
Sørensen commented on this definition: “It is broad enough to include the most important 
dimensions, and precise enough to point to pertinent foci of peace research.”220 
 
Cultural violence, the other form of latent violence, makes people consider structural or direct 
violence as normal, natural or not noticeable.221 Cultural violence is deeply rooted in a society's 
culture. When interviewing people from a specific culture, they are often not able or capable of 
mentioning aspects of cultural violence because it has been deeply grounded in them and thus 
rendered invisible or ‟natural‟. According to Galtung, there are six main domains in which 
cultural violence is to be found: religion and ideology, language and art, empirical and formal 
science. In all of these domains there are elements which can be (mis)used to legitimize direct 
or structural violence.222 An example is the ideology of the „Herrenvolk‟ which the National 
Socialists in Germany established during the Third Reich. This provided the basis for the 
implementation first of structural violence against Jews, such as depriving them of their civic 
and human rights and repressing them in other ways. Later by imprisoning, forcing them to 
work in labor camps under miserable conditions and finally killing them, the National Socialists 
then exerted direct violence.  
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The three types of violence differ with respect to time: direct violence is an event, structural 
violence is a developing, fluctuating process, and cultural violence is rather an invariant, 
remaining constant for a considerable period of time.223 Therefore, attempts to break through 
the vicious triangle need to tackle very essential and basic layers of a culture in order to be able 
to actually constitute a change towards positive peace.  
 
Extended vs. Narrow Understandings of ‘Violence’: An Insight into the 
Academic Discourse  
The approach by Galtung to expand the term violence has been acknowledged as a major 
breakthrough in peace research, marking the emergence of critical peace studies in the 1970s.224 
The concept has, however, not been without its critics.  
Among others, disputed issues are:  
1) definition of violence and its effects on the understanding of peace and conflict research as 
analytical or normative 
2) broadness and limited operationalization of the extended concept of violence and peace 
3) interrelation between the different types of violence 
4) Utopian approach by Galtung versus realistic approaches 
 
1) Examining the field of peace and conflict studies in Germany, Lars Schmitt refers to 
Galtung‟s definition of violence as the crucial point which separates the older from the younger 
generation of peace researchers. According to Schmitt, members of the founding generation of 
peace and conflict studies tend to hold on to a highly normative, practice-oriented thinking of 
peace studies as applied science and the extended definition of peace as the absence of violence 
as defined by Galtung. The younger generation however, or at least parts of it, lean towards a 
less normative approach to Peace and Conflict Studies based on a definition of violence limited 
to that of Galtung‟s direct violence which they claim to be more analytic.225 This dichotomy 
based on or deriving from the acceptance of Galtung‟s definition of violence (in particular the 
inclusion of structural violence) does not only generate gaps between generations of peace and 
conflict researchers, but further prevents conceptional integration of conflict analysis and 
conflict transformation.226  
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2) Another issue of dispute is the broadness and vagueness of the concept of violence and the 
correspondingly the concept of positive peace. Critics maintain that it implies that everything 
could be understood as violence as long it is conceivable that it could be normatively better.227 
It may be argued that the concept thereby loses its analytic value and is not „operationalizable‟ 
as one cannot distinguish analytically between the different phenomena falling under the 
category of violence.228 Those who reject the concept as not sufficiently analytic therefore may 
dismiss the Transcend method (as it is based on Galtung‟s concept of violence and the related 
concept of positive peace) as idealistic and not applicable in scientific research. Therefore, 
criticism with regard to a limited operationalization of Galtung‟s concept of violence as well as 
its „broadness‟ shall be discussed here in more detail as these reservations touch the essence of 
the method of this study.  
 
Galtung defines violence based on the perspective of its victims. Galtung has himself admitted 
that defining violence as the difference between the potential and the actual living conditions of 
people “may lead to more problems than it solves.”229 The question of how or even whether or 
not this extended understanding of violence is operationalizable is a matter of debate among 
academics. Those who claim that it is not, further claim it to be prone to ideology and as such 
not applicable for academic studies, even though lacking operationalization does not 
necessarily mean that a theory is not scientific. Relating „scientificness‟ to operationalization 
(only) ignores the heuristic and normative character of studies in the field of peace and conflict 
research.230  What his critics do not to take into consideration is that Galtung provided an 
example of how to operationalize his conceptualization of violence in his article “Direct and 
Structural Violence – A Note on Operationalisation”.231 The example he chose was „death‟. 
With regard to direct violence, one way of measuring the degree of violence is counting the 
number of dead persons killed as a result of direct violence. Simultaneously, the number of 
avoidable deaths that occur because medical or sanitary resources are not available can be 
regarded as being due to structural violence. Since cases of death occur at different ages, 
Galtung decided to measure not the number of avoidable deaths as such, but rather the „number 
of years lost‟. To calculate the „number of years lost‟, an average life-expectancy is assumed 
which has to be compared to the actual life expectancy of people in a society. As a result the 
„number of years lost‟ can be compared for both types of violence, direct as well as 
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structural.232 Such an approach requires creativity from those who engage in empirical peace 
studies. His article demonstrates how interdisciplinary thinking can work in practice: as 
mathematician, Galtung was able to combine natural science with social science to help 
operationalize his concept.  
Social scientiests are monitoring human society and produce systematic studies of the „quality 
of life‟ in numerous given societies. The resulting sets of data, including infant mortality, 
unemployment, social security recipients and juvenile crime vary from society to society which 
helps to develop „benchmarks‟ for a „potential quality of life‟. If we take the case of 
unemployment as a concrete example, the question arises why people happen to be 
unemployed. Some might argue that they do not want to work, that they are lazy and have 
chosen to be poor. It could, however, also be the case that barriers confronting those who are 
unemployed are built into society in a way that results in unemployment, for example in the 
case of discrimination directed against a certain ethnic group. This marks structural violence. 
Similar arguments would apply to other „quality of life‟ indicators (e.g. health, housing, 
education). Therefore, cross-nation comparative „quality of life research‟ could help to detect 
structural violence in societies by determining differences between the potential and the actual.  
With regard to the disputed topic of the concept‟s broadness, Kjell Eide, for example, marks 
that the meaning of „violence‟ would be function of a chosen goal structure with no meaning 
without an explanation of the goal structure that it would derive its meaning from. He would 
therefore suggest a more subjective definition of violence: the cause of what the user of the 
term dislikes. 233  However, this definition does also create difficulties of its own: without 
explaining the background of the respective user, it is difficult to grasp the meaning of the term. 
Depending on his/her background, each user would perceive violence differently. With this 
definition, Eide mainly avoids actually defining what „violence‟ means and therefore does not 
help to „solve‟ the problem of the concept.   
 
In his article “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Galtung”, Kenneth Boulding as well criticizes the 
„broadness‟ of the definition. According to him, the concept of structural violence includes 
problems of a system, like poverty, misery, and deprivation that are caused by other systems. 
He does accept that cultures of poverty and cultures of violence are often related, but denies a 
cause and effect relationship.234 While both Eide and Boulding admit that Galtung‟s concept of 
violence shows that a narrow concept of violence, i.e. one only related to direct violence, is too 
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limited to grasp the complexity of violence in a conflict environtment, they consider the 
concept itself as being too vague and difficult to apply.  
Galtung once commented on Boulding that he “tells half the story and the other half is just as 
important”. As an evolutionary theorist, Boulding would tend to consider it acceptable that the 
better developed countries, the so-called first world countries, assimilate the other countries 
based on their insight and generosity.235 Structural violence seems to be negligible in the course 
of „social‟ evolution to Boulding. The world seems to be going through different cycles: war-
peace cycles, war-cycles and peace-cycles towards what Boulding calls „stable peace‟ more or 
less on its own.236  Galtung, however, argues that the potential of direct violence is still very (or 
too) high as long as structural violence is present. Therefore, if one remains passive while 
facing indirect violence, one may risk for direct violence to occur. According to him, the active 
removal of structural violence is necessary in order to obtain „stable peace‟.237  
 
Despite the difficulties with the concept as pointed out by Eide and Boulding and others238, it is 
questionable, however, why violence should be restricted to only direct violence if conflict 
realities suggest otherwise. Although Bourgois refers to Galtung‟s concept as “opening the 
Pandora‟s box”239, he points out that expansion is necessary as direct violence is merely the tip 
of the iceberg which distracts from seeing the “less clearly visible forms of coercion, fear and 
subjectification through which violence deceptively and perniciously morphs over time and 
through history.”240 Especially, as in current conflict risks that compromise living conditions of 
people are increasing that cannot be attributed to individual actors. 241  Indirect violence is 
therefore an inseparable part of violence which is necessary may not only explain, but also 
cause direct violence. 
If seizing the suggestion by Bourgois to refer to indirect violence as „invisible‟ violence, 
Galtung‟s concept of violence could be regarded as analytic heuristic which helps to detect and 
make invisible violence visible against the backdrop of a conflict setting. 242  Therefore, 
including indirect violence in the concept of violence is not only prerequisite to reflect conflict 
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reality, it also provides an analytic tool suitable for scientific work for such a tool is required 
for detecting and analyzing violence in complex conflicts, like the case study conflict.243  
 
3) Another dispute regards the interrelation between the different types of violence.  Sørensen 
asked in this context if one form of violence could justify another? What if there is a high level 
of structural violence in a society created by the small ruling elite which could be removed in a 
revolution during which the repressed people resort to direct violence.244 Here lies a dilemma in 
which one type of violence could be removed by using another. People may argue that the 
dimension of structural violence legitimizes direct violence, once the basic human needs of 
many can be served by violating the basic human needs of few.245 Galtung does not deny that 
violence may be used at times to fight violence. In cases where direct as well as structural 
violence are present, depending on the case, the affected actor(s) may have to assert to one type 
of violence to counter the other one. Nevertheless, according to Galtung it does not necessarily 
have to be one or the other (dualism), according to the Buddhist tetralemma thinking which he 
adopted for his approach, it can also be both or neither.246 Therefore, it may also be possible to 
counter more than one type of violence without using means of any type of violence. He further 
stresses the individual nature of each conflict and that it is not possible to have one standard 
procedure of how to deal with conflict. Galtung‟s approach is holistic and therefore conflict and 
violence can neither be understood nor explained without taking the whole picture or context 
into consideration. Any approach or measure taken is determined by results that arise from 
conflict analysis which may provide possible solutions as well as possible obstacles.   
 
4) The problem academics might have with the „broadness‟ of the definition is further closely 
related to the perception of peace as utopia in Galtung‟s approach. For Galtung, world-wide 
peace is the unattainable ideal – a utopia. The „obstacles‟ are multiple and difficult to deal with 
in this concept of peace. If one thinks of peace as an achievable goal, having to overcome as 
many kinds of violence that touch every aspect of a society as suggested by Galtung is difficult 
to accept.247 Sørensen, for example, remarks that it is difficult to point to societies as examples 
where violence is not present. Furthermore, there is no strategy that clearly shows how to pave 
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the way to such societies. He further points out that making progress in one dimension of 
violence tends to create new problems and deficiencies on other dimensions of violence. For 
example, when fighting hunger and poverty, one is likely to create other problems, such as 
damage to the environment and „welfare‟ diseases. Thus, he concludes, contradictions are 
already built into this concept.248 Due to the strong utopian aspect of Galtung‟s approach, 
Sørensen detects a tendency “to run away from the problems” 249 , i.e. the inherent 
contradictions. 250 It may be true that the solution of one problem may create a new one, 
however, that does not mean that one should therefore not address them at all. Instead, the 
problems will have to be solved as they come along for it is not possible to foresee each and 
every one of them.  
 
The academic discourse reveals limits have to be considered when applying the concept of 
violence as developed by Galtung to a conflict for analysis. For this case study especially 
disputed broadness of this concept proved to an advantage as it allows detecting and examining 
violence in its different spheres as well as their interrelations. Without the elements of 
structural and cultural violence it would further be difficult to explain why direct violence 
against ethnic Chinese would occur and re-occur despite long periods of none or less violence. 
Therefore, this concept was considered to be very suitable especially for this case study.  
 
Application of the Concept of the Triangle of Violence to the Case Study 
Applying the tool of the violence triangle in practice proved to be a challenging task. Due to the 
strong interrelations between the three types of violence outlined in the triangle, attempts to 
structure the cases according to these three types are therefore not reasonable. The three types 
of violence are often intertwined and in general more than one type can be detected in any 
given example of violence. In assessing the conflict, it was not possible to distinguish sharply 
between the types of violence involved without risking to lose too much of the intersecting set 
in the process. Nevertheless, keeping the violence triangle in mind helped in exploring more 
potential levels of violence beyond merely the visible and manifest.  
Galtung has outlined examples of different types of basic human needs that are infringed both 
upon on the levels of direct as well as of indirect violence (see table above). Even, the 
distinctions between the different categories are not always clear. For example, Galtung places 
de-socialization into the category of direct violence. By way of an example, he mentions 
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regulations on the use of certain languages.251 If the use of one‟s language is prohibited, this 
could be interpreted as direct violence when referred to the implementing of a law (as an act). 
However, when the law has been enforced a long time ago and has become part of a state's 
legal system, it might also be interpreted as penetration: the group of people affected might 
have lost the ability to speak and think in their „own‟ language. This will limit their access to 
information other than what other groups provide them with. Consequently this may narrow 
their perspectives on their own situation. Penetration, however, is categorized as structural 
violence. This example shows that an act of violence can be assigned to more than one type of 
violence depending on the moment in time of its assessment. What does not change however is 
that both de-socialization as well as penetration are considered as being violence as understood 
by Galtung. It is also not desirable for an understanding of the violence in this case study 
conflict to examine the conflict‟s violence strictly according to the conflict categories. 
Nonetheless, in spite of the practical challenges, both the violence triangle as well as the table 
of the effects of violence on basic human needs served as useful tools that assisted in detecting 
and examining violence in this case studies.  
 
Rather than organizing the following sections according to the three types of violence and 
assigning events or structures of violence to each of them, I will present examples of events and 
patterns and related them to type(s) or category(ies) of violence. The examples presented here 
provide an overview over the extent and different types of violence in the conflict‟s recent past 
and present. The different types of violence will be marked using short abbreviations: when 
direct violence is inflicting upon the survival needs, the abbreviation is DSN: D(irect 
violence)S(urvival)N(needs). For structural violence directed against the freedom needs of the 
victims, the corresponding abbreviation will be SFN: S(tructural violence)F(reedom)N(eeds). 
As cultural violence serves to legitimize the other two forms of violence, it has not been related 
to the basic human needs and therefore the abbreviation CV: C(ultural)V(iolence) will be used. 
The different types of violence are not marked in preparation for a quantitative analysis, but 
rather to assist in more easily identifying the different violence types in their respective context.  
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3.2 Soeharto‟s „New Order‟: Ethnic Chinese In-between Violence and 
Privileges 
After Soeharto rose to power, his major concern was the Communist Party of Indonesia, PKI, 
and Communists in general. In the course of its fight against Communists and other political 
enemies, the Soeharto government also took up an anti-Chinese position which brought the 
government many sympathizers among indigenous Indonesians. The new government thus 
faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the ethnic Chinese as a group were perceived officially one 
of the four major „others‟ of the constructed New Order Self252 and therefore perceived as 
political enemies to be treated as such; on the other hand, the ethnic Chinese were indispensable 
for the running of the country‟s economy as the Soekarno administration was not able to 
establish a self-sustaining national economy without them. Even though Soeharto opened 
Indonesia‟s economy to foreign investors (among those were mainly US and other Western 
companies), the country‟s economy would have suffered severely without the ethnic Chinese 
merchant class. In the economic situation in the middle of the 1960s, the Soeharto government 
provided the ethnic Chinese with more economic incentives and privileges to benefit the overall 
Indonesian economy than the Soekarno government had.  
Apart from economical reasons, socio-political reasons made the ethnic Chinese essential to the 
government: As distinct group of unpopular „others‟, they continued to be important for the 
nation-building process and the concept of „indigenousness‟ in the national identity. Having an 
ethnic counterpart to the imaginary community of Indonesian groups proved to be very useful 
for the political elite in terms of consolidating the not yet fully-accepted Indonesian national 
identity. These reasons for keeping the ethnic Chinese as distinct middlemen minority were not 
new. Soeharto would come to depend on the ethnic Chinese as scapegoats in times of political 
and economic crises. During his fight against Communism, it became evident that he could 
easily motivate indigenous Indonesians to act against the ethnic Chinese by sponsoring “witch-
hunt and terror”253. Having an economically strong, distinct ethnic minority which did not pose 
a political threat to the ruling elite proved to be more than convenient. The official political 
position of the government which had declared ethnic Chinese to be political enemies based on 
their presumable links to communism, however, would have to call for the removal of ethnic 
Chinese or at least their „Chineseness‟ instead. To deal with this dilemma, the Soeharto 
government walked a fine line between policies aiming at assimilation, repressive and 
discriminatory policies as well as granting economic privileges at the same time. The paradox 
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of economic dominance and political and cultural deprivation is not contradictory in this case: a 
group of successful entrepreneurs was required for the nation's economy and the indigenous 
elite was not experienced enough and capable of playing such a role yet. To counterbalance the 
success of ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, the government instigated popular anti-Chinese 
sentiments and discriminatory policies. As unpopular, marginalized group of others, ethnic 
Chinese did not enjoy support from other ethnic Indonesian groups (which would have been 
necessary for them to gain political power) and therefore did not pose a threat to the political 
elite, but were depending on them for security in times of anti-Chinese riots. Periodic anti-
Chinese riots reproduced the dependence of ethnic Chinese on state protection, discredited 
popular native efforts to express grievances and deflected anger from the state.254  
 
Assimilation of Ethnic Chinese: Policies and Acts 
In order to address the so-called „Chinese problem‟ (CV), the official solution was to remove 
everything Chinese from Indonesia and assimilate the ethnic Chinese. Another possibility 
would have been to force the ethnic Chinese to leave the country. However, the committee 
founded to deal with the „Chinese problem‟ in 1967 advised against the latter strategy in order 
not to harm the country‟s economy. As a consequence assimilation policies (SIN), were 
implemented in the course of the 1960s.255 These assimilatory policies were justified publicly 
by citing alleged security reasons. The long history of riots and violent acts against ethnic 
Chinese was considered as being sufficient proof of the incompatibility of ethnic Chinese co-
existing with indigenous Indonesians.256 By blaming the victims of the riots for the riots, the 
government officially sided with the perpetrators. Since the government claimed that these 
kinds of riots caused security problems and threatened the nation's unity and integration, 
assimilation policies were therefore considered to be justified to maintain state security. The 
overall accepted concept of state security in order to prevent direct violence therefore 
legitimized structural violence.  
 
Removal of „Chineseness‟ 
In order to remove everything Chinese, the government issued decrees to close down the 
Chinese organizations in October 1965, as well as Chinese schools in May 1966.257 It further 
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outlawed Chinese organizations, the public use of Chinese characters as well as cultural events. 
The government also prohibited the importing of printed material using Chinese characters. 
Importing Chinese magazines was placed on the same level as importing arms, narcotics or 
pornography.258 Prohibiting the Chinese language and culture forced the ethnic Chinese to de-
socialize from their culture and to re-socialize (DIN) with indigenous Indonesian culture. The 
government clearly marked „Chineseness‟ as something unacceptable and unwanted in 
Indonesian society. The assimilation program also worked as a tool for marginalization and 
fragmentation, infringing upon the basic needs of freedom and identity. The schools and 
organizations as well as the press had been forums bringing the ethnic Chinese community 
together. Closing down these forums can be interpreted as aiming at the fragmentation (SFN) of 
the group.  
 
Limiting Chinese Indonesian culture to the domestic sphere denied the Chinese Indonesians the 
public expression of their own identity in the country which they considered their home. The 
government attempted to eliminate the Chinese Indonesian culture by penetrating (SIN) their 
(the „topdogs‟‟) thinking into minds of the „underdog‟. Since there is no general „Indonesian 
culture‟, the ethnic Chinese were expected to adopt the respective culture of the area they lived 
in. This is an example of how structural violence can enable the ruling elite to exert direct 
violence, as the basic human need of identity and freedom were denied through the government 
bans on the ethnic Chinese to practice their cultural identity. These acts of direct violence – the 
issuing of laws banning the culture – were possible due to the violent structures which the 
indigenous elite had inherited from the Dutch. These structures prevented the ethnic Chinese 
from moving up to the elite level and from participating in politics, therrby possibly preventing 
the passing of discriminatory legislation. Later, once the laws were implemented, they further 
strengthened the marginalization of the ethnic Chinese and as a result reproduced the violent 
structures.  
 
In order to assimilate ethnic Chinese, different approaches were suggested. In 1975, one 
approach put forward was forced biological assimilation through laws which, would they have 
been implemented, would have prohibited marriages among ethnic Chinese for 25 years. 
Parliament also mooted the idea of training centers for ethnic Chinese in which they would be 
indoctrinated in the national ideology of Pancasila 259 . Neither of these approaches were 
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259 “Pancasila” refers to the five principles of state ideology formulated by Soekarno in 1945 and incorporated 
into Indonesia‟s constitution: Belief in the one and only God, Just and Civilized Humanity, The unity of 
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enforced, however. Indonesian politicians, nonetheless officially recommended intermarriage, 
the taking-up of Indonesian sounding names (a corresponding regulation was introduced in 
1966) and conversion to Islam to the ethnic Chinese. However, these practices did not benefit 
those who followed suit. Muslim Chinese Indonesians with Indonesian names as well as 
children of inter-ethnic couples continued to be considered non-indigenous (non-pribumi) and 
identifiable by the „Chinese‟ code on their identity cards (CV).260 While conversion to Islam 
was recommended to the ethnic Chinese, the government did not make reference to the role 
played by Chinese influence in spreading Islam in parts of Indonesia.261  
 
Legitimization of Anti-Chinese Sentiments in Popular Culture 
Indigenous Indonesians perceived assimilating ethnic Chinese and thereby eliminating 
„Chineseness‟ to be legitimate not only because it was foreign, but because they were branded 
as asocial, unpatriotic and blamed for supposedly pursuing selfish interests.262 This perception 
had already been incorporated in local customs and beliefs (CV). A Central Javanese 
thanksgiving ritual, conducted by peasants at the end of the harvest season, is an example. The 
ritual involves cooking rice and it is considered to be bad luck when an ethnic Chinese person 
enters or even passes the kitchen while this rice is being cooked. Should this nonetheless 
happen, the rice has to be thrown away and new rice has to be prepared.263 Another example 
indicating that anti-Chinese sentiments are embedded in local cultures can be found as part of 
the batik traditions of certain areas in Indonesia. Batik as cultural heritage264 has a high value in 
Indonesia and is heavily loaded with symbolism. The different motives and colors have their 
own meaning. For example, brown colors were the official colors of Javanese royal courts and 
green colors stand for Islam. After Chinese arrived to the archipelago, they introduced red dye 
as well as patterns from China to the indigenous Indonesian patterns and colors. The color red 
represents luck, happiness and fortune in Chinese culture. The Dutch introduced indigo as a dye 
and as a result blue colors were associated with the Dutch. While at the beginning of the Dutch 
colonial period all colors were integrated in batik fashion, over the centuries in certain parts of 
Java, such as Yogyakarta, Solo and Surabaya, the use of red color in batik was reduced and 
eventually ceased as relations with the ethnic Chinese in these particular areas deteriorated. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Indonesia, Democracy guided by consensus arising out of deliberations amongst representatives, Social 
justice for all people of Indonesia.  
260 Heryanto, 1998b, p. 103-104.  
261 Taylor, 2005, pp. 152ff.  
262 Heryanto, 1998b, p. 103. 
263 Interview with William Kwan, (15.04.2010).  
264 In October, 2009, the traditional Indonesian dyeing technique, batik, has been included in the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage list of UNESCO.  
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Chinese cultural influence in these areas was unwanted by either the local elite or the local 
population, and hardly any red color can be found in traditional local batik there until today. In 
other areas, such as Lasem, where the gap between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Javanese 
was less pronounced and ethnic Chinese were better integrated in society, the color red is still 
present in batik and has even become characteristic for the batik of this area. No anti-Chinese 
riots took place in Lasem in 1998, in spite the fact that provocateurs were sent there as well. 
The Muslim leaders of this area opposed the riot-makers and sent them away. In Solo and 
Surabaya, on the other hand, large-scale anti-Chinese riots took place.265  
 
Reconstruction of the Chinese Identity to Maintain Distinctiveness 
Since assimilation policies were issued to abolish „Chineseness‟, the government had problems 
keeping the counterpart alive. Therefore, the very identity that the official policies were trying 
to abolish by promoting assimilation had to paradoxically be constantly reconstructed to 
survive. A distinct group of ethnic Chinese served the purpose of unifying the other indigenous 
Indonesian groups, while constituting the politically weak pillars of the Indonesian economy, 
and also acting scapegoats in times of crises.266 In order to maintain their distinctiveness, the 
government employed various different measures and approaches.  
 
Stereotyping of Chinese Indonesians 
Negative stereotypes of and prejudice 267  against Chinese deriving from their position as 
middlemen (often merchants and tax collectors) had already spread during the colonial period 
and had been internalized by indigenous Indonesians. The main negative character traits 
attributed to ethnic Chinese were: greediness, selfishness, exclusivity (not open to others but 
ethnic Chinese). 268  For many indigenous Indonesians these characteristics already justified 
                                                   
265 Interviews with batik entrepreneurs in Lasem, April 2010 (e.g. Gustav P.).  
266 Heryanto, 1998b, p. 101.  
267 Prejudice is defined here as attitudes towards a group based solely on their membership to this group 
(negative or positive). In case of negative prejudice, they create a negative affect or hostile attitude 
towards members of a social group based on a pejorative attitude or conviction. This negative affect can 
lead to a negative treatment of members of this group. Among other explanations or theories deriving from 
social psychology, sources for prejudice can be competition over scarce or desired sources (Realistic 
conflict theory, e.g.: Sherif et al. 1961; Bobo & Tuan, 1983) and/or social categorization which results in 
competing for a distinctive and positive social identity by dividing the social world into two camps, the so-
called us-versus-them effect, (social identity theory, e.g.: Tajfel, 1970). It can also derive from social 
learning. In the case of social learning, prejudices can be transferred from generation to generation through 
classical conditioning, instrumental conditioning, and modeling (social learning theory, e.g.: Rotter, 1954; 
Bandura, 1977). 
268 The characteristics evolved already during colonial times and are still prevalent today according to the 
respondents (both Chinese Indonesian as well as indigenous Indonesians) (interviews in 2008 as well as 
2010).  
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(CV) prejudice and discrimination which violate the basic human need of well-being (SWN). 
Another prominent stereotype was that of superior Chinese work ethics, involving diligence, 
thrift and perseverance.269 These comparatively positive traits seemed to offer an explanation 
for the economic success of ethnic Chinese businessmen. Even if these characteristics are 
positive, they also caused jealousy among the indigenous population which in turn served as a 
motivator for maltreatment of this group. These anti-Chinese sentiments were fuelled by the 
press close to the government. As such, positive examples of the ethnic Chinese community, 
like badminton world champions of Chinese descent, were known in public media (close to the 
government) by their Indonesian names, while ethnic Chinese criminals were referred to by 
their Chinese names.270Caricatures or cartoons portraying Chinese Indonesians as fat people 
with slanted eyes who enrich themselves at the expense of indigenous peasants were published:  
 
 
Figure 5: An ethnic Chinese exploiting an indigenous Indonesian271  
                                                   
269 Heryanto, 1998b, p. 103.  
270 Heryanto, 1998b, p. 104.  
271 Mingguan Trisakti, May 25, 1966, Chua, 2004, p. 83. 
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Figure 6: Indigenous entrepreneurs with small businesses begging an ethnic Chinese 
conglomerate to adopt them.272 
 
The Chinese Indonesian business elite contributed to the fostering of negative stereotypes and 
consequently the prejudice against ethnic Chinese as a group, similar to the colonial times, the 
Chinese business elite was needed to expand the country's economy. 273  The New Order 
government's five-year economic development plan which the Chinese business elite  benefited 
from, helped the overall Indonesian economy but simultaneously widened the gap between 
them and indigenous Indonesians. Ethnic Chinese engaging in trade especially in urban areas 
managed to enhance their status to middle class or higher.274 While their political and cultural 
status declined drastically with the beginning of the New Order, their economical status reached 
new peaks. 275  
The stereotypical image of the rich ethnic Chinese tycoon did not apply to all Chinese 
Indonesians. In fact only a small number managed to form alliances with the political elite. 
Those who did were protected under the so-called cukong system in which an ethnic Chinese 
                                                   
272 Far Eastern Review, May 2, 1991, Chua, 2004, p. 84. 
273 Mackie, 1988, p. 243.  
274 Thung, 2001, p. 167.  
275 Heryanto, 1998b, p. 102.  
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businessman maintained close ties to a member of the Indonesian elite, mainly high-ranking 
politicians or military officers. These ties normally protected the respective ethnic Chinese 
from harassment and ensured influence and control over the private sector for the Indonesian 
power holders in return.276 The ethnic Chinese businessmen tried to gain political influence, 
especially with regard to laws and regulations concerning their strand of business, through the 
cukong system and occasionally succeeded. This created resentment among indigenous 
businessmen who were often supported by Islamic groups and opponents of the government. 
They criticized that Indonesia was not ruled by Indonesians but rather by foreigners who 
controlled the economy, i.e. ethnic Chinese, who were perceived as foreigners in spite of their 
Indonesian citizenship.277  
From the point of view of the political elite, in addition to their experience and skills, it was 
their status as unpopular foreigners which rendered the ethnic Chinese suitable for the role of 
the country‟s business elite. Due to their outsider status, they could not endanger the political 
elite‟s position in power. After Indonesians had freed themselves from colonial rule, it was 
unlikely that the people would accept being governed by „foreigners‟ again. Therefore, they 
posed less of a threat to the political elite than a successful indigenous merchant middle class 
would have, as the latter might have challenged the political status quo. Thus, a small group of 
Chinese Indonesian tycoons became disproportionately rich, seemingly re-itarating the 
stereotype of the greedy Chinese „economic animal‟278 who enriched himself at the cost of the 
indigenous poor. The constant reproduction of this stereotype from one generation to the next 
has shaped the perception of Chinese Indonesians among indigenous Indonesians. The Institute 
for the Promotion of National Unity, a semi-governmental organization established in order to 
facilitate assimilation of ethnic Chinese, did not promote „sameness‟ of indigenous and Chinese 
Indonesians or aimed at countering stereotypes like the image of the „economic animal‟, but 
instead highlighted their differences, making it difficult for either or both of the groups to 
narrow the gap between them.279 For the political elite, it was easy to point to a few very 
wealthy ethnic Chinese with extravagant lifestyles to stir up hatred among impoverished 
                                                   
276 Suryadinata, 1988, p. 266. 
277 Suryadinata, 1988, p. 267. 
278 The term „economic animal‟ as deeply rooted stereotype reflects the image of ethnic Chinese who are only 
focusing on their work and do not engage in social and cultural activities. According to Thung, the 
“longstanding and widespread perception of the Chinese as „economic animals‟ retarded the ability of 
other Indonesian groups to conceive of Chinese activities as having the same social and cultural 
significance as their own.” Thung, 1998, p. 220-221.  
279 Purdey, 2006, p. 21. 
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indigenous, leaving unmentioned the fact that it was only a very small portion of the ethnic 
Chinese who were in such a position.280  
 
„Othering‟ of Chinese Indonesians 
Groups often define themselves against a perceived „other‟ to define themselves. The „othering‟ 
and thus marginalization (SFN) of ethnic Chinese served a functional purpose by identifying 
the salient „out-group‟ against which the nation sought to define itself. This in turn influenced 
the ethnic Chinese‟s‟ understanding of their own identity.281 The non-acceptance and „othering‟ 
of ethnic Chinese by other Indonesian ethnic groups fostered hostile prejudices against ethnic 
Chinese. As a counter-reaction to the hostile attitudes they were facing, ethnic Chinese 
increased their in-group solidarity. This re-enforced their outsider identity which was then often 
perceived as exclusivity and an assumed feeling of superiority vis-à-vis the indigenous, creating 
a vicious circle.  
In spite of government public efforts, Chinese Indonesian ethnicity remained visible and they 
were recognized as being a group of „others‟. Not only were those who still considered 
themselves to be Chinese marginalized but the group as a whole. This also included those who 
sought to assimilate. Many ethnic Chinese already did not feel Chinese but rather Indonesian. A 
considerable number did not speak the Chinese languages 282  or follow Chinese rituals or 
beliefs. This social segregation not only served the purposes of the government, but proved 
useful to the masses as well. In times of frustration, the outsider group could be blamed and the 
indigenous had a chance to vent their anger at members of this group without having to fear 
official censure. A group of underdogs leading a relatively socially marginalized existence 
often proved to be a suitable scapegoat (marginalization, SFN).283  By keeping the official 
discussion about the so-called „Chinese problem‟ alive, the government made sure that ethnic 
Chinese would not cease to be perceived as „others‟. Their ethnic identity was kept alive or 
even reproduced to maintain the status quo of ethnic Chinese as social middlemen.284 To this 
aim, negative stereotypes which fostered prejudices were constantly perpetuated and ethnic 
Chinese were discriminated against by the state and its organs.  
 
                                                   
280 Purdey, 2006, p. 22. 
281 Purdey, 2006, p. 24. 
282 A study conducted already in the early 1970s indicated that 81% of the Chinese Indonesian households 
spoke Indonesian. Purdey, 2006, p. 29.  
283 The Indonesian term „kambing hitam‟ (black goat), meaning scapegoat, is frequently referred to by ethnic 
Chinese (Interview with Christine Tjhin,  01.09.2008).  
284 Heryanto, 1998b, p. 104.  
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(Physical) Segregation and Segmentation of Chinese Indonesians from Indigenous 
Indonesians 
To maintain the distinctiveness of Chinese Indonesians, a number of politicians argued that 
they should be excluded from the rest of Indonesian society. A first step would be the 
reintroduction of colonial-era ghettos or camps for Chinese Indonesians. This was however 
only implemented in West Kalimantan.285  
As response to riots in West-Kalimantan286 in 1967, during which ethnic Chinese were attacked 
by Dayaks, the government re-activated Presidential Decree 10 and relocated ethnic Chinese 
from the rural areas to the coast. An estimated 50,000 Chinese Indonesians were gathered in 
camps and later resettled in the coastal towns of Pontianak and Singkawang.287 As most ethnic 
Chinese distrusted the country's legal system288 and feared that in case they might file a claim, 
they would be further harassed by other indigenous Indonesians, no official claims were filed 
against the Dayak perpetrators.289 Thus the experience of past direct violence shaped a culture 
of silencing incidents such as this one (CV).  
A consequence of the Presidential Decree was that most Chinese Indonesians were forced to 
live concentrated in the cities as they were prevented from working in rural areas. For the 
Indonesian elite, like for the Dutch colonial masters before them, restricting the freedom of 
movement and hindering the integration process of ethnic Chinese made controlling them 
easier. Due to the high concentration of ethnic Chinese in the cities, the likelihood of inter-
ethnic marriage was reduced. From an outsider‟s perspective, they formed a more 
homogeneous group. For the local population, they were segmented (SIN) and at the same time 
expulsed (DFN) from the country side.  
 
                                                   
285 Liem, 1986, p. 557-8. 
286 In 1967, a riot against ethnic Chinese broke out in West Kalimantan. The violence was triggered by an 
attack by the mostly ethnically Chinese Malaysian guerilla force PGRS (Pasukan Gerlyawan Rakyat 
Sarawak) which was active in the jungle near the border. This troop launched an attack on Indonesian 
troops and villages as a reaction to Indonesia's campaign of “Confrontation against the new nation of 
Malaysia”. Dayaks were among the dead in the villages. The villagers noted that the members of the 
guerrilla were ethnic Chinese and thus struck back at Chinese Indonesian villages, killing several hundred 
ethnic Chinese. The local government did not intervene and the attacks by the Dayak went unpunished.  
287 Purdey, 2006, pp. 19-20.  
288 Precedents for making legal claims against the perpetrators who were indigenous were rare and most 
ethnic Chinese did not expect to be treated fairly by authorities including courts. Purdey, 2008, p. 520. 
Similar experiences were reported by Ester Jusuf who tried to convince victims of the 1998 riots to file 
claims without success (interview 05.09.2008). 
289 In case of other physical attacks against ethnic Chinese during the New Order era (e.g 1973 in Bandung, 
1980 in Ujung Pandang and Solo, 1983 in Sumbawa), the government did not punish perpetrators and the 
victims did not receive reparations. Winkelmann, 2008, p. 60.  
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Apart from physical segregation, the government separated the ethnic Chinese from the 
indigenous population by occupational segmentation. The negative image of the ethnic Chinese 
as „economical animals‟290 might have faded over the years had the Chinese Indonesians no 
longer been primarily engaged in business, the segment assigned to them since Dutch times. In 
order to ensure that the ethnic Chinese remained in this segment, the government implemented 
maximum quotas for Chinese students at public universities and in administrative positions.291 
They were mostly excluded from public service or positions in the military to prevent them 
from gaining political influence (SFN). This segmentation (SIN) in terms of profession was 
important as the group would not only continue to be perceived as one group based on their 
ethnicity only but also on their social class and assigned professional fields. As a distinct group 
of „others‟ linked to negative stereotypes, becoming fully accepted as Indonesians in many 
cases proved to be impossible. 292  These regulations fostered the marginalization (SFN) of 
Chinese Indonesians and discouraged integration.  
 
State-led Discrimination against Chinese Indonesians 
Despite the official claim of furthering the assimilation of the ethnic Chinese, the Soeharto 
regime did not change the status of the Chinese Indonesians to indigenous. Even if they wanted 
to become fully Indonesian as a group, ethnic Chinese would not have been able to succeed 
since the concept of „Indonesianness‟ was reserved for people considered as being indigenous 
to the archipelago. Discrimination was thus already embedded in the concept of national 
identity. This concept was not questioned, neither by ethnic Chinese or indigenous Indonesians, 
since the categorization of indigenous and non-indigenous had already been introduced by the 
Dutch before and the emergence of an Indonesian nation (nationalism) and subsequent 
independence (CV).  
 
Language forms an important basis for stereotyping. The ethnic Chinese were referred to as 
Chinese („cina‟)293 rather than as Chinese Indonesians or other terms such as tionghoa, thus 
marking them as foreigners and marginalizing (SFN) them. No difference was made between 
people from China (residing and holding the citizenship of the People's Republic of China or 
Taiwan) and Chinese Indonesians who called Indonesia their home. Chinese Indonesians 
                                                   
290 Interview with Mohammad Gatot (08.09.2008) and Gustav P. (14.04.2010).  
291 Heryanto, 1999, p. 326; Reid, 2001, p. 75. 
292 Hoon, 2008, pp. 107-108.  
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their active choice (if made) to be Indonesians and questioning their sincerity of their choice as well as 
their loyalty to Indonesia. The rather neutral term „tionghoa‟ (Chinese) was banned from public use by the 
government in 1967. 
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considered the use of the term „cina‟ as an offence. The cultural and historical identification of 
some ethnic Chinese with Chinese civilization was interpreted in public as being a political 
identification with the current government of PR China. Especially during the Cold War – 
when Indonesia froze all diplomatic relations with PR China (from the end of 1960s until the 
beginning of the 1990s), ethnic Chinese were frequently reported as having maintained their 
ties to Mainland China. Many indigenous Indonesians considered this to be sufficient proof of 
their disloyalty towards Indonesia as well as their (alleged Communist) political orientation, 
thus justifying discriminatory acts and cultural oppression.294 The use of the word „cina‟ for 
ethnic Chinese enforced this association in daily life. Therefore, language also played a role in 
legitimizing violence (i.e. cultural violence).  
 
In 1970, ethnic Chinese were required to re-register as Indonesians of Chinese descent. This 
procedure especially offended those Chinese who before had already actively confirmed their 
Indonesian citizenship. After this registration procedure, everyone of Chinese descent was 
identifiable by their identity card (karta tanda penduduk – KTP) and census registration card 
(kartu cacah jiwa). In contrast to indigenous Indonesians, the cards of ethnic Chinese showed a 
special code.295 This official stigma exposed them to discrimination by officials (bureaucrats, 
police and military). In order to renew their identity cards, for example, ethnic Chinese were 
often asked for a higher fee than indigenous Indonesians.296 Thus government policies that 
fostered stigmatization and discrimination led to an institutionalization of discrimination 
against Chinese Indonesians (SWN) 297 . This legitimized treating a Chinese Indonesian 
differently from an indigenous Indonesian. As the state already made this distinction between 
Chinese Indonesian and indigenous Indonesians, it is not surprising that the population 
transferred the discrimination from the governmental down to the grass-root level. 
 
In order to transform existing prejudices and discrimination to direct violence in the form of 
large ethnic riots as happened during the May riots 1998, Brass mentions the need for „riot 
specialists‟ or „riot engineers‟ that implement structures and mobilize the crowds.298 These acts 
of direct violence then reproduced the dependency of the ethnic Chinese on security provided 
by the state and thus the political elite. Due to this dependency, this merchant class could not 
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evolve to become a threat to the political elite. This reinforced the structure of indirect violence 
which ensured the existing gap between the ethnic Chinese and other ethnic Indonesian groups. 
 
3.3 End of an Era: Anti-Chinese Riots in the 1990s 
The Asian Crisis and Scape-goating of Chinese Indonesians 
The violence against ethnic Chinese came to a peak during the final years of the Soeharto 
regime, when the political system of the New Order was challenged by other political parties. 
These included the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri (the 
daughter of Soekarno) as well as other smaller parties, such as the Islamic party (PPP), 
supporting the call for more democracy and reforms. In order to silence the voices raised 
against New Order policies, the government banned newspapers and magazines closely linked 
to the opposition in 1994. In this context, Soeharto also ended the „‟program of openness 
(keterbukaan)’ which was introduced in the early 1980s to promote foreign investment in 
Indonesia and greater integration into the world economy.  
 
Even though the economy was still booming in 1996, the gap between rich and poor increased 
instead of decreased which the Indonesian public blamed on the government and the ethnic 
Chinese conglomerates.299 It became obvious that the wealth of the family Soeharto increased 
substantially and a national project for the development of the Indonesian car industry which 
was awarded to Soeharto's son, Tommy Soeharto, along with other lucrative deals, confirmed 
accusations of nepotism. President Soeharto made an effort to divert interest from his family‟s 
wealth by publicly criticizing the wealth of ethnic Chinese tycoons.300  The masses‟ anger 
resulting from the economic crisis, unemployment and hunger should thereby be directed 
towards the ethnic Chinese.  
The mass media stated frequently that the ethnic Chinese who made up only approx. 3% of the 
population controlled 70% or even more of the nation‟s economy.301 This myth of the ethnic 
Chinese‟ dominance of the nation's economy had been perpetuated already in the past to 
strengthen their image as the „rich‟ and „exploitive‟ minority. Even though it is true that a 
                                                   
299 Thung, 1998, p. 232. 
300  E.g. Soeharto held a meeting at his Tapos ranch in 1990 with the heads of the leading business 
conglomerates (mainly Chinese Indonesians) during which he appealed to the conglomerates to assist in 
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disproportionally high number of ethnic Chinese played a significant role in the country's 
private sector, especially since Soeharto took over, their overall influence has been overrated. 
The myth was based on a study made by Michael Backman, Executive Officer with the East 
Asia Analytical Unit of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 1995. 
However, the study states that the Chinese-Indonesians controlled about 73% of Indonesia's 
listed companies „by market capitalization‟. Those who cited this study apparently failed to 
note this detail. This means their “control by market capitalization has been determined after 
listed firms controlled by governments or foreigners are discounted.”302 However, the study 
seemed to confirm the impression many indigenous Indonesians had based on casual 
observation. Many business establishments, shops, banks and manufacturing facilities were and 
still are today owned by Chinese Indonesians.303 
By exaggerating their economical influence, the indigenous elite maintained, further developed 
and even (re-)constructed the image of the „exploitive rich Chinese‟. Despite his efforts, 
Soeharto could not manage to shake the allegations of nepotism against him as he could not 
hide that fact that the Chinese tycoons were his close allies. The negative publicity for the 
ethnic Chinese fostered their image as agents of a system in which the political elite (mainly the 
Soeharto family) and their cronies (the ethnic Chinese) enriched themselves at the expense of 
the rest of the population. They were also held responsible for the widening of the gap between 
rich and poor.  
 
The Asian Economic Crisis began with the collapse of the Thai baht in early 1997, with the 
Indonesian Rupiah following soon after. Along with inflation, the unemployment rate was 
rising and even those who were employed did not earn enough to keep up with the falling 
currency. Prices of food and basic commodities did not fall accordingly, causing panic (buying) 
and accusations against shop-owners of hoarding food to artificially inflate prices.  
During the 1990s new facilities such as shopping malls, leisure complexes and churches were 
built by Chinese Indonesians to satisfy the needs of the growing middle-class in Jakarta. The 
government fueled anti-Chinese sentiments by singling out ethnic Chinese conglomerates as 
being disloyal to the government, as these officially opposed government policies by publicly 
stating that the state should embrace the reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). 304  These reforms included the elimination of economic policies which had been 
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identified as damaging to the national economy, such as ending the national car project and the 
clove monopoly which both involved family members of Soeharto. The ethnic Chinese 
businessman Wanandi, for example, was publicly accused of transferring money out of 
Indonesia and refusing to exchange US Dollars for Indonesian rupiah, thereby further 
weakening the Indonesian economy. Wanandi thus served as a scapegoat for a government that 
was not able to deal with the financial and economical crisis at the time.305 The causal relation 
between the ethnic Chinese and the financial crisis was constantly stressed by the government 
and served as a motor for violence at the grass-root level.306  
 
(Direct) Violent Acts 
In 1996, violent acts against ethnic Chinese in Jakarta (July 27), Situbondo, East Java (October 
10) and Tasikmalaya, West Java (December 26) took place. These focused mostly on property 
(houses, shops, factories) and churches or temples (Confucian or Buddhist) of ethnic Chinese 
rather than their lives.307 As I shall discuss in more detail below, it is often difficult to assess the 
number of deaths since the figures vary from one source to the other. Many incidents and cases 
were not reported to the police, making it difficult to compile exact figures. In 1997, violent 
incidents occurred in Sanggau Ledo, West Kalimantan, Tanah Abang, Jabotabek, 
Rengasdengklok, West Java (all in January), Bandung, West Java (February 18), Pekalongan, 
Central Java (March 27), Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan (May 23), Tangerang, Jabotabek 
(September 9) and Ujung Pandang (Makassar), Sulawesi (September 15). It was not possible to 
determine the exact number of people who died in the above mentioned incidents. In the case of 
Tangerang, for example, it is doubtful that all deaths were reported to the officials as many of 
the ethnic Chinese residing there are missing the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI, 
Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia) and were not even registered as citizens. As 
only ethnic Chinese needed to provide the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate, for example for 
applying for citizenship documentation, this document provides an example for discrimination 
against ethnic Chinese by organs of the state. The most incidents happened throughout 1998 
(the main locations of violent incidents are marked in red on the map, see figure below). 
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Figure 7: Map of Indonesia; places of 1998 riots are marked in red. 
 
The climax of violent acts with regard to their scale as well as their number was reached with 
the riots in May 1998, occurring in Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Lampung, Medan and Palembang. 
Witnesses of the incidents reported of organized groups of men acting under orders and large 
groups of people that followed and took advantage of the situation by plundering.308 After 
1998, riots continued to occur, though, they were on a much smaller scale than those in 1998. 
Examples include Karawang, West Java (January 9) and Bandung, West Java (March 8) in 
1999.  
The total number of vctims of the May 1998 riots remains contested. NGOs, such as the 
Volunteer Group of Humanity (TRuK) estimated that 1,190 people had died in fires and 27 
were shot dead, whereas the police reported 451 dead, the district military reported 463 dead 
and the Jakarta regional government 288 dead.309  Other violent riots in Indonesia which were 
present at the same time caused more casualties, such as in Ambon in 1999. According to the 
International Crisis Group at least 5,000 people (up to 10,000) were killed. 310  As further 
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detailed in the following section, rioters targeted mainly ethnic Chinese shops and houses. It 
was apparently not their intention to harm the ethnic Chinese in person. Instead, their actions 
rather displayed an anger which they vented on the ethnic Chinese collectively as scapegoats. 
By making them feel inferior and subordinate despite their assumed wealth, the perpetrators 
undermined the dominance of the majority population. Since the state did not protect the 
victims, these actions went unpunished.  
 
Even though each incident started off differently, a certain pattern is visible. In the riots prior to 
the economic crisis (before May 1998), an event involving a Chinese Indonesian triggered 
violent acts, such as:311 
 a Chinese Indonesian shop-owner who had strip-searched an indigenous woman whom 
he accused of shoplifting (West Java, 2 June, 1997) 
 the murder of an indigenous by a Chinese Indonesian (Makassar, 15 September, 1997) 
These events served as triggers for riots. Instead of being limited to the people involved, 
violence against the property of ethnic Chinese as well as against the people themselves in 
general broke out across the respective cities. While negative, anti-Chinese stereotypes and 
prejudices created an atmosphere in which riots could occur, turning „normal‟ people into 
rioters may have required the actions of active provocateurs.312 Witnesses of violent acts in 
different places reported to the Joint Fact Finding Team that people not from the area had come 
on motorcycles, talked to the people, and guided them. 313  Before May 1998, an active 
mobilization of masses to act against the ethnic Chinese seemed to have been necessary. During 
the peak of violence in May 1998, however, rumors of shop-owners hoarding food or selling 
food at high prices sufficed to start riots against them which then often spread to other cities.314  
 
After Soeharto stepped down and an interim government took over, riots against Chinese 
Indonesians continued throughout Indonesia, although they were not on the same scale as the 
May riots. It is very unlikely that those would have been engineered by the new government. 
Upon closer examination, a shift in the focus of violent acts becomes visible: instead of 
targeting all ethnic Chinese, the perpetrators concentrated on Christian Chinese. In many, 
though not all, incidents of anti-Chinese violence, non-Muslim symbols such as churches were 
targeted. In Indonesia, religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims became frequent in 
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the 1990s. As many ethnic Chinese are non-Muslims they are considered to be infidels. 
Violence against ethnic Chinese has been legitimized (CV) with the argument of them acting in 
an impure manner, e.g. by eating pork. In many cases the victims were not only ethnic Chinese, 
but also Christian indigenous people. In addition to Christians, the perpetrators targeted mainly 
Chinese Indonesians with considerable or at least ostentatious wealth. The attacks were directed 
specifically at churches and house estates belonging to the „rich‟ (e.g. in Bandung, March 1999 
as well as in Tangerang and Bogor in 2004).315 Thus a shift can be observed, away from ethnic 
or racial aspects towards religious and class components of the conflict.  
 
Gender-based Sexual Violence: Rape 
A new, gendered aspect became prominent in the May 1998 riots that had not been present or at 
least not reported in previous riots, namely gender-based sexual violence (DWN). In the course 
of this type of violence, women (mainly ethnic Chinese, but also indigenous women of the 
urban poor) were raped. Whether isolated or systematic, the effects of rape are devastating to 
individuals and damaging to whole communities. The physical consequences can include 
unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted infections including HIV, and genital injury 
including fistula, all of which can leave women scarred, disabled, unable to conceive, or 
deemed unsuitable for marriage. Apart from physical consequences, the victims suffer from 
psychological damages (traumata). Like the number of people killed, the number of women 
raped is also very difficult to ascertain. Local human rights groups, such as TRuK recorded 168 
victims of rape, whereas the Joint Fact Finding Team appointed by the interim government 
under Habibie could only verify 85 cases of rape. Due to disagreement among the members of 
the team, the report does not state whether the rapes were a spontaneous side-effect of the 
violent attacks against ethnic Chinese in general or whether they had actually been a pre-
meditated part of the engineered violence.316  
 
As rape is still considered a taboo topic in Indonesia, women who have been raped are often 
hesitant to talk about their experience fearing that they might bring shame upon themselves and 
their families.317  After the violence, the Indonesian journalists, religious leaders and members 
of parliament started questioning if the rapes had actually taken place.318 Even though the UN 
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Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, had confirmed mass 
rapes of Chinese Indonesian women.319  Once the credibility of the victims was questioned, less 
women were willing to step forward. TRuK reported that they had supported more victims of 
rape than the number stated by the Joint Fact Finding Team, who, however, were not willing to 
officially file a claim against their perpetrators.320 Their hesitation was further fostered when in 
1998 top officials of President Habibie‟s newly formed cabinet, e.g. the Minister for Women‟s 
Affairs, representatives of the military and major Islamic organizations also joined the public 
debate and questioned the integrity of the victims. 321  Mass media reports stated that the 
economic crisis, unemployment and hunger directed the masses‟ anger against the ethnic 
Chinese, due to their disproportionate economic power.322 As a consequence, the general public 
emotionally distanced themselves from the victims and justified them as a specific ethnic 
problem arising from prolonged economic disadvantage.323  
 
Muslim organizations accused groups protecting the victims (such as the Volunteers for 
Humanity) of fabricating sensationalist stories to discredit Islam.324 Reporters, like Sri Muryono 
demanded to disclose and persuade the alleged victims to testify in public.325 Their demands 
were also supported by top government officials, like General Wiranto (Chief Commander of 
the Armed Forces).326 The victims were therefore violated twice: at first by their perpetrators 
and later by the media and the public who questioned their integrity and honesty. Even though 
the Joint Fact Finding Team had confirmed that rapes had taken place, the government initiated 
no actions to deal with the perpetrators or to provide help to the victims.327  
 
The May-Riots: A New Peak in the History of Violence against Ethnic 
Chinese 
Why was the violence in 1996-1999 different from „normal‟ discriminatory acts against ethnic 
Chinese? First, the scale of the violence was larger than „everyday‟ violent acts prior to these 
riots. Second, physical attacks on ethnic Chinese during the climax of violence in May 1998, 
were committed on a national scale involving an organizational strategy and mobilization of 
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masses by members of the state apparatus (political and military). Apart from active 
involvement of state sections, the state also failed in fulfilling its responsibility to protect its 
citizens from violence. The riots also revealed how deep-seated anti-Chinese sentiments, 
prejudice and discrimination were among the indigenous population. Although it was mainly 
property that was attacked and only few people were killed directly, many ethnic Chinese (and 
also some indigenous – especially poor ones) died because they were not rescued when their 
houses or shops etc. were looted (non-assistance of a person in danger). Therefore, due to the 
higher scale of destruction, the death rate was higher than in incidents before. 
The years 1996 – 1999 also saw the emergence of new kinds of violence: the rape of (mainly) 
Chinese Indonesian women as well as systematic destruction of ethnic Chinese property.328 
Systematic destruction of property can be interpreted as meaning that the violence was 
motivated by ethnic or religious antipathies as well as social envy rather than purely 
economical aims. The social differences seemed to legitimize the destruction of their property, 
common sayings such as: “They have so much, they can afford it. It will not threaten their 
existence.” 329  show that not much harm was seen in “making them more equal” 330  by 
destroying their property. Even though most of the frustration of the rioters sprang out of the 
difficult economical situation they faced, they chose to destroy the property rather than stealing 
it. Instead of taking over shops, factories, churches etc., they merely burnt them down.331  
 
The material losses of around 457 billion rupiahs (ca. 46 million US$) incurred upon the ethnic 
Chinese in Solo during the 1997 riots alone provides an idea of the extent of the material 
damage. These losses made it difficult for many ethnic Chinese to go on with their lives. 
Interestingly, even though indigenous Indonesians destroyed the property of Chinese 
Indonesians to vent their anger and to “make them more equal”,  the widespread belief that 
Chinese Indonesians would have the means to build up everything and go back to where they 
left off still remained quite strong.332 Possibly, this was based on, the fact that the Chinese as a 
group had managed to recover from past riots created the false belief each and every individual 
would be able to do so as well.333 For the tycoons who had secured their money, the losses they 
suffered might have been substantial, but they did not endanger their existence. For small shop 
owners, however, who had lost not only their shops and goods, but also their homes, their 
                                                   
328 Purdey, 2006, p. 36. 
329 Interview with Christine Tjhin (01.09.2008).  
330 Ibid.  
331 Purdey, 2006, p. 65.  
332 Purdey, 2006, p. 215 
333 Stories of poor Chinese families who lost their small businesses in the May 1998 riots and did not recover 
do noe seem to fit the popular perception of ethnic Chinese. Purdey, 2006, p. 215.  
98 
 
economic basis was entirely gone.334 As a consequence their basic human need of well-being, 
in this case security of their existence had been taken away, in some cases even seriously 
threatening their very survival.   
 
In contrast to the violence against ethnic Chinese before 1998, the May riots were reported in 
the news outside South-east Asia, mainly due to the considerably large scale of direct violence. 
Although media reports brought this conflict to attention for the people in other countries and 
raised sympathy and moral support for ethnic Chinese among foreign governments (especially 
PR China, Taiwan, USA) which pressured the new Habibie administration to establish the Joint 
Team, there was also a downside to this. Portraying the ethnic Chinese as victims on the 
international level made many of them feel uneasy. International reactions (especially on the 
internet) included anti-Indonesian or anti-Muslim slurs which the victims (being Indonesian 
and some of them Muslim as well) could not agree with. These reactions also did not help the 
cause of the ethnic Chinese as they highlighted their „foreigness‟ or link to the overseas 
Chinese community at a time when they needed to be recognized as Indonesians.335 
 
Aftermath of the Riots – Dealing With Violence 
In the aftermath of the riots, foreign governments such as the Chinese, Taiwanese and US 
governments, as well as Indonesian human rights organizations and the National Human Rights 
Commission (Komnas HAM) have all pressured the Indonesian government on behalf of the 
ethnic Chinese. In reaction, President Habibie and his government appointed a Joint Fact 
Finding Team as early as July 1998 to investigate the incidents.  
 
The report issued by the Joint Fact Finding Team is a valuable source of information, especially 
since the research was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the riots. However, there were 
limits set to the work of this team, which was only given three months to complete its report. 
Finding witnesses willing to talk about the events only two months afterwards proved to be 
difficult. The members of the team faced further difficulties in gathering information as the 
incidents had taken place in various locations across Indonesia. Another impediment was that 
most members of the team did not have any prior experience in fact finding and in conducting 
this kind of research. Nevertheless, they received only very little training due to the tight time 
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schedule.336  After the report was completed in October 1998, only the government and a 
handful of researchers received the report in full length. While the full report covered several 
hundred pages, only an abriged version of twenty pages was made available to the public (as 
cited here). The team came to the conclusion that the violence was orchestrated by more than 
one party. The parties involved, according to the report, included members of the army, 
political and mass organizations as well as local criminals.337  
 
Since the Joint Fact Finding Team was set up by President Habibie to determine those 
responsible for the riots, it was crucial to the team to identify culprits. The team members 
singled out Prabowo, the Commander of the Kostrad (the Jakarta-based Army Strategic 
Reserve), as their main suspect for being responsible for the May riots. According to the report, 
he played a crucial role in the so called „Makostad meeting‟ on May 14, 1998, during which the 
violent acts were said to have been planned. The Joint Team suspected other members of the 
political elite as having been present at that meeting as well. However, the team did not find 
sufficient proof to name further suspects. Therefore, the team recommended that further 
investigations concerning this meeting should be carried out to find the missing links to 
members of the political elite. As a consequence of the report, Prabowo had to face a military 
trial. During the trial, he stated that he was not the mastermind and had acted only according to 
orders given to him by his superiors, Armed Forced Commander Lt. Gen. Feisal Tanjung and 
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Wiranto. However, his claims were dismissed by the military council, 
insisting that Prabowo had misunderstood the orders given to him. He was discharged from 
military service.338 The Joint Fact Finding Team did not question the decision by the military 
council, although it seems likely that Prabowo served as a scapegoat and that by „handing him 
over‟, the military prevented further investigations in their rows. Prabowo fled the country and 
sought asylum in Jordan. In public mind, this proved his guilt and responsibility for the 
planning and initiating of the May riots.339  
The Joint Fact Finding Team may have managed to provide the name of a key person involved, 
but it did not investigate more thoroughly, neither to uncover more people of the military and 
the government involved, nor to better understand their intentions and reasons. As a 
consequence, several members of the team refused to sign the final report, demanding further 
investigations. Even though the Joint Team had collected evidence to suspect military and 
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government involvement in the violence acts occurred in May 1998340, they could not find more 
links between the violence in the streets and the elite (other than Prabowo). According to 
Purdey, the testimony provided by the Army‟s chief of intelligence, Makarim, and his 
hesitation to support the Joint Team, was the key to why the Joint Team was not able to 
uncover the whole elite machination behind the violence.341 Many potential suspects remained 
in office which may explain why no further investigations were initiated. Apart from these 
weaknesses, the report was obviously not prepared in order to bring upon justice for the victims 
but rather mainly to respond to international pressures. Apart from Prabowo, no perpetrators 
were brought to trial. The report was rejected by the military, widely ignored by the 
government and questioned by sections of the national media.342  
 
While many aspects of the May 1998 riots remain unstudied, the available data allows for a few 
assumptions. It seems likely that the riots were initiated to allow President Soeharto to declare a 
state of emergency. This would have allowed the president to proclaim martial law if necessary 
and to restore order with force. Further, the president was thus given the opportunity to 
discredit rivals of his family (e.g. Gen. Wiranto) by showing that they were not able to control 
the situation. Last, but most important for the ethnic Chinese, the riots aimed at redirecting the 
people‟s anger from the government toward the Chinese Indonesians.343  
Since no other attempt was made to bring about justice, a culture of silence was cultivated 
(CV). In many interviews, ethnic Chinese were reluctant to talk about the riots. Instead, phrases 
such as: “Oh, let's better forget about 1998 and move on – like we always do,”344 were repeated 
like a mantra. Jusuf also identified a „normalization‟ of violence against Chinese Indonesians 
which leads to a tradition of silencing violence. The victims choose silence over testimony.345 It 
might also hint at the deep-seated fear that if the victims actually go to court and demand 
justice, they and their families could again become targets of violence. On the one hand they 
feared being hurt by having to re-live the events in court and on the other hand they feared that 
if the perpetrators were to be sentenced, people connected to the perpetrators could seek 
revenge in the form of violent acts against them.346 The feeling of being treated as second-class 
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citizens by the organs of the state has been embedded in the self-understanding of many ethnic 
Chinese.347  
 
Shortly after the May violence, President Habibie tried to convince the ethnic Chinese who had 
fled the country to return. Exact numbers are not available, but estimates rank between 20,000-
30,000 ethnic Chinese who left the country by Mid-May.348 However, riots continued after May 
1998, the reports of which caused a number of Chinese Indonesian to remain abroad. After the 
violence subsided in 1999, Chinese Indonesians slowly started to return – nevertheless, there 
were also those who decided to remain abroad.349 They were disappointed that their security 
could not be guaranteed and they had lost their trust both in the Indonesian government and the 
country itself.350 President Habibie stated several times in public that the ethnic Chinese had his 
full sympathy and that they were needed in Indonesia. 351  However, according to Sofyan 
Wanandi, the government remained mostly passive and thus unconvincing in its efforts at 
healing the wounds of the Chinese Indonesian community.352 Ethnic Chinese were only urged 
to come home in order to revive the economy again by reopening their businesses as if nothing 
happened. The calls by politicians (e.g. President Habibie and his successor Wahid353) for 
ethnic Chinese to return to Indonesia all mention their importance for the Indonesian economy. 
They were not „called home‟ as an integral part of the Indonesian nation and society, but (at 
least primarily) for their financial assets and business skills. When some ethnic Chinese refused 
to reopen their shops as they were frightened of what had happened before or because they did 
not have the financial resources to recover again, the government blamed them for being anti-
patriotic and disloyal.354  
These reactions to returning ethnic Chinese who either chose not to re-open businesses or were 
unable to do so show that the perception of ethnic Chinese had not changed after the riots. They 
further show that it was not considered wrong to exploit the economic skills and resources of 
the ethnic Chinese. The perception that if they wanted to stay and be Indonesians, they would 
have to contribute more than other ethnic groups supports the assumption that the national 
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concept which is based on „indigenousness‟ furthered the marginalized position of the ethnic 
Chinese and discrimination against them.  
  
The riots in the 1990s, peaking in May 1998, marked a turning point not only in the history of 
the Indonesian nation as such, but also for the history of the Chinese Indonesians in particular. 
The massive direct violence faced by the ethnic Chinese was unprecedented both in terms of its 
scale and its geographical scope. It further included new factors, such as the systematic 
destruction of property as well as rape. Religion also fuelled anti-Chinese sentiments. This 
scale of direct violence would not have been possible without a build-up and intensifying of 
structural violence against Chinese Indonesians in the years prior to the outbreaks. Shortly after 
the violence, little was done to initiate a healing process for the victims. Only few perpetrators 
were punished and the victims were not compensated for their losses.355 Nonetheless, in order 
to win back the ethnic Chinese, measures have been initiated by the governments following the 
Soeharto administration in order to reduce violence in general and to prevent direct violence in 
the future.  
 
3.4 Reformasi: Shifts in Forms and Degree of Violence against Ethnic 
Chinese  
After the fall of Soeharto regime 1998, Habibie, the vice-president took over the government 
until the first elections in 1999. The period following the end of the New Order was termed 
„reformasi‟ (reformation), marking the transition from authoritarian rule to laying the 
foundations for constitutional liberalism and a democratic political structure. The successors of 
Soeharto had and at the time of writing (2012) still, have to deal with the legacy of the New 
Order regime. On the one hand, the transition ushered in unprecedented freedoms, such as 
giving Indonesians, for the first time, a chance to elect their own leaders and the liberty to 
organize themselves in the way they prefer. On the other hand, the removal of the lid on politics 
fomented previously suppressed ethnic and religious conflicts, and even encouraged regional 
separatism, creating political and economic uncertainties. Political and economic instability, 
social unrest, corruption, and acts of terrorism have slowed the progress of establishing 
democratic structures. Although relations among different religious and ethnic groups are 
largely harmonious, discontent with the current social, political or economic situation and 
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violence remain problems in some areas of Indonesia, e.g. in Papua or Sulawesi.356 However, 
the restructuring of the political system towards decentralization satisfied many local 
organizations who aimed at secession – an exception being Papua where secessionist 
movements are still strong. In the face of violent conflicts, such as Papua, the international 
media pays little attention to occasional violent attacks launched against ethnic Chinese. This 
lack of media information may mislead to think that there are none.  
 
Removal of Discriminatory Legislation  
Since the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, successive governments have repealed legislation 
that discriminated against Chinese Indonesians, leading to an increased participation in politics, 
the arts and the media. In order to persuade ethnic Chinese who have left the country to return 
home, the Habibie administration abolished several discriminatory laws. The transitional 
government issued Presidential Instruction No. 26, 1998 which eliminated the difference 
between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians by abolishing the terms „pri‟ 
(indigenous) and „non pri‟ (non-indigenous) in official government policies and administration. 
In 1999, Presidential Instruction No. 4/ 1999 stipulated that the Indonesian Citizenship 
Certificate (SBKRI, Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia) would no longer be 
required for citizenship applications or marriage registrations. This regulation aims at 
simplifying procedures as the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate was or for some ethnic 
Chinese is still difficult to obtain, because they do not possess the required birth certificates. 
Further, in the final clause of the instruction, the ban on the study of the Mandarin (Chinese) 
language was lifted. Under Habibie‟s successor, President Wahid (also known as Gus Dur), 
Chinese New Year was declared an optional holiday and the bans on the display of Chinese 
characters as well as the import of Chinese publications were lifted. Wahid also promulgated 
Presidential Decree 6 of 2000, which repealed Presidential Instruction 14/1967 that had banned 
the public display of Chinese religions, beliefs, and traditions, thus allowing Chinese religions 
(Buddhism as well as Confucianism) and traditions be practiced freely without the need of a 
permit. After Wahid was forced to step down in 2001 and was succeeded by Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, the course initiated by him with regard to the abolishing of discriminatory laws 
against ethnic Chinese continued. Megawati declared Chinese New Year to be an official 
national holiday in 2002.357 Chinese New Year is now celebrated publicly not only by ethnic 
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Chinese but also indigenous Indonesians, who participate in the parades and other Chinese 
traditions like the lion dance – notwithstanding the lack of knowledge about the meaning of the 
rituals performed.358 The new freedom to express their cultural background freely has been 
greatly welcomed by many members of Chinese Indonesian community.359 Chinese New Year 
is viewed by ethnic Chinese as a symbol of new opportunity for freedom of expression, but also 
a recognition and acknowledgment of their long suppressed identity and a renewal of the 
government‟s commitment towards „Chinese‟ culture.360  
During Chinese New Year celebrations in 2007, President Yudhoyono reaffirmed his 
commitment to replace the pejorative term „Cina’ with the neutral term „Tionghoa’ in official 
usage. 361  This measure might slowly work in reducing cultural violence in the sphere of 
language against ethnic Chinese. This is an essential move as a reduction of violence on the 
structural or direct level is unlikely in the long-run without addressing cultural violence. 
 
Violent Attacks against Chinese Indonesians  
In spite of a clear reduction in scope and scale, attacks on the ethnic Chinese (DSN) – 
especially on their property (DWN) after the Anti-Chinese riots 1996-1999 still occasionally 
occur. During my interviews, I asked about violent attacks against ethnic Chinese and many 
respondents replied: “There are still some attacks here and then, but nothing as terrifying as the 
riots in 1998. It is now back to normal.”362 The relief about the fact that no large-scale attacks 
occurred prevails over the fear arising from random, occasional attacks. Since the attacks on 
ethnic Chinese were not on a large-scale, they were and are overshadowed by other ethnic or 
religious conflicts that are reported on in the news. However, in spite of limited attention given 
to them in general, some examples of violence which have been portrayed more prominently in 
the media. 
One well-publicized case was the series of attacks on Chinese Christian churches in Tangerang 
as well as places of worship in Bogor.363  A pastor and a parishioner were injured while 
attempting to stop the attackers. Attacks against Christians by Muslims in this particular area 
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continue at the time of writing.364 In June 2004, the police suspected the involvement of about 
50 local men in attacks on two churches in Tangerang during religious services which left a 
preacher injured.  The news agency Reuters noted that local Muslim communities in Indonesia 
have hindered efforts by Christians to open new churches (e.g. in Bogor), citing fears of 
Christian proselytization.365 The reports of violence in the Indonesian media against Christians 
in Indonesia between 2004 and 2006 did not directly mention the ethnicity of the victims. 
However, during interviews, respondents from Bogor and Tangerang confirmed that the 
Christians involved were ethnic Chinese.366 Both towns have a high concentration of ethnic 
Chinese who make up the majority of the local Christian population.  
 
A general trend to not disclose the ethnicity of neither the victims nor the perpetrators in 
Indonesian media could be observed. Conflicts in Papua and West Kalimantan have shown that 
Indonesia has not yet managed to overcome ethnic tensions in the country and to build up or 
strengthen a national identity. In order to not stir ethnic tensions, ethnicity is often not 
mentioned in the media. Chinese Indonesian journalists and lawyers further revealed in 
interviews that most of the attacks on property of ethnic Chinese were either hardly mentioned 
in the press or, if mentioned, not related to ethnic tensions, but rather ascribed to „social 
envy‟.367 
In late 2005, Chinese Indonesians received anonymous cellular text messages, threatening them 
with violent acts and accusing them of being “robbers with Indonesians' money”368, threatening 
to hurt or even kill them. President Yudhoyono officially asked the police to investigate the 
allegations, though one of his spokespersons explained that it was difficult to trace the 
perpetrators because they had used prepaid cellular telephones to send the messages.369 If actual 
attacks had followed on the text messages could not be confirmed.370 Even if no reported 
violent attacks followed, the threatening of ethnic Chinese, however, shows that their ethnicity 
is still being singled out.    
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Cultural Repression on the Local Level 
Despite the removal of official repression of the Chinese culture on the national level, there are 
still examples of such bans on the local level. For example, the mayor of Pontianak (West 
Kalimantan), where ethnic Chinese form the third largest ethnic group after the Dayaks and the 
Madurese, issued Decision No. 12/2008 that prohibited the display of fireworks and the public 
performances of dragon and lion dances during Chinese New Year. Before the issuance of the 
Decision, the United Malay Front Movement had called for the revival of bans on Chinese 
culture and characters in public. They based their call on the fact these traditions were not 
deriving from an indigenous Indonesian cultural background and therefore should be forbidden 
in public. The mayor did not follow this request in full, but rather issued the restrictions on 
Chinese New Year celebrations as a compromise to prevent social unrest.371  In Aceh, the 
provincial government prohibited a lion dance performance as part of commemoration for the 
fifth anniversary of the 2004 tsunami. Members of the Buddhist commemoration committee 
who planned to include lion dance groups had obtained permits from the mayor and police 
chief; however, they could not obtain a required permit from the Aceh Religious Affairs 
Office.372  
Thus, while bans on Chinese culture and the assimilatory policies have been abolished on the 
national level (at least temporarily), the regional and local governments still have the power to 
revive such bans in case the authorities consider them necessary for security reasons. As the 
central government officially abolished these bans, ethnic Chinese could, however, file a claim 
against the local governments or institutions to revoke discriminatory bans on their culture. 
Even if ethnic Chinese are still hesitant to go to court to claim justice fearing that they will not 
be treated fairly by the juridical administration, in contrast to the Soeharto-era, they have the 
legal right and opportunity to do so.  
The development of regional decrees or decisions overriding national regulations mirrors a 
general trend of decentralization in Indonesia. Like many post-authoritarian, multi-ethnic states, 
Indonesia faces the question: “How to govern the many different ethnic groups without going 
back to an authoritarian system?” In order to better be able to deal with the identity needs of the 
many ethnic groups in Indonesia, the national government has given the local governments 
more political independence over the course of the years. De-socializing ethnic Chinese from 
their Chinese cultural background and encouraging them to re-socialize (i.e. assimilate) with 
the majority's culture still seems to be considered to be the best or even only chance for 
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peaceful integration and peaceful life within society, at least in some regions (as proven by 
examples of Aceh and West Kalimantan).373 These assimilative measures, however, contradict 
the concept of peace according to Galtung since accepting structural violence against the 
identity needs of ethnic Chinese (de-socializing and re-socializing, SIN) to avoid direct 
violence does not lead to sustainable peace. It can merely be a short-term solution. According 
to Galtung, structural violence is as harmful as direct violence and may eventually lead to direct 
violence. 
 
Marginalization of Chinese Indonesians through Negative Stereotyping 
While the Indonesian elite before the fall of Soeharto mainly concentrated on fields such as 
politics and the military, quite a number of former politicians or military commanders have by 
now successfully turned to the field of business.374 On the level of tycoons, it is no longer 
mainly Chinese businessmen who dominate the private sector. Instead, examples of Aburizal 
Bakrie or Jusuf Kalla375 show indigenous Indonesians who are also successful in the private 
sector.376 Struggles over economic influence at the elite level have an impact on the ethnic 
Chinese as a group. Kalla, for example, stated on his personal website that indigenous business 
should be favored.377 To foster and maintain such favoritism, he further stated his support for 
former government policies, including presidential regulation no. 10, the benteng program 
(fortress program) and reviving the Assaat movement which do not only support indigenous 
Indonesian, but at the same time restrict and hinder ethnic Chinese engaging in business.378 As 
a businessman himself whose family business (import-export) had benefitted from the fortress 
program (as import licenses were only given to indigenous Indonesians) in the 1950s,379 such 
measures would have likely increased his business opportunities and provided him with an 
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advantage over his ethnic Chinese competitors. In such case, however, not only conglomerates 
would have been negatively affected, but ethnic Chinese small and medium-sized companies as 
well. While Kalla was Vice-President, none of the former policies were officially revived. 
Nevertheless, as he is a politician with direct access to the decision-making process at the 
highest level, ethnic Chinese were worried that his pro-indigenous and anti-Chinese sentiments 
could or have enter(ed) Indonesian politics. 380 During the fight against corruption, the 
government seems to set a focus on ethnic Chinese businessmen. In the case of ethnic Chinese 
conglomerate Sukanto Tanoto, financial-fraud investigations were revived in 2006 after charges 
against him had been dropped in 2000.381 As general prejudices can hardly be reduced if cases 
that seemingly prove or re-enforce these very prejudices are repeated in the media, the 
Indonesian elite not only harms their competitors, but also ethnic Chinese as a whole.  
Further, it hinders the process of de-homogenization of the ethnic Chinese. Since state-led 
segmentation (SIN) has been widely abolished, Chinese Indonesians have started to diversify 
professionally out of business into other fields, including politics. Not being perceived as a 
homogeneous group helps the integration process and reduces marginalization (SFN). 
Therefore, if the conflict on the business elite level is passed through to the lower social levels, 
it prevents a narrowing of the gap between indigenous and ethnic Chinese in society, in spite of 
the abolition of official state-led segregation and marginalization (SFN). The perception of 
ethnic Chinese as dominating the Indonesian economy and especially the private sector 
continues to make them vulnerable in times of political and social unrest.  
 
A number of ethnic Chinese have now entered the political realm. In interviews with Chinese 
Indonesian politicians, most stated that they wanted to actively engage in politics in order to 
free the ethnic Chinese from dependency on the indigenous elite. Only by engaging themselves 
in forming and developing Indonesia, they stated, would they be able to protect themselves and 
their community.382 Although ethnic Chinese political parties such as the Chinese Indonesian 
Reform Party (PRTI, Partai Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia) and the Indonesian Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika Party (PBTII, Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia) failed to gain much support 
in the 1999 and 2004 elections, numerous candidates of Chinese descent for political offices ran 
for national (not ethnic Chinese) parties. Between 1999 and 2004, the number of Chinese 
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Indonesian candidates standing in national elections increased from fewer than 50 to almost 
150, and some of them have won offices in local elections in recent years. 383  Of the 58 
candidates of Chinese descent who ran for office in the 2009 legislative election as 
representatives from Jakarta, two won seats in the People's Representative Council.384 Political 
participation, even if difficult, can be considered as a means to narrow the social gap by 
diversifying the image of ethnic Chinese, to show that they are not „only‟ economically 
oriented, but are also interested in their country's well-being. Nevertheless, according to 
accounts of Chinese Indonesian politicians, they are still not readily accepted by indigenous 
Indonesian politicians and parts of the public. Two of the politicians interviewed claimed that 
during their campaigns their opponents used anti-Chinese slogans perpetuating negative 
stereotypes in order to prevent them from being elected. Apart from ethnic slurs, they were 
stigmatized on religious grounds as well (SFN). Muslims were told to not vote for Chinese 
Indonesian Christians since they eat pork and therefore are impure.385  
 
Prior the 2012 elections for the position of governor of Jakarta, Dangdut star Rhoma Irama, 
quoted a passage from the Qur‟an which states that Muslims should never chose an infidel to 
lead them or they would incur God‟s wrath during a religious sermon.386 This remark was 
directed against Basuki Purnama, a Christian and ethnic Chinese, the running mate of Joko 
Widodo (mayor of Solo). The pair had been successful in the first round of balloting, receiving 
41% of the votes on July 11, 2012 and eventually won the elections on September 20, 2012.387 
The Qur‟an passage quoted by Rhoma Irama indeed seems to create difficulties for Muslims to 
vote for a non-Muslim. Mujar Ibnu Syarif, of the Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah in 
Jakarta, found Muslim scholars' views divided. While some agree with Rhoma Irama, others 
(more liberal scholars) see the ban on electing non-Muslims as discriminatory and against the 
democratic rights of the minorities.388 During the election campaign, Purnama was the target of 
more than just the one negative campaign (the poll supervisor received at least three negative 
campaigns involving ethnic and religious attacks on Purnama) and as a consequence, the poll 
supervisor officially asked the Jakarta branch of the Interfaith Communication Forum and local 
religious leaders to keep the elections from them ethnic and religious slurs. 389  Sarman 
Simanjorang, chairman of the Jakarta chapter of the Indonesian Indigenous Entrepreneurs 
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Association (Hippi), also called for an end to the current smear campaign against Purnama as 
anti-Chinese rhetoric could be particularly damaging for Jakarta‟s business and tourism (given 
that businesses and tourists from China and Singapore accounted for around a fifth of all 
foreign arrivals each month).390  
 
 Unofficial Acts of Discrimination against Chinese Indonesians  
The amendments and changes to the legislation abolishing discrimination against ethnic 
Chinese are important and represent a successful reduction of structural violence. However, 
they are limited in their effects. For example, even though Presidential Instruction No. 4 issued 
in May 1999 stated that the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI) was no longer needed 
as proof of citizenship. Years after the Presidential Instruction, the document was still being 
demanded by authorities and ethnic Chinese were still forced to pay bribes when wishing to 
have their passports processed.391 This was not only to the case with citizenship applications, 
however. Depending on the civil servant in question, ethnic Chinese have for example been 
required to present their parents‟ Citizenship Certificates when they want to register for 
marriage (SFN).392  
As mentioned above, the national government has started to engage in a decentralization 
process. As with the case of the banning of Chinese cultural elements in public in Pontianak, 
local governments of some regions have ignored the policies of the national government. The 
International Crisis Group states that local institutions (empowered by decentralization) “are 
defying the country‟s highest courts with impunity, undermining judicial authority and allowing 
local conflicts to fester.”393 They have begun to explicitly request Citizenship Certificates again 
as official regulation for administrative procedures. 394  While the national government has 
officially „abolished‟ the Citizenship Certificate, it has not imposed legal or bureaucratic 
sanctions on civil servants nor overruled local regulations that still require it. In order to keep 
the ever more complex national construct together, the central government is willing to 
overlook these kinds of local breaches of national laws.  
 
Since Presidential Instruction No. 4, 1999 did not prove to be sufficient, a new citizenship law 
issued in 2006 again abolished the distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous (ethnic 
Chinese). It aims to help Chinese Indonesians who have resided in Indonesia for generations to 
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obtain Indonesian citizenship, even without the Citizenship Certificate (SBKRI). Since this law 
was relatively recent at the time of writing, the effects will need to be evaluated by future 
research. Currently, there are still thousands of mostly poor Chinese Indonesians who have still 
not managed to gain Indonesian citizenship and are therefore stateless.395 In many cases, they 
lack the educational background to deal with the administrational requirements. Although 
lawyers from legal aid groups provide assistance, the large number of cases means that it will 
take time to process all cases.396 As stateless people they cannot purchase the land which they 
live on. In a recent case of Cina-Benteng (in the Chinese quarter in Tangerang) in 2010, the 
local government has claimed the land and forcibly evicted the residents when they refused to 
leave. This expulsion (DFN) from their homes constitutes an infringement of their freedom 
needs. They refused to leave their homes not only because they wished to remain but also 
because they were not provided with alternative housing by the local government.397 Thus, in 
spite of abolishing of discriminatory laws and implementation of a new citizenship law, the 
situation has not improved yet for ethnic Chinese who lack the educational background and the 
financial resources. They are still experiencing discrimination based on their ethnicity when 
dealing with bureaucracy.  
 
The difference to the discrimination they faced during the New Order regime is that it is no 
longer due to official state policy. Nowadays, it is not the interest of the political elite as such 
but rather of individual civil servants who want to increase their monthly salary by demanding 
bribes. To the officials, it „feels right‟ to ask the Chinese Indonesians for extra money, because 
they have allegedly enriched themselves at the expense of the indigenous (CV).398 Since they 
are not indigenous to the country, it appears to be only fair that they should pay more than 
indigenous citizens. Some Chinese Indonesians, however, also blame the Chinese Indonesians 
for this situation: “The Chinese just always pay. They don‟t want to wait in line or go through 
any trouble – they just pay. No wonder they [the indigenous civil servants or police] keep 
asking them for money.”399 Thus, there is a degree of acceptance (at least among some ethnic 
Chinese) of this situation on both sides. On the side of the Chinese Indonesians there is 
reluctance to go to the trouble of fighting for their rights even if by now they would have a 
legal basis. By trying to avoid confrontation and choosing the path of least resistance in dealing 
with discrimination (i.e. violence), they may further encourage and foster it.  
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There are also other forms of discriminatory behavior against ethnic Chinese which many 
indigenous do not necessarily perceive as being such. One example explicitly directed against 
Chinese Indonesian girls is the use of the term „Amoy‟. It connotes lascivious exotic Orientals. 
Ethnic Chinese women who were victims of rape in the course of the 1998 riots were also 
referred to as „Amoy‟. This indicated that it was their fault that they were raped due to their 
unchaste behavior.400 Many indigenous Indonesians often do not even know that the term is 
offensive and therefore do not see the harm in using it when referring (only) to Chinese 
Indonesian girls. Chinese Indonesian women, however, feel offended and discriminated against, 
but are often hesitant to act against it.401 It will take time for changes made on the national 
government level to come down to the grass-root level.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
A reduction of violence can arise out of different approaches or entry-points. In the case of the 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, the changes that brought about a reduction of violence were 
initiated in a top down manner by the new political leaders of the country (B.J. Habibie, 
Abdurrahman Wahid and later Megawati Soekarnoputri) who aimed at improving the 
relationship between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians by sending clear 
signals.402 With the abolishing of discriminatory and repressive laws, Chinese Indonesians can 
now officially live out their cultural identity and are no longer restricted to their previous social 
position.  
However, on the local level, they still may counter discrimination and cultural repression. The 
negative stereotyping which is still present due to the competition between indigenous and the 
Chinese Indonesian business elites makes it difficult for the two groups as a whole to bridge 
their differences and close the gap which has been created over centuries. Nevertheless, against 
the backdrop of violence during the Soeharto regime, a number of positive developments can 
be detected which have lead to a significant reduction especially of violent attacks (direct 
violence) and state-led discrimination (structural violence) against ethnic Chinese. Riots on a 
major scale such as they occurred in the 1990s have not been reported since. This does not 
mean that there has been no physical violence against ethnic Chinese. Such incidents still occur, 
but they are more difficult to detect as they are not openly discussed as ethnic violence in the 
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media. The focus in these cases has often shifted from an ethnic to a religious conflict. 
However, due to the fact that many ethnic Chinese are also Christians, they are often involved 
when the media refers to religious clashes.  
 
While state-led discrimination has been officially abolished by the removal of discriminatory 
laws and policies against Chinese Indonesians, they still encounter unofficial discrimination 
and cultural repression by organs of the state (civil servants, the military and the police) in daily 
life. In such cases, they are still being exploited and treated as second class citizens. There has 
thus been a shift of violence, away from the official and thereby visible violence on the state 
level in the form of laws and degrees towards unofficial and thus more invisible  or hidden 
violence on the administrational level. The new reforms that the successive governments 
initiated make it harder to detect violence and it is less present for the people involved. These 
acts, nonetheless, constitutes continued structural and direct violence against their well-being 
needs.  
 
As discussed above, there has been a general shift from political centralization to 
decentralization in Indonesia. Over the course of this development, direct violence against 
identity needs that took place during the Soeharto regime, such as de-socialization and re-
socialization measures, have been abolished at the national level. Nevertheless, there are 
examples showing that they have been revived on the regional level. There are currently no 
signs of state-led discrimination against the ethnic Chinese, but the display of their culture is 
occasionally forbidden by local elites. Structural violence against identity and freedom needs is 
also visible in the form of segmentation of the ethnic Chinese as a homogenous group of 
businessmen. Due to stigmatization in form of negative stereotyping and „othering‟ of ethnic 
Chinese, the group as a whole is still marginalized in Indonesian society.  
 
With regard to cultural violence, the grounds that legitimized violence against ethnic Chinese 
have remained the same as in the past. To date, only little attention has been paid to work on 
cultural violence and therefore no significant progress could be observed in this area. As 
reducing cultural violence means to change the actors‟ perceptions of the „others‟ and 
themselves which they have inherited from previous generations, the respective process 
requires long-term efforts. Due to the long history of direct and indirect violence, violence is 
deeply seated in the social construction of Indonesian society. Therefore, although areas can be 
seen where violence has been reduced, indicating a positive developments, the current status 
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quo of violence requires further measures to sustain these developments over the course of a 
sustained conflict transformation process.  
The triangle with its three dimensions of violence can be combined with another tool developed 
by Galtung to understand and analyze a conflict formation: the conflict triangle. The three 
variables used in this method are the conflict actors‟ attitudes, their behavior and contradictions 
between each others‟ aims. The types of violence can be connected to the dimensions of the 
conflict formation: Direct violence is related to behavior (violent acts), cultural violence to 
attitudes and structural violence to the contradictions.403 
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4. Analysis of Conflict Formation  
4.1 The Concept of the Conflict Triangle  
Conflict has been mainly a topic of research in the academic fields of political, social and 
psychological science. For conflicts on the macro and meso level (like the case study of this 
thesis), Hobbes, Marx, Weber and Simmel provided the basis for many conflict theories in 
political and social science. 404  Hobbes understands conflicts as a general part of human 
relationships which have to be regulated by (state) institutions. Marx does not understand 
conflict as part of the human nature, but instead he derives conflict from the unequal 
distribution of assets and a hierarchical structure of society. Conflicts are there conflicts of 
interests between two groups and considered to be necessary by Marx to generate social change 
with regard to the structure of a society until equality is achieved. Weber attributes conflicts to 
a contradiction of values of groups and individuals. In contrast to Hobbes and Marx, Webber 
does not approach conflict from the perspective of social structures, but concentrates on the 
actors and their relationship in which they try to enforce their claims against those of others. 
Like Weber, Simmel also approaches conflicts from the perspective of the actors. For him 
conflicts are the result of social differentiation. People and groups feel as part of one group by 
differentiating themselves from others. Conflicts – like consensus – are both factors that 
constitute societies.405  
Galtung combined the structural perspective (as in the approaches by Hobbes and Marx) with 
the actor perspective (as in the approaches by Weber and Simmel) in his understanding of 
conflict. According to Galtung, every conflict can be mapped by using the conflict triangle. A 
conflict is a contradiction either within an actor (dilemma) or between at least two actors 
(dispute). These contradictions constitute the content or the root causes of the conflict. In his 
article “Konflikt als Lebensform”406 he defines conflict as incompatibility between aims and 
values of actors within a social system. Seen through a conflict triangle, the aims of each party 
which are in contradiction to one another (C) are reflected on the actors‟ side in the attitudes 
(A) as intentions and as means of pursuing these aims through their behavior (B). 407  All 
dimensions of the triangle may influence each other. For example, attitudes of actors towards 
the contradictions may influence actors‟ evaluation of a conflict situation. The contradictions 
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can result in frustration which may then lead to aggressive attitudes. The contradictions and the 
attitudes which together form the latent side of a conflict may then form a specific conflict 
behavior (the pursuit of the goals) which constitutes the manifest side of a conflict. If one 
party‟s conflict behavior means resorting to aggressive behavior towards the other party, new 
contradictions may arise which may result in a vicious cycle of violence that is difficult to 
break. Violence can thus lead to the (re-)production of further violence.408  
Even though Galtung depicts both the concept of violence and the concept of conflict by way of 
triangles which are related to each other, there are differences between the two. Conflict cannot 
be equated with violence or vice versa.409 
 
Figure 8: The Conflict Triangle410 
 
Galtung uses the triangle to clarify that a conflict consists of different dimensions and uses it to 
portray conflict dynamics. A conflict analysis according to this triangle may render these 
dimensions and dynamics visible. Such an analysis is the prerequisite for developing peace-
enhancing measures that aim at reducing violence. In any attempts to transform a conflict 
towards peace it is necessary to work on each of the ABC aspects of the conflict triangle. In 
order to transform the contradictions, creativity is required to find solutions which 
accommodate the legitimate but contradicting aims of the conflict parties. Attitudes can slowly 
be changed by enhancing empathy among the actors. Violent behavior can be transformed into 
non-violent behavior. According to the Transcend method, as a point of entry for most 
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conflicts, the focus lies in transcending the contradictions. Softening of A and B is easier when 
the parties see progress on C. This does not mean that there should be no work on A and B in 
the meantime.411 
 
Classification of Conflict Actors 
The two major parties dealt with in this conflict are ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians. 
When dealing with the attitudes and behavior of the groups, however, it is necessary to specify 
subgroups within the two groups and to identify how these relate to the conflict. According to 
Galtung‟s definition412, this conflict is complex as it involves numerous actors and goals which 
cannot be assessed at once. For analytical purposes, it may be necessary to reduce them in a 
structured manner and allows the researcher to include them again at a later stage of the 
analysis. It is essential to not lose a conflict‟s complexity entirely as it may be the source for 
possibilities to transform a conflict. Based on the interviews conducted in Indonesia in 2008 
and 2010 and related literature, both of the conflict groups shall therefore be divided into three 
subgroups.  
 
Indigenous Indonesians 
 Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Subgroup 3 
Conflict 
transformation 
Opposing / not 
encouraging 
Interested in / actively 
engaged in  
Indifferent 
 
Chinese Indonesians 
 Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 Subgroup 3 
Conflict 
transformation 
Opposing / not 
encouraging 
Interested in / actively 
engaged in 
Indifferent 
 
These categorizations are not absolute, as there will always be exceptions within these 
subgroups as well people who could be placed in more than one subgroup. Nevertheless, this 
rough categorization helps to determine the main positions vis-à-vis this conflict within the two 
main actor groups. The A(ttitudes) and B(ehavior) of the conflict triangle are both party- or 
actor-oriented while C(ontradiction) is goal-oriented.413 In the presentation of the concept of the 
ABC-triangle, the goals are located in A as intentions and as means in B.414 It can be difficult to 
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clearly delineate A and B since they are interrelated and influence each other. Latent intentions 
can surface at the manifest level as behavior. Cultural prejudice as an internal attitude for 
example can transform into discrimination as externally-oriented behavior. Due to such 
interrelations, the various levels need to be examined together rather than separately to avoid 
losing such intersectionalities.  
 
4.2 Attitudes and Behavior of Conflict Actors 
Indigenous Indonesians 
Subgroup 1: Opposing / Not Encouraging Conflict Transformation 
In the analysis of violence, the reviving of bans on the public display of Chinese culture on the 
local level by a few local governments (Aceh and West Kalimantan) was discussed. Attitudes 
behind these actions indicate that the actors (local elites) responsible for the reviving of bans do 
not encourage the integration of Chinese Indonesian culture as part of the local culture.  
On the level of bureaucracy, those bureaucrats who still discriminate against ethnic Chinese by, 
for example, requiring Chinese Indonesians to present the Indonesian Citizenship Certificate 
(SBKRI) and accepting bribes for processing the document even though it is officially not 
required anymore,415 do not have an interest in changing the status quo. They seem to accept 
discriminating against ethnic Chinese as „normal‟ and „justified‟ and therefore do not seem to 
see the need in changing their practices from which they benefit personally.416   
 
During interviews, respondents stated that some indigenous Indonesians do not want Chinese 
Indonesians to enter the political scene.417 Ethnic Chinese politicians have to fight very hard to 
get into parliament or to be elected into political offices against the opposition of indigenous 
politicians. Tsai, an ethnic Chinese politician, reported that when he ran for a seat in parliament 
for his home town in West Kalimantan, ethnic Chinese who wanted to vote for him told him 
that they were sent home when they arrived at the election office. “The officer told them that 
their ID card was not registered at this office and that meant that they could not vote – they 
cheated us!”418 Even though other politicians419 have reported similar experiences, it is difficult 
to prove that there actually has been electoral fraud which was directed against their ethnicity. 
                                                   
415 Winkelmann, 2008, p. 70 and interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008) and Mely Tan (17.04.2008).  
416 Interview with Wahyu Effendi (08.09.2008).  
417  Interview with Frans Tsai, ethnic Chinese politician (20.04.2010) and Nico Harjanto, indigenous 
Indonesian researcher at CSIS focusing on the political landscape and participation in Indonesia 
(03.09.2008).  
418 Interview with Frans Tsai (20.04.2010).  
419 Interview with Basuki Purnama (10.04.2010). 
119 
 
Difficulties in accepting ethnic Chinese as political leaders is not limited to some indigenous 
politicians, as shown by anti-Chinese campaigns against Basuki Purnama (vice-governor of 
Jakarta, elected in September 2012)420. More than a decade after the fall of the Soeharto-
regime, anti-Chinese sentiments aiming at the exclusion of ethnic Chinese from the political 
sphere still appear.  
 
Two ethnic Chinese researchers, Thung 421  and Chua 422 , pointed towards the competition 
between indigenous Indonesian and Chinese Indonesian businessmen- and women which they 
consider to have a negative effect on efforts to transform the conflict.  During the Soeharto-
period, indigenous businessmen for the most part did not develop their own commercial 
activities in competition to the Chinese Indonesian businessmen. Instead, the Chinese tycoons 
and the indigenous political power-holders complemented each other through an elaborate 
division of labor.423 There was no need for the ethnic Chinese businessmen to possess own 
political power, as their interests were well represented by the political elite.424 Despite the 
enormous economic growth of Chinese conglomerates425, the power-holders saw no reason to 
curb their partners, especially as the social and political position of the tycoons remained 
weak.426 The political power-holders did everything to retard the rise of independent indigenous 
businessmen in order to protect their own position and keep a potentially challenging 
indigenous bourgeoisie at distance.427 The politicians and bureaucrats close to Soeharto also 
started to accumulate capital themselves, which decreased their financial reliance on Chinese 
businesses. They could even hope in the long run to become their own class of businessmen 
and eventually be able to emancipate themselves from their Chinese counterparts.428  
 
After the fall of Soeharto, the protectionist economic policies favoring indigenous Indonesians 
were replaced by more liberal policies, both in terms of decentralizing the state and 
deregulating the economy. Without political control over the economy, indigenous businessmen 
had to fear for their position in this new economical environment. 429  The ethnic Chinese 
conglomerates that survived the transition and adapted to the new economic environment 
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became more successful than before.430 Due to decentralization, many of the political power 
holders ethnic Chinese tycoons now have to deal with are on the regional level and thus less 
powerful than those who were concentrated in Jakarta during the New Order regime. 
Nevertheless, it is still advantageous to cultivate ties to the central government for businesses 
which go beyond the local level.431 
According to the Chinese Indonesian tycoon, Winarta432, competing indigenous businessmen 
feel that the Chinese „always‟ bribe state officials, particularly the police and the military. He 
believes that as long as these traditional anti-Chinese sentiments remained prevalent in 
Indonesian society, indigenous businessmen would exploit them in their fight for market 
shares.433 According to Thung, the indigenous elite are competing with ethnic Chinese tycoons 
for large-scale governmental projects and therefore interested in weakening latter‟s position.434 
Through the stigmatization of the tycoons as „Chinese‟ and thus non-Indonesian, Chinese 
Indonesians‟ economic success is defined as undeserving and unfair to the „indigenous‟ 
population. By utilizing such discourses, the politically active indigenous tycoons set 
thumbscrews on the businessmen which they can tighten at times to keep the competition at 
bay.435  
 
Apart from business opportunities in Indonesia, a part of the ethnic Chinese business 
community seems to be in a better position than the indigenous business community to benefit 
from the economic rise of China and the trade arrangements made between China and 
ASEAN436 due to either personal relationships, Chinese language skills or a general cultural 
understanding of Chinese business practices.437 Although it is difficult to assess to what extent 
ethnicity plays a role in Sino-Indonesian business arrangements, arguably due to “their leading 
position in business, Chinese Indonesians have more to benefit from the rise of China than 
                                                   
430 According to Anthony Salim, interview with Chua on 13.04.2004, Chua, 2008, p. 141. 
431 Chua, 2008, p. 173.  
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Indonesians do”438.If indigenous businessmen believe that ethnic Chinese stand to gain more 
economic power due to this new business opportunity, it may add to their perception of the 
ethnic Chinese as a threat to their own (personal) interests.   
 
Turning from the country‟s economic and political elite to lower class indigenous Indonesians, 
anti-Chinese sentiments based on negative stereotypes have prevailed. During the field research 
in 2008,439 I interviewed two mechanics working at a garage in Jakarta. Even though they said 
that they do not want to be involved in ethnic prejudice, they said that all the Chinese they 
knew were greedy and only business-oriented. They also stressed that they as pribumi 
(indigenous Indonesians) would never be able to understand the Chinese (they used the 
pejorative term cina), because the latter were “too different”.440 Even though the term „cina‟ 
was officially replaced by the term „tionghoa‟, it is still commonly used, as is the dichotomy 
„pribumi‟ and „non-pribumi‟.   
 
Subgroup 2: Interested in / Actively Engaged in Conflict Transformation  
The representatives of this subgroup interviewed during the field research were mainly from 
Jakarta and Central Java (Semarang, Lasem and Rembang). The coastal area on the north coast 
of Java was chosen as an example in Indonesia for a good integration and strong interaction 
between ethnic Chinese and Javanese. During interviews with indigenous Indonesians, they 
often stressed the good relationship with ethnic Chinese.441 Islamic leaders pointed out that they 
often join forces with ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in Rembang when organizing communal 
projects.442 This may be related to the long history of ethnic Chinese settlers in this area. In 
1405, Admiral Zheng He landed in Semarang during the first of his seven expeditions and 
returned to this city during later expeditions. His stay influenced the development of the small 
fishing village into the city of Semarang. Public festivals are held each year on the 29th and 30th 
of the sixth months of the Chinese lunar calendar to commemorate the first of his expeditions to 
Java.  
 
In May 1998, rioters who came to this area were turned back by local Islamic leaders, an 
incident which is very well known and appreciated by the ethnic Chinese communities living in 
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this region.443 One of these local Islamic leaders, KH. Zainuddin, the director of an Islamic 
boarding school, later became a member of the Lasem Lion Dance committee which was 
established shortly after the end of the Soeharto regime. Even though he stated that he does not 
like Lion Dance very much himself, it was nonetheless important to him to demonstrate the 
good relationship between the different communities. When asked why he thought that the 
ethnic Chinese asked him to be on the committee, he answered that they felt safer when he was 
“on board”. Although there had not been any riots in Lasem and surroundings, the reports of 
violence all over Indonesia in 1998 created fear among ethnic Chinese. The government might 
have abolished the bans against the public display of Chinese culture, nevertheless, the Chinese 
community felt the need for protection, which they satisfied by inviting a Muslim leader to join 
their committee.444 KH. Zainuddin as a respected member of the community and a religious 
leader was considered by the Chinese community an ideal candidate to support the cause of 
reviving Chinese Indonesian culture. 
 
Not only societies reviving Chinese festival traditions have received support from indigenous 
communities of the region. The northern part of Central Java is also known for its Chinese 
temples, many of which were refurbished after 1998, not only by members of the Chinese 
community, but also by indigenous Javanese who offered their practical help as well as 
financial support.445 The temples have been accepted by the indigenous communities in the 
region as part of their historical heritage as well.446 A local NGO, whose members are mainly 
indigenous Indonesians, was founded to catalogue and restore Lasem‟s historical architectural 
sites. As proof for the long history of ethnic Chinese integration, its members showed me 
different parts of the city where old Chinese-style buildings are located next to indigenous 
buildings, in contrast to other cities where the ethnic Chinese had been confined to ghettos. 
This development survived the course of time and resulted in the mixed ethnic streetscapes of 
today.447 
A further example of Javanese engaging in an NGO which directly or indirectly work towards 
the transformation of this conflict is the NGO Solidarity of the Nation-State (SNB). It was 
founded by Jusuf, a Chinese Indonesian lawyer, two years after the May riots. Jusuf left the 
Jakarta Legal Aid where she had been working previously along with other young activists, 
including indigenous Indonesians. Along with other NGOs, such as the Committee for Missing 
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Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras), the organization established a coalition of NGOs to 
investigate the mass killings that occurred during the May riots.448  
In addition to human rights organizations and legal aid for victims, there are also other 
organizations dealing with ethnic tension and nation-building in general. The Indonesian 
Institute for Pluralism (IPI), for example, was also formed after the May riots with the goal of 
promoting pluralism. The founders were ethnic Chinese as well as indigenous who considered 
it to be necessary to contribute to the development of Indonesia as a multi-ethnic state.449  
 
Especially during the May riots, individuals all over Indonesia sided with Chinese Indonesians, 
and this solidarity has also continued since. Several of the ethnic Chinese interviewees reported 
that their neighbors and friends volunteered to organize night patrols to protect them and 
offered accommodation for those who did not feel safe in their homes anymore. 450 Even though 
these are private, individual acts and the motives for sympathizing with the ethnic Chinese 
remain unknown, it is interesting to see that especially among the same social class or group, 
indigenous perceive the Chinese Indonesians as Indonesians like themselves who therefore 
deserve to be protected as such. Some of the individuals who offered help during the riots later 
joined organizations which directly or indirectly deal with the issues of the ethnic Chinese.451  
 
Subgroup 3:  Indifferent to Conflict Transformation 
 The conflict between indigenous and ethnic Chinese Indonesians is not a priority for all 
Indonesians. This can be attributed, for example, to limited personal contact with ethnic 
Chinese, being occupied with other conflicts either involving their own ethnic or religious 
group, while others prefer not to get involved in conflicts or other people‟s matters in general. 
With respect to conflict transformation, this subgroup of „indifferents‟ has both negative as well 
as positive potential for change. This category consists of respondents who in the interviews 
stated that they were indifferent to the issue of ethnic Chinese. However, over the course of the 
interviews, differences in this „indifference‟ emerged. Respondents were either  
a) Indifferent, but sharing the common negative prejudices against ethnic Chinese as a 
group (but not against individuals) and thinking of the ethnic Chinese as non-
indigenous and thus non-Indonesians 
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b) Indifferent, but not caring about the common negative prejudices and thinking of the 
ethnic Chinese as Indonesians 
 
This classification is only a very rough one and there are nuances in-between. Nevertheless, it 
helps to understand that even those who claim to be indifferent and impartial need to be taken 
into account in the course of possible conflict transcendence efforts. Those who belong to 
group a) are more likely to oppose attempts to work on the conflict while those who fall into 
group b) might even consider engaging themselves in working on conflict transformation.  
 
The topic of Chinese New Year (Imlek) celebrations proved to be a good indicator for seeing 
which of the two categories an „indifferent‟ respondent would fall into. When asked about how 
they felt about the fact that Chinese New Year was now a public, and publicly celebrated, 
holiday in Indonesia, many stated that they had nothing against it in general, especially as other 
ethnic groups also celebrate their traditional festivals. Some would, however, respond that they 
thought the celebrations were “too pompous – typical for Chinese, they just like to show off”452. 
Other indigenous Indonesians responded that they were annoyed that Chinese New Year was 
now celebrated on a large scale: “During Chinese New Year, it is even all over TV. You can 
hardly avoid watching them – but not everyone is interested in the celebrations.”453  Even 
though all of the interviewees agreed that the ethnic Chinese have been and to some extent still 
were being treated unfairly, a few expressed that they do not want to see them being favored.454  
Surjadi, an Indonesian scholar, also expressed his concerns about the Chinese New Year 
celebrations. According to him, some Chinese have aggressively commodified the New Year‟s 
celebrations to exhibit the official recognition of Chinese identity and equality in terms of 
rights. There might be the danger that this celebration of „Chineseness‟ may lead to an 
uncritical assumption of „re-Sinicization‟ by the Indonesian public. There are still many people 
who cling to an understanding of identity according to which the more a person is Chinese, the 
less Indonesian can he/she be.455 These concerns could lead to renewed doubts about the loyalty 
of Chinese Indonesians to Indonesia or seen as „proof‟ of their self-chosen exclusiveness. This 
may once again serve as arguments for those who want to deny ethnic Chinese full social 
integration and acceptance.  
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On the other side, there are also indigenous Indonesians who enjoy the Chinese New Year 
festivals and participate actively in lion dance, martial arts performances and other aspects of 
the celebrations456 and could therefore be placed in group b). However, their interest in Chinese 
„cultural products‟ should not be mistaken as support of the Chinese Indonesian case or as an 
acceptance of them. Tjhin warned her fellow Chinese Indonesians against believing that having 
been granted the permission to celebrate Chinese New Year “manifests the Rise (or Victory) of 
the Chinese Indonesian” 457. “Employing Imlek as the main measurement for the achievements 
of the Chinese Indonesian in the politics of recognition could be misleading. It serves a 
symbolic purpose only visible on the surface.” 458  Other severe problems, however, like 
discrimination are still left unattended.459 Nevertheless, even if the participating in Chinese 
New Year‟s festivals does not constitute support or willingness to engage in work related to the 
conflict, this group is more likely to have a positive attitude towards the ethnic Chinese than 
group a).  
 
Another trend that could be interpreted as mirroring a positive development for ethnic Chinese 
is the boom in learning Chinese (Mandarin) in Indonesia. In 2004, seven universities in Jakarta 
had established Chinese language departments. More than 100 universities had applied to the 
Ministry of Education for permission to offer Chinese courses in the following years. In 
addition, there are more than 3000 Chinese language tuition centers operating in Indonesia.460 
Students consist of both ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians. Interest in the language is 
driven by market demand for people with Chinese language skills for business with China. For 
people interested in engaging in business with the economically prospering neighbor, it is 
advantageous to be able to speak the language. Furthermore, an influx of Chinese movies, 
melodramas, and TV series has raised the popularity of the Chinese language and created a 
more positive image of Chinese culture, in particular among young indigenous Indonesians.461 
Learning Chinese could be a chance for increasing cross-cultural understanding, though it 
needs to be reiterated that mainland Chinese culture and Chinese Indonesian culture differ from 
each other. What indigenous Indonesians may learn in their language classes and on TV is 
mainly the former rather than the latter. Efforts made by indigenous Indonesians to learn 
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Chinese should therefore not be mistaken for an automatic interest in Chinese culture in general 
or Chinese Indonesians in particular. Also, many Chinese Indonesians do not speak Chinese 
themselves and for indigenous Indonesians to learn the Chinese language would therefore not 
necessarily create common ground. Nevertheless, while learning the language, the students‟ 
interest for China and Chinese cultures may raise their interest in ethnic Chinese. 
 
Due to the indifference of the members of this subgroup to the conflict, they are not actively 
engaged in transformation processes. This might change over time or may be influenced by 
actions of other subgroups (mainly subgroups 1 or 2) as well as social changes.  
 
Ethnic Chinese  
Subgroup 1: Opposing / Not Encouraging Conflict Transformation 
In their strategies to protect themselves and their businesses, ethnic Chinese members of the 
economic elite seek to cultivate a positive public image. During his fieldwork, Christian Chua 
repeatedly experienced how many of the Chinese Indonesian conglomerates were even 
concerned with what would be written about them in PhD theses.462    
“James Riady463 disinvited me from an already confirmed interview appointment. Instead, I 
first had to talk to his friend, advisor, and Lippo Commissioner Farid Haryanto who – so it 
seemed – was supposed to find out if the questions I wanted to ask were too critical. Obviously 
I failed this fit-and-proper test, as Riady henceforth refused to meet me. This might be 
coincidental or due to other reasons, but it is not unlikely that this signified Lippo‟s stance on 
how to deal with the public.”464  
 
With regard to public relations, many business groups have purchased media companies, 
including TV stations and newspapers. The Lippo Group, for example, has a relationship 
manager for „extraordinary public relations efforts‟ such as taking journalists around in 
helicopters, bringing them to the nightclubs of Kota on all-inclusive „nights out‟ or, directly 
paying journalists to ensure favorable coverage. In case of negative coverage, companies often 
sue journalists and editors or threaten to withdraw advertisement, thus hurting the respective 
media financially.465 
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Indigenous tycoons are also interested in cultivating a positive image and as such the practices 
of ethnic Chinese to influence the media may not differ substantially from those of indigenous 
Indonesians. However, ethnic Chinese tycoons display an eagerness to reconcile their ethnic 
identity and stress their solidarity with the Indonesian people. In interviews (with the press and 
also Chua), ethnic Chinese tycoons (like Riady, Winarta and Salim466) stated that they „love‟ 
the country and its people and are committed to its development.467 Winarta further stressed 
that he is “purely Indonesian” 468  and that his company Artha Graha is a “truly patriotic 
enterprise”.469  The tycoons are therefore aware that their ethnicity may still be perceived as 
non-Indonesian by the public. They acknowledge the risk that anti-Chinese sentiments may be 
instrumentalized again by political elites in times of crises and in this case the stereotype of the 
rich, Chinese businessmen may be useful tool to stir anger among the indigenous population 
and make them the primary targets.470  They do not rely on the state to protect them but rather 
rely on their own financial assets. Most of them do not see the need to engage directly in 
working on the conflict.471 Their main interest is to „stay in business‟ and they have managed to 
do so until now by being flexible and adapting to the challenges of every new situation. As 
Anthony Salim put it in an interview with Chua: “What is so wonderful about market forces, 
they can be black, they can be white tomorrow, […] but the main thing is that during black and 
white you have to survive.”472 
 
In addition to cultivating a positive image, ethnic Chinese tycoons still rely on allies in the 
political elite. Regarding this strategy, it should be noted that political campaigning is very 
expensive in Indonesia. Even a local election campaign requires several billions of rupiah473, 
while presidential campaigns were estimated to require between Rp140 billion (approx. 11 
million EUR) to Rp500 billion (approx. 40 million EUR) per team merely during the first round 
in 2004.474 Thus, the political parties as well as the candidates themselves are dependent upon 
large donations from the business world as there is no funding of political parties. Only few of 
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the tycoons go into politics themselves even though they would have the necessary assets. Most 
of them prefer to act in the background where they feel safer.475  
 
Among the respondents interviewed during the field research, a number of upper-middle-class 
Chinese Indonesians emerged who think only of ethnic Chinese as their in-group and cultivate 
their Chinese identity as opposed to that of the indigenous Indonesians. Lydia S., a young 
Chinese Indonesian (age 23, middle-class) living in Jakarta told me that her Indonesian 
language skills were not very good because she was raised in an exclusively Chinese 
neighborhood. She attended a middle school where the language of teaching was English and 
afterwards studied in Singapore. Her mother-tongue is a Chinese dialect (Hokkien). When 
asked about any contacts she had with indigenous Indonesians, she replied: “Only our 
employees: the maid, the driver, the gardener.”476 She stated that she did not want to get in 
contact with indigenous Indonesians; she said that she felt uncomfortable around them. Having 
grown up in an almost self-contained Chinese Indonesian environment, she felt almost foreign 
to the country she lived in. Even though she had been very young in May 1998, she still 
remembered the events as being traumatic. This might have triggered or fostered her fears and 
suspicions towards indigenous Indonesians.  
Thung observed that people like Lydia S. had „inherited‟ many of the stereotypes about 
indigenous Indonesians from their parents who chose exclusiveness over integration. As for the 
Chinese Indonesians, there are also negative stereotypes of indigenous Indonesians, such as 
assumptions that they are lazy, slow and likely to steal from those who are rich (e.g. the ethnic 
Chinese).477 Thung interviewed respondents with similar backgrounds to Lydia S. and found 
out that even those who attended public Indonesian schools did not have any personal contact 
with indigenous Indonesians.478 Instead the perceptions and attitudes of these ethnic Chinese 
towards indigenous Indonesians were similar to those of their parents. 479  They showed 
suspicion and fear of indigenous Indonesians, because they are very aware of their own 
vulnerability.480 As a consequence, like their parents, they seek security and comfort behind the 
“emotional barriers the exclusiveness which their Chinese group seems to provide”481. Their 
reaction seems to be partially driven by the thought that since the state was not able to protect 
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them in 1998, they would have to take care of themselves.482 It is therefore considered to be 
advantageous to live close to one another and avoid too much contact with potential 
perpetrators in order to be better able to take care of and assist each other. Patricia S. stated that 
she vividly remembers how her father together with neighbors organized night watches during 
May 1998 in order to protect their homes and families in Jakarta.483 Instead of working on 
establishing or working towards peace, they increased their security measures. 
 
In addition to Jakarta, similar Chinese Indonesian communities can be found in other cities with 
a high concentration of ethnic Chinese. Veronica P., a Chinese Indonesian, at the time of the 
interview living in Jakarta with her husband and three children, grew up in Medan (Sumatra) 
and it was only after she moved to Jakarta that she got into contact with indigenous 
Indonesians. While in Medan, she lived in a closed Chinese community, like Lydia. She told 
me that it scared her at first to talk to indigenous Indonesians, because she expected them to 
treat her unkindly or call her names. Now that she had met more indigenous Indonesians and 
even befriended some, she felt more and more comfortable around them, less scared and more 
at home in Indonesia as a whole.484 Therefore, being more exposed to indigenous Indonesians 
has changed her attitude towards them.  
The state of exclusion in which the Chinese Indonesians of this subgroup live in presumably 
adds to their hesitation to deal with the conflict actively. Instead, they prefer to hide from it by 
hiding themselves. They fear being victimized (again) and assume that the indigenous would 
never fully accept them in Indonesian society. Since they have only limited contact with 
indigenous Indonesians, they have little chance to garner opposite experiences. It is also 
difficult for them to reduce their own negative stereotypes against the indigenous without 
increased mutual contact.  
 
Apart from creating a feeling of security and comfort, keeping to themselves also brings with it 
further benefit, namely business advantages. Businessmen and businesswomen stated that 
having Chinese origins makes it easier for them to build trustworthy business relationships with 
other Chinese in Indonesia, other Southeast Asian countries, but also other countries with a 
Chinese majority population. With the economic rise of China, their ethnic background may 
provide them with an advantage over indigenous businessmen. Even if it can be argued that 
business practices that are linked to the Chinese culture may later be abandoned when businesses 
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grow bigger and are replaced by international business practices, it cannot be denied that they are 
helpful to build up the initial contacts.485  These business prospects are even leading some 
Chinese Indonesians to „return to more Chineseness‟. In a study conducted by Efferin and 
Pontjoharyo, the majority of respondents (Chinese Indonesian businessmen) stated that they 
expect the rise of China to have a positive impact on them, even if they are also aware of the 
fact that the rise of China is also the rise of a competitor  (e.g. in the shoe and garment 
industries).486 
 
Apart from new business opportunities, the respondents also named a political reason why the 
rise of China would have a positive impact on them: the rise of China as a global economic 
player would force the Indonesian government to maintain good relationships with China and 
consequently with them (the Chinese Indonesians) as well and abolish state discrimination 
completely.487 It remains questionable though whether the relationships between China and 
Indonesia on the state-level will reflect positively on how the government treats or protects its 
ethnic Chinese citizens. Most of the discriminatory regulations on the national level have been 
abolished and no evidence was found during research that the Chinese government approached 
the Indonesian government after the May riots 1998 in order to call for more changes. How the 
Indonesian government deals with discrimination on the local or bureaucratic level is part of 
Indonesia‟s internal affairs. According to one of the five principles of peaceful co-existence 
(enumerated in 1954 and reconfirmed in 2004 by the Chinese government) guiding China‟s 
foreign policy, the Chinese government prefers to not interfere with other country‟s internal 
affairs.488  
A respondent of Thung‟s stated that “[i]n Southeast Asia, the Chinese are dominant, so for the 
business, to take the lowest risk approach is to look for and use the Chinese network.”489 The 
common ground based on their ethnicity therefore further increased the trust they have towards 
each other. Thung attempts to explain what could be meant by the „Chinese way of doing 
business‟, which is valued highly among those in Chinese networks. The idea seems to be that 
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Chinese trust people with a Chinese background more than others.490 On this basis, ethnic 
Chinese are granted privileges. While people from other ethnic groups might be required to pay 
down-payments for goods or services provided by mainland Chinese business partners, ethnic 
Chinese on the other hand might even succeed in having payments deferred. Both, mainland 
Chinese and Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese further believe that their common ethnic identity 
would enable business operations to go faster and smoother. 491 
Ethnic Chinese relying on business networks and opportunities based on a Chinese ethnicity 
might be afraid to become less Chinese by engaging more with indigenous Indonesians and 
identifying themselves more with Indonesia, thus potentially losing their business advantage.492 
Such fears are a result of a similar rigid and dichotomous perspective of identity which 
conversely makes it difficult for ethnic Chinese to show their cultural heritage without having 
to fear being criticized as unpatriotic by some indigenous Indonesians. The rhetoric of the New 
Order‟s assimilation policy is still in the minds of many Indonesians, both indigenous and 
ethnic Chinese.  
 
Another reason for Chinese Indonesians to stress their Chinese background is the stereotype 
that Chinese are successful in conducting business. Some ethnic Chinese like to refer to this as 
a „cultural characteristic‟. A Chinese Indonesian pharmacist stated: “We, Chinese, are never at 
the bottom of society – no matter where we go. We are diligent, hard-working and clever. We 
make it, we climb up. Of course, some are lower class, but the majority is not.”493 Here, a 
feeling of superiority is linked to the ethnic background and supposed attributes linked to it. 
Indigenous Indonesians frequently related to me in interviews that they felt that the ethnic 
Chinese would think of themselves as superior and therefore act arrogantly.494  
 
Subgroup 2: Interested in / Actively Engaged in Conflict Transformation  
The members of this subgroup who were interviewed during the field research were already 
actively working on issues related to the conflict. Many of them have been educated abroad, 
have returned with a number of ideas and are keen on contributing to social and political 
developments in Indonesia. They further think that it is them, the ethnic Chinese, who have to 
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become active to make a change and therefore they try to convince other ethnic Chinese to join 
their projects. Their activities include:  
1. Activities aiming at reviving the Chinese Indonesian culture and social life 
2. Charity work 
3. Work on human rights issues 
4. Work related to the nation-building process or fostering of pluralism in Indonesia 
5. Political activism 
 
Some of the activities which the respondents engaged in could not be clearly placed in one 
category only as they covered more than one field.  
 
Those respondents who had witnessed the events of the 1960s and the developments during 
the Soeharto regime experienced a deterioration of Chinese culture in Indonesia. After the 
fall of Soeharto and the lifting of the ban on Chinese culture and organizations, they felt the 
need to re-establish organizations whose main goal is to revive the Chinese Indonesian 
culture. The organizations they established cover different aspects of cultural heritage. 
Buddhists for example have organized themselves to build, renovate and maintain temples. 
Other ethnic Chinese established so-called „family organizations‟ as they consider 
themselves to be an extended „family‟ as their ancestors originated from the same region 
(sometimes even the same village) in China and they may even share the same surname. 
People belonging to these organizations meet to practice Chinese traditions of ancestral 
worship together.
495
 Most organizations are small and restricted to the local level. There 
are, however, also two national organizations which warrant a closer examination: the 
Indonesian Chinese Social Association (PSMTI, Paguyuban Sosial Marga) in the context 
of reviving Chinese Indonesian culture and the Indonesian Chinese Association (INTI, 
Perhimpunan Indonesia) in the context of their work of promoting equal rights for Chinese 
Indonesians.  
 
The Indonesian Chinese Social Association (PSMTI) is mainly concerned with reviving 
Chinese Indonesian culture. In order to encourage young Chinese Indonesians living in Jakarta 
to either learn or improve their knowledge of Chinese culture as well as their Chinese language 
                                                   
495 Lembong, 2008, p. 54.  
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skills, PSMTI organizes the Cici Koko496 contest which is also broadcasted on television. Apart 
from testing the contestants‟ knowledge, the members of the jury also evaluate their Chinese-
style costumes. With this contest, the organization wants to preserve and promote the Chinese 
cultural heritage among Chinese Indonesians.497 The way „Chineseness‟ is presented in the 
contest reveals the ideal image of „Chineseness‟ which the organization wants to revive, exhibit 
and promote. However, especially the traditional mainland Chinese costumes and the focus on 
the contestants‟ presentations in Mandarin ignore the fact that most young Chinese Indonesians 
usually have limited knowledge about Chinese culture and language, let alone wear traditional 
Chinese costumes. The image of Chinese Indonesians in Indonesia which is broadcasted not 
only within Indonesia but also in the People‟s Republic of China, Taiwan and Singapore, may 
therefore transmit a distorted picture. Further, the televised projection of a homogenized, 
essentialized version of „Chineseness‟ may confirm prejudices of ethnic Chinese „otherness‟ 
among the rest of Indonesian society.  
The organization has also embarked on a major project to further re-sinicize ethnic Chinese by 
establishing the Indonesian Chinese Cultural Garden in the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah 
(Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park) in Jakarta. In this park, the different provinces are 
represented in their cultural diversity. In the 1970s, the park was a project of the first lady Siti 
Hartinah, the wife of President Soeharto. It is thus not surprising that initially no Chinese 
Indonesian pavilion had been constructed. The Indonesian Chinese Social Association has 
attempted to change this and has been granted permission to build a Chinese Indonesian 
Cultural Museum in 2007. Given that the projected cost of the project is estimated at 70 billion 
Indonesian rupiahs (about 5.7 million EUR), the association has been relying on donations. 
During an interview with T. Jusuf, the chairman of the association, he described how difficult it 
had been to collect enough donations to complete the project. The project was originally 
planned to be finished in 2008, however, due to a lack of funds, it had not yet been completed 
as of 2011. For Jusuf, the project was an important signal to show that Chinese Indonesians are 
as much a part of Indonesia as the Balinese, the Javanese or the people from Sumatra: “When 
the children are still in elementary school, they come here to learn about the different cultures 
that are all united in Indonesia. If they learn from a very early age that the Chinese are also part 
of it, this is good, isn‟t it? Also, the Chinese children will not feel left out and they will learn 
more about their cultural heritage and will be proud of it.”498 
                                                   
496 Cici Koko means older sister and older brother in the Chinese Fujian dialect. It is a competition for ethnic 
Chinese children.  
497 Interview with Teddy Jusuf (08.09.2008). 
498 Interview with Teddy Jusuf (08.09.2008).  
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The project has not gained support from all Chinese Indonesians. Some respondents stated that 
even though they support the idea of a Chinese pavilion, they worry about the costs for the 
project. They also expressed fears that it could be interpreted as showing off the wealth of the 
Chinese Indonesian community. 499  A further point of critique was that the park was too 
„Mainland Chinese‟ instead of „Indonesian Chinese‟. The architecture does not represent the 
style of Chinese Indonesian buildings nor does the concept take the development of Chinese 
culture in Indonesia into account.500 Thus, although the Chinese organization was longing to 
openly present „Chineseness‟ as part of Indonesian society after the long suppression of 
Chinese culture, the style of the museum might lead to misunderstandings. If the aim of the 
undertaking was to present the Chinese Indonesians as part of Indonesia, building a miniature 
version of Mainland China with a typical mainland Chinese pagoda and a theatre which 
strongly resembles the Forbidden City in Beijing may not send the intended message. It can be 
questioned whether this superficial exhibition of „Chineseness‟ alongside other artificially 
created local cultures would help Chinese Indonesians to enter the imagined community of 
Indonesian ethnic groups or empower them within the process of nation-building.501 There is a 
risk that this exhibition of „Chineseness‟ may substantiate the narrow definition of Indonesian 
national identity which is based on indigenousness by pointing out that the ethnic Chinese are 
from a different origin, instead of challenging it.   
 
The Chinese Indonesian Association also publishes newsletters and magazines in Chinese 
and supports the import of Chinese language newspapers from abroad. The post-Soeharto 
era of Reformasi is marked by the revival of the freedom of the press. In this context, many 
previously banned as well as new daily newspapers and magazines directed at the ethnic 
Chinese community published in the Chinese or Indonesian language therefore (re-) 
emerged.
502
 Due to the fact that especially the younger generation of Chinese Indonesians is 
not able to read Chinese, the audience of these papers is mostly limited to members of the 
older generation. Nevertheless, many young Chinese Indonesians the respective press 
acknowledge the existence of Chinese language press as a sign for the official recognition 
                                                   
499 Interview with Surya Tjandra (23.04.2010) and Mohammed Gatot (08.09.2008).  
500 Interview with several Chinese Indonesians in 2008 and 2010. 
501 Anderson argues that the Taman Mini in general may not help this purpose as the traditional houses at 
Taman Mini are merely “icons of ethnicity” and that “concrete and immediate life is drained” from those 
houses. Anderson, 1990, p. 182.  
502  For the research, the following Chinese language newspapers and magazines were included: The 
International Daily (Gouji Ribao), The Archipelago Daily (Qiandao Ribao), The New Indonesia and 
ASEAN (Xin Yindong), Media Aspiration (Hu Sheng), The Voice of Indonesian Chinese (Yinhua 
Zhisheng), Sinar Glodok and Sinergy Indonesia.  
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of their cultural and identity by the state, even if they are not able to read it.
503
 As the press 
is directed at Chinese Indonesians, it mainly deals with Indonesia and topics related to 
ethnic Chinese on the one hand and with topics about the People‟s Republic of China, 
Taiwan, Singapore or the Chinese diaspora. It is striking that many articles and reports are 
dealing with the development of PRC economy, reflecting readers‟ interest and the pride 
which they take in China‟s economic rise. The papers also cover topics regarding 
traditional Chinese culture.
504
 The press has further become a space for its readers to 
socialize and to imagine themselves as part of the so-called Chinese diaspora, a possible 
global identity for ethnic Chinese.
505
 This identity might serve as a retreat for those who are 
dissatisfied with their marginalized position in Indonesian society, but do not want to 
engage actively in processes of changing this. The focus on the development of the Chinese 
economy and the „re-sinicization‟ of Chinese Indonesians which some of the papers and 
magazines have, goes beyond the intentions of reviving and preserving Chinese Indonesian 
culture. Instead, the People‟s Republic of China as well as Chinese culture and values as 
practiced there are presented as an ideal. It seems to be the „cultural mission‟ of these media 
outlets to encourage Chinese Indonesians to become „more Chinese‟. Therefore, although 
the revival of the Chinese language press in Indonesia as such sets a positive signal for the 
acceptance of Chinese Indonesian culture in general, the publishers‟ determination to „re-
sinicize‟ Chinese Indonesians may hinder rather than encourage social integration. 
 
There are only few ethnic Chinese papers that are published in Indonesian. After two ethnic 
Chinese magazines (SIMPATIK published by the Jakarta-based organization Youth 
Solidarity for Justice and Suara Baru published by the Chinese Indonesian organization 
INTI) came to a halt due to financial problems, the only remaining ethnic Chinese 
magazines published in Jakarta are Sinar Glodok and Sinergy Indonesia. Sinar Glodok is a 
bi-weekly newspaper which is circulated in the so-called „China-town‟ of Jakarta. It 
consists mainly of business reports and advertisement. By focusing on the business 
activities of ethnic Chinese and their successes, the authors tap into and perpetuate 
stereotypes about the Chinese Indonesians as rich businessmen, even if these stereotypes 
may hold a dangerous potential. „Chineseness‟ is presented as the key to success and as 
such this newspaper as well uncritically promotes „re-sinicization‟. 
                                                   
503 E.g. Interview with Patricia S. (02.09.2008). 
504 As e.g. The International Daily (Gouji Ribao) and The Archipelago Daily (Qiandao Ribao). 
505 Hoon, 2008, pp. 239-240 .  
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The other Indonesians language magazine, Sinergy Indonesia, does not aim at „re-
sinicization‟. The magazine aims at presenting a bigger and more diverse picture of ethnic 
Chinese and to thus de-construct stereotypes. The magazine is therefore published in 
Indonesian in order to reach a broader audience. It promotes the idea of pluralism by 
reporting about different ethnic groups, including the ethnic Chinese, and how despite or 
because of their differences they can blend together as one very diverse nation. Multi-
ethnicity is presented as an advantage that Indonesia has and which should be more often 
regarded as a positive asset. During the interview, editor Tan raised concerns that the idea 
of assimilating ethnic Chinese to solve the „Chinese problem‟ could re-emerge as a topic in 
Indonesia. From his point of view the ethnic Chinese like other ethnic groups will make 
their contribution to Indonesia and it will be a valuable one. Getting rid of this ethnic group 
would harm Indonesia and therefore they should be included and treated like other ethnic 
indigenous people.
506
 
 
For those who speak and understand Chinese, but cannot read or write the language, there is 
also the possibility of watching the Chinese program of Metro TV. The TV station 
broadcasts international and national news as well as reports about ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia in Mandarin since the year 2000 during one time slot per day. While ethnic 
Chinese, especially of the older generation are keen on having programs in Chinese, it 
seems to reach only a limited number of ethnic Chinese. These are mainly people who went 
to a Chinese school before the Soeharto regime closed them down in the 1960s and people 
who now study the language as a foreign language as well as foreign nationals who speak 
Chinese. Most Chinese Indonesian households that still use Chinese speak one of the many 
Chinese dialects (mainly from South China) rather than Mandarin, which means that those 
who grew up during the Soeharto-regime, may be able to understand and to communicate 
only in a Chinese dialect. 
Ong, responsible for the Chinese program at Metro TV, said that was it was among their 
aims to not only provide Chinese Indonesians with Chinese language TV but also to show 
that the ethnic Chinese deserve to be represented in the Indonesian media like other ethnic 
groups. They also intended to work on the reduction of the stereotype of the rich business 
Chinese by showing reports about Chinese Indonesians in other regions working as 
                                                   
506 Interview with Dr. Tan Swie Ling (10.09.2008).  
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peasants or craftspeople.
507
 However, due to the language barrier, indigenous Indonesians 
do not watch these programs and their intention to reduce stereotypes therefore seems to be 
difficult to realize. It would therefore make sense to broadcasts these reports during normal 
programs in the Indonesian language.  
 
While the Chinese Social Organization, Chinese press and Metro TV are mainly concerned 
with reviving the Chinese culture, the Indonesian Chinese Organization (INTI) is mainly 
concerned with promoting equal rights for Chinese Indonesians and their obligation to 
contribute to the Indonesian nation. As the organization states on its website,  
“Although it brings together particularly the Chinese Indonesians, Perhimpunan INTI is 
not an exclusive grouping. A need is felt, however, that Indonesian community 
members of Chinese origin must strengthen the unity among themselves and promote 
their awareness of their obligations as well as their rights as Indonesian citizens. 
 
Perhimpunan INTI will not turn a blind eye to the fact that from generation to 
generation the Indonesian community members of Chinese origin have suffered various 
forms of discrimination, something which seems to be considered and accepted as 
proper. However, Perhimpunan INTI also realizes the impression prevailing among the 
board community that the Chinese Indonesians at least have not fully met their 
commitments and obligations as Indonesian citizens. On this basis, Perhimpunan INTI 
is resolved to develop itself as an organization in which the spirit of nationalism will be 
kept a flame so that it can foster the awareness of Chinese Indonesian regarding their 
rights, commitments and obligations as Indonesian citizens.”508 
 
The organization focuses on fighting against discrimination in general and in particular against 
discrimination of ethnic Chinese. This includes improving the social image of the community 
by promoting social responsibility and organizing charity projects. While the Chinese 
organization PSMTI falls in the first category (engaging in reviving the Chinese Indonesian 
culture), INTI‟s work falls into the two following categories (working on human rights issues 
and engaging in charity work). Regarding discrimination, the organization meets regularly with 
government institutions, such as the National Commission on Human Rights or the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to discuss the issues. The charity projects are often conducted in cooperation 
                                                   
507 Interview with Susi Ong (19.09.2008).  
508 Profile INTI: http://en.inti.or.id/profile/1/ (04.02.2011).  
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with Muslim institutions; these projects include e.g. food donation for the poor during Ramadan 
or essay competitions for socially deprived children in cooperation with elementary and 
secondary schools. Through its two approaches, the organization hopes to work with both a top-
down (encouraging anti-discrimination policies on the governmental level) as well as a bottom-
up (charity on the grass-root level) approach.509 
 
The input and engagement of organizations like INTI has been important for the lifting of 
discriminatory laws and the developing of new legislation to replace them, such as the new 
nationality (or citizenship) law passed in 2006 and the Anti-discrimination Bill in 2008. As far 
as their work to improve the social image of ethnic Chinese at the grass-roots level is 
concerned, it is difficult to evaluate their impact. For outsiders, this organization is still 
perceived as an exclusively Chinese organization – a closed club.510 Even some ethnic Chinese 
stated that it was “too Chinese” for them.511 Even if charity is provided and the recipients are 
grateful for what they receive, this does not necessarily mean that the act will necessarily 
change the recipients‟ general opinion about ethnic Chinese. Some may even consider it normal 
and “the least they can do” for “they are all rich”.512  It might therefore also have a negative 
effect and stress the economic gap between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, 
confirming again the stereotype of the wealthy ethnic Chinese. The benefits of using charity to 
enhance public popularity thus seem debatable.  
In addition to INTI, charity is also provided by Christian churches. In addition to food 
donations, free medical supplies are often provided by churches. Other types of projects 
conducted by Christian churches are free schooling and vaccinations for socially deprived 
children.513 The idea and practice of charity is a well-established concept in Christianity and 
does not aim mainly at raising the popularity of the ethnic Chinese donors. Nevertheless, one 
cannot deny that this aspect also plays a role. Some respondents revealed that by trying to 
improve their image among indigenous Indonesians through charity work, they hope to prevent 
violent acts like those during May 1998.514 
 
A number of the ethnic Chinese respondents fall into the second category of those “engaging in 
human rights issues”. These include the likes of lawyers such as Jusuf, who try to bring cases of 
                                                   
509 Interview with Benny Setiono (16.09.2008).  
510 Interview with Kartika Dewi (15.04.2010).  
511 Interview with Surya Tjandra (23.04.2010). 
512 Interview with two indigenous mechanics in Jakarta (05.09.2008).  
513 Visit to a protestant church in Jakarta and interviews with some of its members after church service 
(07.09.2008).  
514 Interviews with members of a Protestant church (07.09.2008).  
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discrimination or human rights violations to court. In the course of their work, they have been 
threatened by people opposed to their efforts. Another ethnic Chinese lawyer, Gatot, was 
physically attacked by a group of radical Muslims after he claimed compensation in court in 
2001 for a man who had been accused of being a Communist, captured, maltreated and 
dispossessed by the military after the coup d‟état in 1965.515 Apart from bringing cases like this 
one to court, many of these ethnic Chinese lawyers frequently publish about human rights 
issues related to the case of ethnic Chinese and other minority groups. Iwan Wibowo for 
example constantly reviews changes in the law with regard to their impact on minority groups 
and makes them public.516 
 
Others are active in anti-discrimination organizations such as the Indonesia Anti-Discrimination 
Movement (GANDI). This organization was founded by ethnic Chinese after the 1998 riots and 
supported by President Wahid and later President Megawati. Through its programs, GANDI 
promotes legal actions that help in decreasing discrimination in Indonesia in general. In this 
context, the members of this organization monitor policies and put forward suggestions on their 
website (lobby work). The organization was also involved in the drafting of the new Nationality 
(citizenship) Law and the Anti-Discrimination Bill. It maintains close connections to the 
Indonesian Human Rights Committee as well as foreign organizations such as the German 
development cooperation agency (GIZ).517  
 
In addition to running ethnic Chinese-founded human rights organizations, ethnic Chinese of 
other professions also actively support the promotion human rights in Indonesia. This category 
further includes journalists writing and publishing about human rights abuses with regard to 
minorities. Andreas Harsono, an ethnic Chinese who at the time of writing is with Human 
Rights Watch Indonesia, has published numerous articles in the national press as well as in his 
online blog about the human rights violations in West Kalimantan and other outer islands in 
which he does not refrain from criticizing state authorities. By trying to raise attention for 
ethnic and religious conflicts all over Indonesia, he attempts to widen people‟s perceptions of 
Indonesia and its problems, especially in Jakarta.518  
 
                                                   
515 Interview with Mohammad Gatot (08.09.2008).  
516 Wibowo, 2007.  
517 Interview with Wahyu Effendy (08.09.2008).  
518 Interview with Andreas Harsono (15.09.2008).  
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A central concept for many of the NGOs dealing with ethnic conflict in Indonesia is pluralism, 
i.e. the acknowledgment of diversity. Numerous NGOs have adapted this concept to the 
Indonesian context and gone beyond a simple acknowledgment or acceptance of diversity to 
embracing it. Having left behind an authoritarian regime, a bottom-up instead of top-down 
approach is considered desirable by many Indonesians.519 Pluralism aims at defining people‟s 
needs and common interests in society through a process of dialogue and sometimes conflict. 
Thus many ethnic minority groups who feel dominated by other ethnic groups may see 
pluralism as a chance to integrate their interests and needs into a re-defined Indonesian nation.  
Even if one group may be able to establish its view as the hegemonic one, this would be as 
result of a negotiation process within a pluralistic framework. Creating space for dialogue 
provides an opportunity for all groups to represent their interests.  
Most of the NGOs working on promoting pluralism try to raise awareness and understanding 
for the positions of different ethnic groups. They also try to encourage and empower ethnic 
groups who lack the requisite educational background to formulate their needs and interests and 
participate in the process of nation-building. Their efforts are not limited to ethnic but also 
other marginalized social groups.   
For example, the Institute for Pluralism in Indonesia (IPI) has initiated the project „Batik 
Lasem‟ to increase pluralism and local empowerment. Currently, there are still many ethnic 
Chinese who work as batik entrepreneurs in the area. The batik work itself is mainly done by 
indigenous workers. It is often difficult for batik workers to leave their employers to start a 
business of their own as they lack both the recipes of the dye, which is kept secret by the 
entrepreneurs, and the necessary financial assets. Many workers have been frustrated with the 
situation and translated this frustration into anti-Chinese sentiments, even though their situation 
is similar for those who work for indigenous batik entrepreneurs.520  
For the Batik Lasem project, three villages in the area surrounding Lasem were selected. 
Women living in these villages had previously been working for Chinese Indonesian batik 
entrepreneurs were now unemployed. IPI organized seminars to support these women to help 
them start their own businesses, to produce their own dye, create designs of their own, and to 
manage their finances. The empowerment of female batik workers has helped them to gain a 
new self-understanding and self-esteem. During local fairs these female batik workers are now 
able to sell their batik cloths next to other, already established, batik entrepreneurs. As they 
have now become batik entrepreneurs, they have started to communicate with other long-
established (often ethnic Chinese) businessmen and businesswomen on a different level, from 
                                                   
519 Interview with William Kwan and Kartika Dewi (15.04.2010).  
520 Interview with Mariati M. (13.04.2010) and Jamiatum R. (14.04.2010).  
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entrepreneur to entrepreneur. IPI also organized exchange meetings for batik entrepreneurs 
where the women had the opportunity to learn from the experiences of Chinese Indonesian 
entrepreneurs, who also gave them advice on improving their designs. Two of these women 
successfully extended their business to areas as far as Solo and Yogyakarta. They stated that 
they now had a different level of access to some of their former employers, which also changed 
their perception of ethnic Chinese in general. The NGO hopes that projects such as this one will 
help in overcoming the ethnic and social class gaps between ethnic groups and foster more 
cooperation.521   
 
The Yayasan Nabil foundation has another approach to promote pluralism. It funds academic 
projects which promote the equitable integration of Chinese Indonesians into the Indonesian 
nation, not as outsiders but as an integral part who have to contribute to the nation's 
development and well-being and fulfill their social responsibility as they might not have done 
in the past. The organization thereby tries to promote the ideas of pluralism and nation-building 
among academics in Indonesia. The organization not only enables students and academics to 
publish works related to this topic, but helps them in promoting and distributing them, 
organizes book launchings and readings as well as seminars and workshops.522 Addressing 
academics not only fosters their academic interest in the topic. Many academics are interested 
in politics or even enter politics.523 They either act as source of information for politicians or 
transfer their knowledge directly into the political realm and therefore the topic of the ethnic 
Chinese may be brought into politics.   
 
The final category within this subgroup is ethnic Chinese who are directly engaged in 
politics. Shortly after the ban on Chinese organizations was lifted, several ethnic Chinese 
political parties were founded. During the first free elections, however, these parties failed 
to gain even the support of the ethnic Chinese communities. The parties were mostly 
dissolved or merged with larger, not exclusively Chinese Indonesian, parties. A number of 
individual ethnic Chinese have joined different political parties and managed to become 
elected. Purnama, for example, became the first ethnic Chinese mayor in Indonesia, 
winning on Belitung Island despite ethnic Chinese only making up 0.3 percent of the 
population on this island. According to him, many ethnic Chinese fail to get elected 
                                                   
521 During my field visit 2010, I spent a week in Lasem where I was able to talk to the initiators of the project, 
participants (batik women worker, e.g. Mariati M., 13.04.2010) and ethnic Chinese batik entrepreneurs.  
522 Interview with Eddie Lembong (16.09.2008).  
523 E.g. Prof. Hendrawan. 
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because they focus too much on issues regarding ethnic or religious problems in Indonesia. 
In his campaign, he instead focused on reforming the health system.
524
 Others have been 
elected into parliament, including Prof. Hendrawan and Tsai. Despite reported cases of 
discrimination and manipulation during elections and electoral campaigns
525
, increasing 
numbers of ethnic Chinese are entering politics. The politicians interviewed here stated that 
they hoped that more young ethnic Chinese would join political parties, to show that they 
are not scared but rather that they want to be part of building the nation's democracy. 
Through their political engagement they also want to prove to the indigenous public that 
ethnic Chinese are not only „economic animals‟, but also socially and politically active, 
responsible citizens.  
However, the respondents also admitted that there were ethnic Chinese who enter politics 
as part of a business strategy. Being politically active is still not easy in Indonesia and 
running campaigns requires vast amounts of money, thus making it difficult to separate 
politics from capital. Some ethnic Chinese politicians voiced their concern that some fellow 
ethnic Chinese “just buy themselves a seat a parliament” without actually caring for 
politics, but rather in the hope of gaining business advantages.
526
  
 
The members of this subgroup have organized themselves to work towards their aims using 
different approaches to work on the conflict, be it directly or indirectly, often investing 
remarkable amounts of their time and personal assets. Although many groups have rather 
abstract goals such as abolishing discrimination (equal rights for all), justice for victims 
(reconciliation), initiating a society forming process in the framework of pluralism, or reviving 
Chinese Indonesian culture. The projects are very diverse and touch upon different levels and 
areas of conflict transformation. Nevertheless, there is always space for improvement and if the 
groups would be working together, synergies could emerge which would allow for a more 
structured approach. To date, each organization or individual has developed a concept or 
measure which is considered to be helpful in the process, without prior analysis of the conflict 
or developing an overall aim which the process should lead to.  
 
Conflict transformation is also in the interest of ethnic Chinese who do not live up to the 
stereotype of the „wealthy‟ ethnic Chinese. The situation of lower class ethnic Chinese in the 
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surrounding of Jakarta527 is a difficult one as poor indigenous Indonesians consider them to be 
„Chinese‟ while the wealthy ethnic Chinese refer to them as „indigenous‟, even though they 
have preserved Chinese cultural elements. The majority of them has Chinese names, worships 
Daoist or Buddhist deities and their ancestors and has developed a Chinese Indonesian cuisine 
of their own.528 In the past, physical traits or anything which highlighted their Chinese heritage 
was sufficient to make them targets of anti-Chinese mobs.  Like other ethnic Chinese, residents 
of Cina Benteng also encounter discrimination. Even though the new citizenship law has 
changed the requirements such as dropping the requirement for the SBKRI document, many 
still have not succeeded in officially becoming Indonesian citizens.529  In contrast to other 
Chinese Indonesians who are better situated, they lack the resources to “buy their way out of 
trouble”530. In spite of being offered assistance by legal aid services and NGOs such as GANDI, 
many poor and less educated ethnic Chinese still struggle with bureaucratic processes. Until 
they are officially Indonesian citizens, they are regarded as stateless people with only limited 
rights in Indonesia. Respondents also claimed that they were often not included in food 
assistance programs and cannot participate in other pro-poor initiatives of the government and 
therefore are interested in conflict transformation if it helps to improve their situation.531  
 
Subgroup 3: Indifferent to Conflict Transformation  
Similar to the subgroup on the indigenous side, this subgroup can be divided into those who 
are more inclined to get positively involved in issues regarding the conflict and those who 
are more inclined to get negatively involved. Unlike indigenous Indonesians who in some 
cases do not even notice the conflict or do not perceive the situation as a conflict, ethnic 
Chinese have little chance of escaping the conflict entirely. Most have encountered 
situations in which they were „confronted‟ with their identity as ethnic Chinese, regardless 
their own perceptions of their identity.
532
 Thung classified this subgroup of people as 
„internationals‟ who choose “to go international”533 for their alternative identity. As such 
they engage “in appropriating national modes of development in such a way that they lose 
the significance of personal identity, including that of their ethnic origin, and instead adopt 
                                                   
527 For practical reasons interviews could only be conducted with residents of Cina Benteng. Therefore, only a 
limited insight about the attitudes and behavior of lower class ethnic Chinese can be provided in this 
study.  
528 Interviews with anonymous Chinese Indonesians during a visit to Cina Benteng. 
529 Khouw, 2010.  
530 Interview with Andreas Harsono (15.09.2008). 
531 Interviews with anonymous Chinese Indonesians during a visit to Cina Benteng.  
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a rather general and uniform identity, for example as a „professional‟.”534 Thereby, they try 
to avoid the topic of their identity and the conflicts connected to it. In some cases, these 
people have been traumatized by events such as the May riots 1998. If the people are 
willing to accept help to deal with their sometimes traumatic experiences, trauma experts 
might be able to provide this. However, respondents from this subgroup stated that they 
preferred to forget about the traumatic events and ignore their traumatic experiences.
535
 
    
Depending on their behavior, they can also influence public opinion about ethnic Chinese. 
If they display their wealth ostentatiously and treat their employees badly, they strengthen 
negative stereotypes about ethnic Chinese. Harsono stated that he felt ashamed about how 
some fellow Chinese Indonesians “celebrate parties like they are kings and they don‟t care 
that the others [indigenous Indonesians] are watching them”.536 By throwing lavish parties 
which are then documented in the newspapers or magazines, not caring about the economic 
situation of the poor living close by, they seem to do everything to confirm the bad images 
of ethnic Chinese.
537
 Harsono believes that if they behave modestly and act as good 
examples, they might contribute to deconstructing negative stereotypes.
538
  
 
4.3 Contradictions  
Having assessed the attitudes (A) and behavior (B) of the involved subgroups, the focus will 
now shift from the actors to the contradictions (C). These contradictions may either result from 
the attitudes and behavior of the conflict parties or bring them about. In most protracted 
conflicts, both occur over the course of time. Contradictions here are understood as the 
contradicting aims and interests of the conflict parties.  According to Galtung, all three aspects 
of a conflict have to be addressed. However, the contradictions form “the root of the conflict, 
the condition sine qua non”539 and are therefore in the focus of interest when it comes to 
transforming the conflict. If the contradictions are transformed first, the attitudes and behavior 
that infringed on the basic human needs of one or more parties can be reduced or even 
                                                   
534 Ibid.  
535 Based on interviews with Patricia S. (02.09.2008), members of a protestant church in Jakarta (07.09.2008), 
Charles N. (16.09.2008) and Thung Ju Lan (20.04.2010). 
536 Interview with Andrea Harsono (15.09.2008) 
537 Ibid.  
538 Ibid.  
539 Galtung, 2010, p. 125.  
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overcome.540 Transforming contradictions does not mean that only one of the parties achieves 
her goals (victory) or that neither of them achieves their goals (compromise). This would not 
eliminate the contradictions, as both options do not necessarily imply that the other party 
accepts the result. Even if the result is accepted for the time being, the possibility remains that 
conflict may arise again at a later point in time. The sharper the contradictions the more the 
social system needs to be changed.541   
 
Galtung distinguishes between objective and subjective contradictions. Objective contradictions 
“may be unconscious and unarticulated”542 while subjective contradictions “pass through the 
human brain, as thought-consciousness, speech-articulation and action-organization.” 543  
Subjective contradictions can be revealed by listening to the conflict parties and the articulation 
of their respective aims and interests which cannot be satisfied as they are being opposed by the 
other conflict party. Objective contradictions are often to be found on the next higher level, in 
underlying structures that mostly are not obvious to the involved actors themselves. Before 
being able to work on objective contradictions, they need to be made conscious to the actors. 
Galtung depicted the possible development of a contradiction with a „contradiction life 
cycle‟:544 
[0] Objective contraction, independent of consciousness 
[1] Consciousness-formation through THOUGHT (intrasubjective) 
[2] Articulation through SPEECH (intersubjective) 
[3] Organization through ACTION (private and-or public) 
[4] Struggle among mobilized actors 
 Violent or nonviolent 
 Quick or slow 
 Without or with outside parties assisting, mediating 
 With more or less polarization, escalation between actors 
[5] Outcomes of struggle: 
 Prevalence or compromise: go back to [0]-[4] 
 Transcendence = a new reality 
 
                                                   
540 Ibid.  
541 Galtung, 2010, p. 171.  
542 Galtung, 2010, pp. 171.  
543 Ibid.  
544 Galtung, 2010, p. 172.  
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Subjective Contradictions of This Conflict 
The subjective contradictions in this case are not easily identifiable as they are not directly 
linked to e.g. territory struggles between two parties. There are not only two conflict groups, 
the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians, but at least six conflict subgroups, all with 
different attitudes, behaviors, aims and interests.  This complexity is due to the goals of 
individuals but also of groups being influenced by deeper, underlying patters of social 
relationships in their direct surroundings (their social environment) as well as subjective 
assumptions. There are contradictions between the two main conflict parties which override the 
divisions into subgroups. However, there are also contradictions overriding the division 
between the ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians as well. As the analysis of the conflict 
subgroups revealed, there are conflict actors in each major conflict group that are opposing 
conflict transformation on the one hand as well as conflict actors that are already engaging in 
projects aiming at conflict transformation. 
 
Based on the analysis of the field research results, ethnic Chinese who are striving for 
acceptance of their identity as ethnic Chinese and self-realization without restrictions due to 
their ethnicity are in favor of conflict transformation efforts. They have a need for equal rights 
and treatment as Indonesian nationals by their fellow indigenous Indonesians. This precondition 
would enable them to better reach their personal goals. Lower class ethnic Chinese who are 
stateless have problems finding decently paid work to improve their economic situation as long 
as they do not have Indonesian citizenship. The upper- and middle-classes aim at living out 
their Chinese Indonesian identity with all of its cultural implications without having to face 
discrimination. They have begun going beyond the segment of work (business) traditionally 
assigned to them to other fields such as politics and aim to expand their options and 
possibilities in life by exerting their right to choose their profession freely. Their goals are 
legitimate and further fall under the (according to Galtung) non-debatable basic human needs of 
identity and freedom. 
 
In the case of the other conflict party, indigenous Indonesians of Subgroup 1 are interested in 
maintaining the social status quo, i.e. keeping ethnic Chinese in their traditional role as 
middlemen. Ethnic Chinese, especially from the upper- and middle-class, are seen as posing a 
threat to their political or economic power (or both). If ethnic Chinese would be able to extend 
their influence to politics, they would be in the same position as the indigenous elite who also 
have combined economic and political activities, like the Soeharto family or Kalla (vice 
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president 2004-2009). In order to preserve their power, it is in the interest of the indigenous 
elite to prevent ethnic Chinese from rising above their current position, be it in society or the 
economy, in order to stay in power and not have to share it. While striving for personal success 
or at preserving one‟s position are legitimate goals, if this means that another group of people 
has to suffer infringements upon their basic human needs, these aims lose their legitimacy. A 
further element is that indigenous Indonesian seem to have difficulties with the idea of being 
governed again by foreigners, as which many of them classify Chinese Indonesians as well. 
These fears can be seen as a kind of trauma deriving from negative collective memories of a 
colonial past as Indonesia has only been independent less than seventy years. These fears 
should be kept in mind and dealt with sensitively when seeking to transform the goals of this 
subgroup. 
 
The Chinese Indonesians of Subgroup 1 also support the aim of the indigenous Subgroup 1 
(preserving the status quo), albeit for other reasons. Those who currently benefit from the 
ethnic Chinese‟ position as marginalized middlemen and Chinese (business) networks would 
not be able to do so anymore if this position and its functions would disappear. Therefore, they 
feel more comfortable remaining in an exclusive position and over time have developed 
prejudices against indigenous Indonesians. They are not interested in being „Indonesian‟, 
instead they prefer being either „Chinese‟ or neither. Many of them have either shown a clear 
orientation towards Singapore, Mainland China, Taiwan or Western countries such as Australia, 
the USA or Europe. Since they have come to terms with their situation, they do not see any 
reason why this should change as change would mean that their perception of their selves (their 
identity) would have to be altered.  
 
Subgroups also disagree about the perception of ethnic Chinese and the understanding of the 
Indonesian nation. While there are members of both groups, ethnic Chinese as well as 
indigenous (especially in the respective Subgroups 2), who want Chinese Indonesians to be as 
much a part of Indonesia as other Indonesian peoples, there are other subgroups among both 
primary conflict parties who still perceive them as different and to some degree as foreigners. 
The understanding of the nation is still strongly tied to the concept of „indigenousness‟. The 
state‟s portrayal of ethnic Chinese as a distinct group of „others‟ in order to form a counterpart 
to Indonesian identity the New Order regime has prevailed until the time of writing (2012). 
Indigenousness is therefore an important, if not the main part of how many Indonesians define 
and understand their identity. While there are subgroups who would like to see changes in this 
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concept of the nation, members of the sub-group opposing conflict transformation efforts feel 
threatened by change and fear for the unity of Indonesia. As can be seen from the many ethnic 
but also religious conflicts all over Indonesia, the concept of unity is very fragile in spite of 
efforts made by successive governments to engender a feeling of being one nation among the 
Indonesian people.  
Choosing and being able to live one‟s own identity is among the basic human needs. Both 
opposing subgroups have a right to their respective identity. However, the two understandings 
of national identity exclude each other. For one subgroup, the exclusion of ethnic Chinese is a 
pre-condition of their concept of indigenousness as the basis for their understanding of an 
Indonesian national identity. For the other subgroup, the inclusion of ethnic Chinese in the 
Indonesian national identity is necessary to be able to unfold and live their identity freely. 
 
Objective Contradictions 
When trying to identify objective contradictions from the subjective contradictions and the 
statements of the respondents, the contradictions can be summarized as maintaining the status 
quo vs. changing society. There is a clash of interests with regard to the social structure of the 
nation in which the ethnic Chinese are in a long-established position as a distinct, marginalized, 
non-indigenous middlemen minority. The analysis revealed indigenous Indonesians as well as 
ethnic Chinese who want to uphold the social structure as it is. As they are content with the 
situation, they are unlikely to welcome change. On the contrary, change might challenge their 
current positions and endanger their economic and social situation. This fear of change should 
not be underestimated, and while Indonesia has only been a democratic state for a little over a 
decade and changes are occurring on a frequent basis, social structures have not changed much 
in this period and vestiges of the colonial era still remain. The current topdog-underdog 
structure in which those in power can use ethnic Chinese as scapegoats against whom the 
masses can vent their frustration, has proven itself to be convenient for both the indigenous elite 
as well as the lower classes. For the Chinese Indonesian elite, their middlemen position and the 
resulting economic symbiosis with the indigenous elite have provided individuals with business 
advantages and personal wealth. Therefore, it is in their interest to maintain the status quo and 
not endanger the social structures which are beneficial to their current personal situation.  
 
There are subgroups both ethnic Chinese and indigenous which aim at more integration and 
ultimately at creating a new, perhaps pluralist society, in which Chinese Indonesians are full 
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members. In this context a new understanding of nationhood would be required which is not 
bound to the concept of „indigenousness‟.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In order to portray and analyze the formation of the conflict, it was mapped based on the 
conflict triangle, thereby covering both the actor and factual levels by dealing with the 
conflict‟s contradictions. The two main conflict groups, Chinese Indonesians and indigenous 
Indonesians, were divided into subgroups based on their attitude (and behavior) towards 
conflict transformation. In defining the attitudes and behaviors of the different subgroups, not 
only differences between the various subgroups emerged but also similar attitudes which 
transcend the division into two main conflict groups. Identifying similarities and common 
ground among the parties is important when it comes to working on transforming the conflict.  
The respective Subgroups 1 are those who could potentially jeopardize efforts to transform the 
conflict as they have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Since the Subgroups 1 and 2 
are in opposition to each other, this category will need special focus in conflict transformation 
efforts.  
In terms of conflict transformation, it is the respective Subgroups 2 which are the most 
promising ones. Here, there are both indigenous as well as Chinese Indonesians who are 
interested in, and often already working on, the conflict. They have already paved the way for 
comprehensive conflict transformation by having initiated diverse projects on different levels 
which tackle the conflict from different angles. The different organizations have not joined 
forces yet, although this would help in approaching the conflict more strategically.  
Subgroups 3 on both sides are not interested in contributing to the conflict, and they are also not 
expected to actively oppose efforts leading to conflict transcendence. Nevertheless, depending 
on the circumstances, they might lean towards either supporting efforts to transform the conflict 
or towards opposing them. Therefore, they could move from Subgroup 3 to either Subgroup 2 
or Subgroup 1. The ethnic Chinese of this category are also affected by violence directed 
against their group as a whole, even if they try to ignore the conflict as such.  
 
It can be thus concluded that there are different subgroups within both main conflict groups, 
which have interests and attitudes that transcend the ethnic division between the major groups. 
Therefore, when looking at and dealing with the conflict actors a horizontal and a vertical 
component need to be considered. The horizontal one distinguishes between ethnic Chinese and 
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indigenous Indonesians as the primary conflict parties, while the vertical perspective looks at 
the different subgroups within these primary conflict parties.  
 
The contradictions on the objective level point to a clash of interests with regard to the social 
structure of the nation (change vs. status quo) which translates at the subjective level into 
opposing interests that touch upon personal needs and fears. These range from the need and 
desire to be able to openly and acceptably express one‟s own cultural identity, to work on one‟s 
self-realization (e.g. with regard to occupation), to fears of losing one‟s personal advantage 
over others.  These contradicting aims need to be discussed with regard to their legitimacy and 
need to be worked on by the actors involved.  This should be done mainly with both indigenous 
and ethnic Chinese members of Subgroups 1 and 2.  The attitudes, behaviors and contradicting 
aims which constitute conflict formation in protracted, complex conflicts often derive from or 
are fostered by underlying structures embedded in deeper dimensions that the involved conflict 
actors are not consciously aware of. 
151 
 
5. Analysis of Conflict Deep Dimensions  
5.1 The Concept of the Deep Dimension Conflict Triangle 
To deal with the contradictions in the conflict implies analyzing their roots. According to 
Galtung they can be rooted or derived “from Nature, Culture and Structure. Nature is in us and 
around us; Culture is in us as internalized values and norms; and Structure is around us as 
institutionalized norms, backed by positive and negative sanctions.”545 Within the theoretical 
framework developed by Galtung which aims at uncovering the unconscious, underlying 
dimension of a conflict, the understanding of nature, culture and structure is based on theories 
developed by Freud, Jung, Marx and Darwin. While Freud and Jung focused on nature as „the 
id‟ (the human drives) and culture as „the super-ego‟, Marx focused on nature as basic needs 
and structure as class relations. Darwin concentrated on nature as a struggle between and within 
species. Galtung combined elements of all three approaches and refined them for his approach 
to conflict transformation. From Freud, he adopted the focus on meeting nature‟s drives and 
social values, from Jung the understanding of a collective unconscious, from Marx the focus on 
goals as structure-induced interests, and from Darwin the basic needs focusing on self- and 
species survival. For completion, specific private goals of individuals had to be added to these.546  
 
Figure 9: The Deep Dimension (Conflict) Triangle547 
 
                                                   
545 Galtung, 2010, p. 73.  
546 Galtung, 2010, p. 73-74.  
547 Based on Galtung, 2010, p. 77.  
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The term „deep‟ is a pre-conditioner and in this conflict triangle refers to what is unconscious, 
hidden and underneath the surface of a conflict‟s formation. The term „deep‟ attitudes refers to 
„deep‟ culture, the collective subconscious of a group which may cause cultural violence. The 
term deep behavior is based on deep nature, i.e. on basic human needs which can form the basis 
for direct violence in case those needs are endangered. The term deep contradictions means the 
deep structures, the infrastructure of a conflict which may include structural violence.548  
 
The deep dimension triangle is closely related not only to the analysis of conflict formation, but 
also to the analysis of violence in a conflict as depicted in the violence triangle. While the 
violence analysis focuses on the infringement of basic human needs, the basic human needs are 
looked upon as a subconscious source of human behavior in the analysis of the deep 
dimensions. This translates into concrete behavior in the conflict as described in the conflict 
formation analysis. All the three triangles (the triangle of violence, the conflict triangle and the 
deep dimension triangle) are interrelated. They complement and complete each other and thus 
allow for a comprehensive approach to understanding the complexity of conflicts. In the 
analysis of the conflict‟s deep dimensions, the two main conflict parties (indigenous 
Indonesians and ethnic Chinese) will not be examined in subgroups which were presented in 
the previous chapter, as the deep dimensions deal with the underlying general characteristics of 
whole societies or civilizations. After presenting the concept of deep culture, deep nature and 
deep structure in more detail, I will analyze elements of this deep dimension which are relevant 
for the analysis and approaches to conflict transformation of this specific conflict case. 
 
Deep Culture 
Galtung adopted three axioms as guidelines: “There is something subconscious conditioning 
our body-mind-spirit. To be master of yourself(ves) be conscious of the subconscious; and 
internalize better consciousness for a better future subconscious.”549 For a better understanding 
of sub-/unconsciousness and Freud‟s vision of the human mind, it is often represented 
metaphorically as an iceberg mostly submerged in the sea although Freud himself did not use 
this analogy.550 The visible part of the iceberg represents the conscious level of the mind. A far 
larger portion remains beneath the surface and stands for the unconscious (also referred to as 
the subconscious part of the mind). Freud first encountered what he later defined as 
unconscious when treating his first female patients diagnosed with hysteria. He discovered that 
                                                   
548 Galtung, 2010, p. 75.  
549 Galtung, 2010, p. 77.  
550 E.g. by Ruch and Zimbardo, 1974.  
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they had „strategically forgotten‟ traumatic events which were too painful for them to recall.551 
According to Freud, there are three levels of consciousness: conscious, preconscious and 
unconscious.552 Ideas, memories, feelings, or motives of which people are actively aware of are 
said to be conscious, while the other two levels remain initially hidden. Aspects of experience 
that are not conscious at a given moment because they lack psychological importance for that 
particular point in time, but which can easily be brought to awareness, are stored at the so-
called preconscious level. Cognitions, feelings, or motives, however that are not available at the 
conscious or the preconscious level are said to be located on the unconscious one. On this level, 
ideas, desires, and memories are located which people are not or cannot easily become aware 
of.  They have to be discovered and brought to the level of awareness with the help of a third 
party.  
The process of shifting ideas, desires, and memories from the conscious or the preconscious to 
the unconscious level is called repression.553 Despite the „unawareness‟ of those thoughts and 
feelings located in the unconscious level, Freud claims that they still influence the respective 
person. There are different reasons why those thoughts and feeling are kept suppressed at the 
unconscious level. According to Freud, the deep attitudes are located beneath the conscious 
attitudes within the individual – since his focus of his research was the individual psyche he did 
not extend his theory to a larger entity such as a social community. 
 
When Freud later developed his topographical concept of the mind in the so-called structural 
model, the unconscious became „the id‟ which wants and desires in the here-and-now. It knows 
no other time than the present and no other answer but „yes‟. In the diagram of the deep 
dimension triangle „the id‟ can be related to the deep nature. It strives for the satisfaction of the 
basic human needs which is reflected in the actors‟ behavior on the conflict level depicted by 
the conflict triangle. „The ego‟ on the other hand represents the conscious part of a person. It is 
also the individual‟s image of oneself as a self-conscious being. In contrast to the id, the ego 
recognizes time and preserves the self by holding back desires when necessary and negotiates 
with reality.554 The „super-ego‟ is the self-critical aspect of the ego which judges the conscious 
                                                   
551 Thurschwell, 2009, pp. 16ff.  
552 Freud developed this distinction in his book Traumdeutung (Interpretation of Dreams) (published in 1900) 
where he tried to gain access to the two hidden levels by interpreting dreams as a window to the 
unconscious. Thurschwell, 2009, p. 3. Definitions of the term „unconscious‟ followed e.g. in Einige 
Bemerkungen über den Begriff des Unbewußten in der Psychoanalyse (A Few Remarks on the Term 
Unconscious in Psychoanalysis) (published in 1912). However, in his publications about the term 
„unconscious‟, the definitions are not consistent as he sometimes uses the term „unconscious‟ also for what 
earlier has been defined as „preconscious‟. 
553 Köhler, 2007, pp. 39ff.  
554 Thurschwell, 2009, pp. 79ff.  
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and unconscious decisions of the id and the ego. The criteria and standards by which the super-
ego judges the id and the ego are set by the respective society the individual lives in. While the 
id and the ego are focused on the self as individual, the super-ego recognizes that the individual 
lives not only for itself, but in a community responding to and also responsible for others. The 
ego acts as the moderator between the id and the super-ego. 555  If transferred to the deep 
dimension triangle, the super-ego not only represents the social setting of the conflict actors, 
but further also deep culture.  
  
Figure 10: The topographical concept of the mind, depicted as iceberg 
 
Even though Freud‟s focus is on the psyche of the individual, the concept of the super-ego 
shows that he goes beyond the individual to the community, however  never leaving the realm 
of the individual far behind. Parents tell a child what it should do or not do or make him/her 
feel guilty for things he/she should not have done. This forms the super-ego, the individual‟s 
„inner voice‟ or conscience.556 Later on in life, social standards are also internalized. Feelings of 
guilt therefore derive from the super-ego. It is not only conscious thoughts (the ego) that 
influence a person, but also natural instincts (the id) and its socially influenced conscience (the 
super-ego).  
 
Carl G. Jung, a student and follower of Freud, was less focused on the individual as a separate 
from society than on the collective. As Galtung puts it, Freud saw deep attitudes behind 
                                                   
555 Thurschwell, 2009, pp. 89-90.  
556 Thurschwell, 2009, p. 45.  
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personal attitudes while Jung saw them behind collective attitudes.557 Jung followed Freud‟s 
theories of the unconscious, but extended Freud‟s concept of the „personal‟ unconscious and 
added the concept of the „collective‟ unconscious in his work Archetyp und Unbewußtes 
(Archetype and Unconscious).558 According to Jung, each person‟s unconscious mind consists 
of not only suppressed feelings generated and experienced by the individual, but also extends 
the origin of such feelings to the collective. The collective unconscious is located between the 
individual unconscious and the part of mind which can never be actively made conscious. The 
collective unconscious suggests an original set of archetypes common to all people, i.e. the 
entire humankind, out of which people formulate meanings, contexts, and patterns. 559 
Archetypes are innate psychic dispositions for experiencing and representing basic human 
behavior and deriving innumerable images, symbols and patterns of behavior. While the 
emerging images and forms are comprehended by the individual consciously, the archetypes 
which inform them are elementary structures which are unconscious and difficult to grasp. 
Being unconscious, the existence of archetypes can only be deduced indirectly by examining 
behavior, images, art, myths, etc. Archetypes are inherited potentials which are actualized when 
they enter consciousness as images or manifest in behavior on interaction with the outside 
world. Ideas such as the concept of rebirth, which occur independently in various cultures and 
ages, are advanced as evidence for an archetypical structure in the human psyche; in effect, a 
collective unconscious.560 The number of archetypes is limited for they correspond with typical 
or archetypal events which human beings regardless their cultural background have 
experienced for countless generations: birth, death, and separation from parents, initiation, 
marriage, or the union of opposites. Archetypal figures range from the great mother, child, 
devil, God, to wise old man / woman and while archetypal motifs can be the Apocalypse, the 
Deluge, and the Creation.561 Jung provided proof for the existence of archetypes in analyses of 
adult and childhood dreams, active imagination, psychotic delusions, and fantasies produced in 
the trance state.562 Although the general idea of an archetype seems to be comprehensible, their 
exact nature and the way they result in universal experiences appears to be more difficult to 
grasp. Archetypal figures such as the great mother and the wise man for example are not 
                                                   
557 Galtung, 2007b, p. 198.  
558 Jung, 1984, Vol. II. 
559 Jung stated in his book Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart: „Das kollektive Unbewußte ist die gewaltige 
geistige Erbmasse der Menschheitsentwicklung, wiedergeboren in jeder individuellen […] Struktur.“, 
Jacobi, 1940, p. 63.  
560 Jung, 1984, Vol. III, p. 31.  
561 Jacobi, 1940, pp. 80ff.  
562 Jacobi, 1940, p. 72ff. 
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archetypes, but archetypal images which have developed from archetypes.563 Jung compares 
archetypes with crystal axes. The axe system only determines the stereometric structure of a 
crystal, not the concrete form of the individual crystal.564  
 
Galtung incorporates the idea of both the individual and, perhaps more importantly, collective 
unconscious in what he refers to as deep culture. He further includes the idea of archetypes as 
patterns of how people ascribe meanings to things and phenomena which form part of the 
collective unconscious and therefore constitute a prerequisite for the behavior of actors. He 
mostly refers to the „unconscious‟ as the „subconscious‟ 565  and thereby emphasizes that 
whatever is in the subconscious can be made conscious even though the person is not aware of 
it. Due to the person‟s unawareness of what lies in the subconscious, the process moving 
subconscious elements to awareness therefore cannot be initiated by the person himself/herself. 
An outsider has to be involved to detect what is in the subconscious and reveal it to the 
respective person.566  
However, in contrast to Jung, who relates the collective unconscious to humankind in general, 
Galtung distinguishes between collective unconscious of different civilizations.567 He thereby 
leaves the realm of the generic archetypes and adds another level to the concept, namely 
cultural or social subgroups of archetypes. The collective subconscious is formed by collective 
value systems deriving from historical experiences of a certain society and therefore may differ 
substantially from that of another. For example, a society which, due to its geographical 
location and its economic history is dependent on overseas trade is more likely to have 
developed a positive attitude towards strangers than a society which has experienced strangers 
mainly as invaders. This difference may aggravate communication between members of two 
societies as they interpret what is „normal‟ and „natural‟ differently, resulting in divergent 
perceptions of reality. Galtung refers to this deep-seated collective interpretation of reality, 
perceptions of what is seen as normal and natural, as the „cosmology‟ of a civilization.568 The 
cosmology is the code of a civilization which produces cultural elements and thereby 
reproduces itself.569. Sources for the attitudes of conflict actors and legitimizations of violence 
can often be found in the respective cosmologies. This perspective therefore provides an 
                                                   
563 Jung quoted in Jacobi, 1940, p. 75.  
564 Ibid.  
565 For example, Galtung, 2010, p. 77. 
566 Galtung, 2010, p. 81.  
567 Galtung, 2007b, p. 198.  
568 Galtung, 1986; Galtung, 2007a, pp. 367ff. 
569 Galtung, 1986, p. 1.  
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additional dimension in the search for root causes of violence as well as contradictions in a 
conflict.  
 
In order to uncover cosmologies, to gain insights into the conflict actors‟ deep culture and to 
discover differing perceptions of reality and violence potentials, Galtung defines civilizations as 
well as parameters or dimensions to analyze their cosmologies. Galtung identifies six 
civilizations based on the cultural characteristics of societies. He understands a civilization as a 
macro-culture spanning vast areas of space and large intervals in time. The civilizations he 
identified do not cover all parts of the world. African or Asian-Pacific indigenous cultures, for 
example, have not been taken into account in this listing of civilization, a fact which Galtung 
himself acknowledges as a shortcoming.570  
For Galtung two factors are dominant for identifying civilizations: first, the distinction between 
„occident‟ and „orient‟571 and second the distinction between Abrahamic religions (Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam) and oriental „religions‟ or spiritual guidance (Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Daoism, Confucianism, Shintoism). With regard to the Occident, he further differentiates 
between Occident I and Occident II which differ in time as Occident I represents modern 
civilization while Occident II refers to the civilization of the medieval Occident.572 Concerning 
the Orient, he distinguishes between Buddhist, Sinic (Buddhism in combination with other 
Chinese perspectives such as Daoism and Confucianism), and Nipponic (Buddhism in 
combination with other Japanese perspectives like Shintoism) civilizations. 573  The Indian 
(Hindu) civilization is considered to be in between the Occident and Orient. Societies are 
grouped under these civilizations based on the two main factors and therefore constitute 
theoretical constructs in terms of Weber‟s ideal types. They therefore form analytical 
benchmarks and means to enable the study of macro-cultures and their underlying 
cosmologies.574  
 
                                                   
570 Galtung, 2007a, pp. 368ff.  
571 Galtung uses these terms (Galtung, 2007a, p. 368) for depicting his concept of civilizations and they shall 
therefore be applied in the presentation of his ideas even though these terms are acknowledged to be over-
simplifying and problematic. Among other critics of these terms, Edward Said emphasizes in his book 
Orientalism (first publication in 1978) the constructed and constituted nature of once ontological 
categories, such as the 'Occident' and the 'Orient'. He contends that it is a politically constructed binary, a 
category of interpretation rooted in preconceived and historically constituted ideas about the 'Orient' as an 
'other'.  
572 According to Galtung, a civilization can survive even if all inhabitants have perished as long their material 
(e.g. layout of cities, art and artifacts) and symbolic (e.g. cross for Christianity) manifestations are still 
present. Galtung, 1986, pp. 1-2.   
573 Galtung, 2007a, p. 371. 
574 Galtung, 2007a, p. 368 and footnote 306. 
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Galtung‟s taxonomy of civilizations is debatable.575 Identifying macro-cultures is a challenging 
task and depending on the choice of determining factors, the resulting macro-cultures may vary. 
Since numerous societies are subsumed under a civilization, the theoretical construct of a 
system of civilizations is unlikely to be entirely coherent and consistent. Without questioning 
the general choice of determining factors (occident/orient and Abrahamic/oriental „religion‟) by 
Galtung, the inclusion of Islamic cultures (including Indonesia) in Occident I is disputed. Not 
only does the history of conflicts between Muslims and Christians suggest different 
cosmologies, but further the majority of Muslims lives in the „Orient‟. As such they have 
oriental cultural backgrounds which are reflected in their cosmology, foremost in different 
perceptions of the self and the social structure.  
Apart from the major factors, the categorization of civilizations does not follow a consistent 
pattern. The Sinic, Nipponic and Indian civilizations can be clearly assigned to geographical 
units which are further influenced by other religions or ideologies, while the Buddhist 
civilization remains a construct which is only defined by religion.576 The parameters used to 
distinguish oriental civilizations differ from those used for the occidental ones. While the 
oriental categories are mainly geographical, Occident I and II are distinguishable by historical 
time, with Occident I marking the present while Occident II represents the medieval past.  
 
In order to analyze what a civilization perceives as „natural‟ and „normal‟, i.e. how it perceives 
reality, Galtung divides reality into six dimensions. Analysing cosmologies of civilizations 
leads to simplification and certainly bears the risk of essentialism. In the analysis of 
cosmologies Galtung included only dimensions which reveal deep-cultural elements with 
regard to the perception of reality – not, for example, to the perception of right or wrong.577.  
 Nature (relationship between human beings and other life forms),  
 self (reception of Freud‟s structural model: ego/id/super-ego),  
 society (vertical/horizontal and individual/collective),  
 world (how do civilizations distinguish the world geopolitically),  
 time (how do civilizations perceive time – as endless or limited),  
 transpersonal culture (religious reality) and  
                                                   
575 According to Lawler e.g., even idiosyncratic and their depiction as simplifying, essentializing and even 
caricaturizing complex, fluid aspects of collective identity. Lawler, 2008, p. 90. 
576 Galtung claims that Buddhism in its pure form can be encountered in Hinayana-countries (Sri Lanka, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Tibet and Mongolia). Galtung, 2007a, p. 379. However, this does 
not mean that these cultures can be characterized by their religion only. Like China or Japan, there are also 
other ideological influences. E.g. The theocratic structure in Tibetan society differs from that of the other 
countries. 
577 Galtung, 2007a, p. 369, footnote 311.  
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 epistemological culture (understanding and description of reality).578  
 
The presentation and social-anthropological anchoring of cosmologies may evoke the 
impression of cultural determinism and collective programming – even though Galtung opposes 
the idea of cultural determination and states that “any cosmology can be lost, can be 
delearnt”579. Without an explanation of which circumstances or mechanisms can mobilize or 
change deep cultural elements of cosmologies, the concept may appear static.  
 
Even if the conflict parties could be assigned to two different civilizations (indigenous 
Indonesians to Occident I and ethnic Chinese to Sinish) the cosmologies as presented by 
Galtung cannot be applied to this case study conflict without reservations. Apart from a general 
skepticism whether Muslim societies belong to Occident I, Indonesia has furthermore been 
influenced by other non-Abrahamic religions (e.g. Buddhism and Hinduism) and local animist 
beliefs. Moreover, in contrast to the characterization of Occident I societies, Indonesian society 
is not individualistic but rather collectivistic. It is characterized by strongly defined social 
framework in which individuals are expected to conform to the ideals of the society and the in-
groups (e.g. the family) to which they belong.580  Galtung‟s description of the Sinish cosmology 
also cannot be applied to ethnic Chinese in full, either. In the course of the long history of 
Chinese settlement in Indonesia, ethnic Chinese were influenced by Indonesian deep culture. 
Even if only partially applicable, the characterizations of Occident I and the Sinish civilization 
along the six dimensions Galtung developed, nevertheless, provides a guiding matrix for 
detecting elements deriving from the conflict parties‟ cosmology which may have an impact on 
their attitudes towards the other conflict party.  
 
According to Galtung, aspects of a cosmology or the collective unconscious may come together 
and form „syndromes‟581. Galtung focuses on two syndromes that are especially problematic in 
                                                   
578 Galtung, 2007a, pp. 369 – 370.  
579 Galtung, 1986, p. 2. 
580 In cross-cultural comparison studies, Indonesia ranks high among collectivistic countries, e.g. Hofstede, 
1980 or Triandis 1986. This underlines the observations made during field research. For example, in 
Indonesia, if a Javanese wishes to marry, it is important to meet a woman‟s family. The man has to visit 
the latter's family and introduce himself formally to the parents of the girl. It is inappropriate to court a 
woman and formalize the relationship without informing the parents of the girl first.  Another example of 
collectivism is in the relationship between child and parent. Indonesian children are committed to their 
parents, as are the parents committed to them all their growing lives. Family loyalty is apparent in the fact 
that Indonesian families usually keep elders (such as grandparents) at home instead of sending them to any 
institution.  
581 In medicine, the term „syndrome„ is used when more than one symptom is identified as well as their causal 
link.  
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conflicts on the macro (between nation-states) and mega level (between civilizations), but also 
have their influence on the meso (between communities) and mirco (between individuals) level. 
The CGT-syndrome refers to a group whose members believe they are a chosen (C) people 
with a glorious (G) past or future. These people suffer from traumata (T) inflicted on them by 
non-chosen ones who envy them. The traumata are perceived as proof of their „chosen-ness‟ 
and the dreams of past or future glory call for perseverance. On the micro level, this means that 
an individual believes to have received a divine order or a mission and expects to be glorious in 
the future. At the same time he/she is deeply influenced and hurt by traumata. This type of 
person will show tendencies of megalomania-narcissism (C and G part) and paranoia (T part). 
On the macro level (nation-state), affected nation-states may display excessive patriotism. 
Examples for this syndrome can be found dominantly in Occident I: Hitler narcissism, Israeli 
exceptionalism or fundamentalist Islamism.582 
 
Another syndrome is the DMA-syndrome: a group whose members believe that there are two 
powers (good / evil; God / Satan) who form opposites (dualism = D) like in manicheism (M) 
and engage in a final battle in which only one side can prevail (Armageddon = A). A group or 
individual with this syndrome is not interested in a conflict‟s objective solution, but only aims 
at destroying the other party. However, this other party is needed to fulfill the role of an enemy 
(or of evil). Due to polarized thinking (we are good, the others are evil), it is not necessary to 
listen to the other parties‟ aims and interests; instead it is considered to be sufficient to know 
that they are evil.583 Collective, unconscious elements legitimize direct or structural violence 
and result in syndromes like CGT or DMA.584 In order to form the basis for positive and 
peaceful approaches to dealing with conflicts, i.e. a positive conflict culture, peace-workers and 
conflict actors need to think about ways to overcome these syndromes, Gaining an insight in the 
deep culture of the conflict parties is important as deep culture strongly influences actors‟ 
attitudes. The goal is not only to understand conflict dynamics, but also the ways in which 
people deal with conflicts: “The road towards more positive handling of the conflict passes 
through the painful process of deep culture awareness.”585  
                                                   
582 Galtung 2007a, pp. 439; Galtung, 2007b, pp. 205 – 206; Galtung, 2010, p. 77 – 79.  
583 Galtung, 2007b, pp. 208 – 209; Galtung, 2010, pp. 77 – 78.  
584 Galtung, 2010, p. 81.  
585 Galtung, 2007b, p. 33.  
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Deep Nature 
Deep nature or (deep behavior) is the latent behavior of human beings and resembles „the id‟ of 
Freud‟s topography of the human mind. In his concept of deep nature, Galtung further adopted 
theories from Darwin. In On the origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life586 Darwin came to the conclusion that 
all life forms have not been created by a supreme being, but rather have evolved over time. The 
self- and species survival which constitutes the first basic need for each life form also 
represents the basis for evolution. In order to survive, species try to adapt to their environment 
and thus either develop or become extinct.   
Galtung extended the idea of basic needs (which Galtung refers to as basic human need for 
survival) by Darwin to a set of basic human needs. Apart from survival, Galtung further 
identified the needs for well-being, identity and freedom (see also chapter 3). Deep nature 
manifests itself in actions that result from basic human needs. Thus people‟s behavior can be 
manipulated by either fulfilling basic human needs or withholding them (carrot-and-stick-
practice): diplomats or managers, for example, are either invited to luxurious dinners in the 
hope that this might change their behavior and decisions in negotiations or are alternately 
forced to negotiate for long hours without breaks and food until an agreement is reached. If 
basic human needs are not met, the result will most likely be frustration which may then lead to 
violent behavior.587  
 
Deep Structure 
Deep contradictions can be located in the deep structure of a society in the form of an 
infrastructure where differences between categories, such as gender, generation, race, class 
(political, economic, military, cultural), included/excluded and nation/territory, interact 
unequally on the meso or mega level.588 Karl Marx was among the first to identify fault-lines in 
society by identifying a contradiction within social structures: the economic structure of work 
and property which is normalized and reproduced through cultural ideology.589 The fault-line 
lies between those who are in possession of means of production and those who are not. 
According to Marxist theory, in a capitalist system the former are the bourgeoisie, i.e. the 
capitalists, and the latter the proletariat, i.e. the workers. These two groups are further divided 
by their market behavior: workers sell their labor power because they are forced to do so as 
                                                   
586 Darwin, 2003, first published in 1859.  
587 Galtung, 2007b, p. 210.  
588 Galtung, 2010, p. 81.  
589 Elster, 1986, pp. 126ff. 
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they lack of means to produce themselves and capitalists purchase this labor power. People 
within a certain class are thus bound together by necessity and a common fate.590  
It is in the workers‟ best interest to maximize wages and benefits while it is in the capitalist's 
best interest to maximize profit at the expense of the former, leading to a contradiction or fault-
line within the capitalist system. Marx developed his ideas against a historical background. 
Earlier epochs, according to Marx, were characterized by complex social orders and 
graduations of social rank. In the epoch of bourgeoisie, the epoch of Marx, class antagonisms 
were reduced and simplified in industrialized societies, gradually resulting in the establishment 
of two opposing classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. 591  The most important 
transformation of society according to Marx was the proletariat‟s massive and rapid growth 
throughout two hundred and fifty years in capitalist, industrialized societies. Starting with the 
industrial revolution, more and more occupations provided a living through wages or salaries. 
Due to automation, manufacturing became cheap for those who had the financial means for 
economies of scale while private, self-employed, small-scale manufacturing, became less 
viable. People who once controlled their own labor-time became employed workers through 
industrialization. Groups that in the past subsisted on stipends or private wealth, such as like 
doctors, academics or lawyers, also increasingly worked as wage laborers. As a consequence, 
the proletariat became the largest class in societies of the so-called „developed world‟.592   
 
Based on these assumptions, Marx developed his theories of social classes and class conflict as 
published in The Communist Manifesto.  A class is formed when its members achieve class 
consciousness and solidarity. It views its interests in opposition to those of other groups; its 
members organize themselves politically to fight for them.593 Based on this theory, the workers 
would become aware of their exploitations and conflict with another class, namely the 
capitalists. The workers would then realize their shared interests and develop a common 
identity. As a result, they would then take action against exploitation and consequently against 
the capitalists. Marx introduced objective and subjective factors of a class. Objectively, a class 
shares a common relationship to the means of production, i.e. they either have means to 
produce or they do not. The members will necessarily have some perception of their similarity 
and common interest, i.e. class consciousness. Class consciousness is not simply an awareness 
of one's own class interest but is also a set of shared views regarding society‟s status quo and 
                                                   
590 Ibid. 
591 MacLellan, 1995, p. 191.  
592 MacLellan, 1995, pp. 192-194.  
593 MacLellan, 1995, p. 185. 
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how it should be. These class relations are reproduced through time.594 Apart from the main 
division of society into the owners and non-owners of production means, Marx later introduced 
a sub-class: the petite bourgeoisie. This group includes those who posses their own means of 
production, but who do not employ others, e.g. people with small businesses who cannot afford 
to hire people. He further mentions managers, supervisors or army servants who may belong to 
the proletariat, but act as intermediaries between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, often 
working in the interest of the latter. They are therefore also referred to as „class traitors‟ by the 
other. People who are unemployed are subsumed as „Lumpenproletariat‟. With regard to 
peasants, dependent on whether or not they owned more or less land, their loyalty would either 
be with the capitalists or the workers. In general, they play a rather insignificant role in the 
class struggle according to Marx. He further mentions the „ideological class‟ in which he places 
himself: „ideological representatives and spokesmen‟ who have been highly educated, originate 
from the bourgeoisie, but also dare to criticize their own class.595  
According to Marx‟ definition, society is divided into an upper, middle and lower class based 
on their income and wealth. It also does not distinguish between occupations, i.e. the specific 
nature of the work the members of a group perform. Instead, it is the work context than work 
itself that constitutes a class.596 Marx‟ distinction of groups is not focused on understanding 
why individuals differ in their way of life (e.g. consumption, health, marriage habits etc.), but 
on which organized groups are likely to be involved in collective actions of a social struggle, 
i.e. a class struggle.  
 
While Marx and his followers are convinced that the key dimensions or the principal lines of 
social cleavage within the system are mainly economic, critics point out that there are also other 
dimensions or divisions that have to be considered, such as racial, religious, or sexual ones. 
Parkin, for example, states that “societies marked by conflict between religious or racial 
communities do not exhibit the same type of class structure as societies lacking such conflict, 
notwithstanding similarities in their occupational systems and property relations.”597  While 
Galtung includes the idea of social fault-lines dividing societies into his theories, he also 
considers the Marxist perspective as being too limited. He therefore extends the concept of 
fault-lines by adding further deep contradictions in social structures which are socially vertical 
                                                   
594 Hanagan, 1994, p. 184.  
595 MacLellan, 1995, pp. 184ff.  
596 Elster, 1986, p. 124.  
597 Parkin, 1979, p. 4.  
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and potentially carriers of structural violence.598 As a result, he developed the table below 
which lists patterned infrastructures that struggle for equity.  
 
 Dimension Meso individual level Mega State level 
1 Nature Human vs. environment States vs. environment 
2 Gender Men vs. women Penetrator vs. penetrated 
3 Generation Old vs. middle-aged vs. young  Old vs. middle-aged vs. young 
4 Race  White vs. yellow/brown vs. 
black/red 
White vs. yellow/brown vs. 
black/red 
5 Class political Repressors vs. repressed Repressors vs. repressed 
6 Class economic Exploiters vs. exploited Exploiters vs. exploited 
7 Class military Killers vs. killed Killers vs. killed 
8 Class cultural Conditioners vs. conditioned Conditioners vs. conditions 
9 Nation Dominant culture vs. dominated Dominant civilization vs. 
dominated 
10 State State vs. other states Region vs. other region 
Table 2: Social Fault-Lines599  
 
Corresponding to the three axioms for deep culture, Galtung also developed three axioms for 
deep structure: “There are deep structures conditioning surface structures; to master structures 
be conscious of those infrastructures; and institutionalize better structures for better 
infrastructures.”600 For the specific conflict in Indonesia, the focus will be on the meso- and 
individual level of fault-lines between races, classes political, classes economic, classes military 
and classes cultural. No indications were found, neither in literature nor during the field trips, 
that the other fault-lines were of relevance to this specific conflict.  
 
5.2 Deep Dimensions of the Case Study Conflict   
Next, I shall analyze the deep dimensions of the conflict between indigenous Indonesians and 
ethnic Chinese with a view to underlying aspects that help to explain the attitudes and patterns 
of behavior as well contradictions within conflict formation. These results have to be 
considered with regard to possible approaches for conflict transcendence. The deep dimension 
elements of the conflict that arose in the course of the research can further provide the basic 
                                                   
598 Galtung, 2007b, p. 211.  
599 Galtung, 2010, p. 78. 
600 Galtung, 2010, p. 79.  
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groundwork or starting points for future long-term research aiming at uncovering the deep 
culture of Indonesian ethnic groups and the deep structure of Indonesian society.   
 
Elements of Deep Culture in the Case Study Conflict 
Even if Indonesia‟s classification as belonging to Occident I is questionable, the 
characterization of the religious dimension is applicable to Indonesia as the majority of 
Indonesians are either Muslims or Christians. In his impressionistic description of cosmologies, 
Galtung characterizes the religious dimension of Occident I as follows: 
The transpersonal is dichotomous. The people of Occident I have an immortal soul that God 
and Satan (both transcendent) are fighting about. The respective religion is regarded as being 
the only true one (singularism) and valid everywhere and at any time (universalism) as 
expressed by the Great Commission.601  
 
The Sinic cosmology may also only be partially applicable to Chinese Indonesians due to their 
long history in Indonesia. However, during the field research evidence for the eclectic character 
of the Sinic cosmology was encountered repeatedly. This characteristic of Sinic cosmology 
arguably supported Chinese in the process of adapting to new environments, like Indonesia, 
once they left their country of origin, as it appears to be easy for new elements to be included 
into their cosmology.  However, this cosmology can also become a factor preventing ethnic 
Chinese from totally dissolving into the host society. Based on the interviews, they were 
reluctant to give up heterogeneity and to adhere for example to one religion or identity only.602 
Instead of an „either-or‟ solution, they consider a dialectic „as-well-as‟ solution to be possible 
and preferable. Thus, even those who are nominally Muslims or Christians often keep house 
shrines for their ancestors, Buddhist and Daoist deities as well as Indonesian national heroes of 
Chinese descent. Even if their families have resided in Indonesia for more than three 
generations, many Chinese Indonesian houses are built resembling Chinese architecture with 
small details reflecting Indonesian influence. Further, ethnic Chinese respondents stated that 
they prefer to follow Chinese wedding and funeral customs instead of local indigenous ones.603 
Thus, Chinese style cemeteries or Chinese style grave stones on private grounds (s. pictures 
below) can be found across Indonesia wherever Chinese Indonesian reside.  
                                                   
601  Judaism differs from Christianity and Islam with regard to universality as it is particularistic (only 
applicable for Jews and only limited conversion). Galtung, 2007a, p. 374 and footnote 318.  
602 For example, interview with Eddie Lembong (16.09.2008). 
603 Interview with Charlotte Setijadi (05.09.2008) and Chang-Yao Hoon (10.04.2008).  
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Picture 1: An ethnic Chinese household in Lasem (Java) whose members have converted to 
Islam, but still worship their ancestors and two Chinese deities (17.04.2010). 
 
 
 
Picture 2: Chinese picture and Chinese names on the wall of an ethnic Chinese household in 
Rembang (17.04.2010).  
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Picture 3: Building in Lasem with Chinese characters on the left side and Arabic characters on 
the right side (16.04.2010).  
 
 
 
Picture 4: House shrine in ethnic Chinese household in Lasem whose owners are Christians 
(12.04.2010).  
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Picture 5: Chinese style grave stone in the backyard of an ethnic Chinese house in Rembang 
(14.04.2010). Grave stones in the same style can be found on Chinese cemeteries throughout 
Indonesia.  
 
 
In the Sinic cosmology, China is perceived as the center of the world and whatever is outside as 
the periphery. Those residing in the periphery, the „others‟, are barbarians who should be kept 
outside. Since the Chinese Indonesians are already outside of this center geographically, it is 
difficult for them to fully identify with the centre and to keep the others outside. There are still 
those who manage to do so, by keeping to themselves in exclusively Chinese Indonesian 
communities with only limited contact with indigenous Indonesians. They consider themselves 
to be in the „centre of the world‟ – not in the geographical sense, but in a cultural sense and 
therefore refer to themselves as part of Greater China.604  
 
Cosmologies and the Conflict 
The cosmology which influences indigenous Indonesians includes a tendency to sharply 
distinguish between those who are insiders and those who are outsiders. This tendency is 
manifested for example in long established distinctions between indigenous and non-
indigenous, but also between ethnic groups. On the level of cosmologies, the religious 
                                                   
604 Interview with Eddie Lembong (16.09.2008).  
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dimension might serve as indicator to explain this tendency. Those who are practicing their 
belief as Muslims or Christians perceive themselves as chosen followers of the only true 
belief.605  This also corresponds to their perception of national identity which is limited to 
insiders, in this case indigenous Indonesians. Therefore, even today Indonesians have 
difficulties to accept ethnic Chinese‟ claim to be both Indonesians and ethnic Chinese. Ethnic 
Chinese on the other hand, influenced by an eclectic cosmology, do not see difficulties in being 
both and taking one part (the ethnic Chinese part) away from them is something they do not 
want to accept. 606  As described above, many ethnic Chinese still have preserved visible 
elements of Chinese culture (architecture, shrines, graveyards, ancestor worship). This makes it 
difficult for some Indonesians to not perceive them as Chinese and thus as foreigners. Chinese 
architecture whose features include walls that surround the buildings (s. picture 6) further 
underlines the impression that ethnic Chinese want to remain Chinese and live separately from 
the rest of society. 
  
Picture 6: Chinese style house from outside with characteristic walls in Lasem (15.04.2010).  
 
Their impression may not be entirely wrong. For many Chinese Indonesians, as in Sinic 
cosmology, the family is the most important unit that has to be set apart and protected from 
                                                   
605 Interview with KH. Zainuddin (15.04.2010) and Gus Shihhabuddin (17.04.2010). 
606  Interview with Eddie Lembong:”…taking our Chineseness, it would be like taking our soul….“, 
16.09.2008.  
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other units. Thus, houses are traditionally surrounded by walls that separate each unit from the 
next one. Erecting walls is a traditional sign of marking the „in-group‟. The same applies to the 
national level. Walls were built in China from 5th century B.C. onwards to separate and protect 
the Chinese empire from outsiders. Later theses walls were rebuilt and maintained throughout 
the history of the Chinese empire and became known as the Great Wall. There is thus a clear 
tendency in the cosmology to keep to one‟s own kind and to exclude the rest. This tendency can 
also be observed in Indonesia. Several Chinese Indonesian respondents during the fieldwork 
identified themselves as part of Greater China. Chinese as well as indigenous Indonesians 
further pointed out that when it comes to the topic of intermarriage it is rather ethnic Chinese 
who would object to it than indigenous Indonesians.607 With regard to this element of deep 
culture (the Chinese architecture), however, it has to be taken into consideration that the history 
of violence against the ethnic Chinese and their property has contributed to suspicion and 
caution by especially wealthy ethnic Chinese. The walls of their houses are not only 
architectural elements of Chinese style; they also serve security and safety purposes. The 
owners feel the necessity to protect themselves and their property (s. picture below where a 
Chinese Indonesian house is further secured by barbed wire). Their cosmology provides them 
with a mindset of how to cope with their fear which results in establishing security measures. 
Here again, it appears to be more logical to ethnic Chinese to deal with the consequences rather 
than the root problem (security logic instead of peace logic).   
 
                                                   
607 Interview with Pratiwi Kartika (ethnic Chinese) in Jakarta (18.09.2008), Rudi K. (indigenous Indoenesian) 
in Lasem (14.04.2010), Mohammad P. (indigenous Indonesian) in Semarang (18.04.2010).  
171 
 
 
Picture 7: Outside an ethnic Chinese house in Semarang (18.04.2010). 
 
Signs of the DMA and CGT Syndrome in the Conflict 
Some important collective memories and traumata are shared by both groups, such as the 
colonial occupation by the Dutch or the anti-communist campaign in 1965 of the Soeharto 
regime. Others have only been experienced by one of the groups, such as the massacre of 
Chinese in Batavia by the Dutch in 1740. Collective unconscious syndromes can evolve, 
deriving from especially traumatic collective memories. Next, I shall assess in how far, ethnic 
Chinese and indigenous Indonesians are suffering from DMA and CGT syndromes as outlined 
by Galtung.  
 
Historical events caused long-lasting traumata which have entered and shaped the collective 
subconscious of ethnic Chinese. They (or at least some of them) seem to have developed a 
tendency towards the CGT (chosen-glory-traumata) syndrome. Even though they do not 
perceive themselves as chosen by god or other deities, they were chosen by the Dutch during 
colonial times as a group to stand above indigenous Indonesians. Later, Soeharto continued to 
provide them with economic privileges even if he discriminated against them in other fields of 
life. The economic success of many of them seems to confirm their „chosenness‟ and 
constitutes their glory. Due to their success, there are indigenous Indonesians who envy them 
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and try to diminish their success. The violence against them – especially traumatic events like 
the massacre of Batavia in 1740, the anti-communist campaigns and the May riots 1998, but 
also the heavy state-led discrimination throughout the Soeharto regime – has resulted in 
traumata for the group as a whole. These traumata can be taken as further proof of their 
chosenness and until now, despite the violence against them, they (not all, but a considerable 
part of the group) have managed to regain their economic success (their glory).  
As a consequence, the group as a whole clings to its cultural identity which has brought them 
economic privileges and social marginalization. The individuals may be more inclined to feel 
special, even superior and as a consequence chose to live exclusively among members of their 
group. This might provide an insight into why there are a number of ethnic Chinese who 
surround themselves with high walls, live in exclusively ethnic Chinese communities and are 
reluctant when it comes to intermarriage. Ethnic Chinese may subconsciously underline their 
special position in society by choosing a religion other than that of the majority of Indonesians, 
such as Christianity or Buddhism.  
While the CGT syndrome seems to apply at least to a part of the ethnic Chinese community, 
indigenous Indonesians on the other hand rather show a tendency towards the DMA (dualistic-
Manichaeism-Armageddon) syndrome. There is a division between „us‟ and „them‟. A dualistic 
view seems to be dominant and popular especially with a number of religious and ethnic groups 
in Indonesia. The own group is the „good‟ one while the other groups is generally seen as „bad‟ 
one (Manichaeism). Once someone or a group does not belong to the good, they are the enemy 
and have to be fought, if necessary with violence (Armageddon). Violent clashes between 
groups of different religions or ethnic backgrounds can be observed across the archipelago. The 
enemy is de-humanized to legitimize violence. In case of the case study conflict, ethnic Chinese 
were de-humanized by claiming that they were infidels (even though there are ethnic Chinese 
who are also Muslims) or by calling them „economic animals‟ – clearly degrading them as less 
human and not equally worthy. The syndromes may play a role in possible conflict 
transcendence; as such they do have to be kept in mind, as do the cosmologies of both groups.  
 
Elements of Deep Nature in the Case Study Conflict 
Previous chapters detailed when and how basic human needs have been violated in the conflict. 
Here, possible conclusions for the deep behavior deriving from the basic human needs or their 
infringement will be explored. Regarding the conflict situation at the time of writing, the 
analysis showed that especially the identity needs of ethnic Chinese are still compromised. 
Even though this has not led to direct violence from the side of ethnic Chinese against 
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indigenous Indonesians, large Chinese Indonesian communities hesitate to actively integrate 
themselves into society. During interviews, indigenous Indonesians often criticized the self-
chosen exclusiveness or segregation of Chinese Indonesians. Since ethnic Chinese see their 
identity needs unfulfilled in the country they are living in, some of them form their own closed 
environment and prefer not to engage in the „normal‟ Indonesian society. They choose private 
schools for their children or, if possible, send them abroad. The connection to Indonesia as their 
home country is therefore very weak and they do not „feel‟ as Indonesians. Indigenous 
Indonesians consequently perceive this as confirmation of the ethnic Chinese image as 
„foreigners‟ who are merely guests in their country and therefore do not deserve the same rights 
they have.  
 
On the side of indigenous Indonesians, well-being and in some cases even survival needs are in 
jeopardy. Direct violence against ethnic Chinese is therefore often related to economic crises. 
Once people feel that their survival and well-being needs are endangered, they become 
frustrated and feel the need for action. In May 1998, this energy was channeled by prominent 
military men and radical Muslim leaders who aimed at diverting people‟s anger from the 
country‟s elite to the ethnic Chinese. They accused ethnic Chinese of hoarding basic 
commodities (like rice and cooking oil).608 This strategy proved to be effective, since basic 
commodities form the basis for survival. These actions against ethnic Chinese reflected the 
people‟s frustration and their need to vent their anger. In many cases, the property of ethnic 
Chinese was not looted, but destroyed instead.    
 
Another aspect influencing this specific conflict derives from suppressed basic human needs of 
identity and freedom prior to the fall of the Soeharto-regime. Therefore, various ethnic and 
religious groups in Indonesia started to strive for more autonomy or even independence after 
the end of the regime, leading to a range of violent conflicts.609 Apart from the provinces of 
Papua and West Papua where violence continues and has escalated, other Indonesian ethnic 
groups are not longer actively seeking to secede from the Indonesian state. In Papua, the 
government established a security force in the region to act against the secessionist movement. 
The Indonesian security forces raided the third Papuan People‟s Congress, during which Papua 
declared its independence from Indonesia in October, 2011. 610 As violence begets violence, 
violence has escalated in Papua. In August 2011, for example, separatists killed a soldier while 
                                                   
608 Coppel, 2006, p. 5.  
609 As e.g. Aceh, Kalimantan, Ambon or Maluku.  
610Hariyadi, 2011.  
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attacking an army helicopter. 611  However, the demand for local self-governance has been 
expressed by local groups all over Indonesia, showing that the establishing of a common 
national identity by the administrations of Soekarno and Soeharto did not succeed in overriding 
local differences as had been intended. The main demand apart from political and financial 
autonomy was for native governors and district heads („local sons‟ putra daerah).612 Identity 
needs had not been satisfied by the concept of national identity even though the Indonesian 
motto „Unity in Diversity‟ at least in theory acknowledged the multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
character of Indonesia.  
Attempts to decentralize the centralized political system inherited from colonial times613 failed 
during the Soekarno and Soeharto administrations. Even though the Soekarno administration 
had agreed to the establishment of regional autonomy after Indonesia‟s Independence (law 1), it 
was removed in 1957 due to political unrest in several regions. In 1974, regional autonomy was 
revived, but never implemented as the Soeharto administration was reluctant to share political 
power with local governments. A third attempt in 1996 failed, because the government did not 
assign sufficient financial and personnel assets for the implementation of decentralization.614 
After the end of the Soeharto-era, local organizations and officials again addressed the need for 
decentralization and their claim was supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank. To pre-empt separatism and preserve national unity, the national parliament 
approved two laws, one regarding administration (law 22) and the other financial 
decentralization (law 25) which focused on the empowerment of the sub-provincial level in 
1999. The first set of implementation regulations was published in May 2000 and 
implementation started in 2001.615 To answer the call for effective local empowerment and self-
governance in the following years, subsequent administrations approved, implemented, and 
revised further laws to foster the decentralization process. Difficulties in the process, however, 
include clear delineations of responsibilities and positions as well as harmonization of laws and 
regulations at the national and local levels. For example, Law 32 (approved in 2004) was 
revised in 2011 strengthening the supervisory role of the province governors as representatives 
of the central government.616 Progress on the harmonization of laws and regulations would in 
particular be of importance for the present conflict. As revealed in the analysis of violence, 
                                                   
611 Ambarita, 2011. 
612 Van Klinken, 2007, p. 8.  
613 Even though van Klinken argues that the Dutch had intended a federal structure for the archipelago (van 
Klinken, 2007, p. 8), the Dutch had a centralized bureaucratic system which did not satisfy the need for 
local self-governance as proven by the claims by various regions after Indonesia‟s Independence.  
614 Green, 2005, p. 3. 
615 Ibid. 
616 Effendy & Sjahrit, 2011.  
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regulations on the local level, for example, which restrain the public cultural display of Chinese 
Indonesian culture would have to be abolished to comply with national law.  
 
The decentralization process in general to respond to longstanding grievances by offering 
opportunities for expressing diversity and better attention to local needs.617 Especially resource-
rich provinces, like Riau, benefit from decentralization as they can access more revenues 
leading to an increase of the province‟s yearly income. 618  Decentralization as such is a 
preferable concept (in contrast to centralization) in the Indonesian context as it reflects 
Indonesia‟s ethnic and cultural diversity on the political and administrative level. Nevertheless, 
despite the increase of income for provinces, reports state that positive impacts of 
decentralization for the local population are hindered by lack of administrative capacity and by 
corruption.619 Corruption has been one of the major challenges the Indonesian state has been 
facing and has not been reduced. Rather, it has been gifted from Jakarta to the local level, 
bringing with it new actors and variation in the background and „modus operandi‟ for 
corruption.620  
 
Due to decentralization, local identities have grown stronger and the Javanese dominance 
(perceived as Javanese chauvinism) of the Soeharto-era has decreased, improving the 
relationships especially of ethnic groups from outer islands with the Indonesian majority 
ethnicity. This does not mean that decentralization has led to a general decrease in conflicts or 
improved ethnic relations in general.621 Several components of the decentralization process 
have the potential to negatively affect local identity and minority politics as well as conflict 
dynamics. The establishment of new districts may change demographics and shift majority-
minority relationships for better or worse.622  In Poso (Sulawesi) for example, a district where 
Christian Pamonas and Muslim Bugis and Gorantalese mobilized by their respective elites 
along religious lines engaged in violent clashes, the establishing of sub-districts shifted 
demographics (the proportion of Muslims in one of the sub-district was lower than before), and 
created more job opportunities for elites in the new administrations reducing competition 
between them, thus leading to a reduction of the violence.623 In other regions, local participation 
                                                   
617 Rinaldi et al., 2007, p. 18.  
618 Ibid.  
619 The process further has a negative impact on the forest as the number of licenses exceeds the amount of 
forest actually designed for conversion. Human Rights Watch, 2003. 
620 Rinaldi et al., 2007, pp. 5ff.  
621 Diprose & Ukiwo, 2008, pp. 10ff.    
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in decision-making processes through direct elections do not only provide incentives for local 
elites to mobilize and instrumentalize sensitive identity issues in their competition for power 
and resources, but also strengthen the dominance of the ethnic majority population of a 
region.624 In asymmetric conflicts, the position of the minority group (in case it is not the 
dominant party) may therefore be further weakened by the decentralization process. For ethnic 
Chinese who are both an ethnic and religious minority in most of the regions they live in, this 
may further explain why they encounter violence on the local level in the form of restraints on 
their expression of identity or discrimination when trying to leave their marginalized position 
and participate in the political decision-making process, despite the positive developments in 
terms of reducing violence on the national level.  
 
The deep nature of the conflict actors has influenced the behavior of the conflict groups and 
will continue to do so until the basic human needs on both sides are satisfied, at least to a 
minimum degree. The analysis of the deep nature reveals that this conflict has to be analyzed in 
the broader context of the internal problems that Indonesia is facing today. These include 
economic problems which threaten the basic human needs of survival and well-being, as well 
as striving for more autonomy by ethnic groups that aim at satisfying their own identity and 
freedom needs but who may simultaneously compromise the identity and freedom needs of 
others.  
 
Elements of Deep Structure in the Case Study Conflict  
Fault-line of Ethno-linguistic Group 
Ethno-linguistics as a fault-line is to be expected in a multi-ethnic country like Indonesia. The 
most general fault-line lies between indigenous and non-indigenous Indonesians. In this context 
the conflict between indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese is the most prominent 
example, even though there are also other „foreign‟ minorities living in Indonesia, such as 
Arabs or Indians. The next level of ethno-linguistic fault-lines would be fault-line between 
indigenous ethnic groups. Due to the decentralization process, the dominance of the Javanese 
who make up the largest group among the Indonesian population decreased and local 
indigenous identities were strengthened. However, there are still other ethno-linguistic fault-
lines in Indonesia, like in Papua and West Papua provinces, where separatist organizations aim 
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to secede from the Indonesian nation-state.625 On the local level, ethno-linguistic fault-lines can 
be found between groups who claim to be „culturally incompatible‟ and therefore aim to drive 
out or at least dominate the other ethnicity(ies). Examples include the Kao and the Makian in 
North Maluku or the Dayak and Madurese in West Kalimantan.626  
Often, the relationships between conflict parties on opposite sides of a fault-line are 
asymmetrical, making it difficult to establish a dialogue between equals. However, without 
dialogue, it will be difficult to work on an adapted concept of Indonesian nationality which may 
accommodate the different ethno-linguistic groups across fault-lines. For the conflict case 
study, it is essential to overcome the fault-line between indigenous and non-indigenous 
Indonesians which would enable ethnic Chinese to overcome their status of being the „others‟ 
in Indonesia. In order to cross the fault-line, the concept of „indigenousess‟ can no longer form 
the basis for the concept of the Indonesian nation. This does not mean that local ethnic 
identities should be detached and not acknowledged anymore. As discussed previously, the 
concept of Indonesian national identity remains problematic. Not only has the concept of 
„indigenousness‟ (re)gained importance on the local level, it is also probably the most 
convincing argument why all the different ethnicities of the archipelago could be perceived as 
one nation. Changing this concept would question the deep structure of Indonesia as a multi-
ethnic state. Accepting a new and different concept of national identity will therefore be 
challenging and require work especially on the side of indigenous Indonesians. On the other 
side, for overcoming the ethnic fault-line, ethnic Chinese who want to remain exclusive in 
Indonesia and orientate themselves towards Mainland China and Taiwan or Western countries 
instead would also have to work on their understanding of their identity as Chinese Indonesians 
in the context of the Indonesian nation. 
 
Fault-Lines of Class  
The term „class‟ in the context of deep structures in a society does not have the same meaning 
as „social class‟. Here the focus is on potential clashes between groups (as in Marx‟ theories). 
For the present conflict, the distinctions Galtung made with regard to class (political, military, 
economic and cultural) will be assessed to detect deep structures which lead to or enhance 
contradictions or form the basis for structural violence in the context of the present conflict.  
 
As outlined previously, ethnic Chinese were politically repressed during the Soeharto-regime 
and even today, although there are no official obstacles, they remain largely underrepresented 
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in the political arena. In the 2009 elections in which almost 12 000 candidates competed for a 
seat in the national parliament, and roughly 79 000 competed for seats in local assemblies, 
Benny Setiono, the chairman of INTI, estimated that only roughly 100 Chinese Indonesians ran 
as candidates.627 At the time of writing (until 2012), only few official positions were occupied 
by Chinese Indonesians. These included the Vice Governor of Jakarta, the Vice Governor of the 
Province of West Kalimantan, the Mayor of Singkawang, and the Regent of East Belitung. 
Even if they constitute less than 3% of the population, the number of candidates is relatively 
small. However, not only ethnic Chinese are poorly represented in Indonesian politics. Other 
ethnic groups who are minorities in the regions they live in face similar difficulties. As long as 
there still is a fault-line between ethnic or religious) groups that are in political control and 
other groups who only have limited access to political power, there will be a tendency for 
frictions to arise. It is important for all ethnic groups to be represented at the level of political 
decision-making in order for them to be able to articulate and integrate their political ideas and 
interests into Indonesian politics.  
 
In the past, very few ethnic Chinese were allowed to enter the military. Regulations and 
discrimination in the enrollment process kept the number of ethnic Chinese in the military 
low.628 Today, the official obstacles were removed, but the number of ethnic Chinese in the 
military hardly increased. This could be due to unofficial discrimination in the enrollment 
process on the one hand, but also to the fact that many ethnic Chinese still fear the military due 
to their involvement in the anti-Communist campaigns in the 1960s and the riots in May 1998. 
As a consequence they prefer to have as little contact as possible.629   
Since the War for Independence, the military has played a key role in the country‟s politics and 
in imposing unity on a fragmented state. After the collapse of the New Order regime, the armed 
forces may have lost some of their political influence, but they are still playing and important 
role in Indonesia. The government is relying on its military in case of natural disasters, such as 
tsunamis or volcano eruptions.630 Being underrepresented in this realm might be perceived by 
indigenous Indonesians as lack of sense of patriotism. Since their loyalty to the Indonesian 
nation is often doubted or at least questioned, this may add to difficulties Chinese Indonesians 
                                                   
627 http://www.topix.com/forum/world/indonesia/TL15HU4DFHLUABMHB (15.06.2011).  
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have to overcome before being fully accepted into society. This means that it could either help 
to increase the number of ethnic Chinese in the ranks of the military or to reduce the influence 
and importance of the military in general.   
 
While the ethnic Chinese make up the weaker party in the conflict formation with regard to 
their political and social role, this cannot be claimed for their economic role. Even if the 
perception that many indigenous Indonesians have that all Chinese Indonesian are rich is not 
true, they still make up a large part of Indonesia‟s middle-class and are also present in the 
upper-class. For indigenous Indonesians, ethnic Chinese are therefore often perceived as 
exploiters while they are the ones being exploited.631 For those who feel exploited it does not 
seem to be important whether or not the whole ethnic group of Chinese Indonesians are „the 
exploiters‟ or not.632 As long as ethnic Chinese are perceived as exploiters, they may be subject 
to prejudice and discrimination and in times of economic crises, even victims of violent acts. 
As discussed in chapter 4, studies show that the situation of the poor in Indonesia might have 
improved along with Indonesia‟s general economic situation after the economic breakdown in 
1998. The number of poor people has constantly declined from 13.33% (which translates into 
31.02 million people) of the population in March 2010 to 12.5% in 2011. Rural areas accounted 
for 950,000 of those who rose from poverty, while only 50,000 came from urban areas.633 
Nonetheless, an estimated 12.5% of the population still remains below the poverty line which 
also marks an economic fault-line between rich and poor.  
Apart from the general economic fault-line between rich and poor, there is also a geographical 
one. During the end of 2006 until the end of 2009, poor households, especially in the rural 
areas, experienced larger pressure from inflation than the overall population. They were hit 
harder by inflation because of the significant increase in prices for food.634 Since the majority 
of ethnic Chinese lives in urban areas, they were less affected, again feeding into the image of 
the „rich Chinese‟. As long as the economic distribution remains unequal and therefore an 
underlying deep structure, it will be difficult to overcome prejudices against ethnic Chinese and 
reduce resultant structural violence.  
Development programs during the Soeharto period not only favored ethnic Chinese tycoons, 
but also Java over the outer islands. 635 There has been an uneven distribution of revenues 
between the provinces and the Central Government. Especially those islands with rich natural 
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resources, felt that they have been seriously deprived.636 In the course of decentralization, a 
more equal distribution of economic assets was achieved, nevertheless, one can distinguish 
between areas which have developed more quickly due to export trade, (examples are 
Palembang, East Sumatra, Southeast Kalimantan) and areas which stayed behind and only 
slowly managed to follow the modernization process that took place elsewhere (as for example 
Bengkulu, Timor, Maluku).637  As a result, economic well-being varies between the ethnic 
groups and thus socio-economic differences can become ethnicized. Tensions deriving from 
this economic fault-line between different groups result in tensions, which also may lead to 
violent conflict.  
 
Religious fault-lines often play an important role (with religion as cultural system) as cultural 
fault-line in many conflicts. In Europe, for example, religious fault-lines have marked the 
geographical position of a conflict. Sarajevo was the geographical point for the clash of 
Christians (Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox) and Muslims in the 1990s.638 With regard to 
the present conflict, the majority of indigenous Indonesians are Muslims and the majority of 
ethnic Chinese are either Christians or Buddhists. This factor adds to their status as minority as 
they are a religious and ethnic minority at the same time. To escape this unfavorable status, 
some ethnic Chinese converted or are in the process to convert to Islam in hopes of leaving 
behind this status. The rate for conversion rose especially after anti-Chinese riots. For example, 
after an anti-Chinese riot in Surakarta in the 1980s, it has been reported that many local ethnic 
Chinese converted to Islam. 639 Nevertheless, as the riots in May 1998 or other smaller riots 
showed, conversion to Islam did not protect Chinese Indonesians from becoming the victims of 
attacks. Physical features revealing their ethnic Chinese background mark them as potential 
targets. Therefore, converting to Islam – even for those who are not practicing another religion 
– for security reasons is not attractive for the majority of ethnic Chinese.640  
Religious fault-lines between Muslims and Christians gained importance after the fall of the 
Soeharto-regime in the landscape of violent conflict in Indonesia. Decentralization not only led 
to a rise of local identities, but also to respective religious identities. Thus, it not only 
intensified ethnic but also religious boundaries. To gain supporters, local political elites 
implemented religiously-influenced local regulations satisfying needs of followers of the 
                                                   
636 Ibid.  
637 Touwen, 2010.   
638 Lecture by Galtung at the University of Giessen, 10.05.2011.  
639 Ali, 2007, p. 14.  
640 Interview with Mohammad Gatot, an ethnic Chinese who converted to Islam, but was still attacked during 
the May riots (08.09.2008). 
181 
 
prominent religion of the respective region but simultaneously fueling religious tensions. In 
South Sulawesi, a number of districts passed shariah by-laws regarding zakat (mandatory 
donations by Muslims). They were implemented by local politicians to increase local 
government revenues to establish and maintain private networks for those in power.641 Islamic 
Shariah law has influenced the local legislation in Aceh and Minang 642  while Christian-
influenced laws have been introduced in Papua and West Papua. In Manokwari (West Papua) 
regulations were promulgated that stipulated that Christians have to obey bible-teachings and 
that forbid the building of mosques. 643 These regulations triggered emotional reactions not only 
in Indonesia among those who are not active followers of the respective belief and those who 
consider religion a private matter, but also on the international level in the media as well as at 
academic conferences. In 2006, for example, 56 legislators signed a petition to the President 
requesting him to revoke Shariah inspired laws. They argued that these laws were 
unconstitutional and not consistent with the state ideology which grants religious freedom. The 
petition was formally opposed by 134 legislators and therefore failed. 644  Violent conflicts 
between Christians and Muslims cannot be generalized or simplistically referred to as „religious 
conflicts‟ only.  Like ethnic conflicts, most cases involve violent competition for economic, 
political or social power and dominance.  Nevertheless, religion is assumed to play an 
important role in many conflicts, as opposing parties often are followers of different religions 
and contradictions between them often involve religious issues. Violent clashes between 
Christians and Muslims in Ambon and Central Maluku, Halmahera and the North Malukus are 
clearly religiously motivated. The same applies to the Muslim-Christian violence in Poso 
(Central Sulawesi), in East Timor and various parts of Kalimantan as well as in West Papua. 645 
Religious dialogue is therefore required to overcome this fault-line, not only in the case of the 
ethnic Chinese but in other religious conflicts or ones which have a religious component to 
them.  
 
5.3 Conclusions 
The analysis of the conflict‟s deep dimensions revealed aspects which go beyond the conflict 
formation itself and influence conflict actors and conflict infrastructure subconsciously. Even 
though the conflict is an intra-state conflict, the conflict parties are influenced by differing 
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collective sub-consciousness and cosmologies (deep culture) that underlie their attitudes. The 
cosmology of indigenous Indonesians reveals a clear division between in-groups and out-
groups. As the criteria for belonging to the in-group (on the national level) is indigenousness to 
the archipelago; ethnic Chinese with their cultural Chinese features are thus perceived as 
members of the out-group. The Chinese Indonesians‟ cosmology includes eclecticism. 
Therefore, ethnic Chinese do not perceive an „eclectic‟ identity – Chinese and Indonesian at the 
same time – as problematic. Due to the different perceptions of the „Chinese Indonesia‟ 
identity, indigenous Indonesians often doubt the loyalty of ethnic Chinese, while ethnic Chinese 
are not willing to give up on their „Chineseness‟ as it forms in integral part of their identity. The 
ethnic Chinese can further be diagnosed with the CGT syndrome and the indigenous 
Indonesians with a tendency to the DMA syndrome which both impede working on conflict 
transformation or engaging in dialogue.  
 
Basic human needs (deep nature), if not satisfied, may lead to violent behavior (direct 
violence). On the side of the indigenous Indonesians, it is mainly basic human needs for well-
being and survival as well as identity and freedom that are infringed upon. This led to violent 
acts not only against the ethnic Chinese, but also against the state (e.g. Papua) or among other 
ethnic groups (e.g. Dayaks and Madurese) in Indonesia. Decentralization of the centralized 
state structure aims at satisfying identity and freedom needs by allowing for more self-
governance of ethnic groups, including administrational and financial responsibilities. To 
further foster the process, laws and regulations need to be harmonized, and administrational 
infrastructure has to be supported. Nevertheless, decentralization alone does not necessarily 
reduce or end local conflicts, especially in regions where many ethnic and religious groups co-
exist. It also did not result in reducing another major problem that the Indonesian state is 
dealing with, namely corruption. Chinese Indonesians mainly suffer from infringements on 
their basic human need for identity and freedom which in some of their cases leads to retreat 
into exclusiveness. For those who work on leaving the marginalized position, decentralization 
programs shifted problems they were previously facing with the state (e.g. discrimination) to 
the local level.  
 
In this case study conflict, the major fault-lines are related to race and class (deep structures). 
The analysis revealed that the „indigenous‟ factor as basis for the concept of Indonesian 
national identity and the resurrection of local ethnic identity are problematic for the integration 
process of Chinese Indonesians. Further, underrepresentation of ethnic Chinese (as well as 
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other ethnic minority groups) in the political realm and the military stress their status as 
outsiders. With regard to the country‟s economic situation, the uneven distribution of economic 
assets and development programs between ethnic groups in Indonesia fuels ethnic tensions in 
general. Furthermore, the religious component to the conflict adds to the minority status of the 
ethnic Chinese, underlines their position as marginalized „others‟ and involves them in other 
conflicts between Muslims and Christians, for example in Bogor.  
 
Apart from complementing the analysis of the conflict, the deep dimensions analysis places the 
conflict in a broader context. The deep dimension analysis reveals general political, economic 
and cultural (ethnic/religious) problems which Indonesia is currently facing and indicates how 
they are related to this specific conflict. It therefore shows the underlying setting of the conflict. 
In order to attempt conflict transcendence it will not be enough to tackle this conflict on its 
own, detached from other conflicts in Indonesia. Instead, it has to be included in a broader 
context where other conflicts and problems will also have to be addressed. It is therefore 
necessary to make the underlying dimensions conscious to the involved actors which could be 
or probably even has to be done by a third party.   
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6. Analysis of Attempts to Transform the Conflict 
6.1 Conflict Transformation according to the Transcend Method
646
 
The 1990s saw a historically high number of „peace agreements‟ or „peace accords‟647 being 
signed, with at least fourteen in place by the end of 1996. Most of these agreements pertained to 
conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, examples like Angola, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone show that a peace agreement alone is usually 
not sufficient to end a conflict.648 There are multiple and distinct reasons for the failure of each 
of these peace agreements. They would appear to confirm Galtung‟s argument that a conflict 
cannot be transformed if only subgroups among the conflict parties (in the case of these 
agreements mostly the upper echelon elites) sign an agreement.  
The failure of agreements is another indicative of the different phases happening within a 
conflict cycle during which parties or subgroups conclude a temporary agreement which 
partially reduces the degree of violence in a conflict. In Galtung‟s analogy, a conflict 
transformation process does not come to an end; peace is a utopian stage which cannot be 
achieved but which one can continue working towards.649  As the term transformation indicates, 
something changes in form or function from being an X to becoming a Y, which would suggest 
that X is not removed; but only incorporated into something new and thus does not vanish. 
Contradictions are considered a good entry-point for conflict transformation. If, for example, 
conflict parties work on contradictions by transcending their goals (which may lead to the 
defining of new goals) with suitable results that all conflict parties (including their subgroups) 
can agree upon and support, contradictions can be transformed, at least in part.650 Attitudes and 
behavior may then follow suit. Often not all three aspects of a conflict (ABC) are transformed 
simultaneously. After transcending conflict actors‟ goals, it may take time for progress and for 
behavior and in particular attitudes to change. In the meantime before any of these aspects can 
be achieved, new contradictions may develop due to changing internal or external factors. Thus 
conflict formation itself changes over time, but a conflict is seldom dissipated completely. 
According to Galtung it is important to learn how to deal with conflicts without resorting to 
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violence and to develop conflict transformation capacities instead of reaching out for a final 
„solution‟ for a conflict.651  
Galtung criticizes that academic research in peace and conflict studies often limits itself by 
focusing on a conflict‟s past and present while “shying away from the future”652.  In this study, 
suggestions for a practical conflict transformation of the present conflict shall be presented 
based on the results of the conflict analysis outlined in the previous chapters as well as the 
theoretical basis for conflict transformation for third parties (referred to as peace-workers) as 
laid out in the Transcend approach. This section of the Transcend method includes planning 
conflict interventions and suggests measures which can be taken during different stages of a 
conflict. As researchers of a conflict are also third party actors, the method provides useful 
guidance for developing possible strategies for the case study conflict.  
 
Transcending a conflict aims at introducing a new workable reality which is developed with or 
by the conflict actors as a result of a creative conflict working process. In this process conflict 
actors, possibly with the help of peace-workers, attempt to identity suggestions derived from 
the conflict formation to transcend conflict contradictions.653 Ideally, the aims of all parties are 
satisfied and therefore no basic human needs harmed. Further, their attitudes and behavior 
allow them to live in peaceful harmony. However, the respective objectives do not remain 
static; it is an important part of the process to alter, change or define any new aims of the 
parties. According to the Transcend method, third parties should work on transforming a 
conflict non-violently using empathy and creativity to reach acceptable, sustainable outcomes 
for all parties.654 Third parties should proceed with great caution since attempting to change a 
problem may also create new problems. Therefore, suggestions or attempts to transform a 
conflict by third parties need to be reversible.655 The main guidelines for assisting in peaceful 
conflict transformation according to the Transcend method are: 
 Peace: the capacity to transform conflicts with empathy and creativity, without violence; 
a never-ending process 
 Transforming conflicts: enabling the parties to move on in a self-reliant, acceptable, and 
sustainable manner 
 Empathy: ability to understand the conflict including the ways the parties understand the 
conflict themselves 
                                                   
651 Galtung, 2007a, p. 166.  
652 Galtung, 2010, p. 72.  
653 Galtung, 2007a, p. 178.  
654 Galtung, 2010, p. 99.  
655 Galtung, 2007b, p. 242.  
186 
 
 Creativity: channeling conflict energy towards new innovative ways of satisfying basic 
human needs for all 
 Non-violence: the process should avoid any threat or use of violence (neither direct, 
structural nor cultural violence)656 
 
Even though only the analytical section of the Transcend method is applied in this academic 
study, these guidelines should be kept in mind while developing suggestions for putting 
potential conflict transformation into practice. The guidelines are further reflected in the 
transcended conflict triangle. Like the conflict formation, deep dimensions or violence of a 
conflict, a transcended conflict can also be depicted in the form of a triangle. This triangle is 
up-side-down as it does not show the present or past of a conflict formation but rather the 
targeted future. The conflict itself still exists, but in a new, transcended form.  
  
 
Figure 11: The Transcended Conflict Triangle 
 
Conflict Diagnosis, Prognosis and Therapy 
In order to work towards this target state of a transcended conflict, Galtung suggests three 
major steps: diagnosis, prognosis and therapy. Galtung has intentionally chosen medical terms, 
as he compares the work of a peace-worker to that of a medical doctor. Both work towards 
healing their „patients‟ – the medical doctor works on a patient‟s disease while a peace-worker 
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works on contradictions, i.e. the relationships between conflict actors.657 The conflict analysis is 
required for the diagnosis and the prognosis of a conflict, however, for therapy, prescriptions 
are needed.658  
 
The critical analysis forms the diagnosis of a conflict based on the analytical schemes 
developed by Galtung, i.e. the violence triangle, conflict formation triangle, and deep 
dimension triangle, as conducted in the previous chapters. Based on the results and experiences 
from other conflict histories, a prognosis about a conflict‟s further development can be made: 
what is likely to happen if nothing changes? Will there be further violence? Have the involved 
parties learned how to deal with the conflict in a peaceful way to entirely avoid violence in the 
future?  
In most cases, “biochemical-psychology-sociology based-hatred and violence processes in A 
[attitudes] and B [behavior], if nothing demobilizing is done to C [contradictions].”659 If no 
work on conflict transformation is undertaken, Galtung outlines possible primary, secondary, 
tertiary and basic consequences. He further distinguishes them according to I. Inner narrative 
(context: culture), II. General narrative (context: nature) and III. Outer narrative (context: 
structure) (s. table 3):  
 
Prognosis Inner narrative General narrative Outer narrative 
Context Culture Nature Structure 
Primary 
Consequences 
Negative cognitions, 
emotions 
Frustration Negative speech, 
behavior 
Secondary 
Consequences 
Attitudinal 
polarization 
Polarization, 
dehumanization 
Behavioral polarization 
Tertiary 
Consequences 
Hatred: Self-
destruction 
Aggression, 
escalation 
(direct) Violence, other-
destruction 
Basic 
Consequences 
Trauma to Self Trauma Trauma to Other 
Producing 
Vicious Cycles 
Trauma to Other Winner‟s goal more 
Glory, loser‟s goal 
Revenge 
Trauma to Self 
Table 3: Conflict Prognosis660  
 
                                                   
657 Galtung‟s father was a physician, Galtung, 2006, p. 23. His family background has influenced him in 
choosing the medical terminology. “Festsymposium anlässlich des 80. Geburtstags von Johan Galtung“, 
Villigst, 03.12.2010.  
658 Galtung, 2010, p. 72.  
659 Galtung, 2010, p. 80.  
660 Extract from Table 10: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation: A TRANSCEND Model, Galtung, 
2010, p. 75. 
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As visualized in this table, frustrations resulting from unsolved contradictions may lead to 
polarization and dehumanization of the „other‟ (conflict party). As a consequence, hatred in 
inner attitudes may result in violence in outer behavior (aggression and aggressive behavior), 
reinforcing an escalation of violence. This violence can then inflict traumata on victims as well 
as perpetrators for having traumatized victims. In increasingly vicious cycles, perpetrators may 
seek for more glory while victims may aim for revenge. According to Galtung, such 
experiences may eventually enter the collective memory of a group, leading to negative 
syndromes such as CGT or DMA, which then hinder conflict parties from working 
constructively on a conflict. Therefore, if nothing changes, i.e. no therapy is applied, chances of 
a conflict to develop towards non-violence and eventually peace are regarded by Galtung as 
being low.   
To prevent further violence, a therapy for dealing with the conflict or at least with some of its 
aspects has to be developed. In order for researchers or peace-workers to successfully develop 
such strategies, timing is important as different stages of a conflict require different conflict 
intervention measures.  
 
Conflict Intervention 
The analysis of violence (part of diagnosis) helps to determine in which phase of the conflict 
cycle a conflict is currently located. In his handbook Conflict Transformation by Peaceful 
Means (2010), Galtung identifies three phases of violence and respective measures or foci for 
conflict work (depicted in the conflict diagram below). A conflict cycle can be divided into 
three phases: 
Phase I: Before Violence 
Phase II: During Violence 
Phase III: After Violence 
It has to be noted here that the use of the word „violence‟ may cause some confusion. In 
contrast to the extended, broad meaning of violence (direct, structural and cultural) typically 
employed by Galtung, the term „violence‟ in this diagram is limited to direct violence 
infringing upon survival and well-being needs, i.e. harming (killing or injuring) people and 
destroying (their) property. This is reflected in suggestions for conflict interventions. In Phase I 
„Before Violence‟ Galtung advices to focus on violent structures and violent cultures. „During 
Violence‟ the focus is set on stopping violence that leads to the harming of people and 
destruction of property (peace-keeping).  
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Figure 12: Conflict Diagram661  
 
After Phase III, the conflict may return to Phase I or Phase II again if no efforts are made to 
work on its transformation. Depending on the conflict development, it can be difficult to 
determine whether a conflict is still in Phase III or if it is already in Phase I again. 
 
                                                   
661 Based on Galtung, 2000, p. 14. 
190 
 
Phase I: Before Violence 
Before violence, suggestions by researchers or peace-workers should aim at sustainable peace 
initiatives and the focus of intervention should be on: 662 
 Violent cultures that justify violence 
 Violent structures of repression, exploitation, alienation etc. 
 Violent actors attracted to violence to show or gain power and hatred to distinguish 
themselves from the others 
 The root conflict, i.e. contradicting goals  
 
The target state for measures and approaches dealing with violent cultures, structures and actors 
is to escape vicious circles and to replace them by a virtuous circle consisting of cultural, 
structural and direct peace. Apart from possible strategies to reach this target state, Galtung 
further introduced a mediation process in order to deal with the root conflict, i.e. the 
contradicting goals of the conflict actors.  
  
Violent cultures call for peace cultures. For establishing a culture of peace in which peace is 
defined as “good, right, sacred and beautiful” 663  and violence (without exceptions) as the 
opposite, Galtung suggests the introduction of human rights664 as a possible starting point; 
however, only if they fit the cultural environment. Even though human rights originate from a 
Western 665  tradition, they are generally considered and accepted to be universal – which 
Galtung attributes to the assumption that the „West‟ is the cradle of early self-realization of 
mankind.666 Galtung does not reject the human rights approach as such; however, he claims it to 
be problematic in that the human rights that originated in and were propagated by Western 
countries have been declared to be universal in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(adopted by the UN which at that time consisted of mainly Western countries).667 It should be 
identified which crucial parts of the declaration are not applicable to civilizations other than to 
the Western ones and on this basis these should be removed. Further, the question should be 
raised about what other civilizations could offer to complement the declaration and thereby 
                                                   
662 Galtung, 2000, pp. 15-16.  
663 Galtung, 2000, p. 107. 
664 According to the “International Bill of Human Rights” (consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (adopted in 1948), the Covenant of on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) by the United Nations). 
665 The term „Western‟ here is used by Galtung and covers what he defined as Occident I.  
666 Galtung, 1994, p. 9.  
667 Galtung, 1994, p. 28.  
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enhance its universality and benefit more people. 668  The human rights approach therefore 
requires critical review leading to further development and better definition. Nevertheless, it 
represents a valuable approach if adjusted to the cultural setting. If there is a strong tendency to 
think in dichotomies (i.e. true/false) in the respective culture, introducing more „shades of grey‟ 
is a possible approach to blunt absolutism. Practices like peace education and peace journalism 
can help to identify and foster (possibly) subconscious, constructive, peace-enhancing elements 
of a culture.669 Instead of legitimizing violence, peace would be legitimized in religion, law, 
ideology, language, art and science to build a positive culture of peace.670 
 
Violent structures have to be identified and reflected upon. If there is an underlying infra-
structure of interacting meso- and mega-fault-lines, peace strategies should aim at peace 
structures, i.e. an infra-structure creating “reciprocity and equity across fault-lines”.671 Apart 
from the human rights approach, another approach could be to empower (for example by 
increasing the level of education) more people to take part in decision-making processes and 
thus increase equity to overcome fault-lines.672 Formulated in Galtung‟s terminology of the 
infringements of basic human needs this means: dialogue instead of penetration, integration 
instead of segmentation, solidarity instead of fragmentation and participation instead of 
marginalization. Together with the satisfaction of basic human needs, establishing a peace 
culture and peace structure constitute therapy approaches to work on the transformation of deep 
dimensions of the conflict.673  
Violent actors have to be identified and taken seriously. They also should be included in as 
many dialogues as possible, or at least provided with the chance of doing so, as neglecting them 
may make them more intractable. In order to support handling conflict processes non-violently, 
it may help to include more actors in the process. Balancing the gender ratio or inviting actors 
with a religious (not hard-liner), intellectual or commercial instead of military background, can 
increase the level of empathy, creativity and non-violence to work constructively on a 
conflict. 674  Actions should aim at satisfying all basic human needs: survival, well-being, 
freedom and identity that might have been infringed upon previously by direct violence. 
Apart from working on establishing peace culture and peace structure as well as increasing the 
number of peaceful actors, structural, cultural and direct violence need to be reduced. Work on 
                                                   
668 Galtung, 1994, p. 35.  
669 Galtung, 2010, p. 81.  
670 Galtung 2007a, p. 67.  
671 Galtung, 2010, pp. 81 – 82.  
672 Galtung, 2010, p. 82.  
673 Galtung, 2010, p. 75, Table 10.  
674 Galtung, 2000, pp. 15 – 16.  
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peace and reduction of violence should be simultaneous and consistent; neither should be 
prioritized at the expense of the other. 675  The diagnosis of violence in a conflict (direct, 
structural and cultural) helps to identify violence that has to be countered. By making culture, 
structures and actors less violent and more peaceful, chances are that contradicting goals can be 
attended without any of the actors resorting to violent behavior. Working on a conflict 
formation (according to the conflict formation triangle) therefore has direct effects on a 
conflict‟s degree of violence.  
 
For the root conflict, i.e. the underlying problems of a conflict or the contradictions between 
goals, Galtung suggests mediation to find a “new, acceptable and sustainable reality”676. In this 
new reality, contradictions may not be completely resolved and do not disappear, but they may 
have been blunted or appear less contradictory than they did before. While working on the 
contradictions, the parties‟ behavior and attitudes need to be attended to by peace-workers. 
Conflict actors need to reach a stage in which they can start working both on the conflict and 
with each other, e.g. by participating in a mediation process.677  
The process of mediation should be conducted as a dialogue with all actors. According to the 
Transcend method, mediators first meet with the parties one-on-one before they facilitate direct 
dialogue, e.g. a round-table. The dialogue should comprise the following:678 
1) Mapping the conflict formation (parties, goals and contradictions) 
2) Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate goals 
3) Bridging the legitimate goals with creativity 
 
In the mediation process, the focus is on contradictions, therefore finding ways to work on them 
is given priority. In the course of discussing contradicting goals and their legitimacy, the parties 
are sensitized to the basic human needs, both their own as well as those of the other party. It is 
assumed that when contradictions are less sharp, attitudes and behavior will be softened rather 
than the other way round. How to attend to all three aspects of a conflict (attitudes, behavior 
and contradictions: the ABC triangle) may vary from conflict to conflict. In his book 50 Years -
25 Intellectual Landscapes Explored, 679  Galtung describes the agenda used by Transcend 
mediators to guide actors through the process as a double dialectic of future vs. past and good-
pursued (i.e. the dreams and glories) vs. bad-rejected (i.e. the fears and traumata). 
                                                   
675 Galtung, 2008, p. 130.  
676 Galtung, 2010, p. 82.  
677 Ibid.  
678 Ibid.  
679 Galtung, 2008. 
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 Bad-rejected Good-pursuit 
Future (4) The Fears (1) The Dreams 
Past (2) The Traumata (3) The Glories 
Table 4: The Double Dialectic of Past vs. Future and Good vs. Bad680  
 
The numbers represent a standard sequence of mediation which often has to be repeated several 
times over the course of the process.  
1. The dreams represent a common constructive vision of the future  
2. The traumata are destructive aspects of the conflict up to now681 
3. The glories stand for the positive-nostalgic elements of a common past682 
4. The fears represent the negative prognosis of the future683 
 
Each actor or party may then reflect upon their dreams, traumata, glories and fears to come to a 
better understanding of how they perceive the conflict as well as how other party(ies) perceive 
it. The actors then discuss how a new reality might emerge in which contradicting goals of the 
parties might co-exist. This approach, along with other mediation approaches, is based on 
criticism, empiricism and constructivism.684 The mediator‟s goal is to guide the parties away 
from their fears / nightmares towards a compelling dream, inspired by theories and values that 
make the dream become as constructive, creative and concrete as possible.685 
 
Phase II: During Violence 
According to Galtung, while the conflict is at its most manifest, violence has to be stopped, 
even if this means military or police intervention. 686  Peace-keeping therefore may include 
violence. This behavior-oriented approach is necessary to gain control over violent actors and 
stop them from destroying others or themselves.687 Circumstances leading to the emergence of 
direct violence need to be identified and included in possible strategies. Direct violence may 
emerge for different reasons. An unattended conflict in which one party wants to impose its 
goals on the other by force may lead to the flare-up of violence. It also could be that one party 
                                                   
680 Galtung, 2008, p. 83.  
681 Later, Galtung refers to this mode as „reality‟ (past, negative), Galtung, 2010, p. 88.  
682 Galtung also named this mode „nostalgia‟ (past, positive), Galtung, 2010, p. 88.  
683 Another term for this mode is „nightmare‟ (future, negative), Galtung, 2010, p. 88.  
684 Galtung, 2008, pp. 82- 83 and p. 225.  
685 Galtung, 2010, p. 90.  
686 Galtung, 2000, p. 13 and p. 18.  
687 Galtung, 2007a, p. 187.  
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is acting out of frustration over unachieved goals or compromised basic human needs. Another 
reason why conflict parties resort to direct violence may be due to an underlying culture that 
justifies its use for gaining honor or to avenge previous acts of violence.688  
 
Galtung outlines five different options for ending direct violence Handbook:689  
1. Embargoes on weapons and mercenaries 
2. Removal of targets and evacuation of people 
3. Demoralizing soldiers (or in general people using direct violence) by clarifying visible 
and invisible consequences of violence 
4. Making clear to parties that they will all lose in the long run due to the spiraling nature 
of violence 
5. UN peacekeeping missions with peacekeeping units that should be large enough to not 
leave space for fighting parties to continue fighting.  
Options 1. and 5. have to be initiated by governments, while options 2. – 4. can also be initiated 
by organized groups, like NGOs, although all of the mentioned options constitute large-scale 
operations for which only very few NGOs have the necessary means (personnel and financial 
assets). Therefore, in most cases these options depend on the willingness of asset-rich outsiders 
(e.g. uninvolved governments) to engage.  
With regard to what involved actors can do in this conflict phase, Galtung names non-violent 
de-escalation as a therapy against direct violence (as a therapy against tertiary consequences of 
the prognosis, see table 4). Galtung identifies the spiral of violence in which violence breeds 
violence is identified as being problematic.690 In order to break the vicious cycle of escalating 
violence, it is necessary to de-escalate violence by refusing to react with violence.691 It is not 
without risks for a party to exercise non-violence. Actors risk surveillance, arrest, maiming and 
in the worst case killing. The basic idea, inspired by Gandhi, is to be willing to suffer violence 
without returning it. Actions of non-violence include peace movement actions, such as 
officially reporting incidents of violence, holding meetings and organizing mass 
demonstrations. Galtung divides measures of non-violence into first, second and third party 
non-violence:  
 First party non-violence acts are offensive acts against structural violence, such as 
massive non-cooperation and civil disobedience. 
                                                   
688 Galtung, 2000, p. 18.  
689 Galtung, 2000, p. 19.  
690 Galtung, 2010, p. 84. 
691 Ibid. 
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 Second party non-violence measures include defensive acts against invasion/occupation 
with massive civil disobedience. 
 Third parties engage in non-violence by facilitating conflict work, bringing parties 
together and conducting mediation.692 
These measures or therapies are suggested by Galtung for de-escalating a conflict and ending or 
reducing direct violence, if only temporarily. As soon as direct violent acts have decreased, 
work on reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution (the „three Rs‟) should already be initiated 
which shall then be continued in Phase III.693  
 
Phase III: After Violence 
Once violent actions have occurred, breaking the conflict life-cycle becomes increasingly 
difficult. People who experienced the end of direct violence (e.g. after a peace accord) may feel 
enthusiastic and may not feel the need for further conflict work. Therefore they may neglect 
long-lasting effects of past violence and the fact that a conflict does not necessarily disappear 
with the end of violent acts.694 Thus, it is important to continue conflict work similar to the 
work suggested for Phase I (before violence) which aims at resolving the root conflict (i.e. 
working on the conflict triangles). This constitutes the first one of the „three Rs‟ which Galtung 
identifies as necessary in his approach. The other „two Rs‟ are reconstruction and 
reconciliation. For all three topics (resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation) the Transcend 
methods provides exemplars of concrete measures which may be applicable depending on the 
results of the conflict analysis.695 In addition, dialogue is required to include the actors (e.g. in 
the form of seminars or workshops or interviews with conflict actors, if necessary with a 
facilitator (conciliator)) during which the applicability of different approaches is discussed. 
Conflict parties could then decide together which approach(es) they would prefer.696  
 
The Transcend Method: An Insight into the Academic Discourse  
Galtung‟s approach of conflict transformation has been criticized as being too simplistic. 
Boulding, for example considers the approach to be too „taxonomic‟ and „dichotomist‟, failing 
therefore to recognize the complexity and randomness of the world. 697  Bonacker, sees 
Galtung‟s totalizing definition of peace („der totale Friedensbegriff‟) as problematic as it does 
                                                   
692 Galtung, 2010, p. 84.   
693 Galtung, 2000, p. 19.  
694 Ibid.   
695 For more details regarding each of the approaches, see Galtung, 2000, pp. 20ff.  
696 Galtung, 2010, pp. 84-85.  
697 Boulding, 1977, p. 78.  
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not allow for any contradictions, conflicting aims or ambivalences.698 As Galtung offers only 
models that seem to fit everything perfectly into one concept, empirical problems and 
challenges in peace processes are neglected. As an example, Bonacker refers to the conflict or 
dilemma between the attempt to bring all perpetrators to justice and the attempt to focus on 
establishing stability in post-war societies which often requires leaving perpetrators in their 
positions of power.699  In the Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies edited by Webel and 
Galtung 700 , post-conflict problems are not assessed in detail, but considered solved after 
conducting measures according to the „three Rs‟. The result is summed up as „past cleared, 
future together‟ in a table. However, especially „future together‟ has proven to be a complicated 
and difficult undertaking in most post-conflict societies.701  
Post-conflict problems are indeed not addressed by Galtung in the Handbook of Peace and 
Conflict Studies. However, they are addressed in his article “After Violence”702, in which he 
explicitly deals with  
1. The problem of reconstruction after the direct violence; 
2. The problem of reconciliation of the conflict parties; and 
3. The problem of resolution of the underlying, root conflict.  
 
The problem of dealing with a juridical approach to punish perpetrators on the one hand and 
establishing stability in post-conflict societies mentioned by Bonacker is also one of the topics 
addressed in this article. Galtung criticizes the processes to deal with perpetrators according to 
Western concepts of justice as being too narrow. Alternately, he suggests expanding the 
concept by adding a restitution and apology approach (similar to the process initiated by the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission) which could enable perpetrators to 
remain in society and help the rebuilding process instead of excluding them.703 Due to the 
comprehensive and complex nature of the Transcend approach and the abundance of theoretical 
work which forms its basis, it is difficult to reduce Galtung‟s method to one compact handbook 
without running the risk of oversimplifying and essentializing it. Therefore, a critique such as 
presented by Bonacker of the approach being too simplistic does not do justice to the 
complexity of the method as a whole.   
 
                                                   
698 Bonacker, 2009, p. 2.  
699 Ibid.  
700 Webel & Galtung, 2007.  
701 Bonacker, 2009, p. 2.  
702 Galtung, After Violence, undated.  
703 Galtung, After Violence, undated. 
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6.2 Suggestions for the Case Study Conflict  
Next, I will determine the current status of the case study conflict within the conflict cycle 
based on the analysis of the conflict‟s present levels of direct violence. An approximate 
indication in numbers of the status of conflict transformation (to what extent the conflict has 
already been transformed) for this specific conflict has been calculated according to the conflict 
transformation index developed by Galtung in Annex 2. The result reveals that conflict 
transformation of this conflict has reached about 37.5 of 100 points (0 means no conflict 
transformation has taken place and 100 means the conflict has been fully transformed). In spite 
of occasional incidents of direct violence infringing mainly upon the well-being needs of ethnic 
Chinese, the conflict is currently not in a phase of large-scale violence as it was during the May 
riots in 1998. During the riots, violence was on a scale that would have required peace-keeping 
actions and the conflict was therefore in Phase II (during violence). It thus has to be determined 
whether the conflict is still in Phase III (after violence) or whether it has already re-entered 
Phase I (before violence) again. For the time period of research (until 2012), the conflict is still 
in Phase III (after violence) as the May riots are still very present to conflict actors and the 
healing process has not been concluded yet. On the other hand, there are no indications that 
large-scale direct violence would occur in the near future. Even though anti-Chinese sentiments 
were instrumentalized during the election campaigns for the position of Governor and Vice-
governor of Jakarta in mid-2012, they did not trigger acts of direct violence. The focus of 
suggestions for conflict transformation should therefore be set on the therapies attributed to 
Phase III (after violence).  
Galtung suggests approaches in order to deal with the „three Rs‟ (reconstruction, 
reconciliation, resolution) which may or may not be applicable to a conflict depending on the 
results of the conflict analysis. These approaches will therefore be presented and discussed with 
regard to their applicability to the case study conflict. For the sake of clarity, concrete and 
practical suggestions will then be explicitly highlighted at the end of long sections. 
 
Reconstruction 
According to the Transcend method, four different tasks help the reconstruction process after 
violence:  
 Rehabilitation (trauma and sorrow approach) 
 Rebuilding (development approach) 
 Restructuration (peace structure approach) 
 Reculturation (peace culture approach) 
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Rehabilitation 
Galtung suggests a trauma and sorrow approach to initiate rehabilitation. In this approach, a 
time of collective sorrow could be set up during which sorrow is expressed as condolences to 
those who have lost someone, suffered from injuries or other damages during violence (Phase 
II). By the end of the sorrow period, a public celebration could mark its end and a new 
beginning as life goes on. This approach should however not contribute to a culture of war, in 
which perpetrators (or victors) celebrate sacrifices necessary to „win‟ and victims (or 
vanquished) deplore their losses. Instead, war or violence as such should be disapproved of 
collectively as a sign of human failure. Violent actors, violent structures and violent cultures 
should be addressed by both perpetrators and victims alike. The long-term goal of rehabilitation 
should be the abolition of violence. For the healing process, the focus has to be on leaving the 
wounds behind and to focus on the future without harboring revenge. This is especially difficult 
when dealing with collective trauma.704  
 
There was no public collective sorrow period after the May riots 1998 and during interviews 
with ethnic Chinese, many were still hoping for an official apology, not knowing that President 
Habibie had in fact offered one in his traditional Independence Day speech in August 1998 for 
the losses the ethnic Chinese had suffered.705 This could be attributed to the fact that Habibie 
and his government were generally not perceived as having been apologetic by Chinese 
Indonesians. The official apology was therefore not understood as an apology, but rather a 
reaction to international pressure and as an effort to convince ethnic Chinese who had left the 
country with their financial assets to return.706 It may thus have not been considered as sincere 
and gone mainly unnoticed by ethnic Chinese as well as indigenous Indonesians. More than a 
decade after the riots, it may be too late for a collective sorrow period.  
 
Suggestion 
However, it could help to initiate a commemoration day for the May riots, e.g. in May 2013 
(fifteen years after the riots), during which perpetrators and victims step forward to condemn 
the violent acts of the past and mourn its consequences. In this context, members of the political 
elite, but also the military, would have a chance to officially apologize and reach a nation-wide 
                                                   
704 Galtung, undated, pp. 54-55. According to Galtung collective trauma may be brought upon by large-scale 
violent acts, like war, ibid. 
705 Interview with e.g. Lydia S. (11.09.2008) and Fajar P., half-Chinese Indonesian (09.09.2008).  
706 Wanandi, 1999, p. 133.  
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public. It is also quite likely that an official apology would be accepted by ethnic Chinese and 
helps them to work on closure.707 A renewed sincere apology and official recognition of crimes 
could further help both groups to concentrate on a common goal, such as ending other on-going 
forms of violence, like discrimination, in Indonesia.  
 
Rebuilding 
For some societies, reconstruction of property destroyed in the conflict can offer new 
opportunities. Construction processes after Phase II can mark a visible new beginning. Apart 
from governmental efforts, the involvement of the private sector is often required for 
reconstruction projects. This, however, also carries with it the danger that private investors are 
only interested in profiting from past violent incidents. The result could be economic 
dominance which could replace direct with structural violence. To prevent this, a national 
dialogue including general citizen participation is required. Citizens, as future inhabitants, 
would be provided with the chance to engage in the planning of new houses, districts and cities. 
Peace-workers can help in initiating and facilitating dialogues about development and open 
possibilities that may go beyond classical models, like social democratization which includes 
elites as well as non-elite sections of society.708  
 
After the riots in 1998, Indonesia required rebuilding after the twin collapse of the authoritarian 
regime and the national economy. In contrast to other conflicts where the victims are 
economically weaker than the perpetrators, e.g. the Kurds or the Tibetans, the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia formed an essential part of the country‟s economy. Even if they had lost much of 
their assets during violent acts, in this case, the Chinese Indonesians were needed for the 
country‟s rebuilding process, because of their business experiences and remaining business 
assets. There were without doubt also those who lost their livelihoods during the crisis and did 
not recover, but on the whole, the financial capital of the Chinese Indonesian community and 
its reputation as major catalysts of the private sector ensured them an active role in the 
rebuilding process. This role was however limited to the economical part. They have not been 
explicitly invited into the political sphere even if the number of politically active Chinese 
Indonesians is slowly increasing. 
General prejudices against Javanese and ethnic Chinese dominance of the Indonesian economy 
will be difficult to counter as long as a more equitable economical distribution has not been 
                                                   
707 At least five ethnic Chinese respondents stated that they would welcome an official apology (Fajar P., 
Christine Tjhin, Protus Tanuhandura, Wahyu Effendi and Alexandra Wulan).  
708 Galtung, undated, pp. 56-57. 
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achieved. Despite the reductions in the number of poor, Indonesia is still a country where large 
sections of the population are economically disadvantaged. The rebuilding process of the 
economy in Indonesia has not been concluded by the end of the research for this study (2012). 
Economic programs that reflect democratic structures are required. The Indonesian researchers 
Thee and Tan go as far as to claim that only if the economic gap between ethnic Chinese and 
indigenous Indonesians is narrowed can the conflict be transformed towards peace. 709  To 
achieve this, it would be necessary to develop and implement sound economic policies which 
foster economic growth in combination with social development.710 Expertise in economics and 
commerce of (at least some) ethnic Chinese businessmen would be a valuable asset to draw 
upon by the government, which would call for more political and bureaucratically participation 
of ethnic Chinese. As unlike the other ethnic groups ethnic Chinese are not living in only one 
specific territory in but rather across Indonesia, they may assume the role of intermediaries in 
case of disagreements between ethnic groups. They are familiar with local thinking (hopes and 
concerns alike), but due to their special position as a marginalized ethnic group, ethnic Chinese 
may have another perspective from other ethnic groups and might be able to assist in bridging 
contradictions. 
 
Suggestions 
Establishing economic forums (e.g. by the World Bank) or workshops in which ethnic Chinese 
businessmen would be part of and could encourage discussions for new economic concepts for 
the resource-rich country that benefit society more broadly.  
Due to the strengthening of local identities with the implementation of decentralization policies, 
local organizations and local governments can be expected to have an interest in participating in 
the economic rebuilding process, especially as it also touches upon issues of importance to 
local governments, such as the distribution of economic assets. These workshops could 
therefore be initiated and provide the required infrastructure for workshops all over the country 
on the communal level for discussing national and local policies for economic development. 
Organizing and coordinating of economic forums or workshops (as peace-building tool) could 
either be the central government‟s task or that of an international organization. Outcomes are 
expected to not only reflect the country‟s diversity, but moreover to transfer this diversity into a 
rebuilding process of the country. By including different ethnic groups and sections of society, 
the results of this process could achieve a higher level of acceptance among the people.  
                                                   
709 Thee, 2006, p. 98; interview with Mely Tan (17.09.2008).  
710 Thee, 2006, p. 98; interview with Mely Tan (17.09.2008).  
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Due to the long history of Javanese dominance in the archipelago, the risk that Javanese 
representatives might take over a leading position in the workshops has to be considered and 
reacted to. On the local level, the same has to be considered with regard to the respective 
dominant ethnic group which forms the local elite. In the process, ethnic Chinese would have to 
be treated as equals with the other, indigenous, ethnic groups. This would open opportunities 
for ethnic Chinese to contribute to the country‟s development, prove their loyalty to and interest 
in Indonesia.  
 
Restructuration 
The analysis of the conflict‟s deep dimensions identified violent structures, i.e. an underlying 
infra-structure of interacting meso- and mega-fault-lines. An approach to establishing an infra-
structure with reciprocity and equity across fault-lines which is favored by democratic countries 
is increased democratization.711 Galtung names two common structural causes for outbreaks of 
direct violence: too much dominance (politically as oppression and economically as 
exploitation) and too much distance between classes or other groups. In combination, this may 
result in marginalization or social exclusion of one or more groups. Democratization processes 
should therefore aim at countering marginalization and exclusion, for example by raising 
educational and health levels of those who are marginalized or excluded (empowerment). 
Productive resources such as land, credit, technology and management, would also have to be 
made accessible more equitably to counter inequity. According to Galtung, building peace 
structures could imply extending the concept of democratization from a merely political 
meaning to an economical and cultural understanding.712  
The suggested measures here only hint at possibilities of what could be done to work towards 
structural peace. The list is neither comprehensive nor can success in terms of achieving 
structural peace through them be guaranteed. Working on structures of society is a difficult and 
long-term undertaking for which these suggestions can, however, provide impulses. More 
important than possible effects of the measures, is the initiation of a general process that might 
slowly pave the way from structural violence towards structural peace.  
 
Democratization in Indonesia 
Indonesia started its democratization process after the fall of the authoritarian Soeharto-regime. 
However, the process has not been completed yet and the county is still in the course of 
defining its own type of democracy. Elements inherited from former non-democratic 
                                                   
711 Galtung, undated, p. 58. 
712 Galtung, undated, pp. 59-60. 
202 
 
administrations can still be found in the social, legal and political structure of the country. As 
the analysis of the conflict context shows, the pyramidical social structure introduced by the 
Dutch is part of this legacy. Other elements include laws, regulations and political structures 
inherited from the Soekarno and Soeharto administrations, including weak institutions on the 
local level and, on occasion, military intervention in politics.  
Decentralization programs have included the establishing of local administration structures and 
limiting of the military‟s influence in the political realm which is a key part to democratization. 
This is further reflected in reforms of the electoral system and improvements of democratic 
structures to better adapt them to the local and national context.713  
 
Suggestion 
As Indonesia is still undergoing a democratization process, this leaves space for peace-workers 
to facilitate dialogue about democratization and nation-building which may lead to including 
ethnic Chinese in the process. Dialogue will be necessary not only in order reduce potential 
fears among indigenous Indonesians that Chinese Indonesians may become too powerful if 
their number of political representatives increases, but also to encourage ethnic Chinese to 
participate in political processes. 
 
Political Representation of Minorities 
As decentralization programs are still in the process of being implemented, political 
mechanisms are required which ensure minority representation in local governments and local 
bureaucracy. Literature on the subject of minority political representation is divided between 
those who consider mechanism ensuring minority representation to be positive discrimination 
in favor of minorities which would be against the principle of democracy (one equal vote per 
person only)714 and those who consider these mechanism to be necessary to enable minority 
groups to become part of the political decision-making process715. As the experiences of other 
countries (e.g. New Zealand) show, ensuring the political representation and participation of 
                                                   
713 During its 2002 annual session, the People‟s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, 
MPR) added fourteen amendments. From 2004 onwards, the MPR is composed of the existing People‟s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and a new Regional Representative Council 
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) to meet demands of the outer islands for more co-determination. Since 
all the seats in the MPR are directly elected, the military was removed from the legislature, whose 38 
representatives had been appointed before. Another amendment was the direct election of the President as 
well as the Vice President. Only parties or coalitions of parties that gained at least 3 percent of the DPR 
seats or 5 percent of the vote in national legislative elections were eligible under the 2004 amendment to 
nominate a presidential and vice presidential ticket. See for example U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy 
in Action. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm, 20.05.2012. 
714 E.g. Heywood, 2002. 
715 E.g. Phillips, 1995 and Goodin, 2004.  
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minority groups is important for strengthening and consolidating both democracies and the 
integration of minority groups.716 These experiences further show that in those societies in 
which minorities are politically represented, they are likely to develop a more positive attitude 
towards the state they live in, as they have the chance to address issues which affect them and 
at the same time to contribute to a more collective approach to democracy.717  
 
In the case of Indonesia, minority political representation would not only comply with the 
general aims of the decentralization programs, but further support the nation-building process 
by fostering more positive attitudes towards the nation-state as well as the national and local 
governments. This would help minorities to accommodate themselves in the political structure 
of a multi-ethnic state and encourage them to contribute actively to the nation-building process.  
Political participation by ethnic Chinese on the decision-making level is still subject to 
constraints. Despite efforts to decentralize the political system, the party system is centralized 
and focused on Jakarta. This has an impact on the „local sons‟ who aim at positions in local 
governments. Candidates who are not close to their party‟s centre in Jakarta are unlikely to be 
nominated for positions in the local governments by their party. Further, those running for any 
political position need to have considerable financial assets available or supporters who do.718  
 
Suggestions 
Establishing minority political representation mechanisms on the national, but probably even 
more importantly on the local level is highly recommended. Further, the call for 
decentralization has to be answered not only in the electoral system but also by reforming the 
structure of the political parties to encourage people who are not close to the political base to 
become political candidates, regardless their ethnicity or religion. Means to enable potential 
political candidates who lack the financial assets to participate have to be found, as for the time 
being, access to capital determines active political engagement.719  
 
The Nation-Building Process 
Engaging in the nation-building process on the political level is important for the social 
integration of Chinese Indonesians. This may not be an easy undertaking, not only due to 
possible resistance by indigenous Indonesians but also because, as outlined by researchers like 
                                                   
716 Banducci et al., 2004.   
717 Ibid.   
718 Interview with Hanjaya Setiawan, ethnic Chinese politician (10.09.2008). 
719While the Indonesian government provided quite generous public funding to political parties between 2001 
and 2005, it afterwards cut this support by as much as 90 per cent. Mietzner, 2007.  
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Wang Gungwu,720  ethnic Chinese have inherited a deep-rooted and distinctive culture. He 
argues that it is not only a difficult mental process for a culture-based people (like ethnic 
Chinese) to move to a state-based people, but also that globalization forces or encourages 
Southeast Asian Chinese to look beyond their national borders and return to (a more) cultural 
identification. A focus on globalization and the overseas Chinese community may even serve as 
part of the survival tactics employed by ethnic Chinese when dealing with discrimination in 
their own nation-states or in the respective nation-state building processes.721 Therefore, being 
more aware of their „Chineseness‟ may become a mechanism to avoid those parts of the nation-
building-process or their country‟s politics which they do not agree with and reduce their 
general interest in engaging with the national political realm. On the other hand, it can also be 
argued that ethnic Chinese have already been involved in the Indonesian nation-building 
process in the past and should get involved again as an opportunity to improve their image in 
the eyes of the indigenous Indonesians.722   
 
Suggestion 
To encourage the ethnic Chinese to participate (again) in politics and in particular the nation-
building process, ethnic Chinese organizations or politicians could promote a sense of 
responsibility towards Indonesia among their fellow Chinese Indonesians. Programs to raise 
political awareness and the need for especially the younger generation of Chinese Indonesians 
could be initiated and conducted.   
 
Re-conceptualization of Indonesian National Identity 
With regard to specific fault-lines as identified in the course of the conflict analysis, the concept 
of Indonesian national identity and underrepresentation of ethnic minorities (also on the local 
level) were identified as hindering „structural peace‟. The concept of Indonesian national 
identity is regarded here as problematic as it is based on a concept of indigenousness which 
excludes ethnic Chinese as well as ethnic groups with a „foreign‟ origin like Indonesian Arabs, 
even if the Indonesian national motto „unity in diversity‟ suggests otherwise. Peace-workers 
could not only initiate and facilitate dialogue about national identity among ethnic groups, but 
further try to encourage a re-thinking of „Indonesian-ness‟ that would adapt the present concept 
by referring to examples of other countries with multi-ethnic backgrounds. 
 
                                                   
720 University Professor at the National University Singapore (focus Far Eastern History).  
721 Tan, 2004, pp. 3ff.  
722 Tan, 2004, pp. 20ff.  
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Suggestions 
In the course of the democratization process and nation-building process, it would therefore be 
recommendable to explicitly detach the concept of indigenousness from the concept of the 
nation. The conflict analysis showed that leaving the concept unchanged will hinder 
transformation efforts. In contrast, re-conceptualizing is expected to have a positive effect on 
conflict development even if it may not be an easy task and should be given priority in a 
conflict transformation process.723  
Including ethnic Chinese into Indonesian national identity will leave a gap which has to be 
filled. Indonesia witnessed a rise of local ethnic identities after 2001, eclipsing in part the issue 
of national identity. Therefore, dialogue would need to be initiated to encourage and revive 
discourses on national identities. These discourses may include, on the content level of identity, 
the construction a common past, present and future, cultural and political elements as well as 
common values. For example, with regard to a common past, it will be necessary to work on 
the presentation of the Indonesian historical background. Indonesian history lessons usually do 
not include sufferings of ethnic Chinese under colonial rule or involvement of ethnic Chinese in 
the Indonesian fight for independence.724 The first Chinese Indonesian was added to the list of 
Indonesian national heroes only in 2009. Even though he was not the only ethnic Chinese who 
fought in the war for independence, the inclusion of Major John Lie can be regarded a 
significant step in the process towards the acceptance of Chinese Indonesians as part of the 
Indonesian nation. This list of heroes (together with their biographies) forms an integral part of 
the Indonesian school curriculum. National heroes are symbols of freedom which Indonesians 
are proud of and serve as resources for cultural unity. As such, lives of ethnic Chinese would 
enter the collective memory and ethnic Chinese would be represented positively, altering their 
negative image. Identity constructions of a common present would include ethnic Chinese, if 
contributions of Chinese culture to Indonesian civilization would be made accessible to the 
Indonesian public, for example by being taught at school. A cultural contribution that could be 
                                                   
723 Other multi-ethnic countries such as Canada face similar difficulties trying to build a common national 
identity while promoting diversity and tolerance. As identities can both include and exclude, they require 
boundaries to sustain themselves. Boundary mechanisms are established by collectives to protect their 
distinctiveness in contrast to other collectives. Stressing unique traits or characteristics which can include 
anything from language to dress code or diet can be use as boundary mechanisms. For example, Croatia 
introduced new vocabulary to differentiate its language from the Serbian language. This strategy aims at 
distinguishing the Croatian identity from the Serbian as both identities (despite their cultural differences) 
share a language which is philologically the same (Schöpflin, 2001, pp. 5ff). To underline the 
distinctiveness of an identity, identities are also constructed against a specific group of outsiders. In the 
case of Canada therefore, anti-Americanism became a dominant part of Canadian identity (Granatstein, 
1996, pp. 286ff). Even if critics argue that being against another group should not be the basis for any 
rational national identity a „common other‟ seems to serve as marker to unify a group of otherwise diverse 
people (ibid).  
724 Interviews with e.g. Mohammad Gatot (08.09.2008). 
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highlighted would be the official integration or acceptance of red dye to Indonesian batik. Batik 
is perceived as „typically Indonesian‟ by most Indonesians and Indonesians are proud of their 
batik tradition, especially after it was proclaimed part of world cultural heritage by UNESCO in 
2009.725 Therefore, contributions by ethnic Chinese to batik could encourage seeing them as 
integral to Indonesian culture.  
It will not be possible to detach indigenousness from the concept without finding something 
new to substitute for it. Apart from elements listed above which explicitly include ethnic 
Chinese, dialogue with other ethnic groups is expected to lead to more elements being 
identified that can be considered „typically Indonesian‟ which may be added to the concept. 
The results of nation-wide dialogues would need to be compiled in a new concept, for example 
by a committee with representatives of various ethnic groups. The committee would further 
have to develop a plan for the promotion of this new concept in public, especially on the pre-
school and school-level.  
 
Representation of Ethnic Chinese in the Military 
At the time of research for this study, ethnic Chinese were underrepresented in the military.726 
As reasons for this, fear on the one hand and unofficial discrimination in the recruitment 
process on the other hand were identified. Peace-workers would have to work on the traumata 
related to the military‟s involvement during the May riots which ethnic Chinese are suffering 
from and to encourage them to lose their fear of the military. With regard to discrimination in 
the recruitment process, the analysis revealed that negative prejudices against ethnic Chinese 
seem to be still high in this field of occupation. However, this does not refer to ethnic Chinese 
only, as other minorities are also being discriminated against in the admission process.  
 
Suggestion 
In the context of military reforms, an anti-discrimination committee being present at the 
admission process might help preventing that Indonesians are not admitted based on their 
ethnic background. Such a state committee could ensure that the anti-discrimination law is 
adhered to more generally as well. As the research only provides limited insight into the 
structures of the military, a thorough analysis of the military and related cases of ethnic 
discrimination will have to remain another challenging gap to be closed by future research. 
 
                                                   
725 E.g. interviews with William Kwan (15.04.2010).  
726 Interview with Teddy Jusuf (08.09.2008). 
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Reculturation  
Substituting a culture of violence with a culture of peace is a long-term process. This process 
includes all transformation measures aiming at dismantling cultural elements which legitimize 
the use of violence and instead promoting peaceful ways to deal with conflicts. In order to 
establish a constructive conflict culture, Galtung suggests peace education from kindergarten 
onwards throughout the adult life.727 This can be supported for example by peace journalism.728  
Further, it is necessary to develop an understanding for the deep culture of „others‟ among 
conflict parties. However, this does not imply that raising awareness alone is sufficient. In some 
cases, aspects of the deep culture (cosmology) have to be brought to the surface so that the 
respective group can actively work on it. Working on the CGT syndrome for ethnic Chinese 
and on the DMA syndrome for indigenous Indonesians also will be an important and difficult 
task. It can be expected that psychological therapy may be required to overcome traumata – 
even if conflict actors do not feel the need and may refuse treatment. According to several 
respondents, many ethnic Chinese prefer to ignore discrimination and past violent incidents 
instead of actively dealing with them.729 
Building peace structures and a peace culture together with satisfying the basic human needs 
constitute therapies necessary to work on the deep dimensions on a conflict. If direct violence, 
structural violence and cultural violence can simultaneously be reduced, this would form the 
basis for a virtuous cycle. Suggestions on how to possibly deal with violence in this particular 
conflict, will be discussed in the section „resolution‟ below. 
 
Suggestion 
The ethnic Chinese, for example, could work on their „exclusiveness‟. This includes 
overcoming their distance to indigenous Indonesians, which may require frequent contact and 
joint projects. Those who do not want to be exclusive, but evoke that impression, for example 
because of their Chinese-style houses, would not necessarily have to move into Indonesian-
style ones. Chinese Indonesian architects could try to develop a new „Chinese Indonesian-style 
architecture‟ which incorporates Indonesian as well as Chinese architectural elements. Peace-
workers could help to encourage people to deal with their traumata and to facilitate accessing 
professional help, e.g. in the form of psychoanalytical therapy.  
                                                   
727 Galtung, 2010, p. 81. 
728 Ibid. 
729 E.g. Veronica Purnama (10.04.2010) and Dr. Grace W. (18.04.2010). 
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Reconciliation 
Reconciliation includes different strategies or measures which aim at a healing process for 
conflict actors. Conflict actors from both sides are brought together to participate in projects, 
usually facilitated and guided by peace-workers, during which they explore their mutual fears, 
anger or other emotions. This may then mark the beginning of building bridges of trust between 
them. Different suggestions for such projects by Galtung will be listed below. As not all 
approaches are appropriate for all conflicts, they will be examined one after another to 
determine whether or not they could be a possible option for the present conflict. 
 
Exculpatory Nature-Structure-Culture Approach or Blaming the Circumstances 
Approach  
In this approach, perpetrators and victims both agree that the circumstances, i.e. violent 
structures and cultures were underlying causes of a conflict which turned one group of people 
into perpetrators and the other into victims. Once both sides agree on this, they can counter 
circumstances that caused the violence together. Peace-workers explain to each party (one-on-
one) this perspective of their situation. After each of the parties has reached an exculpatory 
position, both can be brought together to work out approaches for a common future.730 This 
approach might be applicable to the case study conflict; however, it should not be the only 
approach. It could be a supplementary perspective that would make it easier, especially for 
those ethnic Chinese who still perceive indigenous Indonesians as enemies and are of the 
opinion that they have to protect themselves against them. Blaming the circumstances might 
help them to see the indigenous Indonesians as victims as well with whom they can work on 
underlying causes together.  
 
Reparation / Restitution Approach 
When reversible harm, such as the destruction of property, has been inflicted, perpetrators or 
the state can offer reparations or restitution. Since replacement or restitution of property should 
not only cover the cost of what was destroyed, but also time and inconvenience lost in the 
process, the reparations should be higher than only the material costs only for what was 
destroyed. The peace-workers‟ task would not only be to make sure that the replacement is 
appropriate, but that both sides understand the correct symbolic message behind the act. 
Perpetrators neither buy themselves out nor is it an explicit admission of guilt. The peace-
                                                   
730 Galtung, 2005, pp. 222-223.  
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worker may have to work out a contract that ensures that the symbolic closure is fixed.731 This 
approach is not considered to be an option for the aftermath of the May riots 1998 as it is 
impossible to identify all perpetrators of the May riots, and it is doubtful that they would have 
the financial assets to replace property they destroyed. The state is also not in the position to 
offer reparations. If the ethnic Chinese were to be receiving restitutions, other ethnic groups 
involved in conflicts who suffered material losses would claim the same. Therefore, this 
approach is not practicable in this case.  
 
Apology / Forgiveness Approach  
In principle, in this approach, perpetrators are conscious of the harm done and apologize to 
victims. Victims in turn, accept their apologies and forgive them. In order to prevent that this 
process is merely a superficial exchange of words, peace-workers have to be make sure that 
both parties are sincere and in the right stage for this approach. 732  As suggested under 
Restruction (rehabilitation) a commemoration is recommended. Since the incidents are more 
than a decade ago, based on the research conducted in the framework of this study, chances are 
quite high that ethnic Chinese have reached a stage in which they would actually be able to 
forgive and start to overcome the trauma resulting from the riots.   
 
Theological / Penitence Approach 
This highly religious (Christian) approach involves submission, confession, penitence and 
absolution. In this approach, the individual sin of the perpetrators is stressed and, in order to 
avoid eternal suffering, they have to work on redeeming themselves in this life (e.g. by praying 
or going to a monastery). Peace-workers in this case, would be religious leaders or prominent 
persons representing a religious community. A prerequisite for this approach is that perpetrators 
and victims are religious believers in a Christian tradition and willing to accept guilt. The 
victims play a relatively minor role in this process, making it a perpetrator-oriented approach.733 
Since this approach focuses strongly on perpetrators, it seems to be less comprehensive than the 
previous ones and would not be recommended for this cast study conflict. As the majority of 
perpetrators in the case study belong to a different religion than the victims (Islam / 
Christianity), victims and perpetrators are unlikely to accept this approach.  
                                                   
731 Galtung, 2005, pp. 223-224.  
732 Galtung, 2005, p. 224.  
733 Galtung, 2005, pp. 224-225.  
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Juridical / Punishment Approach 
This approach represents the secular version of the religious one described above. The religious 
leader is replaced by a judge and God by the state. The approach is focused on punishing 
perpetrators only – victims have to be content knowing that justice was done.734 This approach 
has similar flaws to the previous one, though it could however be applied as an additional 
approach. It is a very common and accepted approach especially in Western societies and due 
to the wide-spread influence of these societies, other societies have adopted this approach as 
well. In Indonesia, the judicial system has been inherited from the Dutch and this legacy 
remains strong. Some of the perpetrators of the May riots have been sentenced in court, but as 
the analysis of the conflict‟s past showed, their trials were merely show trials aimed more at 
satisfying the calls for justice by the international community than the victims‟ needs. 735  As it 
would be impossible to find key perpetrators let alone all of the perpetrators and bring them to 
justice for the May riots, the effects, especially for the victims, would not justify the costs 
necessary for this measure.  
 
Codependent Origination / Karma Approach 
This meta-approach originates in Buddhism where the decision of the perpetrators to act 
violently is influenced by their karma736. The victims‟ karmas also contribute to this decision. 
Therefore, perpetrators and victims share bad karma which has led to violence and they have to 
counter it together by dialogue. Dialogue is conducted in the form of round-tables for outer 
dialogue accompanied by meditation as a form of inner dialogue. In contrast to previous 
approaches, this approach does not focus on perpetrators and their punishment or ways to gain 
absolution from guilt. It concentrates on the cooperation of both parties in order to improve 
their bad karma. The approach is neutral, dialogue-based and holistic, not focusing only on the 
dichotomy between the perpetrator and victim.737   
Even though Buddhism is nowadays only a minor religion in Indonesia, it used to be the 
leading religion in some of the ancient kingdoms. Due to this historical influence, the concept 
of karma is not entirely unknown to Indonesians. Ethnic Chinese, depending on their family 
history as well as background, are often even more familiar with it, especially as the majority of 
Indonesian Buddhists today are ethnic Chinese. As a result, the approach could have a chance 
of being accepted by both sides. It could be broadened by not only addressing the conflict 
                                                   
734 Galtung, 2005, p. 225.  
735 Purdey, 2006, p. 144.  
736 The accumulation of whatever he / she has done before in this life or in lives before the present one. 
737 Galtung, 2005, p. 226.  
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between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, but also conflicts involving other 
ethnicities, like Papuans. A culture of setting up nation-wide round-tables for peace would be a 
valuable contribution to the process of establishing a peace culture for Indonesia.  
 
Historical / Truth Commission Approach 
In this approach, perpetrators explain to a commission in detail what happened during violent 
acts. In doing so, their acts of violence will be set into a broader context, rather than being seen 
as single acts. Victims get the chance to understand how violence came about and based on this 
understanding may be able to forgive their perpetrators. The problem is however that 
understanding does not necessarily lead to forgiveness. Admitting their guilt by stating 
everything they did may be punishment for perpetrators and they may feel tormented by this 
exposure, however, this „self-punishment‟ does not necessarily result in forgiveness. 
Nevertheless, these reports of the truth (of every individual truth) may prove helpful if they are 
collected and made public to become part of the collective memory. However, not only 
perspectives or truths of perpetrators have to be part of this, truths of victims revealing how 
they perceived the violence also need to be included.738  
The idea of a collection of truths by both sides – perpetrators as well as victims – seems to be a 
highly valuable addition to other approaches. It would contribute to „healing the past‟, closing 
wounds and contributing to a common future of all conflict groups. Books about the traumatic 
events that occurred during the anti-communist campaigns in the 1960s in Indonesia are still of 
academic and public interest almost 50 years after the incidents. They include the truths of 
individuals who obviously wanted to share their truth, which shows their need for dealing with 
the past.739 In order to raise a similar interest for the anti-Chinese incidents during the May riots 
1998, Jusuf initiated a travelling exhibition in 2008 of photographs taken during and shortly 
after the May riots occurred.740 She considers it to be important that the May riots are not 
forgotten and dealt with as something that should not happen again in the future.741 Therefore, 
collections (in writing or as photographs or as recordings) of past truths would most likely be a 
positive contribution to reconciliation in this conflict.  
                                                   
738 Galtung, 2005, p. 227.  
739 For example, Heryanto, 2008.  
740 Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).  
741 Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).  
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Theatrical / Reliving Approach 
In this approach, the conflict parties relive what happened by re-staging their subjective 
experience. There are different measures to do so. In addition to story-telling, people may also 
stand up and re-enact like in a theatre and in the course thereof even switch roles between 
perpetrators and victims. By reliving the experience, not only will facts be exchanged but also 
emotions. People may be reluctant though to re-stage their experiences for they may be too 
painful, socially unacceptable and lead to re-stigmatization. In that case, the events may be 
rewritten to disguise obvious similarities. Peace-workers can help parties to initiate conflict 
plays and accompany them through the process as part not only of reconciliation, but also 
conflict resolution and reconstruction.742 This approach may be helpful especially for smaller 
incidents of violence based on ethnic or religious tensions on the communal level. Cases of 
discrimination would be suitable examples for a conflict play at Indonesian schools. This could 
become an integral part of peace education. For large scale violence, it seems to be very 
difficult to imagine how this could be staged. However, for local communities, storytelling by 
witnesses could be recommended, especially for teenagers who were too young to experience 
the riots in 1998. It could help them to gain an understanding of what happened. It would 
therefore be a valuable addition to other approaches, especially as this approach can be used to 
encourage especially young people to work on strategies that may help to prevent future 
violence.   
 
Joint Sorrow / Healing Approach  
In this approach, joint sorrow is publicly announced for all conflict parties. War or violence is 
deeply discussed and deplored in mixed groups of 10-20 people involving people of all parties. 
Victims and perpetrators work with peace-workers and try to see violence for what it was, ask 
how it could have been avoided and how to avoid it in the future. An important part of this 
approach is exploring alternatives to what happened together with the opposing conflict party. 
It is the task of peace-workers to bring people together, for example by arranging meetings 
between members of opposing conflict groups who may further meet politicians or 
representatives of the military. The meetings should not be seen as tribunals where guilt is 
passed from one party to another, but as meetings of joint sorrow. The focus should be on 
creating a starting point for a healing process.743  
This would be another approach to be suitable for the communal level in Indonesia. The 
analysis of violent acts during the May riots highlighted several „hot spots‟ where anti-Chinese 
                                                   
742 Galtung, 2005, pp. 227-228.  
743 Galtung, 2005, p. 229.  
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violence occurred during the May riots in Indonesia, e.g. Solo and Bogor while in other places, 
like Semarang and Yogyakarta, ethnic Chinese were left basically unharmed. As violence or 
how ethnic Chinese experienced violence differs from place to place, it would be 
recommendable to conduct joint sorrow meetings in different regions with representatives from 
other regions to exchange their different experiences. Ethnic Chinese and indigenous 
Indonesians who were part of the violence would meet, deplore the conflict and discuss the 
questions of how to deal with it in the future.  
 
Joint Reconstruction Approach 
In the joint reconstruction projects, all parties would work together to rebuild and repair what 
was damaged as a result of direct violence. While rebuilding is a concrete and practical act, 
reconciliation is a spiritual one. During the work conducted together, reflection about what 
caused the destruction and how not only material things have to be rebuilt, but also structures 
and cultures, would be an integral part of the work. It would therefore be the peace-workers‟ 
task to guide participants from practical to spiritual reconstruction.744 In the case of the May 
riots, it might be too late for this approach since the practical rebuilding has already been 
carried out.  
 
Joint Conflict Resolution Approach 
This approach is mainly practiced by diplomats, politicians or military leaders. Both sides come 
together and try to resolve the conflict in (what is often) a top-down and non-participatory 
approach. Negotiations happen behind the veil of secrecy and the „common people‟ often do 
not even know about them. This could be modified by including people from other levels in the 
process and initiate discussions (e.g. using online platforms) about what went wrong in the past, 
what could have been done differently, as well as on how the future would be if there was work 
done on peace. By creating a joint idea pool, human, cultural and structural healing could be 
processed. Peace-workers would provide guidance in conflict transformation by introducing 
peaceful means. 745  When taking into consideration that all three „Rs‟ have to be tackled, 
conflict transformation does not seem to be an approach under reconciliation, but under the last 
of the „three Rs‟, „resolution‟, and will be further discussed under the respective section. 
                                                   
744 Galtung, 2005, p. 230.  
745 Galtung, 2005, pp. 230-231.  
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Ho‟o Pono Pono Approach  
This approach is derived from indigenous Hawaiian culture and is an approach which combines 
reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution. When an act of violence has occurred, the parties 
gather with a moderator (a village elder) and present their version of what happened, including 
why and how. Apologies are offered and accepted, forgiveness demanded and granted. 
Perpetrators have to make up for damage caused and together they try to devise ways to help 
perpetrators so that they will not have to resort to violence again in the future. In the end, the 
acts of the violence are put down in writing in a way acceptable to all parties and then burnt, as 
symbol of the end of the conflict. This approach combines several aspects of the approaches 
described above: it includes rehabilitation for victims, apology and forgiveness, restitution, 
joint sorrow, sharing karma, efforts to attribute causes for violence to circumstances for violent 
acts of violence, penitence and punishment of perpetrators as well as telling subjective truths.746  
This approach may be adapted to other cultural contexts and practiced also by other cultures, 
like the punishment approach is also practiced outside Western societies. In Indonesia, 
(Javanese) village communities established the musyawarah institutions. In these conflict-
resolution processes, conflict parties approach each other in order to develop a general 
agreement which can be accepted by all parties. In the course of the process, the parties make 
adjustments in their viewpoints or integrate contrasting standpoints into a new conceptual 
synthesis. In the end, all conflict actors need to unanimously accept the agreement which shall 
prevent majorities from imposing their views on minorities. At the end of the process, an 
official ceremonial meeting is held during which the representatives of the conflict parties vote 
for or against the agreement (normally, there are no votes against the agreement during this 
meeting as it is held after all behind-the-scenes lobbying was completed to avoid controversy in 
public).747 This approach is similar to the Hawai‟an approach and could be valuable in the 
context of the case study conflict as well.   
 
Resolution / Transformation 
As in Phase I („Before violence‟), work on the conflict‟s transformation is required in Phase III 
as well. Even though Galtung uses the term „resolution‟ when referring to working on conflict 
formation in the context of the „three Rs‟, it will be referred to in this study as conflict 
transformation to avoid confusing the Transcend approach with conflict resolution (as for 
                                                   
746 Galtung, 2005, pp. 231-232.  
747 Kawamura, 2011, pp. 4-5.  
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example defined by Burton748).749 Conflict transformation is as important for conflicts which 
are in Phase III as it is for those which are in Phase I, for if no work is done on the conflict, 
manifest violence can easily re-occur.750 Therefore, peace-workers as well as conflict actors 
have to work on the elimination of the various forms of violence, direct, structural and cultural 
(violence triangle), to reach negative peace as one part of a virtuous cycle. Approaches to 
building positive peace as the other parts of a virtuous cycle by establishing direct peace, peace 
structures, and a peace culture have already been presented in the sections on „reconstruction‟.  
 
Reduction of Violence 
The violence analysis or diagnosis of this particular conflict showed a reduction of direct 
violence inflicting on survival and well-being of ethnic Chinese since 1998. Direct violence 
against identity needs as during the Soeharto regime, including de-socialization and re-
socialization has been abolished on the national level. Nonetheless, examples emerged in the 
analysis where these have been revived on the local level. While state-led discrimination was 
officially abolished, discrimination by organs of the state, such as the bureaucracy, the military 
and the police are still existent. When dealing with these organs, ethnic Chinese are still being 
discriminated against and exploited due to their ethnic background. Segmentation of ethnic 
Chinese as one homogenous group of businessmen and marginalization deriving from 
stigmatization in the form of negative stereotyping and „othering‟ was also still visible. Cultural 
violence legitimizing the direct and structural violence against ethnic Chinese has remained 
unchanged over the years and is mainly based on their „non-indigenousness‟. These are broad 
areas of direct, structural and cultural violence that have to be reduced and eventually 
eliminated in order to reach a stage of negative peace.    
In order to transcend a violent conflict Galtung suggests non-violence, empathy and creativity 
as basic capacities to counter each of the possibly types of violence. 
In his book Peace by Peaceful Means, Galtung includes a table showing the praxis triad of how 
to deal with the three types of violence: 
                                                   
748 Burton, 1993, pp. 55-64. 
749It might have been for the sake of the alliteration (reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution) that the 
term resolution has been referred to, however, that remains speculation. 
750 Galtung, 2010, p. 80. 
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Conflict triangle Behavior Contradiction Attitudes / 
Assumptions 
Problem = 
violence 
Direct violence Structural violence Cultural violence 
Diagnosis History of direct 
violence: history of 
structural violence; 
history of cultural 
violence; all 
defining the present 
Vertical: Repression / 
Exploitation 
Penetration 
Segmentation 
Fragmentation 
Exclusion; horizontal:   
too much or too little 
interaction 
Cosmology:  
CMT syndrome 
DMA syndrome 
Universalism cum 
singularism; 
Utopianism cum final 
states 
Prognosis Escalation, 
continuation till 
prognoses coincide; 
or no energy 
Continuation if no 
consciousness 
formation and efforts 
to build peace 
Continuation if no 
consciousness 
formation and efforts 
to build peace 
Self-Therapy 
(what you can do 
to reduce violence) 
Non-violence 
Negative: marches, 
strikes, fasting, etc.;  
Positive: 
construction, 
human contact, 
dialogue, joint 
efforts 
Creativity 
Consciousness of 
verticality  
Organization 
Confrontation 
Struggle 
Decoupling = Self-
reliance 
Re-coupling, but 
carefully  
Empathy 
Consciousness of 
individual collective 
subconscious;  
Trace origins 
Trace effects 
Modify codes 
Build codes 
Other-Therapy 
(what others may 
have to do, 
intervention) 
Non-violence 
Negative: as 
hostages 
Positive: facilitators 
as links of 
communication as 
above, willing to 
incur risks 
Creativity 
Sowing seeds, one 
party at a time, 
watering the seeds, 
being the facilitator 
for ideas, 
participation in 
dialogue with explicit 
peace goals, 
mediation, arbitration 
Empathy 
Positive: trying to 
identify the legitimate 
goals of all parties 
Negative: trying to 
eliminate illegitimate, 
unnecessary goals, 
limit the conflict 
surface 
Table 6: Dealing with Violence: The Praxis Triad751  
 
A number of measures or therapies to counter violence as suggested in Table 6 can be applied 
to the present conflict. With regard to direct violence and in specific violations of identity, it 
seems to be unlikely based on the interviews conducted here that ethnic Chinese would start 
striking or marching for their identity rights. Building up contacts between ethnic Chinese and 
indigenous Indonesians through meetings to start dialogue around this issue seems to be far 
more likely and promising. Since infringements of identity needs are present at the local level, 
                                                   
751 Based on Galtung, 2007a, table in annex: Peace by Peaceful Means: the praxis triad, 
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representative of local governments and administrations will need to be included in respective 
dialogues. Peace-workers may help facilitating dialogues and act as mediators.  
Many ethnic Chinese also should be made aware of their collective subconscious and that of 
indigenous Indonesians. It is not only indigenous Indonesians who have internalized the idea 
that ethnic Chinese are non-indigenous and therefore deserve to be treated differently. Due to 
the historical dichotomy between indigenous and non-indigenous already introduced by the 
Dutch, ethnic Chinese as well have gotten used to their status as „others‟ in Indonesia. Peace-
workers as outsiders are required to help the parties to realise their collective subconscious 
before they can start working on them. 
 
Suggestions 
For reducing the structural violence present in this conflict (discrimination, i.e. repression / 
exploitation, marginalization, segmentation), ethnic Chinese who are not aware of these vertical 
structures have to be made aware of them. Raising awareness could be the task of Chinese 
Indonesian organizations (like IPI or INTI). It will be difficult at first to encourage ethnic 
Chinese to actually act against structural violence. As many ethnic Chinese prefer to remain 
silent when encountering discrimination, in spite of anti-discrimination legislation providing 
them with a legal basis, these Chinese Indonesian organizations together with legal aid 
organizations could work on convincing the ethnic Chinese community that it is their right and 
their responsibility to claim their rights publicly. Since they are not the only ethnic group facing 
discrimination, it would help to approach other groups as well, bring them together and thereby 
reduce their fear of opposing organs of the state. Once the various groups learn that they are not 
the only ones who are discriminated against, their willingness to act against it could be 
increased. 
 
Mediation Process 
By reducing violence and making culture, structures and actors more peaceful, chances are that 
the root conflict, i.e. the contradicting goals can be handled without any of the actors resorting 
to violence. The focus for conflict transformation according to the Transcend method is on 
contradicting goals and working towards a “new, acceptable and sustainable reality”752. With 
respect to the present conflict, the contradictions have been summed up as follows: 
There are contradictions on the objective level involving a clash of interests with regard to the 
nation‟s social structure in which the ethnic Chinese are in a long-established position in the 
                                                   
752 Galtung, 2010, p. 82.  
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middle of a social pyramid as a marginalized middlemen position or a distinct group of non-
indigenous „others‟. This translates to the subjective level as well: While the majority of ethnic 
Chinese has the need and desire to be able to openly and acceptably express their own cultural 
identity and working on their self-realization (e.g. with regard to occupation), a (sub)group of 
indigenous Indonesians fears losing their advantage over the ethnic Chinese as „underdogs of 
society‟, a group of defined „others‟. Each of the positions above is supported by a group from 
the respective other major conflict party for their own reasons. Therefore, there are subgroups 
among the two groups who share the same goals and therefore oppose other subgroups in their 
own, larger group. There are conflict actors who are open to social change or are already 
actively striving for it on the one hand, and other conflict actors who are opposing social 
change and therefore also oppose efforts to transform this conflict on the other. 
It should be easier for those who are already interested and familiar with dealing with this 
conflict, to work on creative ideas of how to deal with the contradictions and how a new reality 
could look like. Afterwards, other subgroups would need to be addressed. These groups may be 
more difficult to convince to engage in the process, since they either oppose a transformation of 
the conflict or their interest in the conflict is relatively limited. Nevertheless, they should be 
provided with the chance to be included as well. In the process of discussing aims, it is 
important to sensitize these subgroups to the basic human needs of the opposing subgroups 
which are currently infringed upon. In this case, this touches identity and freedom needs on the 
side of those in favor of conflict transformation. The aim would be to reach a new 
understanding of the opposing party and their aims. It should be the mediator‟s goal to guide 
the parties according to the mediation agenda (the dialectic of „future vs. past‟ and „good-
pursued vs. bad-rejected‟) towards „the compelling dream‟ and away from the „fears / 
nightmares‟.  
In this context, it may help to map possible outcomes of the conflict: a simplified display of the 
conflict with subsequent solutions can be provided by Galtung‟s basic diagram.  
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Figure 13: The Basic Diagram for Conflict Outcomes753  
 
For this conflict, the differing positions could be simplified as: 
Conflict actors opposing conflict transformation (Group A / Subgroups 1): Indigenous 
Indonesians as well as Chinese Indonesians groups do not want ethnic Chinese to fully integrate 
into Indonesian society in order to keep the status quo alive. 
Conflict actors in favour of conflict transformation (Group B / Subgroups 2): Indigenous 
Indonesians as well as Chinese Indonesians groups want ethnic Chinese to be accepted in the 
society as equal members without having to give up their „Chineseness‟.  
 
This leads to five possible outcomes: 
1. Unilateral A: Ethnic Chinese continue to live as outsiders in the society. 
2. Unilateral B: Ethnic Chinese are granted equal rights and furthermore obtain special 
rights to live and preserve their „Chineseness‟, e.g. in the form of cultural autonomy. 
                                                   
753 Based on Galtung 2007a, p. 26. 
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3. Negative transcendence: Ethnic Chinese leave Indonesia to live their „Chineseness‟ 
somewhere else (e.g. Singapore, PR China, Taiwan). 
4. Compromise: Ethnic Chinese continue to live as outsiders in Indonesia, but obtain legal 
rights to preserve their „Chineseness‟. 
5. Positive transcendence: Ethnic Chinese are not a marginalized group of „others‟; instead 
they live and are treated as one of the many ethnic groups within an Indonesian society 
which cherishes its pluralism and diversity.  
 
Solutions (1) and (2) would not lead to more acceptance of ethnic Chinese in society, but would 
rather enhance their special position within Indonesian society. Since this special position has 
lead to maltreatment in the past, these options should be avoided.  Solution (3) is not acceptable 
and has already been dismissed in the past as this would lead to a mass emigration and none of 
the neighbouring countries could deal with this amount of refugees. Furthermore, this option 
would weaken Indonesia‟s economy.  
Solution (4) is very close to the current situation. It is certainly considered to be an 
improvement in contrast to the situation of ethnic Chinese under Soeharto, but as revealed in 
the course of the study, it is not sufficient to prevent future violence.  
Solution (5) represents be the most preferable option, even though it also requires long-term 
and in-depth changes. Apart from willingness of all parties involved, assets for its 
implementation have to be made available. Transcending contradictions requires work towards 
a new social reality in which ethnic Chinese would leave their marginalized position behind. A 
new concept of society will have to be developed to substitute the current one.  Since there is 
no short-term solution available, a variety of measures and approaches on different levels 
addressing different aspects and layers of the conflict would have to be applied which, over 
time, foster the process towards transcendence without infringing upon basic human needs of 
any of the involved parties.  
 
6.3 Conclusions 
Working on a conflict and going beyond the diagnosis can be difficult for researchers working 
from a distance and rather than from the inside of a conflict, like peace-workers or mediators. 
However, the researcher can offer a different perspective, which may not be more „objective‟ 
(as perspectives for everyone working on a conflict become „subjective‟ after a while) but a 
broader, structuralized and critical perspective. This might enable him or her to consider and 
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assess different aspects of the conflict as well as various possible measures and approaches 
based on a comprehensive conflict analysis at once. This can contribute to the transformation of 
a conflict by providing groundwork for the practitioners in the field, including concrete 
impulses as well as the conflict‟s bigger picture. 
Conflict transformation work in the case of the present conflict requires work towards a new 
social reality in which ethnic Chinese are no longer in their marginalized position as middlemen 
and distinct „others‟. For this long-term process, a range of therapies or approaches as 
suggested by the Transcend method were identified as being suitable and these could and 
should be applied simultaneously. Since all „three Rs‟ should be worked on simultaneously, 
significant resources, both in terms of personnel and financial assets, would be required to 
actually apply the approaches considered, especially as the conflict would need to be tackled on 
different levels, across Indonesia and involved a great number of conflict actors. Nevertheless, 
this should not prevent peace-workers or conflict actors (groups as well as individuals) from 
initiating respective processes. On the contrary, when working on this conflict and practicing 
approaches discussed above that aim towards the „three Rs‟, general conflict transformation 
capabilities will be built that would not only benefit the ethnic Chinese. Establishing and 
practicing these capabilities would be valuable for Indonesia in order to deal with its many 
current conflicts and ones it might have to face in the future. Peace-workers can help in this 
process; however, the conflict parties will eventually have to engage in the transformation 
process themselves. Outside actors may help, suggest, comfort, facilitate and mediate, but the 
willingness to engage in conflict transformation has to arise from the actors involved. To date, 
only subgroups of the major parties have shown this willingness. It will therefore be a 
challenging task to convince and include the other subgroups in the process of conflict 
transformation as well.  
The Transcend method provided a range of impulses for approaching practical work on this 
specific conflict; however, since it is not the only method or approach to conflict transformation, 
a number of questions have to be raised: how far can this approach carry? Where are its limits?  
And at what point can other conflict transformation theories step in or provide a better approach?  
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7. Review of the Transcend Method by Galtung  
7.1 The Transcend Method and the Case Study Conflict: Experiences 
Based on experiences of applying the method to this specific conflict case in Indonesia, I will 
assess to what extent the chosen approach provided a solid theoretical frame to guide and 
„carry‟ research work on this case study. Every method has its limits and limitations and the 
ones which have been encountered over the course of the research process shall also be 
presented. These limitations will be further assessed with respect to other approaches to conflict 
analysis and transformation.  
 
The theoretical framework provided by Galtung proved to be very helpful in analyzing this 
complex and long-lasting conflict. The holistic and complex nature of the approach provided a 
comprehensive basis for working on the conflict even though it was not an easy method to 
grasp in its entirety at first. The approach not only takes different layers and phases of the 
conflict into consideration but also combines theory, method, empiricism, as well as different 
cultural perspectives and approaches. The epistemology of Transcend tries to integrate different 
ways of thinking derived from different cultures, and seeks to thereby contribute to „universal‟ 
peace research.754  
 
Conflict Analysis according to the Transcend Approach 
A conflict analysis according to the Transcend method covers the following aspects: 
 Time (a conflict‟s past, present, and future) 
 Various conflict dimensions of the formation itself (conflict formation, deep dimension, 
and violence dimension) 
 Perceptions (perception of the conflict formation by those involved) 
 
Time 
Analyzing the conflict according to three steps (diagnosis, prognosis and therapy) as suggested 
by the Transcend approach, covers a conflict‟s development from its conception up to the 
present as well as prospects for the future. These three steps have therefore been adopted for the 
structure of this study and analyzed respectively using tools as provided by Galtung. The past 
                                                   
754 Galtung, 2008, p. 47.   
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and present of the conflict are dealt with within a conflict‟s diagnosis. As the roots of the case 
study conflict can only be understood within the context of the development of Indonesian 
society, a historical background of these processes from the first Chinese settlements until the 
founding of the Indonesian nation in 1945 has been provided. The more recent past, the period 
of the Soeharto-regime 1965 - 1998 as well as the conflict‟s present, have been analyzed 
according to the triangle of violence, a tool which connects the conflict‟s past and present. This 
allowed not only a recording of violence in both the past and present, but also the ability to 
reconstruct its development over time. 
The conflict formation which was mapped based on the ABC triangle also depicts the present 
of the conflict, but from a different perspective than the triangle of violence. It concentrates on 
conflict actors and their contradicting aims. Negative experiences derived from the history of 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have been introduced into the deep culture and deep structure of 
both conflict parties, making it more difficult for the two parties to work on the conflict 
constructively. The analysis of deep dimensions therefore covers the entire three time 
dimensions, past, present and future. The results of the diagnosis which cover primarily the past 
and present form the basis for the „prognosis‟, meaning the bridge to conflict‟s future. The 
future is further examined in the „therapy‟ part (chapter 6) of this study. In this section, possible 
ways of transforming the conflict peacefully based on the results of the conflict analysis are 
analyzed to formulate constructive suggestions for the conflict‟s future. The Transcend method 
thus offers the ideal tools to deal with all three time dimensions of the conflict.  
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Various Conflict Dimensions of the Conflict Formation 
Conflict formation encompasses various interdependent dimensions which can be mapped as 
follows: 
 
Figure 14: Conflict formation, its underlying deep dimensions, resulting violence and the 
transcended conflict.  
 
Conflict formation consists of the conflict actors‟ attitudes, behavior and their contradicting 
aims. Beneath this surface formation lie the deep dimensions of conflict formation. Together, 
they may result in direct, structural and cultural violence. In order to overcome violence, the 
conflict has to be transformed into transcended attitudes, behavior and contradictions leading 
towards direct, structural and cultural peace. The conflict does not vanish, i.e. the transcendence 
does not stand for a dissolution of the conflict formation itself. Instead, it stands for a 
transformation that enables non-violence in dealing with contradictions, paving the way to 
(positive) peace. All these dimensions are portrayed by Galtung as triangular formations which 
provide academics as well as practitioners working on a conflict with tools that are plausible 
and capable of providing guidance. 
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Examining the case study conflict through the lens of the ABC triangle, the triangular division 
had to be altered as the attitudes and the behavior of the actors were assessed together for the 
case study. Connections and relations between attitudes and behavior provided interesting 
insights with regard to the conflict actors. On the factual level, the contradictions show that this 
conflict, together with other Indonesian conflicts touch the core of the country‟s society. 
Transforming this conflict would therefore require altering the current social construct, which 
would affect other conflicts and their transformation as well. Without the perspective offered by 
the conflict triangle, these insights which are essential for suggestions to transform the conflict 
might not have become visible. 
 
The analysis of the conflict‟s deep dimensions revealed different cosmologies which the two 
major parties of this conflict have inherited, syndromes such as CGT (ethnic Chinese) and 
DMA (indigenous Indonesians) as well as social fault-lines which can aggravate 
communication between actors. This study alone cannot claim to have dealt with this issue of 
deep dimensions entirely and further research is both necessary and desirable, however the 
examination of the conflict‟s deep culture, deep structure and deep nature in this study was 
conducive for a better understanding of the actors involved and unconscious reasons which may 
hinder them in overcoming their contradictions. This understanding of the deep dimensions 
further increases the ability to evaluate possible conflict transformation methods and their 
approaches with regard to their applicability to the conflict and possible acceptance by the 
conflict actors.  
 
The analysis of the resulting violence based on the triangle of violence underlined the fact that 
levels of violence have been reduced in the years following the end of the authoritarian 
Soeharto-regime. Nevertheless, violence in its entirety has not vanished, as it is still present in 
different forms. There are parallels applicable to general social and political developments in 
the country which however do not necessarily imply a causal relationship.   
By way of example, political power is being de-centralized in Indonesia; correspondingly, with 
regard to violence against ethnic Chinese, a shift of discrimination on the state-level to 
discrimination at the local level was identified. The political system of the country has also 
been transformed from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, while simultaneously the forms 
of violence against Chinese Indonesians moved from the manifest, direct to the latent, indirect 
level. During the processes of decentralization and democratization, violence did not disappear, 
but rather shifted to a different level paralleling larger social and political shifts. In its latent 
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and decentralized form, the violence is also now more difficult to detect than previously. The 
movement of violence against ethnic Chinese as revealed with the help of the triangle of 
violence not only underscored the necessity for further work on the conflict, but also the 
specific areas of violence which need to be addressed. 
 
In order to develop suggestions for a possible conflict transformation, Galtung suggests 
different measures which can be applied during various stages of a conflict. Following the 
suggestions made and evaluating them based on the results of the conflict analysis provided the 
foundation for the development of specific recommendations for this case study. 
 
Perceptions 
The analysis of the actors‟ attitudes and behavior provided an insight into how they, as insiders, 
perceive the conflict. For an approach which aims at putting conflict transformation into 
practice, learning about the conflict actor‟s perceptions of the conflict, their role therein as well 
as the perception of the opposing party is essential for developing conflict transformation 
strategies. In the present conflict, for example, it often was a fear of change for the worse that 
strongly influenced the actors‟ perception of the conflict and their attitude towards a possible 
conflict transformation. For some ethnic Chinese this fear even results in the denial of the 
existence of a conflict as such.755 Confronting this fear therefore has to be included in the 
concept of „therapy‟ for this conflict.  
 
(Broad) Definitions of Violence and Peace 
In contrast to how critics perceive the extensive and comprehensive definition of the terms 
„violence‟ and „peace‟ by Galtung as being problematic, these did not cause difficulties in this 
analysis. On the contrary, they proved to be helpful in gaining a more thorough understanding 
of the conflict and to explain why violent outbursts may still occur. During interviews, it was 
not possible to simply ask the respondents whether or not they were experiencing violence as 
most of them were not familiar with this broader definition of violence.756 However, over the 
course of the interviews which usually lasted an hour at a minimum, respondents indirectly 
revealed that they encountered forms of violence in this broader sense of the term, e.g. 
discrimination or marginalization, which they themselves may not have classified as violence. 
                                                   
755 Interview with Ester Jusuf (05.09.2008).  
756 Most respondents thought of violence only in terms of violent acts directed against themselves or their 
property. 
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Keeping the theoretical basis of the broad definition in mind therefore helped to look for and 
detect violence even when it was not explicitly mentioned by the respondents.  
The analysis of the historical development of this conflict revealed conflict phases in which 
forms of violence were less manifest and phases in which they were more manifest. In the 
common understanding of violence, phases of latent violence are perceived as phases of relative 
peace. The end of the Soeharto-regime for example brought about euphoric reactions from 
ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia and „the present‟ is celebrated as being relatively 
peaceful. This optimistic assessment of the current situation carries the risk that actors do not 
see the necessity to (further) work on the conflict. However, as long as one type of violence is 
still present, violent acts may still occur – this also means that as long the three types of 
violence have not been eliminated and their peaceful counterparts have not been created and 
established, peace cannot be achieved. The broad definitions of violence and peace help to 
understand why working on a conflict usually does not come to an end. Reaching „negative‟ 
peace (mere absence of violence) may be a desirable stage, but it does not constitute „positive‟ 
peace, which is an almost utopian stage, yet. Some organizations in Indonesia, such as IPI or 
INTI, share a similar understanding of the terms „violence‟ and „peace‟ as used by Galtung and 
who therefore see the need to continuously work on attempts to transform the conflict, even in 
times that are perceived by the majority of conflict actors as being peaceful.  
 
Limits Encountered  
Even though the theoretical basis provided by Galtung proved to be comprehensive, there is 
always room for improvement. Some limits and difficulties were encountered when applying 
the approach to the case study conflict. Galtung divided the conflict cycle into three parts: 
before, during and after violence, and attributed a wide range of conflict intervention measures 
to these stages. People working on the conflict (especially practitioners in the field) may be able 
to identify „where they stand‟ in this protracted, complex conflict. However, the conflict cycle 
only helps to determine the present situation of the conflict and offers a very broad range of 
possible means of intervention. It does not provide guidance to the following stages of conflict 
transformation which could be expected or should be aimed at once the intervention process has 
started. A map of a conflict transformation process covering more stages of a conflict, 
especially those following interventions, could help to deal with this problem.  
 
In most of the examples for conflict analysis and suggestions for conflict transformation based 
on the Transcend approach, actors within one conflict party are divided into only two groups: 
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the elite and the people.757 Even though Galtung briefly mentions actor levels that are in-
between, like NGOs, they do not play an explicit role in the analysis and the transformation 
process. For this case study, differentiating actors within each conflict party, in contrast to 
Galtung‟s theory of conflict as well as the approach in practice, was important not only with 
regard to the analysis, but also for developing specific strategies for transforming the conflict. 
The conflict will have to be tackled at different levels, all over Indonesia and there is a high 
number of conflict actors involved. It would therefore be helpful if strategies for conflict 
transformation would further be differentiated with regard to different levels of actors and their 
leadership for reasons of coordination and identification of „entry-points‟.   
 
Due to the long history of the case study conflict, it has developed complex conflict dynamics 
that are influenced by more general social, political and economic transformations that change 
over time, adding to its complexity. Galtung‟s approach may take the complexity of conflicts 
into consideration; however, he does not offer any tools which would help in portraying 
complex conflict dynamics and factors which may influence conflict developments. Such tools, 
however, would be helpful not only for a conflict analysis, but also a conflict prognosis. 
As long as conflict parties are not willing to work on transforming the conflict, peace-workers 
cannot start their mediation process. Possible approaches to encourage or even convince 
conflict actors to join the process have not been covered by the Transcend method.  
 
7.2 Complements to the Transcend Approach: Francis, Lederach and 
Systemic Approaches 
In addition to the Transcend method, I examined other conflict transformation approaches in 
order to overcome limits of the method encountered. I was able to identify several approaches 
or, more specifically elements of these, that could potentially enrich the Transcend approach. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will only highlight approaches here which provided helpful 
impulses for the analysis of the present conflict. The approaches have different backgrounds: 
While Francis and Lederach developed their approaches in order to create analytical methods 
based on their practical field experiences of dealing with conflict; the systemic approach 
derives from an already existing theoretical background. The latter has been developed and 
applied by researchers of other academic disciplines before being applied to conflict 
transformation in practice, for example by Ropers.  
                                                   
757 See for example Galtung‟s conflict transformation indicators, Galtung, 2010, p. 240.  
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(Road) Mapping Conflict Transformation:  
In an interview with Mischnick, a practitioner (mediator) actively working in conflicts in 
Indonesia, it became obvious that the three-stage Transcend conflict cycle as depicted by 
Galtung may not be sufficient for peace-work in practice. Instead, a more detailed outline 
which hints at possible subsequent stages following a successful conflict intervention would be 
required. Mischnick referred to a conflict diagram by Francis as a helpful tool in this regard.758 
This diagram (s. below) describes the different phases of conflict (ellipses) and related 
processes (rectangles) that can be used by peace-workers to transform conflicts. The diagram is 
based on over 30 years of experience in working on non-violent conflict management, 
mediation and reconciliation in the United Kingdom and in other countries. Most of Francis‟ 
practical experience was gathered in the post-communist countries, particularly in former 
Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. She also worked in conflict regions Africa, Asia and the Middle 
East. Her focus is set on conflicts with unequal power relations which is similar to the conflict 
of the case study conflict.759  
According to Francis, protracted conflicts are complex, and it therefore helps to develop a 
framework, an intention and a direction to deal with them. Without a framework, people are 
dealing with a myriad of matters of dispute without a clear understanding of what the potential 
impacts of the actions can be. Problems may be solved superficially without necessarily leading 
to a significant, constructive social change on a deeper level. In her diagram, phases should not 
be understood as being static and the actors could also be in different phases. Even though the 
diagram hints at a chronological order, conflict transformation processes do not work 
necessarily work in a linear manner. There can always be setbacks and new approaches will 
have to be applied (see inverted arrows in Figure 15). Phases and processes thus may not be 
clear-cut and separated from each other. Different actors may work on different processes 
simultaneously or commence their work at different entry-points. In some cases, for example, it 
can be important to start with reconciling the past as a prerequisite for negotiations. The 
diagram was developed for asymmetric conflicts.  
                                                   
758  Interview with Ruth Mischnick (20.07.2009) who worked as mediator in conflicts in Indonesia 
(Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sumatra, West Papua and Moluccas).  
759 The following paragraphs explaining the diagram of conflict phases and processes have been adapted from 
Francis, 2002, pp. 49ff.  
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Figure 15: The Conflict Diagram by Diana Francis760  
 
The diagram starts with a situation in which the oppression or exclusion of a group constitutes a 
hidden or latent conflict and the oppressed group remains passive in the face of injustice or 
structural violence761 They may remain passive due to a long history of social injustice which 
they have come to accept as „normal‟, due to a lack of awareness or because the power 
constellation itself does not allow them to make requests. To change this, people within the 
weaker group or subgroups need to reflect upon their situation, express what is happening and 
                                                   
760 Based on Francis 2002, pp. 49ff. 
761 It is not clear, whether structural violence for Francis refers to social injustice only or whether she follows 
the wide-ranging definition developed by Galtung. 
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encourage others to do the same. Francis refers to this process as „conscientisation‟.762 If this 
process reaches a stage of sufficient determination, groups can aim at changing the situation. 
The application of conflict transformation at this point requires non-violent options that often 
have to be pointed out to conflict actors involved by a third party (empowerment).763  
When their power and visibility increases, the weaker groups may be noticed by those in power 
and a threat and a phase of open confrontation may follow. This phase includes the possible use 
of repressive measures by those in power even if the group oppressed chooses to resort to non-
violent actions. 764  During the phase of open conflict, the power relationship between the 
opposing parties changes as a consequence of continuing confrontation as well as other 
developments inside the groups and the wider environment. As soon as the oppressed groups 
increase their relative power sufficiently, they can expect to be taken seriously as a dialogue 
partner.765  
The next phase of the diagram consists of conflict resolution processes, through which 
communication can be restored and as a result the conflict groups (or their representatives) can 
negotiate settlements.766  However, talks can collapse, settlements can be breached and the 
conflict may be set back to its phase of confrontation or violence. Third party intervention may 
help at this stage, for example through mediation aimed at preparing parties for negotiations or 
supporting the negotiation process itself. Preparing the ground and face-to-face dialogue may 
relax the situation and create the hope and trust necessary for the parties to reach and adhere to 
settlements.767 
The next phase focuses on working on the psychological damage caused by the conflict and 
aims at developing a positive relationship between formerly opposing groups.768 These positive 
relationships will have to be strengthened by a long-term peace-building process supported by 
social, political and economic institutions. It includes development, political participation and 
the democratization of societies.769 Like Galtung, Francis does not perceive societies as static 
constructs.770 Therefore, she also doubts that there could be a final phase of peace and promotes 
peace education for conflict actors to learn how to deal with conflicts in general.771  
 
                                                   
762 Francis, 2002, p. 52.  
763 Francis, 2002, p. 53.  
764 Ibid. 
765 Francis, 2002, p. 54. 
766 Francis, 2002, p. 55. 
767 Ibid. 
768 Francis, 2002, p. 56.  
769 Ibid. 
770 Ibid. 
771 Ibid. 
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When translating Francis‟ diagram to the present case study, the conflict is in the stage of 
conscientisation. Conflict actors within the major conflict groups, e.g. organizations like INTI 
or IPI as well as individuals such as journalists and politicians, are already working on the 
process of conscientisation. They are trying to counter the tradition of „silencing the conflict‟ 
and ignoring it out of fear. As the process of conscientisation is still in progress at the time of 
writing, supporting measures from outside (third party intervention) would be recommendable. 
Third parties could focus on non-violent approaches suggested by Galtung, such as the joint 
sorrow / healing approach, or other appropriate measures for raising awareness and fostering 
conscientisation.  
 
Despite the fact that ethnic Chinese have already experienced repression and even large-scale 
violent attacks, this phase of the conflict has not actually been reached in Indonesia, at least not 
yet. As the analysis of past and present violent acts shows, ethnic Chinese were and are still in 
the role of the victims and they have not started to organize themselves to actually oppose 
indigenous Indonesians. Over the course of the research, I came across only a few published 
statements by ethnic Chinese in which they openly express their anger and claim equal rights 
and treatment.772 Open conflict does not necessarily imply physical violent acts and fighting, 
but rather refers to a stage in which the conflict has come to the surface and cannot be denied or 
ignored anymore by any (sub)group.773 This phase could be the next target phase in a potential 
conflict transformation process following a successful conscientisation process. 
 
Following Francis‟ scheme bears the risk of limiting a mediator‟s or peace-worker‟s 
perspective on the conflict. It may prevent him/her from developing new approaches deriving 
from a specific conflict context or conflict parties themselves. Instead, the mediator‟s vision 
may be simply imposed on the parties. Nevertheless, Francis‟ diagram can be helpful, 
especially to practitioners, since it not only helps the mediator or peace-worker assess which 
stage a conflict is currently at, but further provides guidance through (possible) developments 
and enables him or her to keep a „bigger picture‟ in mind. While working on conflict 
transformation in practice, the peace-worker may need to know what the next concrete stage 
could be instead of only working towards the rather abstract goal of peace.774 Therefore, a 
combination of the conflict diagram and the approaches offered by Galtung (see chapter 6) 
                                                   
772  For example The Jakarta Post, 22.05.2006. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/05/22/time-
chineseindonesian-claim-equal-rights-citizenship.html (30.04.2012).  
773 Francis, 2002, p. 53. 
774 Interview with Ruth Mischnick (20.07.2009). 
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would improve the analytical quality of the approach for conflict transformation in the present 
case study.  
 
Dealing With Many, Different Actors: John Paul Lederach  
John Paul Lederach is often mentioned together with Galtung as one of the key scholars in the 
field of peace studies. Conflict transformation and reconciliation form the core of his research 
and publications.775 However, while in Galtung‟s approach the method of analysis (underlying 
praxis) is dominant, Lederach‟s approach to conflict transformation focuses more on the 
method of conflict transformation in practice.  
In Lederach‟s approach to conflict transformation, the key lies in the understanding of a 
culture‟s interpretation of a conflict (social context), a positive notion of conflict as potential 
catalyst for positive change, rebuilding and healing of relationships between involved actors by 
initiating constructive social change leading to relationships based on mutual understanding, 
equality, and respect.776 Therefore, rather than perceiving peace as a static „end-state‟, Lederach 
perceives peace as a continuously evolving and developing quality of relationships. Instead of 
concentrating exclusively on the content and substance of a specific dispute, his approach to 
conflict transformation suggests that the key to understanding conflict and developing creative 
change processes lies in examining less-visible aspects of relationships, which represent a web 
of connections that form the broader context of the conflict.777 Nonetheless, conflict issues are 
also important and require creative responses. It is out of this relationship context that particular 
issues arise and either become volatile or are swiftly resolved.778 In Galtung‟s approach, on the 
other hand, the focus is first on contradictions and the specifics of a conflict (factual level) and, 
once progress is made on the contradiction, the relationships between actors (actor(s) level) 
may improve as a consequence. 
 
Lederach suggests two basic „sets of lenses‟ when examining conflicts: The first lens involves 
focusing on the level of those actors who are concerned with conflict transformation and peace-
building in an affected population as well as the respective resources and activities available at 
each level.779 The second lens focuses on the structural component of conflict transformation, 
i.e. micro-issues as well as a broader systemic context in which a conflict is situated. Lederach 
                                                   
775 See for example Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, 1995 and Building Peace: 
Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 2006. The following summary of Lederach‟s approach is 
based on these two sources. 
776 Lederach, 2006, pp. 63ff.  
777 Lederach, 1995, pp. 7ff.  
778 Lederach, 2006, pp. 74ff.  
779 Lederach, 2006, p. 39. 
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adopted the „nested paradigm of conflict foci‟ developed by Dugan780. The nested paradigm 
consists of the following components to define a conflict‟s setting: the issue, the relationships, 
the subsystem and the system. It corresponds in part to Galtung‟s theories about conflict 
formations, especially the ABC triangle and the triangle of the deep dimensions. The issue 
corresponds to the (subjective) contradiction; the relationship between the actors in the 
paradigm can be found as attitudes and behavior of actors. The subsystem and the system are 
part of the underlying deep dimensions of the conflict (especially the Deep Structure). The 
paradigm might serve the purpose of looking at a conflict‟s dimensions, but it is not as complex 
nor does it touch the deeper layers of conflict examined by the models developed by Galtung.781 
For the present conflict, especially the first lens which is focusing on the leaders of different 
actor levels was a useful addition to the Transcend approach.  
In a conflict, actors often can be divided into groups with respective leaders.  Based on this 
observation, Lederach developed a pyramid which is divided into three levels: Top Leadership, 
Middle-range Leadership and Grassroots Leadership (s. below). The pyramid also illustrates 
where the fewest and the largest number of people within a population affected by conflict are. 
The pyramid further describes the types of leaders at each level and outlines suggestions for 
conflict transformation activities these may be able to undertake. This analysis of actors can be 
helpful in determining needs and resources at different levels as well as entry-points for conflict 
transformation. The actors listed are not limited to those involved in the conflict themselves, 
but also includes outsiders.   
 
Top Leadership 
This group represents key political and military leaders characterized by a high visibility, 
access to power, and influence. Due to their position, they have the possibility of influencing 
peace processes to a large extent which can be advantageous for a positive conflict 
development. However, their publicity and public profile can reduce their room for maneuver 
freely. In case they settle for anything less than what they officially demanded, this could be 
perceived as weakness by their supporters as well their adversaries.  
 
Middle-range Leadership  
This group consists for example of well-known people who function in leadership positions. In 
contrast to the first group, they are not on the top level as key political and military leaders. 
They can occupy positions as heads of well-known NGOs, national universities or religious 
                                                   
780 Dugan, 1996, pp. 9ff.  
781 Lederach, 2006, pp. 37ff.  
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communities. Due to their position in the middle, they are connected to both the top as well as 
the grassroots levels. For Lederach, middle-range leaders can “provide practical initiatives for 
addressing immediate issues, are able to draw on valuable human resources, tap into and take 
maximum benefit from institutional, cultural, and informal networks that cut across the lines of 
conflict, and connect the levels of peace activities within the population.”782 This observation 
was supported by the research presented here, in which middle-range actors from both conflict 
groups were identified as the most promising agents and „entry-points‟ for transforming the 
conflict. 
 
Grassroots Leadership 
The leaders here include people involved in local communities, members of small NGOs who 
are close to the daily effects of the conflict, such as lack of access to resources or security.783  
 
Figure 16: The Pyramid of Conflict Actors by John Paul Lederach784  
 
Possible conflict transformation approaches differ depending on the capacities of each level. 
Top-down approaches involve top-level leaders. They may engage in peacemaking as 
                                                   
782 Lederach 2006, pp. 60-61.  
783 Lederach, 2006,  pp. 38-43. 
784 Based on Lederach, 1997, p. 39. 
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intermediaries between conflict parties if they are outsiders to the conflict785 or represent one 
conflict party articulating their demands in negotiations as insiders. The outcomes are often 
ceasefires or peace accords which are often subject to media scrutiny. After peace accords, top-
level actors can facilitate reconciliation process by initiating dialogue or political measures such 
as nation-building, depending on the context of a conflict. The measures are supposed to 
trickle-down to the other levels; however, the success of this approach depends on whether or 
not the other levels accept what has been decided upon at the top-level, often behind closed 
curtains.786  
Approaches for middle-range leaders are divided into three categories: problem-solving 
workshops, conflict resolution training and development of peace commissions. For Lederach, 
these approaches hold the most potential to help establish a relationship- and skill-based 
infrastructure for sustaining a peace-building process787  which corresponds with his strong 
emphasis on relationships and the socio-cultural context in a conflict.  
Grassroots leaders can implement their work at the local and communal level through bottom-
up approaches, including programmatic peace efforts, such as the UNICEF-funded project 
„Circus for Peace‟. For this project, a traveling show (resembling a circus) toured in 
Mozambique combining drama and arts. The themes of the show were all related to the nature 
and challenges of war and conflict as well as skills to resolve and reconcile. It also served as a 
way of initiating public grief over the losses the country had experienced over conflict.788 
Efforts on the grassroots level often focus on the victims of violence, including through projects 
concerning rebuilding of the economy and infrastructure, reconciliation and overcoming the 
trauma of conflict.789 
 
The pyramid can help in finding „entry-points‟ for conflict transformation. Resources for 
conflict transformation are never unlimited and often have to be channeled at first. Lederach 
further broaches the issue of entry-points by highlighting difficulties of coordinating the 
implementation of a comprehensive transformation and peace-building approach. Due to 
multiple roles, activities, strategies and approaches, peace-workers and conflict actors need 
points of contact for conducting conflict transformation measures. For those who initiate wide-
ranging, comprehensive conflict transformation strategies, it poses a great challenge to establish 
                                                   
785 For example, Kofi Annan in Syria (February – August 2012).  
786 Lederach, 2006, pp. 44-46.  
787 Lederach, 2006, pp. 46-51. 
788 Evans, 1996, p. 21. 
789 Lederach, 2006, pp. 51-55.  
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points of contact and to coordinate them.790  Taking into consideration that the case study 
conflict is nation-wide and affects a very population-rich country, having points of contact on 
different levels of leadership appears to be a practicable and necessary way to coordinate any 
large conflict transformation attempt.  Since the middle-range has been identified as a 
promising entry-point, middle-range leaders and activities attributed to this level would have 
priority when it comes to budgeting resources for a conflict transformation process. 
 
Apart from his contribution in the form of the pyramid presented above, Lederach‟s training 
models for conflict transformation can also be complementary elements to the Transcend 
approach. In his book Preparing for Peace – Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (1995), 
he analyzes training models which can be categorized as either prescriptive approaches based 
on transferring conflict resolution technology from one setting to another or elicitive 
approaches which build on the cultural resources in a given setting. Based on his experience as 
a practitioner, he recommends a combination of both approaches in most settings best as both 
methods have their advantages and disadvantages.791  
 
Lederach‟s elicitive conflict transformation approach has been further developed by other 
researchers and practitioners in order to offer diverse and creative methods for peace-workers 
as well as researchers in dealing with different aspects of conflicts and their transformation. 
Among others, Wolfgang Dietrich, added different practical methods to the approach which are 
derived mainly from psychology and communication studies as well as Shamanism, Sufism, 
Daoism, tantra as well as Zen Buddhism.792 He further includes techniques from Butō (Japanese 
dance theatre according to Tatsumi Hijikata), Aikidō (Japanese martial arts as developed by 
Morihei Ueshiba)793 as well as hypnosis methods inspired by Osho (founder of the neo-Sannyas 
movement)794 in his approach to conflict transformation. Considering these methods as tools for 
conflict transformation provides creative additions which emphasize the interdisciplinary 
character of peace and conflict research and could also be applied during workshops with 
involved conflict actors in the present conflict.   
 
                                                   
790 Lederach, 2006, p. 152.  
791 Lederach, 1995b, pp. 69-71.   
792 Dietrich, 2011, pp. 41-42.  
793 Dietrich, 2011, pp. 230ff.  
794 Dietrich, 2011, pp. 156ff.  
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Coping with Complexity: Systemic Approaches to Conflict 
Transformation
795
 
Systemic approaches constitute an interdisciplinary way of thinking which uses systems to 
describe and explain different complex phenomena such as conflicts. A system, although 
consisting of elements, should not be merely understood as their sum (as for example according 
to Cartesian logic).796 The inter-relations and interactions between elements create something 
new that cannot be covered by the elements if they are only analyzed separately. The actions of 
an individual are therefore not explained by an individual‟s characteristics, but by its position in 
society and resulting social restraints. Systemic approaches not only portray the complexity of 
systems, but also help in analyzing this complexity and understanding underlying structures 
which generate change by organizing complexity.797  
Systemic approaches can also be applied to conflict transformation. The result, systemic 
conflict transformation, is based on the assumption that conflicts are complex systems that can 
only be changed or altered to a limited extent. The approach offers tools for understanding and 
explaining non-linear developments, like complex social and political changes. Using this 
approach requires a complex analysis of the whole conflict system in order to detect where 
possible entry points for change could be found. In order to deal with the problem of conflict 
complexity, the system dynamic approach as applied by Ropers798  will be examined here. 
Ropers uses elements of a systemic approach which was first developed in the 1960s by the 
management and engineering expert Forrester799. This method aims to depict and simulate the 
behavior of complex systems in which the development of one factor in a system is normally 
not linear, but is rather „balanced‟ or „controlled‟ by other factors.800   
 
                                                   
795 Systemic thinking encompasses a broad spectrum of theories, principles, methods and techniques, which 
are all rooted in the observation that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. It was first proposed 
under the name of „General System Theory‟ by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (first published 
1968). Even though originating in the field of natural science, the approach has later been adopted by other 
fields of science like social science (e.g. by Niklas Luhmann who developed social systems theories, 
Luhmann, 1984). 
796 Wils et al,, 2006, p. 13.  
797 Wils et al,, 2006, p. 13.  
798 Ropers is one of the editors of the Berghoff Handbook of Conflict Transformation. 
799 Forrester, 1968.  
800 Ropers, 2011, pp. 105ff.  
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Figure 17: Example diagram according to the systemic approach 
In the example diagram above, two factors influencing a conflict transformation process for the 
case study conflict are portrayed as interconnected feedback loops and time delays. When 
analyzing the level of support for pro-active work on conflict transformation by the elites of the 
two major conflict groups, it becomes obvious that their support depends on the interaction of 
two loops: a reinforcing one and a counteracting one. This makes it unlikely for the level of 
support to grow in a linear fashion. The reinforcing loop shows that the stronger the support is, 
the more likely it is that financial support will be made available for the transmission of conflict 
conversion methods to be applied on a large scale throughout the country. This may then have a 
positive effect on other subgroups by enhancing their awareness of the conflict, leading to more 
understanding why conflict transformation work is necessary. The effect can be enhanced if a 
peace dividend is generated for the constituencies of both groups. The counteracting loop 
shows factors which work against supporting conflict transformation work. One factor may be 
unwillingness due to economic competition which may result in fear that changing the status 
quo may result in personal disadvantages. Negative stereotyping of the other group may 
influence other subgroups to also oppose conflict transformation efforts. This diagram only 
shows a small aspect of the conflict, but it can be extended with more loops and variables to 
provide an organized picture of a complex conflict.  
 
Based on systemic approaches it is essential to define the system‟s boundaries as basic steps for 
conflict analysis.801 Main variables that have an impact on a specific conflict and its setting 
have to be reflected upon. The setting is framed as the environment which influences the 
system through certain parameters. It is further necessary to identify key issues, flows and time 
                                                   
801 Ropers, 2008, p. 16. 
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delays between them.802 In the next step, data on these factors neds to be collected for defining 
the main feedback loops which form patterns of interaction with a strong dynamism of their 
own. Other causal loops have to be added to map the conflict „architecture‟.803  This map 
visualizes the actors, their position within the overall conflict system and their relationship with 
each other in order to gain a „bird‟s eye view‟ of the interactions (the supra-system). 804 
Eventually, information about a conflict system can be combined in an adequate diagram or, in 
the case of highly complex conflicts, in a computer simulation. 805  The approach offers a 
practical tool for understanding and explaining a conflict‟s complexity and its non-linear 
developments. It also illustrates why peace processes are often fragile and characterized by 
numerous setbacks along the way. Due to the complexity of causal interactions, of time delays 
and various in-built resistances, systems do not function or develop in a predictable linear way. 
 
The systemic conflict transformation approaches do not take the time factor or the conflict‟s 
development over time sufficiently into consideration. As a consequence they do not provide 
guidance with regard to which measures or approaches would be appropriate at a given stage of 
the conflict. They merely point out five core elements have to be worked on at all times 
simultaneously: 806  
 Systemic conflict analysis and conflict monitoring 
 Strategic planning of systemic interventions 
 Engagement with key stakeholders 
 Mobilization of agents of peaceful change 
 Creativity in the imagination of sustainable solutions. 
 
Apart from dealing with complexity, systemic approaches also address issues of how actors can 
be convinced and encouraged to engage in the conflict transformation process, for example 
through multi-stakeholder approaches and forms of network management 807 As for Lederach, 
relationship-building plays a crucial role in this approach.808  
In the case of a conflict transformation process in Sri Lanka, the so-called „One-Text Initiative‟ 
was chosen as an attempt to support dialogue between actors after the 2002 ceasefire (started in 
                                                   
802 Ibid. 
803 Ibid. 
804 Ropers, 2008, p. 23. 
805 Ropers, 2008, p. 16.  
806 Wils et. al., 2006, p. 31.  
807 Wils et. al., 2006, p. 31.  
808 Wils et al., 2006, p. 52.  
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2003 and ended in 2005). With help of a computer application, technical experts created a 
platform for exchanging and discussing ideas and problems. After having gathered issues and 
interests of all parties, a nominated process manager and technical experts drafted a proposal 
which was accessible by all actors and open for their input and criticism. Representatives of 
political parties, NGOs, consultants and researchers were provided with a platform for 
discussion as well the ability to discover common needs and interests that should be included in 
the next draft of the proposal. The proposal was revised and re-drafted according the actors‟ 
inputs until a version was created which was believed to best represent the interests of all 
parties. Thereby this method created a framework in which many actors, state and non-state, 
local as well as international could participate in as equals.809  
 
This method could be a very interesting approach for the case study conflict, since it would 
enable the actors to virtually bridge the geographical distance between them. In Indonesia 
online social networking (e.g. Facebook) enjoys nation-wide popularity810 and therefore an 
online platform would be an appealing method to reach different actors across the country and 
to even attract those who are at first less interested in the transformation process. Although 
those who are strongly opposed to transformation efforts are unlikely to be convinced by such 
an offer, even without them, a dialogue process as such could be useful to gain new knowledge 
which could be applied to transforming the conflict.  
 
7.3 Conclusions 
The Transcend approach does not offer a „road map‟ or scheme which can simply be applied to 
every conflict. When dealing with protracted conflicts, such as the case study conflict, a 
„prescriptive‟ approach is unlikely to be applicable. Instead, a complex and comprehensive 
approach which captures the multiple layers and dimensions of the conflict is required. In 
working with conflicts, different ways of thinking have to be included to do justice to different 
cultural settings. The Transcend method provides an insightful and in-depth analysis of a 
conflict as well as guidance for suggestions for practical conflict transformation. In applying 
this approach, creative thinking is required. It may help to „practice‟ working with this 
                                                   
809 Wils et al., 2006, pp. 62-63.  
810  According to Facebook, there are more than 44 million users registered in Indonesia (rank 4 in the 
Facebook user country statistic). http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/indonesia, 08.09.2012. 
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approach at first by applying it to daily-life micro-conflicts before moving on to more complex 
conflicts on the meso or even macro level.811  
 
Elements from approaches by Francis, Lederach as well as systemic approaches can further 
contribute to this approach. These approaches were assessed and compared to the Transcend 
approach.  
Francis approach to conflict transformation provides helpful guidance throughout the process 
which is depicted in a compact diagram. The approach by Francis if applied on its own may, 
however, hinder a flexible and creative search for steps in a conflict transformation process due 
to its prescriptive character. In contrast to Galtung‟s approach which has a more „universal‟ 
character, Francis does not leave the realm of Western academic thinking. With regard to the 
present conflict‟s setting (geographically and culturally) this proved to be a considerable 
limitation.  
 
The approach by Lederach was perceived as the most comparable to Galtung‟s approach both 
with regard to structure as well as content. Like Galtung, Lederach calls for the need of “an 
integrated framework for peacebuilding”812 to deal with conflicts due to their structural and 
systematic complexity. However, his approach appears to be less holistic than the approach by 
Galtung as it does not include as many different fields of study, episteme, and epistemologies. 
On the whole, the theoretical basis for conflict analysis offered by Lederach was perceived as 
less original and monolithic compared to Galtung. Galtung developed a theoretical framework 
of conflict and peace theory which the Transcend method is based on, while Lederach adopted 
different theoretical models by other academics (Dugan). Elicitive conflict transformation 
methods which are build upon Lederach‟s approaches (by for example Dietrich), further 
include valuable additions which may add to the interdisciplinary character of the approach. 
 
The systemic approaches offer a range of useful methods and tools for understanding and 
interpreting conflicts, but seem to lack an overall framework for how to deal with conflicts in 
their different stages. However, during different stages of a conflict, there is usually the 
necessity to focus on certain aspects only as resources are limited,  especially if, as with the 
case study conflict, it does not attract as much attention as other „hot conflicts‟, such as those in 
                                                   
811 In his book Transcend and Transform (2007b) Galtung also starts by introducing micro-conflicts and the 
way they can be transformed. Based thereon, daily conflicts can be used to try and practice conflict 
transcendence.   
812See for example Lederach, 2006, p. 73.  
243 
 
Aceh or Papua. Therefore, while the systemic approach holds a lot of promise, it would need to 
be tried and tested more in the field in order to develop it into a comprehensive, consistent and 
practicable method.  
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8. Conclusion  
8.1 Case Study Conflict 
After the May Riots 1998 and the subsequent demise of the Soeharto-regime, the number of 
violent acts against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and their property has significantly decreased. 
The governments succeeding the Soeharto administration abolished laws and degrees which 
discriminated against ethnic Chinese and forbade the public practicing of Chinese Indonesian 
customs. The most prominent example of the new spirit of tolerance towards ethnic Chinese are 
public nation-wide celebrations of the Chinese New Year „Imlek‟, which was even declared a 
national holiday in 2002. In the atmosphere of the post-Soeharto democratization and reform 
process which promotes multiculturalism and pluralism, Chinese Indonesians have organized 
themselves within social organizations to defend their legal rights. These have worked towards 
reviving their long-suppressed Chinese Indonesian identity and cultural heritage. Furthermore, 
Chinese Indonesians and indigenous Indonesians have founded NGOs together to promote 
solidarity between ethnic groups and foster the emerging nation-building process in Indonesia. 
Ethnic Chinese have also entered the political realm and although their number is still 
comparatively small, some have been elected into the national parliament and into local 
governments.813 
The lifting of bans on the use of the Chinese language and representations of Chinese 
Indonesian culture in 2004 triggered almost euphoric reactions among many ethnic Chinese. 
This may have mistakenly misled them into assuming that the overall conflict between 
indigenous Indonesians and ethnic Chinese had been fully resolved and that continued efforts to 
work on conflict transformation are therefore no longer required. However, an analysis of the 
conflict using the triangle of violence developed by Galtung shows that in spite of positive 
developments in terms of the reduction of violence, the conflict has not vanished, but rather 
entered a new but clearly defined phase within a conflict cycle. The conflict‟s violence has 
shifted on the one hand from the manifest to the latent and on the other from national to local 
level. The current largely indirect forms of structural and cultural violence have remained and 
would be expected to further develop until they eventually again evolve at some point into 
direct forms. Therefore, despite the positive developments mentioned above, the requirement 
for a sustainable conflict transformation process is still valid.  
 
                                                   
813 At the time of writing, positions occupied by Chinese Indonesians include the Vice Governor of the 
Province of West Kalimantan, Mayor of Singkawang, and Regent of East Belitung. 
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At the beginning of the thesis, I introduced the following research questions:  
1) what is the conflict between the ethnic Chinese and the indigenous Indonesians about,  
2) what are the underlying structures causing frictions between the two groups which initiate 
violent conflict, and 
3) How can this conflict be transformed into the direction of sustainable peace acceptable to all 
parties involved? 
Regarding the first research question: In contrast to conflicts in which the involved actors fight 
over territories, natural resources or political power, the main (objective) contradiction for the 
present case study is rooted in Indonesia‟s social structure. An analysis of the conflict 
formation based on the conflict triangle tool affirmed a clash of interests regarding the social 
system which was initially introduced by the Dutch during the colonial era and maintained and 
further developed by the subsequent Indonesian governments under Presidents Soekarno and 
Soeharto. Within this social construct, the ethnic Chinese were positioned in the middle of the 
social pyramid as a marginalized middlemen minority and a distinct group of non-indigenous 
„others‟. In order to maintain this balance and prevent the minority group from either mingling 
with the elite or the majority population, the elite offered them economical incentives, while 
simultaneously discriminating against them on the socio-political level. Although a number of 
ethnic Chinese maintained close business and personal relations with members of the political 
elite, the ethnic group as a whole served as scapegoats in times of political crises, preventing 
attacks against the elites.   
Even though the political system has changed from a centralized authoritarian to a 
decentralized democratic system and the social constellation in general has become more 
flexible after 1998, this middleman position held by the ethnic group of Chinese Indonesians as 
a whole within the country‟s social structure continues to be prevalent until today. Subgroups 
of indigenous Indonesians and some of the ethnic Chinese who belong to the political and 
economic elite of the country continue to ensure that the social structure remains as it is. These 
subgroups are content with the status quo and do not welcome social change – on the contrary: 
change may well challenge their current social position and endanger the economic privileges 
they enjoy. Moreover, a subgroup of indigenous Indonesian members of the political elite do 
not want to lose their advantage over a distinct group of „others‟ who could serve as potential 
scapegoats in the case of any future crises. Other more conciliatory subgroups, however, want 
to change the current social status of the Chinese Indonesians as not fully-accepted Indonesians 
who are discriminated against and marginalized. The main contradiction of this conflict can 
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therefore be summed as the want to preserve the social structure status quo on the one hand and 
to implement social change on the other.   
 
To answer the second research question, the underlying structures responsible for the frictions 
leading to this violent conflict have been analyzed using a third tool the deep dimension 
triangle (subsequent to the triangle of violence and the triangle of conflict). Based on this 
analysis, a range of general tendencies among the conflict parties emerged, the importance of 
which varies depending on the different conflict actors. The opposing conflict groups are far 
from being homogenous – even if they are often viewed as such by members of the respective 
opposing group. According to the analysis, the conflict actors have slightly differing cultural 
backgrounds that serve to shape their respective perceptions of the conflict as well as the other 
conflict party. On the side of the indigenous Indonesians, a partial reluctance to fully accept the 
claim by the Chinese Indonesians‟ to be Indonesians while at the same time preserving Chinese 
cultural traits emerged. Many indigenous Indonesians consider some, especially visible, 
cultural characteristics, such as Chinese-style houses, as proof of the foreignness and eliteness 
of the ethnic Chinese in general. As a result, indigenous Indonesians question the loyalty of the 
minority to the Indonesian national identity. Ethnic Chinese, however, do not perceive their 
Chinese and Indonesian cultural identity as being contradictory and they are therefore not 
willing to accept a loss of their „Chineseness‟.  
Historical experiences have entered the collective memory of all conflict parties and contribute 
to the way they view and perceive themselves and others. Even though the experiences are 
located in the past, the painful collective memories (traumata) of the suppression during the 
colonial era (with regard to indigenous Indonesians) or the riots in 1740, 1965 and May 1998 
(with regard to ethnic Chinese), diminish their willingness today to empathize with the other 
party. The actors have difficulty acknowledging the right of the other party to also satisfy their 
own basic human needs.  
 
The analysis of the deep dimensions of the conflict further revealed several general social, 
political, and economic problems which Indonesia is currently facing but which actually form 
the background of the conflict. Indonesia was declared a nation-state in 1945; however, despite 
Soekarno‟s and Soeharto‟s efforts to establish an umberella national identity unifying the 
various ethnic groups of the archipelago, local identities have remained strong. After 2001, 
these identities strengthened by the decentralization of the political system. In contrast to the 
Soeharto era, the political and social domination prevalent to the Javanese people has 
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decreased. Local ethnic groups both in and outside of Java have successfully accessed local 
leadership positions such as governors, regents, mayors or district heads. These positions are 
now increasingly occupied by putera daerah („local sons‟). While many ethnic groups 
welcomed this development which corresponds more to the multi-ethnic character of the 
Indonesian nation, it has also created problems in regions where numerous ethnic groups co-
exist. Apart from the ethnic factor, the religious factor has further gained importance in politics. 
Some local governments have been pushing for the implementation of Islamic Syariah (e.g. 
Aceh and Minang) or Christian law (e.g. Papua and West Papua). Groups such as the Chinese 
Indonesians who are both an ethnic and religious minority in most of the regions they live in 
(with the exception of Pontianak, West Kalimantan), often therefore encounter problems when 
competing for seats in local governments or when dealing with legal issues. The political 
decentralization and strengthening of local indigenous identities make it more difficult for the 
national government to accommodate all ethnic groups under one common national identity and 
thereby foster a nation-building process.  
Even though the Indonesian economy is growing and has not faced another crisis like the Asian 
crisis in 1997/8, the country is still struggling to reduce poverty and although absolute poverty 
levels have come down, there is a widening gap between rich and poor. In addition the central 
government has responded to the demands of the resource-rich regions for a more equal 
distribution of economic assets to the benefit of these regions. Economic development 
programs have been initiated throughout Indonesia with differing degrees of success, leaving 
some regions (as for example Bengkulu, West Timor or Maluku) lagging behind more 
successful ones. The resulting economic differences and social status are at times linked in 
public discourses to ethnicity, fuelling tensions and rivalry.   
 
Following the analysis of the conflict, I focused on the third research question. This question 
was approached by both drawing on the results of the conflict analysis and approaches as 
suggested by the Transcend method and elements of other conflict transformation approaches 
(therapy). As outlined in the Transcend method, the entry-point for conflict transformation lies 
in transcending the contradictions, for which the actors‟ attitudes and behaviour need to be 
transformed as well. The three components814 of conflict transformation are interlinked and co-
dependent.  
Due to the complexity of conflicts, transcendence processes are also complex, with no single 
short-term „solution‟ to the contradictions. Instead, a variety of measures and approaches on 
                                                   
814 Attitudes, behavior, and contradictions (ABC).  
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various levels addressing different aspects and layers of the conflict have to be applied over 
time. Specific therapies or measures, such as the Ho‟o Pono Pono approach, have been 
evaluated in this study with regard to their suitability for the present conflict, taking into 
consideration the different conflict subgroups as well as the deep dimensions of the conflict. 
Subsequently, approaches tackling different dimensions of the conflict have been identified that 
could initiate and support a conflict transcendence process. The aim of such a process would be 
to diminish the conflict‟s violence levels and direct the process towards a stadium of negative 
peace while simultaneously initiating the building and establishing of positive peace.  
 
Transcending the contradictions in this case requires working towards a new social reality. In 
this, the ethnic Chinese would be less regarded as a marginalized non-indigenous group while 
simultaneously the basic human needs of the indigenous Indonesians as well as subgroups 
within the overall group of ethnic Chinese would not be infringed upon. This new reality would 
also need to address reasonable demands for a more equitable distribution of the country‟s 
economic assets and development programs. Furthermore, adequate political and social 
representation of all ethnic and religious groups regardless whether or not they form the 
majority in their region would need to be ensured.  
The Indonesian government abolished the official distinction between indigenous Indonesians 
and ethnic Chinese (non-indigenous) on a national level by legislating a new citizenship law in 
2006 and a further anti-discrimination law in 2009. However, more time and further measures 
by the government and civil society are required if mental barriers between the two groups are 
to be overcome. The Indonesian national motto „Unity in Diversity‟ as introduced by President 
Soekarno at the time of Indonesia‟s Independence remains valid, but ethnic Chinese require 
explicit inclusion within the national identity. How people perceive and understand the motto 
and the concept of Indonesian national identity is subject to constant change. As local ethnic 
identities have grown stronger since 2001, the national identity will need to be remodelled and 
structured with a view to satisfying the identity needs of all ethnic groups in Indonesia. In order 
to foster this integration process, an overview committee could be formed consisting of 
representatives from all ethnic groups who would develop and introduce an adapted concept of 
national identity which is not based on the concept of indigenousness or where indigenousness 
places itself behind national identity. Despite the fact that the ethnic group directly affected by 
the conflict only constitutes 2-3% of the country‟s population, the analysis has shown that this 
conflict would be better served if examined and approached in the broader context of the social, 
political and economic developments of the country in general. The process of conflict 
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transformation will therefore influence the continuing processes of nation-building by 
remodelling and structuring the Indonesian national identity. 
 
This thesis argues that launching a structured attempt to transform the conflict will be a 
challenging task due to the wide range of actors involved who are spread across a population-
rich state consisting of more than 17,000 islands. In contrast to continental countries with 
contiguous territories, this specific aspect requires a very well-structured approach. However, 
there are promising prerequisites for such an attempt:  
 Chances of finding entry- or starting-points for a transformation process are higher if the 
parties themselves are heterogeneous. The conflict analysis showed that the conflict 
parties in this case study are not monolithic. Within both of the conflict groups 
subgroups that have a vital interest in working towards transforming the conflict were 
identified in the study. Having already started this work, these groups thus provide 
promising entry-points for conflict transformation. Breaking up the opposing blocks of 
conflict parties into smaller less affiliated units offers more starting-points as well as 
space for new options and possibilities to approach the conflicts.  
 Other ethnic and religious groups share, in part, similar problems as the ones the ethnic 
Chinese are confronted with. Therefore the latter‟s claim for a new reality embracing 
multiculturalism and pluralism is not a lonely voice. The subgroups interested in conflict 
transformation can reach out and find allies among conflict parties of other regional 
conflicts, such as conflict(s) in Southeast Maluku, West Kalimantan or Papua. Once 
these groups come together and formulate their common aims, they can increase their 
influence and push for changes. 
 Indonesia is still a very young democratic state which is still in the process of defining 
itself. Therefore, there is space for social changes. Once the concept of „indigenousness‟ 
becomes less dominant, ethnic Chinese could be better integrated as part of the nation, as 
equals among other ethnic groups in terms of the national identity and the nation-
building process. This could end their position as marginalized middlemen.  
Working on this and other Indonesian conflicts based on the Transcend Method could generate 
conflict transformation capabilities within Indonesian society. Establishing and practicing these 
capabilities would help Indonesia in dealing with its present and future conflicts. Peace-workers 
can assist in this process: they can put forward suggestions, provide comfort, facilitate meetings 
or workshops and mediate between the respective parties. The willingness to start working on 
conflict transformation has to be initiated by the actors themselves. It is therefore necessary to 
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actively draw attention to the fact that conflict transformation is still essential in this case by 
raising its profile through public awareness by and increasing the actors‟ want and willingness 
to engage in the process. The infringement of basic human needs among all of the conflict 
actors underscores the need for conflict transformation. Approaches aiming at conflict 
transformation by local actors which have already been implemented, such as the batik project 
of the Indonesian Institute for Pluralism, should be further encouraged and built upon by the 
Indonesian government and both local and international institutions and organizations. Specific 
measures to be implemented as suggested in the framework of this thesis, such as the joint 
sorrow / healing approach or diversity projects could help to introduce a modified national 
identity concept at the pre-school level and schools. Such measures require long-term 
engagement, but the prospects are promising in that over the course of time this conflict could 
be transcended.  
 
8.2 Theoretical Approach 
Based on this thesis, the chosen analytical approach can be regarded as a reliable and solid 
framework for use when working with this particular conflict. The approach combined an 
extensive body of theoretical literature which offered both analytical tools and practical 
suggestions for conflict transformation. Although the Transcend approach is comprehensive in 
nature by itself , elements of other conflict transformation methods such as by Lederach, 
Francis and the systemic approaches, can be used to complement the Transcend approach. This 
is applicable both in general and in this particular case study.  
The Transcend method allows for a holistic and universal approach to conflicts. It can thus be 
applied to conflicts other than this case study, regardless of the conflict frame on the micro-, 
meso- or macro-level. Galtung's approach of including basic human needs in the analysis of 
conflicts has increased the applicability and depth of peace and conflct studies, linking it with 
broader human rights discourses. As a consequence, peace research has been further de-
nationalized and de-culturalized, allowing for the development of „international‟ or „universal‟ 
peace studies. In order reduce the reliance on Western epistemologies for his approach,815 
Galtung adopted South and East Asian ones, such as the Buddhist Wheel (tetralemma) and 
elements of Daoist logic (holism-dialectics).816 Even if other epistemologies, such as those from 
                                                   
815  According to Galtung, the Western epistemologies which are influenced by the Abrahamic-Christian 
religion which brought upon the pyramid of dilemma as well as philosophers such as Aristotle and 
Descartes who introduced causality, atomism and deduction are not sufficient on their own for working on 
conflicts. Instead, other epistemologies have to be added. Lecture at University of Gießen, May 10th, 2011.  
816 Galtung, 2008, pp. 46ff.  
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African societies, have not been explicitly included yet, the road leading towards universality 
has been paved.  
 
In addition to the incorporation of different episteme, the Transcend method as applied in this 
thesis combines different academic theories817: 
 Conflict diagnosis is based on criticism where the conflict‟s data is analyzed and 
evaluated according to moral expectations („good‟ or „bad‟). 
 Conflict prognosis is based on empiricism when the objectively-obtained data is 
interpreted, i.e. verified or falsified by comparing it to already-existing theories.  
 Conflict therapy is based on constructivism, i.e. the current status of the conflict is 
compared to the target state. Plans and ways to achieve the target stage are then 
developed and require evaluation with regard to their applicability and adequacy.  
 
In contrast to Cartesians‟ atomism and deduction, Galtung, together with representatives of 
systemic approaches, argues in favor of holism for the following reasons. Atomism and 
deduction may bear the risk of “losing key features of the „whole‟ which [is] […] more than the 
sum of its parts”.818 As with other social phenomena or systems, one cannot attempt a conflict 
analysis or transformation by breaking it down into pieces (atoms) and dealing with these one 
by one. Instead, one should approach and work on a conflict as a whole. Galtung offers a three-
fold schematic (depicted as a triangle) which enables a complex and holistic understanding of 
conflicts consisting of  
 attitudes, behavior, and contradictions as well as their underlying deep dimensions;   
 its violence in the forms of direct, structural, and cultural violence; and  
 the target stage of peace which requires non-violence, empathy, and creativity.  
 
The Transcend method thus constitutes a universal and holistic conflict transformation 
approach that encompasses a variety of conflict factors (time, conflict dimensions and 
perspectives) as well as different academic perspectives and cultural epistemologies.  
 
The Transcend method strives to combine theoretical and practical work. For academic conflict 
transformation as performed in this thesis, the strength of the approach lies in its extensive and 
structured framework for conflict analysis. With regard to the practical work, parts of the 
                                                   
817 These theories are also reflected in the three strands of peace and conflict studies. Therefore, not only the 
theories as such but also the different strands of this academic field have been combined.  
818 Ropers, 2011, pp. 104-105.  
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approaches application to this conflict – especially those involving an imaginary mediation with 
the parties – have to remain merely speculative as no attempt at conflict transformation 
involving mediation has been carried out to date. Nonetheless, the theoretical analysis of the 
conflict along with direct discussions with Indonesians (diagnosis) allow for a realistic 
estimation of the conflict‟s further development (prognosis). This also applies to the evaluation 
of measures and approaches to transform and transcend the conflict (therapy). Future studies on 
this conflict should include practitioners‟ experiences once/if a conflict transformation process 
implementing these measures and approaches are commenced. 
 
8.3 Future Studies: Closing Research Gaps  
The present case study and the approach by Galtung offer a rich potential for further academic 
studies. Over the course of the research, research gaps emerged that are worth re-visiting. As 
Galtung focuses on violence enhancing elements of actor‟s deep culture, an analysis of peace 
enhancing elements in general and with regard to the Indonesian deep culture in particular 
would be a challenging research topic. Further, the relation between the category of ethnicity 
and other collective identities, such as gender and age which have not been considered in this 
case study should be conceptually questioned or tested. Therefore, this specific case study 
conflict should be re-assessed by applying a different conflict transformation approach. Having 
gained a brief insight into the systemic approaches to conflict transformation, an analysis of this 
conflict from a systemic perspective appears productive. Since conflicts are perceived as 
systems in systemic theories, systemic tools which derive from different academic disciplines 
allow for a comprehensive and holistic approach. Initial attempts to apply system thinking to 
conflict transformation have been made e.g. by Ropers. His studies of the conflict in Sri Lanka 
reveal the potentials of systemic tools. Apart from new insights for the present conflict, 
applicability and effectiveness of systemic tools needs to be examined. More case studies are 
required to develop an overall framework for their application during different conflict stages 
as a consistent systemic method for conflict transformation process to be used by practitioners 
in the field.  
 
Even though the experience of applying the Transcend approach to the present case study 
suggests that it is generally applicable to other case studies as well, more case studies are 
required to verify this assumption as well as provide new perspectives and insights. Other 
Indonesian conflicts, such as the conflict(s) between Christians and Muslims in Southeast 
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Maluku, South Sulawesi, or West Kalimantan819 would lend themselves to such an analysis. 
Due to the common conflict setting and the fact that the religious factor is also present in the 
conflict between ethnic Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, one would expect some results 
from the present case study to be transferable.  
Another interesting research question would further be if and to what extent a revised foreign 
political involvement could contribute to the transformation of the case study conflict. I would 
assume that this could be feasible if China chose to change its minority policies or if ASEAN 
would develop a normative process (like e.g. the EU) that would initiate a conflict 
transformation process in one of the member states.  
Also, other conflicts in Southeast Asia which involve ethnic Chinese, for example in Malaysia 
or Vietnam, would provide suitable case studies given similar social dynamics. Studies of these 
conflicts would not only prove whether or not the method by Galtung is generally applicable, 
but they could further offer new valuable perspectives for comparative studies on ethnic 
Chinese in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, additional research revisiting these topics would 
provide a test of „intersubjectivity‟ upon which the results of this thesis could be re-
evaluated.820  
 
In the course of the research for this study, I observed that ethnicity not only plays a role in the 
conflict itself but also in the academic research surrounding the conflict. To date, research on 
this conflict has mainly been conducted by Chinese Indonesians researchers, many of whom 
have been educated in „Western‟ countries, or researchers from „Western‟ countries, often with 
an ethnic Chinese background. Academic contributions by indigenous Indonesians on this 
conflict are rare. This is unfortunate as such contributions would not only complement the 
understanding of the conflict from another perspective, but could possibly also help to raise 
awareness of and an interest in this conflict among their fellow indigenous Indonesians. 
Therefore, research by indigenous Indonesians on this topic should not only be welcomed, but 
encouraged as it could support the long process of conflict transformation in practice.   
                                                   
819 For details regarding the conflicts see Asia Briefing No. 19, 27 June 2001, Asia Briefing 60, 18 July 2003, 
and Asia Briefing 64, 22 May 2007, International Crisis Group. 
820 Galtung, 1979, p. 213. 
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Annex 1 List of Respondents
821
 
 
Name/sex/age group  Occupation / Position  Date of interview  
Chinese Indonesians   
Alexandra, Lina/f/30-40 Researcher at Center of Strategic 
Studies (CSIS) 
03.09.2008 
Chua, Christian/m/30-40 Lecturer (Lehrbeauftragter) at the 
Department of Southeast Asian 
Studies at the University of 
Frankfurt 
15.02.2008 
Dawis, Aimee/f/30-40 Lecturer in the Department of 
Communication at the University of 
Indonesia 
21.04.2010 
Effendi, Wahyu/m/30-40 Member of NGO against 
Discrimination (GANDI) 
08.09.2008 
Gatot, Mohammad/m/30-40 Lawyer at Legal Aid 08.09.2008 
Harsono, Andreas/m/40-50 Journalist 15.09.2008 
Hartono, E., Dr./m/60+ Member of Chinese Indonesian 
Organization PSMTI 
09.09.2008 
Hendrawan, S., Prof. 
Dr./m/50-60 
Prof. for Economics at University of 
Indonesia, member of Parliament  
11.09.2008 
Hoon, Chang-Yao/m/20-30 Assistant Professor of Asian Studies 
at Singapore Management 
University 
10.04.2008 
Irwan, Alex/m/30-40 Ford Foundation 18.09.2008 
Jusuf, Ester/f/40-50 Lawyer and Human Rights activist 05.09.2008 
                                                   
821 For this thesis the respondents were asked at the beginning of the interview whether or not they wanted to 
have their full names revealed. Some even insisted on having their full names in the thesis so that their 
voices could be heard. For the others only their first name und first letter of their last name were used in 
this work which they agreed to.  
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Jusuf, Teddy/m/60+ Leader of Chinese Indonesian 
Organization PSMTI 
08.09.2008 
Kartika, Pratiwa/f/20-30 Researcher at Center of Strategic 
Studies (CSIS) 
18.09.2008 
Kwan, William/m/40-50 Founder of Institute for Pluralism in 
Indonesia (NGO) 
09.09.2008 and 15.04.2010 
Lembong, Eddie/m/60+ Former chairman of INTI and 
founder of Yayasan Nabil 
foundation 
16.09.2008 
N., Charles/m./40-60 Pharmacist 16.09.2008 
Nughoro, Christopher/m/30-
40 
Politician 09.09.2008 
Ong, Susi/w/30-40 Producer of Chinese news on Metro 
TV 
19.09.2008 
P., Fajar/m/20-30 Student 09.09.2008 
P., Gustav/m/20-30 Batik entrepreneur 14.04.2010 
Protestant Church visit and 
interview with a few church 
members 
Various 07.09.2008 
Purnama, Basuki/m/40-50 Politician, member of house of 
representatives, former Mayor of 
Bangka Belitung, candidate for vice-
governor of Jakarta (2012) 
10.04.2010 
Purnama, Basuri/m/40-50 Medical doctor, candidate for Mayor 
in Bangka Belitung (2010) 
22.04.2010 
Purnama, Fifi /f/40-50 Lawyer 23.04.2010 
Purnama, Veronica/w/35-40 Wife of Basuki Purnama 10.04.2010 and 22.04.2010 
S., Hari/m/60+ Member of Chinese Indonesian 
Organization PSMTI, businessman 
09.09.2008 
S., Lydia/w/20-30 Student 11.09.2008 
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S., Patricia/w/20-30 Student 02.09.2008 
S., Widji/m/60+ Batik entrepreneur 12.04.2010 
Setiawan, Hanjaya/m/30-40 Politician 10.09.2008 
Setijadi, Charlotte/f/20-30 PhD-Candidate at La Trobe 
University, Melbourne 
05.04.2010 
Setiono, Benny/m/60+ Chairman of Chinese Indonesian 
Organization INTI 
16.09.2008 
Tan, Mely G./f/60+ Researcher 17.09.2008 
Tan, Swie Liong/m/60+ Founder of Chinese Indonesian 
magazine Sinergy 
10.09.2008 
Tanuhandaru, Protus/m/30-
40 
Founder of NGO One Destination 
(for equality in Indonesia) 
02.09.2008 
Teng, B., Dr./m/60+ Co-Founder of Sinergy 10.09.2008 
Thung, Ju Lan/f/40-50 Researcher at the Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (LIPI) 
20.04.2010 
Tjandra, Surya/m/40-50 Lawyer (for labour unions) 23.04.2010 
Tjhin, Christine/f/30-40 Researcher at Center of Strategic 
Studies (CSIS) 
01.09.2008 
Tsai, Frans Politician, former member of house 
of representatives 
20.04.2010 
W., Grace, Dr./w/60+ Dentist 18.04.2010 
W., Sigit/m/60+ Batik entrepreneur 12.04.2010 
Wibowo, Iwan /m/30-40 Lawyer 10.09.2008 
Wijaya, Nancy/w/60+ Chairwoman of the women division 
of INTI 
24.04.2010 
Wulan, Alexandra/f/30-40 Researcher at Center of Strategic 
Studies (CSIS) 
03.09.2008 
Yap, Hong Gie/m/40-50 Member of Chinese Indonesian 
Organization INTI 
20.09.2008 
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Name/sex/age group  Occupation / Position Date of interview 
Indigenous Indonesians   
Dewi, Kartika Project assistant at IPI 15.04.2010 
G., Conda/m/20-30 Project assistant at IPI 11.04.2010 
Gus Shihhabuddin Muslim leader in Lasem 17.04.2010 
Harjanto, Nico/m/20-30 Researcher at CSIS 03.09.2008 
K., Rudi/m/30-40 Government offical in Lasem 14.04.2010 
KH. Zainuddin Muslim leader in Lasem 15.04.2010 
M., Mariati/w/40-50 Batik worker 13.04.2010 
Members of Lasem 
Historical Organization 
Various 15.04.2010 
P., Mohammad/m/30-40 Medical doctor (married to a 
Chinese Indonesian) 
18.04.2010 
R., Jamiatum/w/40-50 Batik entrepreneur 14.04.2010 
W., Slamet/m/60+ Teacher at High School 14.04.2010 
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Annex 2 Classification of the Conflict according to the Conflict 
Transformation Index 
Before applying the Galtung approach to the case of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, it will be 
determined to what extent the conflict has already been transformed or rather how far away the 
conflict currently is from being completely transformed. Conflict transformation indicators will 
therefore be applied to the conflict of the case study which (when all taken into consideration) 
result in a rating of the conflict according to the conflict transformation index. The first 
indicator introduced by Galtung is conflict consciousness (CC). This indicator is based on the 
assumption that conflict narratives or perceptions can be distinguished into the following two 
types of narratives: 
“Narrative I [the mainstream narrative]: 
Problem: there are evil forces out there waiting for their time; 
When time comes their evil is articulated as violence; 
Remedy: be strong enough to deter evil and crush it if needed; 
If strong enough there is a gift: security. 
Narrative II: 
Problem: there is a difficult unresolved conflict out there; 
The conflict leads to frustration leading to aggression-violence; 
Remedy: conflict resolution with empathy-nonviolence-creativity; 
If acceptable-sustainable-equitable enough there is a gift: peace.” 822 
 
These two narratives can be depicted in a table which makes it easier for deciding on a 
numerical index to determine the conflict conscious degree of a specific conflict. 
                                                   
822 Galtung, 2010, p. 239.  
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Dimensions EITHER 
Narrative I 
NEITHER-NOR 
HALF-HALF 
BOTH-AND 
OR 
Narrative II 
Conflict Root Other  Conflict 
Violence Root In Other  In context 
Approach Fight Other  Process conflict 
Goal Victory  Solution 
Table 6: Indicators for a Conflict Transformation Index, CTI (reconstructed acc. to Galtung, 
2010, p. 239). 
 
Most conflict narratives may be in-between the two narratives (second and fourth column). For 
the index, it is now necessary to decide on a rating of 0, 1, or 2 (low, medium or high) to the 
second, third and fourth row (conflict root, violence root, approach and goal), which adds up to 
an overall index from 0 to 8. To this first indicator, other indicators have to be added which 
depending on their status will also be rated with 0-1-2 each: 
 Three indicators of mediation: mapping-legitimation-bridging (x + x + x) 
 Three indicator for transformation process: empathy-nonviolence-creativity (x + x + x) 
 Three indicators for solutions outcome: acceptability-sustainability-equity (x + x + x) 
 
After each of the indicators was rated, an index from 0-18 will be the outcome which represents 
the conflict transformation scope (CTS). Additionally, the conflict transformation domain 
(CTD) has to be considered. Here, it has to be determined who shares the goal of conflict 
transformation and who participates in the conflict transformation scope. It could be none, only 
one party or both. Another perspective would be: none, people only, elites only or both. For 
none, an index of 0 shall be given, an index of 1 for the case that only one party participates and 
an index of 2 for the case that both are involved. As a result, the index for conflict 
transformation domain can range from 0 to 4 for each of the above presented indicators. After 
the first indicator is added (conflict consciousness), a total conflict transformation index can be 
determined.  
The formula would be: CTD x (CC + CTS) = 0 - 100, while 0 means no conflict transformation 
at all und 100 means conflict transformation has successfully reached all parties at all levels for 
all dimensions.823  
                                                   
823 Galtung, 2010, p. 240.  
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It is difficult to set up an index for a complex conflict with many sub-parties to the general 
conflict parties involved. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made here, since the conflict 
transformation index provides an idea of where the conflict stands in terms of transformation: 
Conflict consciousness: none of the parties, neither ethnic Chinese nor indigenous Indonesians 
seem to blame the other party entirely for the conflict or consider eliminating the other party as 
approach to deal with the conflict. However, there are some who deny the existence of a 
conflict as such. The idea of disharmony which is implied for many when confronted with the 
term „conflict‟ often raised discomfort with respondents. Therefore, during interviews 
numerous indigenous Indonesians as well as ethnic Chinese denied the existence of a conflict – 
at least for the moment.824 The problem seems to be the understanding of conflict and violence: 
conflict and violence is mainly associated with direct physical violence. As long as no wide-
ranging direct violence (like during the May riots 1998) is present, many Indonesians preferred 
to ignore violence or conflict, or even appeared to be ashamed of it. As a consequence, 
interviews revealed that many respondents would prefer to leave the conflict untouched in 
hopes it might disappear by itself over time. Other respondents clearly recognized that the 
conflict has not ended after 1998 with the change of the political system and still has to be 
worked on to prevent future violence.825 It is difficult to determine which of the two positions is 
dominant and the fact that both of the positions are found among people in both parties makes it 
even more difficult to give a numerical index. It is not clearly narrative I nor narrative II, the 
index would be neither-nor / half-half / both-and.  
Result conflict conscience (CC): the most suitable numerical index therefore seems to be: 4.5. 
 
Now turning to the three indicators of mediation: 
Since there is no on-going mediation process, the following indicators are difficult to rate. 
When imagining a mediation process, the indicator for mapping would be considerably high. 
The conflict parties are very much aware of the actors involved and more or less know what 
their goals are: 1.5.  
Concerning legitimation and bridging, there are (mainly ethnic Chinese) NGOs or 
organizations, like INTI, Yayasan Nabil or IPI, who try to deal with this indirectly by trying to 
make their goals public and defend their legitimacy. They also try to put forward suggestions to 
realize these goals in a way they perceive as acceptable to both parties. The same applies to 
                                                   
824 Interview e.g. with Dr. Grace W., ethnic Chinese (18.04.2010) and Slamet W., indigenous Indonesian 
(14.04.2010). 
825 Interview, e.g. with Eddie Lembong, ethnic Chinese, organization Yayasan Nabil (16.09.2008) and KH. 
Zainuddin, head of Islamic boarding school (15.04.2010).  
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bridging goals. However, since the majority of conflict actors do not present their goals, the 
index for these two indicators has to be considerably low: 0.5.  
Result mediation: a total of 2.5  
The three indicators for the transformation process: 
Empathy: a rating of 1 seems to be appropriate. As could be learned from the analysis of the 
conflict formation, subgroups among the ethnic Chinese as well as the indigenous Indonesians 
are not preoccupied with the conflict or try not to get involved even though they are also 
affected by it. Others are very interested and actively work on it. In total numbers, it can be 
expected that only the minority of actors is working on transforming the conflict. Among those 
who work on conflict‟s transformation, the level of empathy is very high, since they try to find 
sustainable approaches which can be accepted by both sides. However, since the majority of 
involved people, is less empathizing, the overall rating cannot be more than 1.  
Non-violence: according to the analysis of violence, violence in general was reduced after 
1998. Direct violence diminished quickly, while the level of structural and cultural violence is 
decreasing slowly. Looking at the situation from another perspective reveals that none of the 
parties seems to be trying to increase the level of violence to reach their goals – at most there 
are subgroups who are actively trying to maintain the current level of violence to preserve the 
status quo. An estimate for the index of non-violence in the conflict transformation process 
would be: 1.5. 
Creativity: those groups who are working on conflict transformation, mainly organizations, 
NGOs, politicians, lawyers and journalists as presented previously, provide very interesting, 
diverse approaches to work on the conflict. None of them claims to have found the one and 
only solution, instead they are aware that they are working on one part or aspect of the conflict 
only (like on a puzzle). Their creativity index would therefore be high, but has to be reduced as 
the majority of actors are not involved in the process at all. Nevertheless, since it is normal that 
not all of the involved or affected actors are actively working on a conflict, the index should 
still be rated: 1.5.  
Result conflict transformation process: a total of 4.  
When it comes to the three indicators for solution outcomes of the transformation process, it 
is more than difficult to give a numerical index, since projects that constitute a conflict 
transformation process are not (yet) organized in a way leading to a common goal or solution 
outcome which could then be tested for acceptability, sustainability and equity. The different 
project groups are not working together and there are no prominent representatives speaking for 
their groups. However, one cannot claim that there are no outcomes or approaches at all. 
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Therefore, the index cannot be 0. Instead an index of 0.5 for each indicator appears to be 
appropriate.  
Result solution outcome evaluation: a total of 1.5. 
Consequently, the overall index for the conflict transformation scope (CTS) would be: 8. 
 
For the conflict transformation domain (CTD), the questions are:  
Who shares the goal to transform the conflict and who participates in the transformation 
process? People of both groups are working actively on the conflict. However, people of both 
groups ignore the conflict and others even try to hinder the conflict transformation process. 
Some of them belong to the people, others belong to the elite. It is therefore difficult to clearly 
provide an answer to the question. However, since all groups (both parties as well people and 
elites) are present among those who work actively on the conflict transformation process, it 
seems to be reasonable to give a considerably high rating. 
Result conflict transformation domain (CTD): 3.   
 
If adding the indices of all of the indicators, the total conflict transformation index would be: 
3 x (4.5 + 8) = 37.5.  
The result is only an estimated approximate figure. It is difficult to evaluate the appropriate 
indices, because there is currently no on-going mediation process or dialogue with conflict 
parties in general to refer to. Nevertheless, the index can provide us with a broad idea of where 
the conflict currently stands with regard to conflict transformation. Conflict transformation 
work is being conducted which can be evaluated positively. However, it is still far from having 
reached all actors involved at all levels and it does not touch all necessary dimensions of the 
conflict (yet).  
 
  
 
